








Luminos is the open access monograph publishing program from 
UC Press. Luminos provides a framework for preserving and rein-
vigorating monograph publishing for the future and increases the 
reach and visibility of important scholarly work. Titles published 
in the UC Press Luminos model are published with the same high 
standards for selection, peer review, production, and marketing as 
those in our traditional program. www.luminosoa.org
STUDIES OF THE WEATHERHEAD EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE,  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSIT Y
The Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute of Columbia University were inaugurated in 
1962 to bring to a wider public the results of significant new research on modern and contem-
porary East Asia.
For a select list of books in the series, see page 308.
Imperial Genus
ASIA PACIFIC MODERN
Takashi Fujitani, Series Editor
 1. Erotic Grotesque Nonsense: The Mass Culture of Japanese Modern Times, by Miriam Silverberg
 2. Visuality and Identity: Sinophone Articulations across the Pacific, by Shu-mei Shih
 3.  The Politics of Gender in Colonial Korea: Education, Labor, and Health, 1910–1945, by Theo-
dore Jun Yoo
 4.  Frontier Constitutions: Christianity and Colonial Empire in the Nineteenth-Century Philip-
pines, by John D. Blanco
 5.  Tropics of Savagery: The Culture of Japanese Empire in Comparative Frame, by Robert Thomas 
Tierney
 6. Colonial Project, National Game: A History of Baseball in Taiwan, by Andrew D. Morris
 7.  Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II, by T. 
Fujitani
 8. The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China’s Collective Past, by Gail Hershatter
 9.  A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation-State, 1900–
1949, by Tong Lam
 11. Redacted: The Archives of Censorship in Transwar Japan, by Jonathan E. Abel
 12.  Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945, 
by Todd A. Henry
 13. Working Skin: Making Leather, Making a Multicultural Japan, by Joseph D. Hankins
 14.  Imperial Genus: The Formation and Limits of the Human in Modern Korea and Japan, by 
Travis Workman
Imperial Genus
The Formation and Limits of the Human in  
Modern Korea and Japan
Travis Workman










































University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university 
presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advanc-
ing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its 
activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic 
contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, 
visit www.ucpress.edu.
University of California Press 
Oakland, California
© 2016 by The Regents of the University of California
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND license. 
To view a copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses.
Suggested citation: Workman, Travis. Imperial Genus: The Formation and 
Limits of the Human in Modern Korea and Japan. Oakland: University of 
California Press, 2016. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/luminos.9
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Workman, Travis, 1979- author.
  Imperial genus : the formation and limits of the human in modern 
Korea and Japan / Travis Workman.
   pages cm. —  (Asia Pacific modern ; 14) 
  Includes bibliographical references and index. 
  ISBN 978–0-520–28959–8 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 0–520–28959–5 
(cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0-520–96419–8 (ebook) — ISBN 
0–520–96419–5 (ebook)
  1.  Korea—History—Japanese occupation, 1910–1945. 2.  Essentialism 
(Philosophy) 3.  Korean literature—20th century—History and criticism. 
4.  Japanese literature—20th century—History and criticism.  
5.  Japan—Cultural policy—History—20th century. 6.  Japan—Politics 
and government—1912–1945. 7.  Korea—Colonial influence.  




Manufactured in the United States of America
24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of 
ansi/niso z39.48-1992 (r 2002) (Permanence of Paper).
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
  Introduction 1
 The Japanese Empire and Universality 1
 The Logic of Genus-Being 6
 From Civilization to Culture in Imperial Rule, 1895–1919 13
 Practice, Pragmatics, and Norming Space 18
 The Limits of the Human 22
 1. Culturalism and the Human 26
 Culturalism and Cultural Policy 26
 Morality, Life, and the Person: Kuwaki Gen’yoku 31
 Political Economy and Cultural Economy: The Limit Concept in Sōda Kiichirō 41
 Translating the Human, Communicating Concepts, National Language 49
 Japan’s Area Studies: Korea as Cultural and Literary Region 56
 2.  The Colony and the World: Nation, Poetics, and  
Biopolitics in Yi Kwang-su 62
 Cultural Reconstruction 66
 Forming Life for Humanity 70
 Cosmopolitan Sentiment and the Role of Literature 80
 Finitude and the Allegorical Novel 84










































vi    Contents
 3. Labor and Bildung in Marxism and the Proletarian Arts 98
 An Uncertain International: Nakano Shigeharu and Im Hwa 102
 Soviet Debates: Unevenness, Anthropology, and Culture 108
  Proletarian Bildung in East Asia: The Cultural Formation of a  
National Proletariat 113
 Economic Stages of Genus-Being: Paek Nam-un 128
 Proletarian Culture and the East Asian Community 132
 4. Other Chronotopes in Realist Literature 134
 Chronotope and Humanism 134
 Allegory and Realism in Fiction and Criticism 139
 Ch’oe Sŏ-hae: Migration, Letters, and Death 153
 Countryside, City, Primitive Accumulation 160
 5. World History and Minor Literature 167
 The World-Historical State 167
 Osmotic Expression 176
 Ch’oe Chae-sŏ and People’s Literature: The Crisis of Modern Humanism 180
 Translation as Tactic 191
 Acting Human: The Minor Literature of Kim Sa-ryang and Kim Nam-ch’ŏn 196
 Ambiguous Identities: “Into the Light” 208
 6.  Modernism without a Home: Cinematic Literature,  
Colonial Architecture, and Yi Sang’s Poetics 213
 Modernist Temporality and Imperialism 214
  The Ecstatic Time of Cinematic Literature: Ch’oe Chae-sŏ and  
Yokomitsu Riichi 219
 Culturalism and Architectural Space: Korea and Architecture 229
 Yi Sang’s Cinepoetic Space: “Blueprint for a Three-Dimensional Shape” 240
Notes 249
Appendix 271
 Opening an Umbrella on Yokohama Pier/Im Hwa 271




In the decade I have been working on this project, I have received help and support 
from a number of teachers, colleagues, students, and institutions. I was blessed 
to have Brett de Bary as a dissertation adviser. She patiently helped me to work 
through my ideas and to chart a manageable path during my years at Cornell. She 
also gave me important advice and comments about writing in the early stages of 
the dissertation, which I carried with me all the way until the completion of this 
book. The influence of Naoki Sakai’s thinking and the effects of his teaching are 
apparent throughout this work and I was very fortunate to have the opportunity 
to be immersed in philosophy, translation, and political discussion in the context 
of his seminars. He has an enviable ability to pinpoint the crux of a theoretical or 
historical problem, and at multiple points his responses to what I had done so far 
led me in new and fruitful directions. In addition to their individual contribu-
tions to my growth as a scholar, they, along with J. Victor Koschmann, created a 
transnational environment for comparative historical and literary studies that I 
was extremely lucky to enter into as a young graduate student in East Asian stud-
ies. Michael D. Shin introduced me to the field of Korean studies and generously 
shared with me his knowledge of colonial period intellectual history, as well as 
many of the specific discoveries he had made in his archival research. Without the 
connections he made between Yi Kwang-su and Japanese culturalism, this project 
would have been impossible.
Harry Harootunian’s work has affected my own for quite some time and he 
also kindly gave me guidance concerning publishing. Other professors who 
had a strong impact on me through their teaching are Susan Buck-Morss and 
Peter Hohendahl. Many of the central ideas in the book were developed during 
Acknowled gments
viii    Acknowledgments
a summer at Cornell’s School of Criticism and Theory, where I was fortunate 
to take a seminar with Robert J. C. Young.
I could not have hoped for a better cohort in graduate school and many of 
my peers ended up being my teachers as well; Takeshi Kimoto, Pedro Erber, 
Gavin Walker, Annmaria Shimabuku, John Namjun Kim, Yoshiaki Mihara, Judy 
Park, Sean Franzel, and Josh Dittrich all contributed ideas and necessary distrac-
tions. Sun Min Oh steered me toward very useful texts and helped me to connect 
with scholars in South Korea. With great generosity and kindness, Go Mi-sook, 
Yi Jin-kyung, and Goh Byeong-gwon welcomed me to research, study, eat, cook, 
and occasionally pluck away at a piano at their commune in Seoul. It inspired me 
to think that intellectual pursuits could still be meaningful and transformative in 
practice. Thanks also to Tobias Liefert, Emilia Wojtasik, Maija Brown, and David 
Olson, and to Pia Vogler for her encouragement.
This project grew up quite a bit during my time as a postdoctoral fellow at the 
University of California, Los Angeles. The program directors, Shu-mei Shih and 
Françoise Lionnet, created and developed a truly remarkable environment for both 
scholarship and friendship and I am indebted to them. I thank my fellow fellows 
in the program, Sonali Pahwa, Greg Cohen, Maya Boutaghou, Sarah Valentine, 
Joseph Bauerkemper, Marcela Fuentes, Sze-wei Ang, Jeannine Murray-Román, 
and Fatima El-Tayeb, for both their keen intellects and their senses of humor.
Many people in Korean studies welcomed me, despite my late arrival. Jin-kyung 
Lee, Janet Poole, Sonia Ryang, Steven Chung, Kyung Hyun Kim, Immanuel Kim, 
Dafna Zur, Jinsoo An, Kyeong-Hee Choi, Christopher Hanscom, Michelle Cho, 
Baek Moonim, and Youngmin Choe have all enabled me at some point to carve 
out a place in the field. Jie-Hyun Lim was kind enough to invite me to present in 
Seoul. Theodore Hughes and Michael Robinson have done a great deal to move my 
career along with their advocacy of my work.
It was in Santa Cruz, California, as an undergraduate that I first realized that 
publishing a book like this was what I wanted to do. There, Professors Christo-
pher Connery and Earl Jackson, Jr. enlivened my dedication to a life of reading, 
writing, and thinking. Dave Youssef, Zen Dochterman, Manuel Schwab, Kinneret 
Israel, Alexei Nowak, and Morgan Adamson have become lifelong friends and 
continue to impact my academic work. In Los Angeles, I met Erin Trapp, who be-
came an invaluable contributor to the project, reading and commenting on every 
chapter. Rei Terada and Eyal Amiran went out of their way to provide friendship 
and support. Numerous discussions with Duy Lap Nguyen and Duncan Yoon 
on philosophical and historical topics allowed me to deepen my argument and 
clarify its contours.
My mother, Monica George-Halling, and my father, Jay Workman, have always 
been in my corner, no matter what I have decided to do, and I love them for it. My 
brother Brandon and my sister Hana are inspirational in their talents and their 
Acknowledgments    ix
ability to endure. Bill Halling and Angela and John Guy made me more adventur-
ous early on. Bob, Eva, Micah, Roman, Mark, Steven, Daniel, Chris, Tracy, and 
the rest of the Trapp family have taken an interest in and bolstered this project in 
various ways.
The colleagues in my department, Asian Languages and Literatures at the 
University of Minnesota, have been tremendously supportive. It is difficult to cre-
ate an atmosphere that is both congenial and intellectually engaging, but they have 
done so despite all of the usual pressures. Jason McGrath has been a wonderful 
mentor when it comes to university matters and a good friend when it comes to 
food, drinks, and music. I will miss the wit and kindness of my former office neigh-
bor, Simona Sawhney. It has been instructive sharing ideas on humanism and ecol-
ogy with Christine Marran. As a junior faculty member navigating a new university 
and a new city, I am lucky to have had Paul Rouzer and Joseph Allen as depart-
ment chairs and Maki Isaka as a senior colleague. Suvadip Sinha and Baryon Posa-
das have brought magnificent energy to the department. Hangtae Cho has built 
a strong and enduring Korean-language program that is inimitable in its support 
of my own teaching and research. I owe a lot to him and to his large undertaking.
Matthias Rothe is a precious colleague and friend, and my many discussions 
with him about both Foucault and German thought improved this book im-
mensely. He also read and provided detailed commentary on the introduction 
and chapter 1. My reading groups and discussions with Hoon Song stimulated 
new thinking on Marx and deconstruction. Hiromi Mizuno’s work building Asian 
studies at the university has been crucial. The argument of the introduction was 
advanced greatly through a graduate seminar on the colonial construction of Asia 
and the West. Thank you to the graduate student participants. Sejung Ahn has 
done superb research work for me and also kindly tracked down the cover photo. 
Minhwa Ahn and Saena Dozier were excellent teaching and research assistants. 
I am also grateful to Matt Sumera, Aaron McKain, and Michael Gallope for our 
musical endeavors.
The Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University was instrumental 
in getting the manuscript reviewed and eventually published. In particular I would 
like to acknowledge Ross Yelsey for his timely and friendly assistance at all stages 
of the process. I would also like to thank Carol Gluck for supporting publication 
and for finding the right press and series. Takashi Fujitani was not just a support-
ive series editor; his work on biopolitics in the Japanese empire contributed in fun-
damental ways to the rearticulation of my argument between the dissertation and 
the book. It was a pleasure and a privilege to have Reed Malcolm of UC Press as an 
editor. Stacy Eisenstark kept everything on track and kept me reassured by fielding 
my many questions. Two reviewers provided very useful and spot-on commen-
tary that allowed me to improve the manuscript significantly. Robert Demke did a 










































x    Acknowledgments
The Korea Foundation supported my time in Korea with its Korean Language 
Training Fellowship, as well as my position at the University of Minnesota. A 
McKnight Land-Grant Professorship from the University of Minnesota supported 
the latter stages of the writing process. Part of chapter 5 first appeared as “Locating 
Translation: On the Question of Japanophone Literature,” PMLA 126, no. 3 (May 
2011): 701–8. It is reprinted by permission of the copyright owner, the Modern 
Language Association of America. Thank you to the YoungIn Museum of Litera-
ture for their permission to use the cover photo.
A number of texts that I began working with at the dissertation stage have now 
been translated into English and published, particularly in the case of Korean 
texts. Unless an English source is cited in the notes, translations from Korean, 
Japanese, and German are my own. If an English source is cited, I have used that 
translator’s translation.
Finally, I dedicate this book to Erin, Philomena, and Imogen, who not only 
sustained me emotionally through the long process of writing, but also gave this 
life’s project a meaning that I never would have found on my own.
1
Introduction
THE JAPANESE EMPIRE AND UNIVERSALIT Y
In an essay from 1920 titled “On the Notion of ‘Japanese,’ ” published as part of 
Culturalism and Social Problems, the philosopher Kuwaki Gen’yoku discusses his 
attendance at a Berlin production of Giacomo Puccini’s Madame Butterfly during 
his time as a student in Germany. He recounts how reluctant he was to attend the 
opera, because he could not bear to watch the various historical and cultural inac-
curacies in this kind of Orientalist production:
Once in Berlin I saw and heard the opera Madame Butterfly. At that time I was going 
to plays, opera, and musical theater quite often, but I did not have any desire to go 
see Japanese things. However, I had a change of heart and ended up going because it 
was my only opportunity to see Geraldine Farrar, who had returned from the United 
States after a long time. This was a useless justification that I made to myself. Really 
I wanted to show that I did not appreciate this kind of play. Why did I not appreci-
ate it? One reason was that I did not have time for that sort of thing, because I was 
researching Western cultural artifacts for only a brief time and with limited means; 
however, the main reason was that I could not bear to see the frequent mistakes 
made in such a play.1
In his response to the play, Kuwaki is particularly critical of the depiction of 
the subservient Cho Cho and thinks that modern Japanese women could not 
identify with such a character. He points out that a man in a Chinese hat ap-
pears at a Japanese inn from an indefinite time period and that time and place 
are generally out of joint. He also discusses that he felt embarrassment when the 










































2    Introduction
behaviors of lower-class peasants and merchants were used to epitomize Japanese 
national culture. As a matter of time, money, and academic interest—or perhaps 
as a quiet mode of resistance—he would have refused to go entirely, if not for the 
chance to see one of the greatest opera and silent film stars in the world at the 
time, Geraldine Farrar. Unfortunately, it was difficult to appreciate the talent of 
the actress due to the character she portrayed. In Kuwaki’s account, Cho Cho is 
an American and European fantasy of a timeless and feminized Japan of the past 
that bears little resemblance to the reality of that past or, certainly, to the Japan of 
Kuwaki’s present.
Such passages recounting a personal experience are very rare in Kuwaki’s 
works, which are mostly dedicated to interpretations of ancient Greek philosophy 
and the German philosophical tradition, including the life philosophy (Lebens-
philosophie) and neo-Kantian cultural science that were prominent in the early 
twentieth century. He recounts the experience not in a diary, but rather to make 
a conceptual point in the middle of a political tract, one of two attempts he made 
around 1920 to address the social problems of his day through the “philosophy of 
culturalism” (bunkashugi no tetsugaku).2 Having suffered through the historical 
and cultural inaccuracies of Madame Butterfly, he describes how he came away 
even more convinced that those concerned about the meaning and value of the 
idea of Japan should not cede them to the false observations and representations 
of American and European Orientalists.
Kuwaki does not primarily seek to correct the historical inaccuracies of such 
representations, as if Orientalism only needs to improve its content, to give a 
better accounting of the materials it uses to construct national and continen-
tal essences. He rather uses Madame Butterfly as a case in point for the need to 
challenge the transcendental rules of the human sciences, in which Europe is po-
sitioned on the side of the subject and Japan on the side of the anthropological 
object. He states that an indexical notion of Japan, or the “remarkable illusion” of 
pointing to a cultural artifact and stating “This is Japan!” is unacceptable, because 
it lacks “universal validity” (fuhen-teki datōsei).3 In another formulation, he states 
that such an indexical notion of Japan “confuses the contingent characteristics of 
culture with its essential characteristics.”4 Taking up the neo-Kantian concern for 
the transcendental rules governing knowledge formation, he argues that the truth 
of “Japanese” (nihon-teki) should not be sought in experience at all, but rather in 
an a priori (senten-teki) concept arrived at through an internal critical philoso-
phy: “It is really a huge mistake to make imported thought the standard for estab-
lishing the ‘a priori’ quality of ‘Japanese’ or theorizing ‘Japanese’ through critical 
philosophy. That which determines the ‘a priori’ through critical philosophy is 
‘Japaneseness’ itself performing a criticism of ‘Japanese.’ ”5 Kuwaki gives an a priori 
rather than a posteriori meaning to the signifier “Japanese,” taking the meaning 










































Introduction    3
noumenal concepts that precede experience, effectively dismantling the structure 
of Orientalist representation.
What did it mean for Kuwaki to take Japanese out of the realm of experience 
and make it the object of critical philosophy, of a Kantian attempt to establish 
transcendentally the conceptual conditions of possibility for experience? Modern 
narratives of the emergence of the European subject or the West—from Imman-
uel Kant’s statements on history and anthropology to postwar US modernization 
theory—have told the story of this kind of scientific separation of the human 
subject from the chaotic manifold of experience as a culturally specific possibil-
ity with an identifiable origin in Europe.6 Defining this cultural specificity of the 
transcendental subject, as well as priming it for colonial export, was a process 
concomitant with the figuring of the non-West as an object of empirical knowl-
edge, particularly through the discipline of anthropology.7 How, then, can one 
read Kuwaki’s critique, which breaks from the construction of Japan as an em-
pirical object of the anthropological gaze? How can his work, and the innumer-
able humanist works of the Japanese empire that articulated political and cultural 
positions according to the standard of universal validity, be read as an element 
of their time and place without falling back into the very historical, cultural, and 
anthropological constructions of the non-West that Kuwaki rightfully questions?
It might seem adequate to analyze Kuwaki’s call for Japaneseness to critique 
Japanese as a straightforward ethnic nationalist response to the coding of univer-
sality as a particularly European possibility, but this reading cannot account for 
how he changes the meaning of both Japaneseness and Japanese such that they 
no longer immediately refer to a shared ethnic tradition. In a discussion of the 
“perpetual development” of history in his philosophy of history, Kuwaki pointed 
out that once the human being becomes the object of a priori scientific knowledge, 
there is no point in historical or human scientific development when the cosmo-
politan purpose of history will have been completely fulfilled in the actual world.8 
Likewise, in the nationalist language of Culturalism and Social Problems, when 
Japanese is posed as the object of transcendental critique, there will be no point 
in history when it has been exhaustively conceptualized or understood. If Japane-
seness is the subject that performs such an internal critique, then the perpetual 
development of history also entails the constant reconfiguration of the anthropo-
logical concepts that one uses to define the essence of this subject. The empirical 
identity of this subject will be constantly transformed in history. In other words, 
once the anthropological category of Japanese is understood not as an object of 
experience, but rather as a transcendental idea, it will not be possible for national 
identity to be constructed by an atavistic turn to a stable past of the ethnic nation; 
this identity can only be a future constantly iterated and reimagined.
This view of the nation and national history, based on a modernizing notion 










































4    Introduction
important political and social consequences. Kuwaki wrote Culturalism and Social 
Problems one year after the March First independence movement in Korea, a na-
tionwide popular uprising met with a great deal of violence by the Japanese colo-
nial authorities and then by the governor-general of Korea’s shift to cultural policy 
(bunka seiji). Kuwaki’s discussions of Japanese as an object of critique rather than 
observation and Japaneseness as a historical subjectivity constantly transformed 
were suitable to the flexible notion of nationality that was becoming necessary 
for the new discourses of assimilation in the colonies. However, there is another 
important aspect to such a turn to universality and universal history in the phi-
losophy and literature of the Japanese empire in the 1920s. Along with the more 
flexible notions of the nation and national borders that were created by the idea 
of Japanese as an object of perpetual internal critique and development, there was 
also the figure of the human being itself, through which Kuwaki and other cul-
turalists situated Japan within a larger cosmopolitan project of uniting human-
ity through “general culture” and “absolute values.”9 Kuwaki and other cultural-
ists translated Kant’s grounding of the universal in morality in order to present 
culturalism not simply as a project for national development, but as an equally 
interminable mission to create a moral cosmopolitan community.
In his early short fiction, the Korean novelist and philosopher Yi Kwang-su 
also recounted experiences of being reduced to an unconscious object through the 
depiction of Korean foreign exchange students living in Tokyo whose lack of in-
teriority or purpose leads them to unrequited love and suicide.10 However, he was 
a student of Kuwaki’s at Waseda University in the 1910s and took up the philoso-
phy of culturalism in order to argue that self-consciousness (chagak) and value 
philosophy should be foundational for the development of Korean national char-
acter. He came to see Korea as a population that had to become capable of apply-
ing transcendental, cosmopolitan values to its empirical circumstances before it 
could hope to be part of human history, much less regain nation-state sovereignty. 
Furthermore, just as Kuwaki’s assertion of the transcendental human subject in-
fluenced and was intertextual with Marxism, the proletarian arts, and imperial 
nationalist philosophies, Yi’s turn to the universality of self-consciousness, and 
the allegorical literature he wrote from this philosophical position, introduced 
new modes of comparison that affected nearly every intellectual and writer in 
colonial Korea.
The primary purpose of this book is to trace how this kind of cosmopolitan 
thinking related in various explicit and implicit ways to Japan’s imperial project, as 
well as to trace simultaneously how anthropological universals, and the figure of 
the human being in general, allowed for new critical modes of thinking about the 
singularity of capitalist modernity. Kuwaki’s and Yi’s notions of internal, transcen-
dental critique ended up reverting to a colonial logic when they were applied as 










































Introduction    5
fashion, the possibility for a common plain on which Europe and Japan, and also 
Japan and Korea, could be considered temporally coeval. Although their models 
for modernity and capitalism became developmental, the original insight that mo-
dernity is fundamentally about possible futures, rather than a position from which 
to index the past of the anthropological other, includes a claim to universality not 
immediately reducible to an imperialist position. In order to analyze their dis-
courses as imperial discourse, therefore, it is necessary to see their universalisms 
as comparatively as they themselves saw them, while also locating where these 
universalisms instituted anthropologically defined colonial, gender, and class hi-
erarchies. Their philosophies of the human, and by extension of empire, were both 
a transformative translation of the universalism of neo-Kantian thought and ma-
neuvers comparable to other instances when the human being has been invoked 
politically as a figure of both sameness and difference, of the transcendental and 
the empirical, and of the universal and the particular.
In order to understand how anthropological universals were situated and 
translated within the Japanese empire, and to see the extent of their political and 
historical effects, I have chosen to compare philosophical, social-scientific, and 
literary discourses in Japan proper and colonial Korea, roughly between 1910 and 
1945. This comparison is in some respects meant to challenge the structure of uni-
versality and particularity that governed Cold War knowledge about East Asia, as 
well as ethnic nationalist readings of the Japanese empire in postwar Japan, South 
Korea, and North Korea.11 During the Cold War, US modernization theory and 
cultural anthropology ethnicized knowledge about East Asia, discussing tradition 
and modernity as matters of collective psychology and ethnic national identity.12 
These discourses treated Japan and Korea as discrete and organic national spheres, 
thereby forgoing an interpretation of the significance of universalist humanisms 
in the colonial policy and practices of assimilation of the Japanese empire. With 
their concern for both historical convergence and the maintenance of ethnic-cul-
tural differences, modernization theory and cultural anthropology repeated many 
of the problems in the humanist discourses of the Japanese empire. However, in 
doing so unconsciously, they came to assume that views of the human being in 
the Japanese empire must have been antimodern, traditionalist, ethnocentric, and 
semifeudal.13
In a different but complicit way, the formation of ethnic nationalism in Japan, 
South Korea, and North Korea after 1945 meant that the question of Japanese im-
perial rule would be framed as a matter of one identifiable nation’s exploitation of 
another identifiable nation. Discussions of collective war guilt or collective inno-
cence on the political right defined the debate on historical memory in Japan. The 
category of “pro-Japanese” allowed for South Korean ethnic national identity to be 
solidified despite uncomfortable connections with the Japanese imperial past. In 










































6    Introduction
the Japanese and US empires. Those intellectuals who had been patriotic Japanese 
only years earlier struggled to remain politically or economically relevant to a re-
gime whose political ideology was founded on anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle.14
Most texts from the period of the Japanese empire, particularly in the textual traf-
fic between Japan and Korea, suggest something different from this dichotomous 
Cold War view of warring ethnic nationalisms. Universalist claims about humanity 
were central to Japanese imperial rule, responses to that rule, and the conflicted 
mediation between these. They also became embedded in postwar discourse in, 
for example, the continuation of culturalist notions of the cosmopolitan in postwar 
Japan, in the violent humanist critique of communism employed at the founding 
of the Republic of Korea (particularly in the work of An Hosang), and in the Juche 
thought of North Korea (whose humanist aspect was developed by Hwang Chang-
yŏp, and which proclaims that “man is the master of all things”).15 In order to under-
stand the workings of the Japanese empire and its postcolonial legacies, this book 
recognizes the universalist dimension of those modern humanist discourses that 
facilitated the political and economic processes of primitive accumulation, assimi-
lation, and identification with empire, opening up the epistemological and other 
representational problems in that context to comparison with other situations of 
modern imperialism (including the historical present of late US empire). It also 
examines the limits of these universalist concepts, which appear as they come into 
contact with located practices of thinking, writing, and representing. In this respect, 
I take seriously Kuwaki’s assertion of the coevalness of Japanese empire, including 
colonial Korea, with the modern world at large, while questioning the specific ways 
that the transcendental and universal notion of humanity posited by the philosophy 
of culturalism was employed to identify and to regulate the political, social, and 
cultural differences internal to the imperial nation-state.
How can the universalism of anthropocentric knowledge continually be trans-
lated and particularized, despite the acts of norming and exclusion that it also 
enables? That is the guiding question of this book.
THE LO GIC OF GENUS-BEING
Culturalism (bunkashugi) was the hegemonic “-ism” of the Japanese empire in the 
1920s. It refers generally to the cosmopolitan ethos of Taishō democracy, to the 
idea that culture in Japan belonged to the general culture of global liberal society. 
Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and others in the Southwest Baden School 
of Neo-Kantianism first developed cultural science (Kulturwissenschaft), which 
became, through the works of Kuwaki Gen’yoku, Sōda Kiichirō, and others, the 
dominant philosophical articulation of the culturalist ethos in the Japanese empire 
in the 1920s.16 Rickert and Windelband opposed the human, spiritual, historical, 










































Introduction    7
for the study of nature and the study of the human. In Rickert’s formalized ver-
sion of cultural science, he states that natural science studies the objective laws of 
nature, but must limit itself to nature when questions of human will, individuality, 
and history enter the picture.17 Rickert’s cultural science studies how cultural values 
and cultural value formation determine historical events and their understanding. 
Cultural science was central to the establishment of various anthropocentric epis-
temologies in early-twentieth-century Japan, particularly those organized around a 
concept of human generality. The philosophies of culturalism of Kuwaki, Sōda, and 
Yi Kwang-su can be understood as the politicization of cultural science, and they 
each claimed that liberal society required the cultural integration of the individual, 
the nation, and the world.
The concept of proletarian culture served a similar purpose for Marxism and 
the proletarian arts as general culture did for the philosophy of culturalism. It re-
introduced anthropological content into the formal concept of productive labor as 
the general determination of the modern human. For the various exploited classes 
of the empire to be unified under the banner of the proletariat, the most historical-
ly advanced subject in world history, proletarian culture had to intervene, guided 
by the vanguard, in order to provide the masses with purposive consciousness. 
Otherwise, the merely spontaneous and natural acts of revolt against capitalism 
and colonialism could never actualize the necessary transition of humanity to the 
stage of socialism, enacted by a unified national-international subject, the prole-
tariat. Quantifiable productive labor differentiated the industrial proletariat, the 
proper political subject of modernity, from those social classes whose form of la-
bor and class consciousness belonged to the premodern past and were trapped in 
nature, spontaneity, and mechanism.
For imperial nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s, individuals who lacked a 
nation-state, or rather failed to identify with a nation-state, were not properly 
modern, because they had no means to connect their individuality to the gener-
ally human within the imperialist competition called world history. Multiethnic 
Japanese national culture was called upon to mediate between the world-historical 
imperial state and the as-yet stateless individuals, particularly those belonging to 
colonial and ethnic minority communities. The idea of culture was again employed 
at the intersection of the universal and the particular, this time between the world-
historical state and its various anthropologically defined, internal others. National 
or regional culture performed an integrative and mediatory function as a means 
of liberating the individual from previous ethnic, class, or local affiliations. This 
culture also allowed for the representation of a dynamic and culturally differenti-
ated relation between the various ethnic nations internal to the world-historical 
state. The world-historical state was the unity of individual moral actions. How-
ever, these actions were not undertaken solely for the state and by state subjects, 










































8    Introduction
individual and general humanity, or what the philosopher Tanabe Hajime referred 
to as rui, or “genus.”18
In these shifting references to culture as the site for the actualization of a proper 
subject of modernity, it becomes clear that modern anthropological universals cannot 
remain empty signifiers detached from history, but must be related to actual people 
through concepts that reference the human being’s active and practical construction 
of the world (concepts like culture). Universal claims about the human being require 
a concept of general human activity and practice that can mediate between tran-
shistorical anthropological universals and particular historical conjunctures. In the 
German intellectual tradition, this mediation is the genus-being (Gattungswesen)—
that formal generality and mode of practice through which the specific characteris-
tics, content, and differences within the genus homo might disappear and the human 
world might become unified. The genus-being is not the existing state of the human 
being, but its practical mode of actualizing a future in which significant differences 
will no longer exist within it. In this sense, the genus-being is radically temporal, 
but only insofar as it is historical; it is a presence that is never entirely present in the 
present. It is not a quality that defines the essence of the human being taxonomically 
upon an ahistorical table of representation. It is not human nature. It is rather the 
generic existence and practice of the human that distinguish it from other animals 
and govern its development over the long duration of its history.19
In the philosophy, literature, and social science of culturalism in early-
twentieth-century Japan and Korea, the genus-being of the human is self-legislated 
morality. In Marxism and the proletarian arts, it is productive labor. In imperial 
nationalism, it is nation-state subjectivity. These definitions of the genus-being of 
the human were each in their own way caught up in the language of Japan’s im-
perial project and in colonial Korean intellectuals’ fraught efforts to respond to 
it. With the institution of cultural policy in Korea (1919–31), culturalist concepts 
of moral personhood transformed the way that both metropolitan and colonial 
intellectuals discussed the individual, the nation, and the world, making bour-
geois cosmopolitanism into a universalist discourse of empire. As Marxism and 
the proletarian arts critiqued the abstractions and moral didactics of culturalism 
(1923–35), they defined labor and productive relations as the genus-being of the 
human, a redefinition that often entangled them in another kind of universalizing 
imperialist discourse. Finally, with the formulation of ideas of multiethnic empire 
(1932–45), intellectuals began to articulate the Japanese nation-state as a specific 
and worldly representative of the human genus, employing narratives of world 
history to explain how the idea of general humanity now required a concrete 
nation-state community if it was to be more than an abstract and ahistorical idea 
of cosmopolitanism. In each of these discourses, the imperial project sought to 
unmoor existing social relations and reconstruct humanity around and through 










































Introduction    9
Statements about the human genus-being get entangled with imperialism, be-
cause governing a multiplicity requires some definition of the generic standards or 
rules that can unify the one and the many. Imperialism is an ideology of state and 
capital expansion that must assimilate new subjects while also justifying inequal-
ity (or much worse) between nations, classes, genders, races, and ethnicities. It 
requires knowledge that empties the human being of any particular content, while 
also regulating and differentiating humanity according to flexible categories and 
hierarchies. Knowledge centered on a claim about the human’s genus-being is par-
ticularly adept at performing these dual roles. In positing the essential historical 
being of the human in order to evacuate humanity of differences, ideas of the ge-
nus-being attempt to integrate all of humanity into a single system of knowledge. 
Ideas of the genus-being also code the internal differences of humanity according 
to a normative ideal and therefore can be employed for the pragmatic and tech-
nological construction of the human being. Formal concepts of the genus-being 
contribute to the assimilatory function of imperialism because they can empty 
the human of any other content while at the same time reorganizing any residual 
differences around an ideal type (the moral subject, the proletariat, the National 
Subject). Nonetheless, in the use of the concept of general culture for colonial 
purposes, in the schematic way Marxists conceptualized the national proletariat as 
an embodiment of productive man, and in the way imperial nationalists thought 
the Japanese state should represent the generally human, the genus-being is clearly 
the site of an ongoing political contestation. The notion that the generally human 
mediates between the universal and the particular is not necessarily imperial, just 
as the dominant concepts of “culture” cannot remain uncontested. As Marx argued 
in his critique of the ahistorical aspect of Ludwig Feuerbach’s concept of genus- 
being, this generality is not a figure that will resolve the conflicts and disagree-
ments of history, but rather the site of sensuous activity and the alienation of labor 
into production, and therefore a site of political contestation.20 There is nothing 
inherently imperialist about concepts of the genus-being, but through the con-
testation over the meaning of the generally human one possibility is the employ-
ment of genus-being for the purposes of empire. This was no doubt the case in the 
Japanese empire.
Admittedly, not all of the texts I will discuss use the philosophical terminology 
of the genus, but each is concerned with some etymological or conceptual variant 
on the idea that the human being has a regulative, historical essence that guides 
the spatiotemporal process of cultural and social development. These variants in-
clude the idea of a moral general culture (ippan bunka) or world culture (sekai 
bunka) in culturalism and the concept of human productive labor in Marxism 
and the proletarian arts. Those who translated the philosophical terminology of 
the genus-being most directly were philosophers such as Tanabe Hajime in Japan 










































10    Introduction
the abstract could no longer be thought of as a universal immediately unifying 
individuals, nations, and the world, as culturalism had claimed. Rather, an impe-
rial nation-state, or species (shu), was required in order to mediate “absolutely” 
between the individual (ko) and the genus within world history. This species was 
not representative of an ethnic nation, but rather a mediator between general hu-
manity and the individual (in other words, nation-state subjectivity was no longer 
tied to ethnic origin, but rather became a kind of genus-being).21 Although these 
precise discussions of the changing status of the concept of the human genus in a 
time of interimperial warfare did not solidify until the mid-1930s, the problem of 
genus-being and generality was significant in philosophy, social science, and liter-
ature beginning in the late 1910s, coinciding with the acceleration of Japanese im-
perialism and the political need for universalist anthropocentric epistemologies. 
Tanabe’s and Sŏ’s discussions of the genus most clearly show how cosmopolitan 
ideas about the generally human could be appropriated for an intellectual justifi-
cation for the imperial state, but the underlying premises that genus-being is the 
teleological purpose of historical development and that imperialism is a pragmatic 
means to achieve this purpose were present in important ways in both culturalism 
and Marxism.
In each case, a concept of the generally human tended to revert to a specific 
identity. Symptomatic of this tendency for concepts of the genus-being to return 
to determined anthropological identities, Marx’s Gattungswesen was mistranslated 
in English for decades as “species-being.” The translation “species-being” coded 
“genus-being” as a transcendental essence of the human species, something inher-
ing in every human transhistorically and a specific difference between the human 
and other animals. Peter Osborne and Simon Skempton have argued convincingly 
that “species-being” is a misleading translation for an understanding of the sta-
tus of the general in Marx’s works.22 I agree with their readings of Marx, particu-
larly the important distinction between labor as genus-being and production as 
estranged labor in industrial capitalism. However, in analyzing the historical body 
of Marxist thought in Japan and Korea, I would rather see the “mistranslation” of 
Gattung as “species” as symptomatic of a tension between the formal concept of 
a human being with no specific content and the figuration of this possibility of 
a contentless human in specific historical types like the industrial worker. This 
is particularly important for understanding the colonial dimension of Marxism 
and the proletarian arts, particularly at a time when Marxism was taken up not 
just as an analytic of capitalism, but for modernizing projects in peripheral areas 
that were concerned with the reformation of consciousness along with economy 
in ways that conceived of productive labor not primarily as estranged labor, but 
rather as a necessary step in the process of entering human history.
The ambiguity about whether Gattung refers to something specific or to some-










































Introduction    11
distinction between anthropology (人類学) and ethnology (人種学)—one of which 
suggests general humanity and the other specific ethnic communities—and the 
compound 種類, which combines the specific and the general into a single term 
approximating “type.” The confluence of generality and specificity under concepts of 
the genus-being is deeply related to typology (類型学), which in Japanese and Ko-
rean contains the character for “genus.” “Type” can at once refer to a specific group 
and an abstract ideal such as the moral person, the productive laborer, or the loyal 
national subject. In the case of Japanese and Korean, we also have to consider the 
term ningen or in’gan (人間), which is certainly a generality, but also connotes both 
a proper human being in the normative sense and a situated, specific, and relational 
being. Because I am locating and analyzing the historical and political effects of a 
broad discursive formation of humanism in the Japanese empire, it will not be pos-
sible in this book to take account of every nuance of translation involved in the 
transnational discussion of the human. However, in the background of all of my uses 
of the term “human,” I have in mind a problem that emerged in Japanese philosophi-
cal discourse in 1925 with Miki Kiyoshi’s Pascalian reading of the human as ippan-
sha, or “concrete generality,” and continued in 1934 with Watsuji Tetsurō’s parsing of 
ningen (human) as ethical relationality—the human is a liminal figure that mediates 
problematically and politically between the infinite and the finite, the universal and 
the particular, and the transcendental and the empirical.23
Furthermore, because the discourses I analyze sought to reconcile or overcome 
this liminal status of the human, their concepts of the genus-being often do not 
remain expressions of a contentless, purely formal generality, but tend to collapse 
into a species within the genus, a species that is universalizable. Therefore, when 
Tanabe and Sŏ wrote of the imperial state, that species that represents in concrete 
world history the abstract principles of humanity in general, they were referring, 
in particular, to the universality of the Japanese state or the East Asian Commu-
nity. There will be numerous other examples in this book of this movement of 
modern thought from genus-being to such a universalization of the particular and 
particularization of the universal, processes that Naoki Sakai, Etienne Balibar, and 
Takashi Fujitani have all identified as fundamental to twentieth- and twenty-first-
century nationalism and racism.24
The translation of Gattung as both “species” and “genus” points to the problem-
atic way that concepts of the human genus must at once differentiate humanity 
from other species of animal while also regulating humanity’s internal variations. 
In the European context, Carl von Linné’s eighteenth-century system of bino-
mial taxonomy set the stage for the modern discussions of the genus-being of 
the human, even though the taxonomy quickly became too rigid and ahistorical 
for modern anthropocentric knowledge. In Linné’s Systema Naturae, the human, 
or homo, became a genus unto itself for the first time.25 Linné introduced a con-










































12    Introduction
homo erectus, and so on). He also made possible various elaborations on sentience 
(sapiens) that later took on a social-scientific connotation in modernity. Beginning 
in the mid-eighteenth century, binomial terms such as homo aestheticus (Goethe), 
homo oeconomicus (Smith and Ricardo), and homo loquens (Herder) began to pro-
liferate, each attempting to give homo a defining nature. In Linné’s system, the spe-
cific difference sapiens distinguished homo sapiens from other animals, but sapiens 
as a specific difference within the human genus also allowed Linné’s more histori-
cally minded successors, such as Kant, to connect the defining characteristics of 
the modern human (sentience and morality) to a historical model that placed the 
white race and Europe at the origin and telos of history and the yellow, black, and 
reddish-brown races at differing degrees of cultural development in relation to 
whiteness.26
Therefore, by the time of the nineteenth century, the era of universal history, 
the racial varieties of mankind were not thought to be unified by their shared 
human nature, but were rather organized hierarchically by their nearness to the 
genus-being of historical practice and the supposedly empirical category “white.” 
According to Michel Foucault in The Order of Things, Linné’s continued depen-
dence on the table of representation and an idea of the world as the Great Chain 
of Being gave way to the modern notion that the human exists in History.27 In 
Linné’s system homo sapiens was still one being on a taxonomic table of beings, not 
the finite historical being around which the entirety of an episteme (the modern) 
was soon to be organized. Foucault argued convincingly that Linnaean binomial 
taxonomy belongs to the prehistory of modern thought, and that the eighteenth-
century European debates about human nature signal that the human itself had 
not yet become the historical subject-object of knowledge it would become in mo-
dernity.28 In my argument, with the emergence of modern thought, human nature 
was rearticulated as genus-being, as a historical essence that would be both general 
to the species, in the sense that every proper human being must have or seek to 
have this trait, and specific to the genus, in the sense that this trait differentiates 
the human species from other animals. The question as to whether genus-being 
is a purely formal concept of the generally human or a concept that delineates a 
specific difference is not solely one of accuracy in translation, but is inherent in 
the way that the generally human tends to fall back upon specific, empirical, and 
anthropological categories, including racial and national identity.
Because of the prominence of this movement of modern thought from genus-
being to particular empirical features of the human, one should take into account, 
in an analysis of Japanese empire, not only the empirical anthropology that racial-
ized or ethnicized the colonial Other, but also the transcendental claims about 
the human through which such a racializing and ethnicizing regime could be in-
stituted as a regime of truth, as well as translated into the colony and into colo-










































Introduction    13
and imperial nationalism were all formulated through an unstable intersection 
between anthropological universals, formal truth claims about the genus-being, 
and anthropological identities in the empirical world. Culturalism’s metaphysical 
assertions about the moral genus-being of the human intersected with anthro-
pological theories concerning the cosmopolitan-national individual (the person) 
and the “natural human.” Marxism’s genus-being of productive labor intersected 
with the class identity of the national proletariat, articulated through social sci-
ence and distinguished abstractly from the subalterns, the peasants, and, often, 
women. While imperial nationalists discussed the Japanese state as a completely 
inclusive and universal political body empty of any specific anthropological con-
tent, they nonetheless continued to connect it to anthropologically defined na-
tional, racial, regional, and continental identities, such as Japan, the yellow race, 
East Asia, and Asia.
Such an intersection between universality and its ideal type or exemplar in the 
phenomenal world is a structural feature characteristic of modern thought. In this 
book I analyze this structural feature through figures and concepts of the gener-
ally human, because it is in these figures and concepts where the tensions between 
universal and particular come to light, especially when anthropological universals 
are a matter of imperialism, colonization, and responses to them. Concepts of the 
genus-being and the practice of the genus-being in the Japanese empire are regula-
tive not only because they allow knowledge to imagine a human being empty of 
any specific content, but also because they organize all the empirical differences 
around a regulative identity that is phenomenal, experienced, and constructed as 
a fact in history. In order to construct this identity, modernity has to be presented 
as a unilinear and sudden passage from another state of being to the genus-being, 
from nature to culture, from peasant to industrial worker, or from stateless indi-
vidual to nation-state subjectivity. In each case, anthropological otherness is not 
something external to the modern subject, like the colonial Other, but is rather 
accorded differentially, by the relative distance of someone from the genus.
FROM CIVILIZ ATION TO CULTURE IN IMPERIAL 
RULE,  1895–1919
How can one historicize in a reading of texts of the Japanese empire the emer-
gence of formal concepts of the human genus-being? Through Foucault’s convinc-
ing archaeology, in the context of nineteenth-century Europe we find a transition 
from the genus homo as it appeared on the table of representation to modern, 
historical, and anthropocentric thought. However, the dissemination and transla-
tion of knowledge are extremely uneven and we should not assume that Foucault’s 
archaeology of the human sciences is either entirely consistent internally within 










































14    Introduction
knowledge in the late 1910s in modern Korea and Japan. I would hesitate to think 
of it as a complete “epistemic break” in any way subsumable into Foucault’s lo-
cal archaeology of the human sciences, but the analogies are certainly sufficient 
to make comparative reference to Foucault’s insights into the emergence of the 
human being as the subject and object of modern thought. Between the Meiji and 
Taishō periods in Japan (ca. 1912), and between the end of the Korean empire and 
Japan’s institution of cultural policy in Korea (ca. 1905–19), a dramatic shift oc-
curred in knowledge from a model of civilization and enlightenment to a model of 
culturalism, which corresponded to the emergence of new connections between 
ideas of the genus-being and the imperial project. These conceptual relations were 
between the individual, the nation, and the world in the case of the moral genus-
being of culturalism, between social class, modernization, and culture in the case 
of the productive genus-being of Marxism and the proletarian arts, and between 
the individual, the imperial state, and world history in the theories of nation-state 
subjectivity in imperial nationalism.
There were differences and continuities between the humanist discourses of 
the Japanese empire of the 1920s and 1930s and those of previous decades, both 
in their content and in how they functioned for Japan’s imperial project. Previous 
to the philosophies of culturalism, the March First Movement in Korea (1919), 
and Japan’s institution of cultural policy, the most significant translation of knowl-
edge between Japan and Korea had occurred from the First Sino-Japanese War 
(1895–96) until Japan made Korea a protectorate in 1905. This period of transla-
tion corresponds to the years of the Korean empire, when intellectuals, political 
leaders, and journalists in Korea took up the early Meiji slogan of “civilization and 
enlightenment” (bunmei kaika, munmyŏng kaehwa) for the purposes of their own 
nation-building project.29 The first ten years of Japanese colonial rule (1910–19) 
were particularly brutal, and the violent effort to nationalize the people of the 
Korean peninsula created enough popular animosity that upward of two million 
people participated in the anticolonial rebellion of 1919. By the time widespread 
Korean-language publication emerged again with the institution of cultural policy 
in 1919, the intellectual and political landscape had changed considerably in the 
Japanese empire and globally.
The most obvious difference between the two periods was that Korea was no 
longer a politically independent empire in respect to international recognition, 
which greatly transformed the way that intellectuals approached the nation-
building project. As the historian Andre Schmid has shown, the proponents of 
civilization and enlightenment in the Korean empire, while increasingly wary of 
Japan’s rising power in continental Asia and in many ways subordinate to its in-
terests, were able to appropriate many of the themes of Meiji thought and use 
them to think through the Korean situation.30 These themes included the concept 










































Introduction    15
according to their level of material and spiritual progress. In this regard, the writ-
ers of Independent News and Capital News often emphasized the need to become 
independent from China and to catch up with the West and Japan technologically 
and culturally. At the same time, some intellectuals, particularly at Capital News, 
delinked the concept of civilization from the geographic West and argued for the 
civilizational possibilities of Pan-Asia, Pan–East Asia, or the yellow race, a pros-
pect that was increasingly troubled by Japan’s imperial hegemony in the region. 
Social Darwinism (the account of history as the gradual weeding out of weaker 
nations and peoples) greatly affected the views of civilization and enlightenment 
that appeared in these newspapers.
What was translated between Meiji Japan and the intellectuals of the Korean 
empire, then, was a particular model of nation-building in which a peripheral 
country, racialized and marginalized at the global level, attempted to rise to the 
level of civilizational progress of the West by invigorating and modernizing exist-
ing institutions. The teleology of this development, the moment of convergence 
between Korea, the West, and Japan, would be an imperial state, a shared national 
language, and a civilized population of citizens governed by benevolent elites. This 
nation-building project, like that of the Meiji state, integrated the modernization 
of government institutions, sovereignty centered on an imperial figurehead, and 
nationalization of the citizens and their language. The universalism of this model 
lay in the unilinear view of the progress of civilizations and a Social Darwinist 
perspective that warned of the potential to lose out in the competition between 
empires, national economies, and state formations.
Some have argued that the institution of cultural policy in 1919 marked a return 
to the ideas of civilization and enlightenment in the mediation of Japan-Korea 
relations, but this book argues that it was not so simple.31 Those Korean intellectu-
als and writers who studied abroad in Japan in the late Meiji and Taishō periods 
confronted a very different political situation, in which Korea had lost the possibil-
ity to establish national sovereignty due to Japan’s colonization and the Japanese 
empire’s agreements with other empires (for example, the Taft-Kastura agreement 
of 1905).32 Furthermore, academic discourse in Japan was no longer dominated by 
civilization and enlightenment, but rather by epistemologies that emphasized the 
cultural unity of humankind and later, with the influx of Marxism, the unity of 
humanity through the stages of economic development. In Kuwaki’s distinction 
between “progress” and “development,” he marked civilization’s difference from 
culture, stating that history should be imagined not as a straight line to a defined 
end point, but as a perpetual process of human cultivation and development guid-
ed by moral universality and the idea of world culture. This development required 
a “purpose” (mokuteki), but the precise material and technological content of this 
purpose could not be defined entirely beforehand by a fixed image of civilization.33 










































16    Introduction
totality of expressions of human will came to the fore and transformed the idea of 
empire from one of imperial sovereignty and unilinear progress to one of the per-
petual cultivation of the generally human. Therefore, in 1925, the governor-general 
of Korea, Saitō Makoto, used a metaphor of personal cultural development when 
he called for the “cultivation of state power” as a means of contributing to world 
culture.34
The distance from Meiji and the reality of Japan’s aggressive imperialist expan-
sion transformed perspectives on both culture and history. Yoshino Sakuzō and 
others would not formally establish the Research Group on Meiji Culture until 
1924.35 However, when Yi Kwang-su was a student at Waseda University in the late 
1910s, Yoshino had published his mimponshugi theory for Taishō democracy and 
was criticizing the militarism of Japan’s imperial project, which was obvious in the 
aftermath of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. Yoshino’s response to 
Japan’s military mode of imperialism was to highlight the cultural achievements of 
the Meiji period, especially the cultural contributions of great individuals, while 
critiquing militarist slogans like “rich country, strong military” (fukoku kyōhei).36 
He extended this criticism of Meiji imperialism to Japan’s colonial rule in Korea, 
and after visiting Korea he wrote positively about the March First Movement.37 At 
the same time, his political philosophy and his Christian cosmopolitanism pro-
vided a humanist political discourse to Korean intellectuals such as Yi Kwang-su, 
a discourse that facilitated their turn away from anticolonial revolution toward a 
gradualist cultural nationalism.
In his political theory, Yoshino parsed the cultural aspects of imperialism from 
its military aspects. His reading of this division and his later attempts to recuper-
ate Meiji culture from the excesses of Meiji imperialism reflect a different concept 
of sovereignty and national subjectivity than Meiji civilizational rhetoric. As is 
well known in Japanese intellectual history, Yoshino differentiated between mins-
hushugi, a notion of democracy that asserted the direct sovereignty of the people, 
and mimponshugi, which asserted that sovereignty remains with the emperor, but 
that the emperor and his representatives in the Diet and the bureaucracy were 
morally obligated to govern in the interests of the mass of people, who were at the 
foundation of society. In Yoshino’s theory we find an attempt to reconcile imperial 
sovereignty with popular sovereignty through a moral philosophy based on the 
capacity for great individuals, or persons (jinkaku), to act for the greater good of 
Japan’s imperial subjects and humanity at large. The sign of modern subjectivity 
and enlightenment is in the capacity of the self to legislate moral universals, which 
requires the cultural and spiritual cultivation of the self into a cosmopolitan-
national individual. The gradual turn away from the rhetoric of civilization to the 
rhetoric of culture reflected this shift from the idea of the globe as organized ac-
cording to levels of technological, educational, and nation-state development to a 










































Introduction    17
individual human’s development from natural, physiological being, to the psycho-
logical ego, to “transindividual general consciousness.”38 The model of the prog-
ress of civilizations and empires in competition with one another was displaced 
by a model based on the internal spiritual development of the human individual 
toward general consciousness and general culture.
In culturalism, nations are not neatly bordered civilizations in military, tech-
nological, and spiritual competition with other civilizations, but rather anthropo-
logical, cultural, and moral entities with their own life, language, and internally 
constituted organic form. In “On the Reconstruction of the Nation” (1922), Yi 
Kwang-su took up both Yoshino and Kuwaki, completely deemphasizing the issue 
of sovereignty—which for him resided in human reason alone—and reinterpret-
ing the Wilson Doctrine not as a call for self-determination in the sense of popular 
sovereignty, but rather as a call for Koreans and other stateless people to seek a 
more fundamental transformation of their individual and national characters and 
their everyday lives, a transformation that would transcend the mundane, natural 
changes of technological and civilizational progress.39 In this way, the genus-being 
of self-legislated morality, and its linking up with cultural anthropology, became 
essential to the working of empire under cultural policy, because it conveyed that 
in modernity there was another, entirely secular and human realm in which the 
sovereignty of emperors and the international recognition of nation-states were 
relatively minor affairs compared to the cultural and moral improvement of the 
individual, the biopolitical reformation of life, and the formation of a national 
community.
With the new authority accorded to neo-Kantian cultural science and the phi-
losophy of culturalism, the idea of culture came to mediate between freedom and 
determination, the universal and the particular, the transcendental and the empir-
ical, change and identity. As Terry Eagleton points out, the idea of culture includes 
such seemingly contradictory meanings.40 This mediatory function of culture is 
connected in my reading to the logic of genus-being. In its colonial usage, culture 
promises to liberate the colonized from previous social formations and reform 
them according to a process that is general to humanity, but at the same time cul-
ture can determine specific spheres of ethnic and racial difference that continue 
to racialize the colonized. This distinction is reflected in the difference in early-
twentieth-century anthropology between culture and Culture, a difference that 
was not fixed in the malleable and myriad ways that the terms munhwa and bunka 
were used in modern Korea and Japan. In the interstice between particular culture 
and general culture, the human becomes the object of its own self-consciousness 
and self-cultivation. For the modern idea of culture, nature is the raw material, or 
the seed to be cultivated, but without the improvements of culture, the natural ele-
ment remains inorganic, mechanistic, and ultimately inconsequential to universal 










































18    Introduction
the purely human realm of will and freedom from the mechanism of nature, but 
this does not mean that culture is then transformed into something purely sub-
jective. In the pragmatic application of the idea of culture, the human becomes 
an object of empirical anthropological knowledge. As the idea of cosmopolitan 
culture became integral to the Korean nation-building project under Japanese co-
lonial rule, it became a cultural and anthropological project rather than one of 
gaining popular national sovereignty. Through this project, the idea of culture was 
also employed to ethnicize the population of the Korean peninsula into a single, 
anthropologically defined nation (minjok), to which a number of empirical char-
acteristics could be attached, not as stagnant essences, but as historically mutable 
traits.
The discourses of culturalism, Marxism, and imperial nationalism were more 
complexly political than the earlier rhetoric of civilization and enlightenment in 
Meiji Japan and fin de siècle Korea. The notion of the world in culturalism was a 
hypothetical spiritual unity of humanity to be attained at some point in the future, 
one that was dependent neither upon the official establishment of national sover-
eignty nor upon a particular degree of technological, civilizational progress. De-
spite the colonial dimension of culturalism, which is blatant in the statements of 
Japanese colonial officials in the 1920s, many Korean intellectuals were seduced by 
culturalism precisely because it provided a new discourse of civilization in which 
internal matters of subjectivity and life practices—moral values, spiritual cultiva-
tion, the cultural refinement of the senses—were more significant for politics and 
history than the mundane concerns of technological advancement, sovereignty, 
natural rights, or equality in the distribution of material goods. By discussing the 
genus-being of the human in moral and spiritual terms, both colonial administra-
tors and Korean nationalists found a way to circumvent, or actually to rearticulate, 
the political and economic problem of imperialism.
PR ACTICE,  PR AGMATICS,  AND NORMING SPACE
Perhaps to confront the autonomy of practice in modernity, a whole network of 
discussions concerning practice developed in the Japanese empire of the 1920s. 
Concepts of the genus-being—of morality, productive labor, and nation-state sub-
jectivity—are essentially concepts of practice belonging to ideologies of practice. 
However, they are also pragmatic concepts applied to the practices of the human 
as the object of knowledge and technology, which is an aspect, at least, of what 
Foucault meant by “governmentality.”41 In order to analyze how, at the level of 
practice, cosmopolitanism became exclusionary, Marxism became schematically 
organized around the national proletariat, and a supposedly “deethnicized” impe-
rial state continued to rely on regulative anthropological categories, it is neces-
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organized. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand how these formal concepts 
of genus-being boomerang back to the empirical to regulate and norm practice, 
as well as the space and time of practice. The genus-being as a concept of practice 
should be read in relation to the fundamental problem in modern anthropocen-
tric thought: in modernity, the human being becomes the legislator of knowledge 
and history and at the same time an enigma at the center of the world in constant 
need of decoding through empirical observation. This was Foucault’s watershed 
insight into the place of the human in modern thought: “Man, in the analytic of 
finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that 
knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible.”42 It is 
this rendering of knowledge that became the focus of concepts of the genus-being 
in the Japanese empire, because in the anthropological observation of practices it 
was supposed to be detectable which actors were proper subjects of this rendering, 
capable of applying the transcendental pragmatically to their empirical conditions. 
Insofar as the philosophy of culturalism and cultural policy in Korea were founded 
on the anthropological principle of the subject as citizen of the world, this figure 
of the human as self-legislating but also empirically observable became directly 
related to colonial governmentality.
In the preface to Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant set the 
stage for the structure of the empirico-transcendental doublet.43 He also suggested 
the way that anthropology would become enmeshed in practices of governmen-
tality that seek the pragmatic formation of the human, particularly in cultural-
ist discourses of empire such as Japan’s cultural policy in Korea or postwar US 
modernization theory and cultural anthropology. Kant states that the move from 
theoretical knowledge to pragmatic knowledge is a matter of applying knowledge 
to the human, who is the centerpiece and the only proper object for knowledge 
about the world. This is the conflation of knowledge of man (Menschkenntnis) with 
knowledge of the world (Weltkenntnis), the anthropocentric view of world history 
from which Foucault began his archaeology of the human sciences.44 Kant writes 
in the preface:
All cultural progress, by means of which the human being advances his education, 
has the goal of applying this acquired knowledge and skill for the world’s use. But the 
most important object in the world to which he can apply them is the human being: 
because the human being is his own final end.—Therefore, to know the human being 
according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves 
to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the 
creatures on earth.45
In the Kantian epistemology, the human is free; it conceptualizes the laws of na-
ture, but it also distinguishes itself from nature as the legislator of the laws of free-
dom, as a being with the capacity for morality.46 In this passage, the human is the 










































20    Introduction
words, the only animal capable of morality. When Kant turns to the pragmatic 
application of theoretical knowledge through anthropology, he states that science 
should take the free-acting, willful human being as the only object of knowledge 
through which the totality of the world should be understood. In his dissertation 
on Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault discusses how this pragmatic view of anthro-
pology differs from the physiological anthropology from which Kant also drew, 
because it is “not a description of what man is but what he can make of himself ” in 
the process of his education or formation (Bildung).47 The human being becomes 
the object of pragmatic anthropology precisely because it is a free being defined 
by its moral practice, a being capable of making something of itself. Kant creates 
a confluence between practice in the universal sense and the pragmatic transfor-
mation of cultural practices through the generality of the human being and the 
anthropology he developed to study it.
Kant’s privileging of the human as the sole object of pragmatic knowledge had 
to be given time and space if it were to have actual historical effects. Giving time 
and space to this metaphysical and largely transhistorical concept of the human 
became normative and racialized. Modern thought has often negotiated the re-
lation between the inside and outside of humanity, and therefore the inside and 
outside of the world, through ideas of cultural and moral practice. Charles Mills, 
having traced the tradition of spatializing and racializing ethics in European social 
contract theories, states that white supremacist discourse, including Kant’s own 
moral philosophy, “norms space” through ideas of cultural and moral practice.48 
By linking the capacity or incapacity for self-legislated morality to anthropologi-
cally defined spaces, modern moral philosophy polices the borders between the 
human, the subhuman, and the nonhuman, including and excluding according 
to the norms of the metaphysics of morals and a racialized spatiality. This turn 
from the transcendental and regulatory claims of practical reason, or the “interi-
ority” of the proper human subject, to the empirical register of anthropocentric 
thought, including races and nations, is expressed in the title of part 2 of Kant’s 
Anthropology: “Anthropological Characteristic: On the Way of Cognizing the In-
terior of the Human Being from the Exterior.”49 The first half of the Anthropology 
is concerned primarily with inner sense, moods, affects, and practical reason, but 
in the second part these concerns give way to a cognizing of such interior states 
through the observation of the exterior. Ideas about the proper unity to give to the 
human’s interior life are connected to external, empirical traits like race, national 
character, and geographic origin. Therefore, Kant connected his conception of the 
human genus quite directly to race, in many ways inaugurating the problems of 
nation, race, and universalism that would develop in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. This problem of the empirico-transcendental doublet of the 
human was explicitly centered on the genus-being of the human and whether or 
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the white, brunette race, which historically inhabited the Old World between the 
thirty-first and fifty-second parallels, was an ancient “stem-genus” (Stammgattung) 
from which all other racial variations of the human genus derived (Stamm mean-
ing “stem” or “trunk,” but also “tribe”).50 His project of European cosmopolitanism 
was as much a project of reconstituting this stem-genus as it was a theory of the 
cultural and moral progress of humanity as a whole. Although clearly a histori-
cal fallacy and a construct of both the nascent human sciences and eighteenth-
century race theory, the mythical stem-genus of Europe was a hypothetical figure 
that served as an image for the shared origins of the cosmopolitan, secular human.
Kant’s conception of the human in the Anthropology was very influential in the 
philosophical discourse of the Japanese empire, from the neo-Kantian philosophy 
of culturalism in the 1920s to Kyoto School texts by Watsuji Tetsurō, Tanabe Ha-
jime, and others. In Ethics as the Study of the Human (1934), Watsuji Tetsurō writes, 
“Kant’s moral philosophy—in other words, his philosophy of practice—is the most 
originary anthropology; it is the ‘study of the total determination of the human.’ ”51 
As Watsuji discusses in his reading of Kant’s Anthropology, his own “study of the 
human” (ningen no gaku) is not physiological, but rather pragmatic.52 It has little 
to do with the natural historical, empirical, or structuralist study of “primitive” or 
“exotic” social formations—it is rather concerned with what the human being can 
make of itself through its practical reason. Kant’s critique of practical reason is 
the foundation for a more originary anthropology because it grounds itself in the 
metaphysics of morals. When Watsuji defined the object of his study, he sought its 
universality in ethics and its generality in culture. This moral philosophy allowed 
Watsuji to map the world not simply according to culturally and geographically 
determined customs, the object of his Climate and Culture, but also according to 
a normative ethical universality that he associated anthropologically with Japan 
proper.53 In interpreting Kant, Watsuji shifted the precise location of the ground 
for “originary anthropology” from Europe to Japan, but maintained the basic logi-
cal structure of Kant’s intersection of moral universality and the stem-genus.
Watsuji’s trajectory suggests the kinds of connections between moral philosophy, 
anthropology, and the norming of space that Charles Mills analyzes in his reading of 
the racial contract. Because such humanism begins with a generic definition—self-
legislated morality—intellectuals in Japan could appropriate Kant while ignoring or 
reworking his claims to white racial superiority and their connections to his Euro-
centric view of geography and history. Likewise, colonial intellectuals in Korea could 
appropriate “originary anthropology” and its practice of norming space for their own 
nationalization project, even though humanist philosophers like Watsuji often made 
overt claims to ethnic superiority when they wrote about Japan’s colonies.54 Again, 
the primary question of this book: how can the universalism and transcendentality 
of anthropocentric knowledge continually be translated and particularized, despite 










































22    Introduction
I return to Foucault’s early work on cultural-historical thinking in his disserta-
tion on Kant and in The Order of Things because I see it as an important aspect 
of his understanding of governmentality, and one that we might hesitate to apply 
to intellectual discourse if we imagine that governmentality is solely a matter of 
welfare institutions, prisons, colonial policy, and technology. By linking Foucault’s 
later themes of biopolitics and governmentality to his archaeology of the human 
sciences, it becomes possible to read philosophy, literature, and social science as 
embedded in a network of political relations mediated by normative understand-
ings of the human and human practice. In some respects, this urge to connect 
governmentality to Foucault’s analysis of culture in The Order of Things is an effect 
of the historical instance of Japan’s “cultural policy,” which demands an investiga-
tion into the ways philosophers and writers have theorized the citizen of the world 
and how this cosmopolitanism can become a technology of colonial rule. Or less 
ambitiously, at least this connection helps to explain how and why Yi Kwang-su’s 
controversial essay from 1922 on the anthropological “reconstruction” of Korean 
national character begins with a reference not to the loss of national sovereign-
ty, but rather to the need for a more fundamental reconstruction of the human, 
thought and felt by all citizens of the world (segyein).55
THE LIMIT S OF THE HUMAN
Although a good deal of this book is concerned with tracing different iterations of 
the problem of the human in imperial discourse, I am also concerned with tracing 
the limits of the structure of the empirico-transcendental doublet, or the modern 
confluence of genus-being and particular identities, facts, or subjectivities. Spe-
cifically, I look for the places in texts and historical situations where philosophy, 
in becoming spatiotemporal, gives way to the nonidentity of the subject to itself, 
where, in literature, writing practices push language toward the nonrepresentable, 
or where the ethico-political construction of a human community fails to come 
to completion. In locating the limits of modern anthropocentric thought, I have 
tried to move between (rather than within) the areas of Korea, Japan, Europe, and 
the North American academy, with the hope of disrupting the repetition of the 
structure of the empirico-transcendental doublet and the patterns of knowledge 
it has produced. Rather than discussing the dynamics of self and other in colonial 
discourse as dynamics between two established and assumable identities, I focus 
instead on three limits to the formation of the human, limits that modern thought 
constantly confronts and attempts to resolve: a semiotic limit, a spatiotemporal 
limit, and an existential limit.
The semiotic limit to humanism is related to the metaphysics of national lan-
guage, because it emerges out of the way that philosophers and writers discussed 










































Introduction    23
means of grounding the transcendental subject of modernity within a local ter-
ritory. In chapters 1 and 2, I show how culturalist thinkers such as Sōda Kiichirō, 
Kuwaki Gen’yoku, and Yi Kwang-su turned to the idea of national language at 
various points in order to ground the transcendental subject and its self-legis-
lated morality in a local anthropological identity. Sōda, for example, argued (in 
German, paradoxically) that Japanese had to become a “generally understood 
world language of science” for Japanese and Asian cultural scientists to properly 
study their own past.56 He also argued that the limits of what the philosophy 
of culturalism could know were not real limits to the capacity of the human 
sciences to represent the totality of human life (or the world). The existence of 
limits to anthropocentric knowledge rather required the positing of general cul-
tural values as transcendental limit concepts that governed morally and teleo-
logically the development of anthropocentric knowledge and the cosmopolitan 
human. The formation of the national language allowed for both the recognition 
of the limits of knowledge and the internalization of that difference within the 
cosmopolitan-national subject. National language provided a ground for the na-
tional subject within a bordered cultural area, but it was also the mediation that 
allowed one to translate communicatively between the concepts of the generally 
human and new, as-yet unincorporated territories. Likewise, in Korea Yi Kwang-
su and Ch’oe Nam-sŏn wrote, respectively, of the future and prehistoric unity of 
the modern Korean language, not solely out of nationalism, but in order to make 
the case that a moral and cultural cosmopolitanism could find its local ground-
ing in Korean national self-consciousness.57 Bilingual writers such as Arai Tetsu 
(Uchino Kenji), a migrant from Japan proper to Korea, and Kim Sa-ryang, an 
ethnically Korean Japanophone writer, were both very immersed in culturalism, 
but they also formulated different interfaces between languages that disrupted 
the idea of a cosmopolitan totality created through the communicative function 
of national languages.
The spatiotemporal limit of humanism emerges out of the way that historical 
models of world history tend to homogenize the differences between and within 
spatial locales in order to make them subject to the historical model. At the spa-
tiotemporal limit of humanism, the chronotopes of representation break with the 
logics and narratives of the genus-being. In chapter 3, I examine the stage theory 
of history in both economics and cultural theory, a theory founded in a concept of 
the genus-being as productive labor. In stage theory, a form of labor and division 
of labor determines the stage—tribal, slave, feudal, capitalist, socialist, and com-
munist. In the debates on Japanese capitalism, as well as in the stagist histories of 
Korea developed by Paek Nam-un, space and time are reduced to the nation form 
and the historical stages of its developing economy. Likewise, the chronotope of 
the nation form, as it appeared, for example, in Nakano Shigeharu’s essays on the 










































24    Introduction
of modern Korean literature, greatly affected how fiction, poems, and literary criti-
cism represented the spatiotemporal divides between metropole and colony, and 
between the city and the countryside. It also came to require a theory of cultural 
modernization, or what I call proletarian Bildung, through which the peripheries 
of the exploited groups of humanity could be formed into a universal class subject, 
the national proletariat. However, as I show in chapter 4, through chronotopes that 
broke with historical modeling, realist literature and anthropological texts were 
able to critique the notion that art should be an allegory of the historical process 
of universal history as defined by the dominant Marxist social science. The result 
was more complex chronotopes that were more revealing of the content of social 
relations, because they did not adhere to the formalistic intersection between uni-
versal history and national history. In the anthropology and fiction of Nakanishi 
Inosuke and Kobayashi Takiji in Japan and Ch’oe Sŏ-hae, Kang Kyŏng-ae, and Yi 
Ki-yŏng in Korea, we find examples of different chronotopic imaginaries that are 
equally critical of imperialism and capitalism, but do not attempt to regulate the 
limits of the formation of the human by reducing spatial and temporal differences 
to differences within a nation’s diachronic-synchronic history.
The existential limit concerns how the ontology of the living human always 
exceeds the pragmatism of anthropological discourse and the technologies of 
humanist imperial rule. Leo Ching writes about the period of imperial subjecti-
fication (1939–45), “Cultural representations under kōminka [imperial subjectifi-
cation] displaced the concrete problematic of the social and replaced it with the 
ontology of the personal.”58 As I discuss in chapter 5, Ch’oe Chae-sŏ and other colo-
nial Korean advocates of a multiethnic Japanese national literature welcomed this 
displacement of the social into an ontology of the personal, because it promised to 
create a new subject position out of which the contradictions of colonial moderni-
ty might be overcome. By writing from the people’s standpoint and in the Japanese 
national language, Korean writers could reunite the level of consciousness with the 
level of existence, which had, Ch’oe assumed, been separated through the abstract 
cosmopolitanism of culturalism and the trivial mass culture of the proletarian arts. 
Other Korean writers, such as Kim Sa-ryang and Kim Nam-ch’ŏn, explored the 
existential limits to the project of Japanese national literature. By showing that the 
ontology of the personal demanded by imperial nationalist discourse remained a 
highly precarious venture in the interiority of the colonial subject, they exposed 
an existential limit to the demand that the colonials transform themselves into 
subjects of the Japanese state. In other words, they refused or complicated the 
function that imperialist thinkers had assigned to national culture—the mediator 
between ethnic difference and the subjectivity of the world-historical state.
Although the semiotic, spatiotemporal, and existential limits of the human ap-
pear through all of the counterdiscursive strategies that I examine, chapter 6 touch-
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relates to the imperial project, both through its valid critiques of anthropological 
notions of the generally human and in the ways that this critique can easily revert 
back, through conservative ideas about social space, to notions of culture and sub-
jectivity that are in concert with fascist politics and the imperial state. I am particu-
larly interested in the status of “ecstatic temporality” in modernist writings, and the 
way that time as the constant projection of the human being outside of itself, and 
therefore as the condition for the human’s self-alienation, was related in the early 
twentieth century to the advent of cinema and cinematic space-time. I approach 
ecstatic temporality through a reading Ch’oe Chae-sŏ’s earlier work and also the 
works of the New Sensationist Yokomitsu Riichi. I show how and why in each case 
the ecstasis of the modernist view of the human being enabled a particular kind of 
turn to a fascist political perspective. I then move on to the poetry and fiction of 
Yi Sang, who also used cinematic poetic images to figure the human being as an 
ecstatic subject constantly projected outside of itself, but perhaps offering another 
possibility to at once undo the anthropological epistemology of culturalism, while 
also keeping in motion a cinepoetic subject that never becomes identical to itself 
again by returning to a spatial origin. In my reading of Yi Sang, I first analyze the 
culturalist spatial imaginary present in the colonial architecture journal Korea and 
Architecture and then show how Yi’s poetry in that journal drew from the theory 
of relativity and cinematic space to critique the journal’s culturalist understanding 
of space and time. It also shows how this subversion of culturalism differs from the 
Hegelian dialectic of Tanabe Hajime, which was based on an osmotic rather than 
intensive mode of expression. The chapter ends by asking whether or not Yi Sang’s 
cinematic notion of “vision,” not as a total perspective, but rather as a network of 
singular, temporal points around which space curves, might offer another possibil-
ity for a genus-being without subject, objects, or individuals.
26
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Culturalism and the Human
He who is not oriented toward cultural value is only a natural human; per-
sonhood can only exist in a cultural human.
—Sōda Kiichirō
CULTUR ALISM AND CULTUR AL POLICY
In March 1919, there were nationwide protests in colonial Korea against Japanese 
imperialism, leading up to the proclamation of a declaration of independence by 
leading intellectuals. Following the March First Movement, the governor-general 
of Korea shifted its policy from military policy to cultural policy. Cultural policy 
was not simply a euphemism for colonial exploitation, but a set of policies and 
discourses based on particular ideas of culture. At the same time as cultural policy 
was instituted in Korea, culturalism became a dominant intellectual orientation in 
Japan proper and in the colonies. As culturalism became the dominant intellectual 
orientation and cultural policy the mode of government in the colonies, ideas of 
culture were gradually linked to political domination. The rational organization of 
education, populations, aesthetic practices, and social space became connected in 
various manners to ideas of culture.
Cosmopolitanism and the cultural unity of humanity were central themes in 
statements by liberal Japanese reformers and governors in colonial Korea in the 
aftermath of the March First Movement. These reformers’ appropriation of metro-
politan cosmopolitan ideas and their translation of them into the colonial context 
had profound effects on governing practices and colonial politics, as well as intel-
lectual discourse in Korea. In 1925, six years into cultural policy, the governor-
general of Korea, Saitō Makoto, wrote the following sentimental statement about 
the prospects for the development of world culture, coprosperity between the im-
perial countries, and a mutual love shared by humanity:










































International relations between each nation in the alliance have become more and 
more congenial; each is employing its power for the development of world culture; 
the spirit of coexistence and coprosperity is spreading; we can see a trend toward 
actualizing the ideal of a mutual love shared by all of humanity; in order to achieve 
this, the greatest purpose of our times, we take the cultivation of state power, in both 
name and fact, to be the primary principle.1
Considering the imperialist expansion of Japanese capital, the policing of politics, 
and the cultural erasure that was ongoing in colonial Korea, such statements seem 
blind to colonial violence, or even constructed cynically to shroud the realities of 
colonialism in a veil of triumphal, idealist History. In its banal humanism, it moves 
vaguely but assertively from the idea of world culture, to humanity’s shared senti-
ment of mutual love, to the power of the state, giving it the equivocation typical of 
colonial proclamations. Despite its blatant obfuscations of the violence of colonial-
ism, the statement is nonetheless revealing if we consider it as part of a broader 
discursive formation in its intertextuality. It contains, in condensed form, many 
of the questions and solutions that arose as universalist claims about humanity 
became integral to both culturalist thinking and Japan’s colonial project.
Saitō was concerned with how to imagine and to manage a multiethnic and as-
similatory state, while still maintaining social hierarchies between colonizer and 
colonized. In order to resolve the tension between the universality and inclusive-
ness of the state and its regulation and subjugation of Korean colonial subjects, 
Saitō turns to the idea of development, presented within a cultural-historical 
framework, asserting the formation of a world culture and a universal sentiment 
of love shared by humanity as the greatest purpose of history. For the Japanese 
empire to contribute to this project of cosmopolitanism—understood as the uni-
fication of humanity through cultural-historical development—the power of the 
colonial state in Korea must be “cultivated” (kanyō suru), in an anthropomorphiz-
ing turn of phrase. The governor-general’s frequent demand that Korea contribute 
to this cosmopolitan project offered Koreans a means to enter the development of 
universal history by assimilating to its local representative, Japan, but it also dif-
ferentiated Koreans ethnically and politically by figuring them as a people internal 
to the nation who were not yet national and not yet cosmopolitan.
Saitō’s statement echoes the more serious philosophical concerns of promi-
nent culturalists and cultural scientists in Germany, Japan, and colonial Korea. 
In the aftermath of World War I, neo-Kantian philosophers, who had constituted 
one dominant strain of academic philosophy in Germany since the 1880s, became 
more directly concerned with the political ramifications of the ethnic national-
ist response to modernity that had led to the war and began to think about the 
philosophical system of the cultural sciences as the potential departing point for 
a cosmopolitan-national community with a transcendental and universal, rath-
er than particularistic, foundation. Many liberals in Germany, particularly the 










































neo-Kantians who focused on the cultural and human sciences, were asking how 
an individual, postimperial nation-state could take on a cosmopolitan purpose and 
how through this nation-state national subjects could overcome their ethnic chau-
vinism. Japanese philosophers and social scientists such as Kuwaki Gen’yoku and 
Sōda Kiichirō, both of whom studied in Germany for long periods, engaged with the 
German philosophical discourse of the time and also created their own epistemolo-
gies for the study of culture. In developing Kantian and neo-Kantian thought into a 
culturalist program for the reformation of society, or what they called “the philoso-
phy of culturalism,” they shared with the German neo-Kantians a critique of ethnic 
nationalism, a concern with finding a transcendental and universal foundation for 
the nation-state, and a belief in the formation of a united world and world culture 
as the ultimate historical purpose of humanity. The significant difference between 
the philosophy of culturalism and the German context, however, was that Japan had 
neither participated extensively nor suffered defeat in World War I. It remained an 
imperial power with growing colonial holdings. Under these conditions, what was 
imagined as a cultural mode of reconstructing the German nation-state along cos-
mopolitan lines was able to transform into a colonial discourse that demanded that 
Korean colonial subjects overcome their ethnocentrism and enter universal history 
and world culture through the mediation of the Japanese colonial state.
In the philosophy of culturalism, the formal essence of the human (or its genus-
being) is self-legislated morality, the capacity of the cosmopolitan-national 
individual to autonomously and freely determine how to act in the interest of the 
public good. Kantian liberals of the 1920s understood the moral universality of 
Kant’s categorical imperative in historical terms—seeds of goodness exist in all 
humans, but these seeds have to be cultivated over time through education and 
culture. Compared to civilizational claims and claims about human nature, such 
a historical and cultural claim to humanity was more easily tailored to the flexible 
and differential mode of colonial rule developed through cultural policy, because 
individuals and groups could be categorized according to their relative distance 
from the regulative, historical, and general idea of the perfected moral person. 
When Saitō wrote of “mutual love” between the more developed states, he did not 
assume that every human felt this love due to his or her nature, but rather consid-
ered this sentiment to be something developing historically, through individual 
and collective cultivation. Therefore, he repeatedly demanded that Koreans con-
tribute to world culture by cultivating their inner sense of correct action and their 
dedication to both the empire and its world-historical mission. In combining the 
rhetoric of cultural cosmopolitanism with a moral justification for colonial rule, 
colonial officials and the intellectuals who informed their discourse articulated a 
national economy and a colonial-imperial state formed through normative prac-
tices of inclusion and exclusion, through that combination of universalist human-
ism and ethnic discrimination that characterized assimilation.










































The moral concept of general humanity was in part a critical response to the 
unbridled individualism associated with economic liberalism. The relation be-
tween economic self-interest and universal moral sentiment remained problem-
atic in the expanding Japanese empire. In the statement “The Primary Mission of 
the Nation” (1924), Japan’s Inspector General of Political Affairs in Korea, Ariyoshi 
Chūichi, makes more explicit the two tendencies in thought with which cultural 
policy’s idea of the moral human is meant to compete. Referring to World War 
I, Ariyoshi discusses forging a new, more sustainable relation between the indi-
vidual and the human collectivity, one that improves upon both individualism 
and collectivism:
The majority of world humanity, having suffered the wounds of the Great War, and 
having experienced much anguish in thought, economics, and politics, wonders 
whether the calamity of war will end with this period or will continue onward in-
definitely; we could say that God has given humanity a great test. The majority of 
the world senses the huge significance of this test, supports the ideas of justice and 
charity, is endeavoring to advance the welfare of the human community, and believes 
that the current mission to which humanity should devote itself is to escape from the 
anguish of the present and accept a world of peace and happiness. However, with the 
aim of actualizing such a world, each person makes himself the standard, swagger-
ing about and displaying an extreme individualism; in order to create a new, noble 
period of humanity, this is certainly not the path to be taken.
It seems that an extreme collectivism is called for, but the situation in Russia 
shows clearly that in the present state of humanity such collectivism does not offer 
happiness, but rather terrible suffering. Among those who have returned from a tour 
of Euro-America, there are some who have the impression that individualism is ac-
cepted there, but the majority of conscientious observers agree with the perspective 
that Euro-America, while wary of today’s extreme individualism, sees in the Russian 
situation the harm of extreme collectivism, and feels acutely the need to reinvigorate 
the state. From this example, it can be hypothesized that no great development can 
be accomplished by acting as though the self is the only standard or by being partial 
to extreme collectivism.2
Ariyoshi states that humanity has a shared sense of mission that defines its his-
tory, particularly in the aftermath of the ethnic national conflicts of World War I. 
In articulating cultural cosmopolitanism for the colony, he emphasizes that an 
overly individualistic liberalism does not recognize the need for society and so-
cial conscience, whereas the extreme collectivism of the Soviet Union threatens 
the bourgeois state and the individuality that it grants to its subjects. He goes on 
to discuss the primary mission of cultural policy as the creation of a new moral 
connection and sense of mission shared by the individual, the nation, and the 
world. He appropriated the neo-Kantian idea of culture, with its tones of civility 
and moral cultivation, to articulate a new relation between the individual and the 










































totality, a new kind of liberalism that would be a third way between the asocial in-
dividualism of unrestrained capitalism and the destruction of the bourgeois state 
in revolutionary Russia.
In speaking of the cultivation of the state and the contribution of the state and 
its colonial subjects to world culture, Saitō and Ariyoshi were borrowing from a 
prominent intellectual and public discourse, culturalism, and putting it to use for 
colonial rule. This chapter discusses how in culturalist thinking, ideas of moral 
universality and personhood became connected to empirical anthropological 
claims about national character, origins, behaviors, and ethnic worldviews. The 
developmental understanding of cultural phenomena, derived from the neo-
Kantian interpretation of Kant, involved Kuwaki and Sōda in the conceptual prob-
lem of the limit and the limit concept. In casting Japan, its culture, and its national 
economy as a priori ideas rather than empirical entities, they were forced to ask 
how this transcendental Japan could be translated into a territory governed by the 
Japanese state but marked as anthropologically different (Korea). This is where 
the supplementarity of the binary signs of the cultural human (the person) and 
the natural human came into play for the human scientific system to be presented 
as a total system determinant of both the world and the nations making up the 
world. In arguing that general cultural values served as the regulative principles 
for cultural historical development, and that the capacity to attain these values dis-
tinguished the cultural human from the natural human, Kuwaki and Sōda trans-
formed the limits of knowledge about the human into the very guiding principles 
for this knowledge. In order to try to overcome the question of the limits of the 
transcendental knowledge of the human in the actual historical existence of hu-
manity, they used the concept of the world to refer to both the totality of humanity 
and the nations belonging to this totality. The relationship between the totality of 
the world and its nations became biopolitical, because transforming the nation to 
suit the cosmopolitan order required bringing life under the rule of the categori-
cal imperative through the human’s attainment of its genus-being, self-legislated 
morality.
In this turn to a cosmopolitan-national framework for humanist knowledge, 
culturalist thinkers in Japan proper and Korea confronted a semiotic limit to the 
attempt to guide knowledge of the human by the limit concept of general values 
and by the binary of cultural humans and natural humans. At marginal moments of 
epistemological crisis—when culture and nature, freedom and necessity, and tran-
scendental and empirical threatened to blur into one another unsystematically—
culturalists turned to the idea of a communicative and spiritual national language 
as the ground for the transcendental subject within local spheres of difference. 
In the final part, I show how area studies knowledge about Korea, produced and 
compiled largely by Japanese migrants to the colony, reiterated in popular form 
many of the precepts of the philosophy of culturalism. I also discuss how some 










































texts, such as the poetry of Arai Tetsu, both participated in culturalist discourse 
and articulated differently the semiotic limit to the culturalist idea of the human.
MOR ALIT Y,  LIFE,  AND THE PERSON: 
KUWAKI GEN’ YOKU
Kuwaki Gen’yoku and Sōda Kiichirō were the two thinkers most responsible for 
establishing the anthropocentric philosophies of neo-Kantianism and culturalism 
as the most powerful liberal ideologies of the Japanese empire of the late 1910s 
and early 1920s. Kuwaki taught at Waseda University and had a strong impact 
upon Yi Kwang-su and other cultural nationalists in Korea. Sōda was a banker and 
finance capitalist whose integration of the philosophy of culturalism with politi-
cal economy became a central social-scientific discussion of liberal society in the 
1920s. Each of these philosophers defined the essence of the human being as the 
capacity for self-legislated morality, a capacity that had its origins in nature but 
had to be cultivated self-consciously through the use of reason. The human’s self-
conscious cultivation of its knowledge and its practical reason was a historical 
process; therefore, they referred to general consciousness as the telos of the devel-
opment of the individual psyche and general culture as the telos of the develop-
ment of everyday cultural life. They argued that just as the human is not an effect 
of nature, its cultural life is not determined by natural factors, but rather governed 
by metaphysical cultural values. In the work of Kuwaki and Sōda, most of the cen-
tral issues presented by culturalism and cultural policy are brought together into 
a philosophical system—the regulation of life by ideas, the primacy of spirit over 
matter, a political economy centered on money and finance capital, and a theory 
of moral action as the actualization of general cultural value (Sōda) or absolute 
cultural value (Kuwaki).
Drawing from French and German legal concepts, Inoue Tetsujirō and others 
had developed philosophies of personhood in late-nineteenth-century Japan, long 
before culturalism.3 However, the culturalist concept of personhood was somewhat 
unique in that it utilized a neo-Kantian philosophy of history to posit a completely 
moral human world, or Kant’s “kingdom of ends,” as the utopian culmination and 
telos of cultural value formation.4 The capacity to govern one’s own practical activ-
ity, or to act morally, was that essential quality that differentiated the human from 
other animals; it also organized the empirical differences of humanity regulatively 
and historically. The philosophy of culturalism did not consider all humans to be 
moral, but it did assert that the development of humankind and knowledge about 
this development both ought to be governed by the idea of the moral human, vis-
ible in the actual world in the form of the person. In this sense, the person was the 
actual-ideal figure for the genus-being of morality, the ideal actor and effect of all 
human cultural and moral development.










































One primary concern of neo-Kantians was to arrive at a concept of moral action 
that saw it not as an effect of a heteronomous law of divinity or nature, but rather 
as an expression of human freedom that therefore requires an internal spiritual and 
cultural life to guide it. In Kuwaki’s and Sōda’s texts, morality is free individual ac-
tivity, but it is also what connects the individual, however conflictually, to both the 
laws of the state and the rules of society. Therefore, the moral law should not be 
merely an individual sense of right and wrong, but should also be able to serve as 
a potentially universal law that can ground a community of free individuals, or 
the nation-state. Just as Kant turned to moral philosophy when the transcendental 
realm of human knowledge seemed hermetically closed off from its objects, Kuwaki 
arrived at a moral philosophy of the person at that ambiguous point of intersection 
between transcendental reflection and the elusiveness of experience (indicated in 
the following passage by his reference to the person as the thing-in-itself).
In Kant and Contemporary Philosophy (1917), Kuwaki writes,
A human (hito) is more elevated than the self, and Kant has given this human a name, 
person (jinkaku). Through the person, the ground for the transcendental elements 
was established in the practical field. A factual thing (jibutsu) that is heteronomic 
and necessary is a means employed for the use of another, but because something 
(mono) autonomous and free is only employed for the use of its self, its end is itself. 
A means has only a price, but an end has value and dignity; we call the former an 
article (Sache) and the latter a person (Person). The moral law must be established by 
taking the human to be free, a thing-in-itself, and a person.5
The figure through which the universal moral law should be established in actu-
ality is the autonomous actor who is employed only for its own use, or the free per-
son understood as end rather than means. On the one hand, Kuwaki is concerned 
with the noninstrumental treatment of others, at least within the limited sphere of 
subjects who are capable of morality. On the other hand, in order to belong to the 
kingdom of ends, the acting subject must be autonomously capable of applying the 
moral law to itself through self-legislated morality. The person must be capable of 
legislating morality autonomously and freely, but also universally, or it risks being 
reduced to a mere factual thing (jibutsu), or even an article with a price. Finally, in 
a neo-Kantian transformation of the meaning of the “thing-in-itself ” from its ref-
erence to the unknowable in Kant’s own system, this subject of self-legislated mo-
rality is also the final end and object of epistemological inquiry, of cultural science 
as a transcendental and empirical study of the nonnatural, anthropocentric world. 
In a structure akin to the empirico-transcendental doublet diagnosed by Foucault, 
the person is the actual-ideal figure through which a philosophy and science of 
human culture can unite transcendental inquiry about culture with culture as a 
possible object of experience; or, in the simpler formulations of culturalism, the 
ideal figure of the person brings the Culture of what ought to be (Sollen) to bear 
on the culture of what is (Sein). Sōda Kiichirō discussed this passage from Sein to 










































Sollen as a “leap” (hiyaku) whereby one would come to determine all particular 
and contingent cultural values by the limit concept of general cultural value.6
Kuwaki connects self-legislated morality and its autonomy from the uncon-
scious mechanism of nature directly to nation-state formation when he argues 
that “if humans that are their own ends gather together and make a country, then 
it is in contradiction with a country belonging to nature; therefore, in the social 
state that unites people, a meaning outside of nature emerges.”7 In this turn from 
the moral universal to a kind of social contract between proper subjects of culture, 
what Charles Mills calls the “norming of space” through the racial contract finds 
a subtle articulation.8 The implication is that this country’s boundaries will not be 
vertical lines drawn on a map, but rather will be inscribed into society through 
the binary of culture and nature, which will be applied differentially within so-
cial space according to the ideal standard of the person. In that case, “countries 
belonging to nature” could be any group or space internal to the “social state” 
that is marked, through customs, practices, or physiological features, as remaining 
in the state of nature. Somewhat paradoxically, considering the inevitable violent 
discrimination implied by the distinction between cultural and natural nations, it 
is also through this kind of agreement between moral subjects and their collective 
contradiction with the peoples belonging to nature that self-legislated morality 
will not devolve into a destructive individualism.
Therefore, just as Ariyoshi argues in his official statement that extreme indi-
vidualism could threaten the world community of nations as easily as extreme 
collectivism, Kuwaki thought of the difference between natural and cultural coun-
tries as analogous to the difference between a country comprising individualists 
and a country comprising moral persons treating one another as ends rather than 
means. Again stating this difference in terms of a difference between empiricism 
and the transcendental, Kuwaki writes,
Individualism has at its foundation an empirical theory, but if personalism does not 
depart from an a priori theory then it has no meaning. Therefore, it is absolutely a 
mistake to conflate individualism and personalism. However, if we are to articulate 
a collectivism that opposes individualism in a complete way, we must make person-
alism the foundation. Because a collective that is simply an aggregation of people 
only has an empirical significance and does not have universal validity, we cannot 
recognize in it any kind of authority; in other words, the collective obtains its tran-
scendental foundation first in the person.9
If a philosophical origin for cultural policy in Korea can be located in any mean-
ingful way, it is in this kind of attempt to create a transcendental concept of the 
social contract, a kingdom of ends in which individuals are at once free and auton-
omous from external determinations and also cultivated and educated enough to 
apply the universal rules of practice. In thinking of Kant as a modern philosopher, 
Kuwaki was addressing the problem of the lack of a heteronomous foundation for 










































ethics in modernity. In Ariyoshi’s appropriation of the logic of the categorical im-
perative for the colonial state, the capacity for self-legislated morality also became 
a demand placed on colonial subjects as a mark of their entrance into modernity 
through the cultivation of their capacity for moral personhood.
In this respect, self-legislated morality was a formal concept of the human’s 
genus-being, the norm through which the differences within humanity would 
disappear. However, Kuwaki connected this formal concept to a pragmatic an-
thropological project immersed in and transformative of human life. Like all neo-
Kantians, Kuwaki distinguished between natural science and cultural science by 
distinguishing their objects of inquiry: natural science studies the laws of nature 
and cultural science studies the historical and cultural world of the human being. 
Furthermore, by thinking of cultural science as a philosophy of life (jinsei tetsug-
aku, Lebensphilosophie), he made human life the subject and object of cultural 
history. This separation of the human from nature required an epistemological 
distinction between human cultural life and “nature” understood as mechanism. 
Yet this distinction between human cultural life and nature actually allowed for 
the inclusion of the bios of the human being within culture, as something mal-
leable and transformable. Giorgio Agamben has discussed this distinction and this 
inclusion as marking philosophy’s turn to the biopolitical.10
Outline of Philosophy: The Thing and the I (1929) is a work that spans the history 
of European philosophy and Kuwaki’s own research and teaching career, discuss-
ing a number of topics through the basic philosophical problem of the subject’s 
relation to the object. In the chapter titled “The I and Action,” Kuwaki presents 
his own perspective on the problem of the subject and object. It emphasizes the 
human being’s moral autonomy from objects and the way that human life (jin-
sei) unifies moral action into a total system. The chapter opens with some reflec-
tions on the relationship between human life and proper conduct, through which 
Kuwaki articulates in culturalist terms the connection between the governing of 
oneself, the governing of things, and the governing of the population, or what 
Foucault names “governmentality.”11 Kuwaki discusses this confluence with the 
concepts of conduct, the thing, and life:
Interpreted analytically, “knowing” is a phenomenon that emerges when the I re-
ceives the operation of the Thing. However, insofar as the I is independent from the 
Thing, the I reacts against the Thing. This is called action or Conduct.12 Of course, 
making such a clear distinction between the I and the Thing is not proper, but for 
the convenience of explanation we can state it this way. Just as individual knowing 
accumulates to form knowledge or learning, individual actions accumulate to form 
human life. Here the philosophy of life must be established alongside the philosophy 
of knowledge. However, in order to establish this philosophy we must determine if 
we should first ascertain the concept of life, or, assuming there must be something 
that unifies conduct, if we should ask what this unifying principle might be.13










































Kuwaki turns to the problem of conduct at the point where the I transcends or is 
independent from things. This is the problem of the free will of the human being, 
which distinguishes itself from the necessity of nature through its free conduct. 
Two problems emerge from this separation. What is the rule or law that unifies or 
should unify various individual actions? If human life is the accumulation of in-
dividual actions, should we analyze human life first or rather analyze what unifies 
the actions that constitute human life? In this situation of aporia between human 
life and its transcendental determination, Kuwaki turns to an organicist theory of 
general culture, because culture conceived this way can unify and be unified by 
the moral universal as practiced by individuals. Because human life and individual 
conduct taken as empirical objects appear too dispersed and differentiated, the 
philosophy of human life must turn to the transcendental if it proposes to arrive 
at a unity that could be properly called Culture in the global sense. This is how he 
was able to differentiate his theory of culture and cultural activity from the empiri-
cal study of customs, traditions, or the minutiae of modern styles and behaviors 
emerging in the social sciences and literature of the time.14
In the full formulation of the relationship between morality and life, Kuwaki 
turns to Kant’s categorical imperative: “act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”15 
Kuwaki makes the further assertion that because the categorical imperative con-
stitutes the substance of morality and unifies conduct in the actual cultural world, 
a total system can be founded on its universality. This despite the trace of the hy-
pothetical in the formulation “as if.” The subject and object of this unification of 
the moral law are human life, which therefore becomes the subject and object of a 
pragmatic application of the transcendental:
If we take the substance of the moral law to be the purely formal categorical im-
perative, then it becomes the transcendental element of morality, the substance of 
morality, or the transcendental and formal element of conduct, thereby becoming 
a ground and, in the case of knowledge, something like a category. If we interpret 
conduct and morality in this way, then a unity for each conduct emerges for the 
first time; a unity exists for the totality of conducts and a single system is formed. 
In the case of knowledge, each individual understanding synthesizes and becomes 
something like learning. If we give to the system of conduct the name “human life,” 
then we must say that human life is that which takes morality and makes it a unified 
principle, or an “a priori.”16
Human life unifies morality under the rules of the transcendental, becoming cul-
tural life (bunka seikatsu). Morality, in turn, forms a system of conducts through 
its substantive universality. At this point, Kuwaki’s discourse collapses into the 
structure of the empirico-transcendental doublet, because the human being and 
human life unify morality in the material world while the material world comes to 
reflect the unity of moral universality ascertained transcendentally. This is where 










































Kuwaki turns to the concepts of culture and cultural value, which refer to both 
the conducts that constitute the unity of human life and the transcendental values 
through which they are unified.
For Kuwaki, because cultural value connects particular histories to a develop-
ing universal history, it is not an interpretive practice directed primarily toward 
the past, but rather the foundation for historical development. History is a history 
of the ongoing passage from nature as merely contingent incident to Culture as the 
unity of consciously and freely enacted historical events (what he calls, quoting 
Kant, the “history of freedom”). Kuwaki emphasizes that the historical perspective 
of culturalism, or his version of “historicism,” must not be solely a conservative 
look to the past, but must be both modern and modernizing: “People name the 
turn to history ‘historicism’ and take this to mean that historicism must venerate 
only the past; however, speaking about the essence of history, historicism must not 
grasp development in the future by simply understanding the laws of development 
of the past; in other words, it cannot be simple conservative thinking.”17
In addition to this differentiation of culturalist historicism from cultural con-
servatism, Kuwaki associates history as simply a “written record of the past” with 
an outmoded naturalist idea of causality, for which each event appears as an effect 
of preceding events and as a cause for subsequent events.18 In opposition to cul-
tural conservatism and naturalist views of history, Kuwaki proposes a perpetual 
historical development that must have a purpose, but whose purpose cannot be 
fully formulated outside of historical time. Development is the transformation of 
human life according to universal moral law, but this development is continu-
ous and its own end.19 In discussing history as perpetual development, culture is 
figured as radically temporal. What ought to be never completely becomes what 
is through the unity of cultural life. The idea of unifying human life according 
to cultural values was in this sense a symptom of modernity and a response to 
modernity. Despite his primary concern with unifying humanity under moral 
universals, Kuwaki could not locate a fixed substance for morality, but only the 
generally human capacity to individually arrive at the moral universal. In history 
he recognized an eternal process that can never find its final resting point. In this 
sense, the person as the ideal center of moral and cultural life would always be 
in the process of actualizing and being actualized—history would be the history 
of cultivating the individual and the totality of individuals, or, in the language of 
nation-state building, Saitō’s “cultivation of state power.”20
This understanding of culture and cultural values was very political. As texts 
engaged with popular understandings of the political present, Culturalism and So-
cial Problems (1920) and Culture and Reconstruction (1922) discuss philosophy in a 
more everyday language that reveals some of the underlying social circumstances 
motivating Kuwaki’s turn to culture. He opposes the philosophy of culturalism to 
various materialist and natural scientific views of society, including Social Darwin-










































ism, naturalized ethnic nationalisms (including that of the colonized), and, increas-
ingly, Marxism and the historical materialist view of history. Cultural science is no 
longer solely a matter of epistemological or philosophical truth, but is intended to 
be the foundation for a new cosmopolitan ethos for Taishō democracy and its im-
perial missions. We also discover in Culturalism and Social Problems that Kuwaki’s 
experiences as a student in Germany did not solely provide him with a philosophi-
cal education. His confrontation with European Orientalism turns out to have been 
a significant motivation for his search for a science of culture governed by a priori 
values. In the passages quoted at the beginning of this book, Kuwaki argues against 
the type of historical thinking that informed Orientalism, which was one motiva-
tion for claiming in modern fashion that the historical future is necessarily open 
and therefore allows for the perpetual development of the cultural human. Edward 
Said describes the method of Orientalism as a haphazard piecing together of frag-
ments into an illusory representation of Oriental society. It is a discourse of experi-
ence that follows no identifiable rules except to objectify the past of the Other as 
the present of the Other, from the position of the informed expert.21 According to 
Kuwaki, Puccini’s opera brings together fragments of the Asian past and presents 
them as the essence of Japanese things. In turning to Kantian critical philosophy, 
Kuwaki uses Madame Butterfly as a sign of the need for an internal critique that will 
define the true essence of Japaneseness in an a priori manner.
However, once Kuwaki identified cultural values as the guiding force of historical 
development, and the human being as the subject and object of this development, 
he was very much working within the structure of the empirico-transcendental 
doublet that he identified as the primary problem in European representations of 
Asia. Positing the unity of human life under absolute values reintroduced anthro-
pology into Kuwaki’s system, particularly an understanding of national character, 
which Kant differentiated from the natural racial variations—white, black, yellow, 
reddish-brown—that he had picked up from eighteenth-century racial science. 
This national characterological rather than explicitly racial confusion of the tran-
scendental and the empirical, posited at the level of culture and cultural practice, 
comes through in a section of Kant and Contemporary Philosophy, “Kant’s View of 
Japan.” Kuwaki works through Kant’s dubious reflections on national character in 
the Anthropology, including the reference to the Japanese as the English of Asia. 
Kuwaki states that for Kant Japan was “neither utopia nor an uncivilized land.”22 
He also discusses Voltaire, Marco Polo, and other European views of Japan. His fi-
nal conclusion is that despite Kant’s prejudices, we can assume from the content of 
Engelbert Kaempfer’s The History of Japan (1727)—the primary European source 
on the country in eighteenth-century Europe—that “the Japan that appeared to 
Kant, in a certain sense, would have been a country that understands das Primat 
der praktischen Vernunft (the primacy of practical reason).”23 In opposition to Puc-
cini’s pastiche of Japanese and Asian culture, Kuwaki fantasizes that in gazing on 










































the unity called “Japan” Kant would have recognized that unity as an effect of its 
collective formation under the rule of the universal, and therefore as a national 
character (a confusion of the transcendental and the empirical that is particular 
to the neo-Kantian understanding of cultural value formation as a cosmopolitan-
national process). If the unity of the transcendental in the practical realm happens 
through culture and moral values, these values will be not only cosmopolitan, but 
also formative of national character, and therefore observable as a custom, a be-
havior, or even a physical feature.
This doubling of subject/object, universal/particular, transcendental/empiri-
cal affected Kuwaki’s discussions of Korea and the problem of cultural reform in 
the colonies. His perspectives on Korea were not Orientalist in the same way as 
Puccini’s opera, but the idea of world history as the ideal unity of humanity was 
still an ethnicized idea that maintained an anthropological boundary between the 
cultural spheres of Japan and Korea. His culturalist view of the world returned to 
empirical anthropology when he spoke of the discrete national worlds that made 
up the cosmopolitan world. In an essay titled “The Korean World of Ideas,” Kuwaki 
writes of Korea as a unified “world of ideas” both integrated within and distinct 
from “our world of ideas.” He puts Koreans in the position of students who need 
to regain faith in values-centered thought, and to overcome, along with their Japa-
nese teachers, the Meiji period’s false application of natural-scientific principles to 
culture and society:
I see that Korean thinkers’ faith is shaken because of scientific research (particularly 
the knowledge of evolutionary theory). . . . Biology is the science that developed most 
remarkably in the nineteenth century and evolutionary theory inspired the minds of 
numerous cultivated men. Herbert Spencer’s philosophy of evolution, which con-
fused Darwin’s evolutionary biology for a methodology, entered our country on the 
heels of English and American utilitarianism at the beginning of the Meiji period. . . . 
The secrets of psychology, law, economics—all of the human sciences24—could sup-
posedly be revealed through the principle of evolution. . . .
The theory of evolution is an explanation of facts and does not provide a standard 
for the evaluation of facts. . . . One thing that I myself tried to assert strongly during 
the aforementioned public lecture was the intent of critical philosophy and the ques-
tions that I received afterward confirm the degree to which the theory of evolution, 
psychologism, and the superficial and polarizing metaphysics that so easily combines 
with them have become the foundation for our world of ideas; they confirmed the 
fact that very few people really understand logicism and critical philosophy. From 
this I can say that the Korean world of ideas, even in its large tendencies, resembles 
the world of ideas of our own society. In this we must feel the need to clarify the true 
meaning of criticalism.25
Kuwaki employs the fact/value dichotomy of neo-Kantianism in order to critique 
Social Darwinism and utilitarianism, which had been very powerful in East Asia, 










































Meiji Japan, and the Korean empire. By distinguishing between the facts of nature 
and the values of the human sciences, Kuwaki shifts the discussion of the nation 
and the world from one of struggle, adaptation, and potential extinction, to one of 
culture, spirit, and the metaphysics of morals. He interprets the power of material-
ist and natural science epistemologies in Korea as a sign that the culturalist view of 
history, as well as the unity of Japanese and Korean culture within general Culture, 
has yet to take hold sufficiently. In the statements of Saitō and Ariyoshi we can see 
how liberal reformers of the colonial state saw political potential in this argument, 
because it demanded the negation of present factual conditions while making the 
capacity to evaluate facts morally and self-reflexively a condition for modernity 
shared by individuals in both Japan and Korea.
What Kuwaki calls “the evaluation of facts” requires critique, or the ethos of 
what he calls “criticalism.” In turn this critique requires the capacity for moral 
judgment and a sense of historical and cosmological purpose. Prefiguring the co-
lonial versions of culturalism that would emerge in the years to come, Kuwaki saw 
the problem of separating the purpose and methods of the human sciences from 
natural science as the central intellectual and social problem of the whole Japanese 
empire. For him, Social Darwinist accounts of history justified both world war and 
anticolonial nationalism, and the assertion of cosmopolitan community against 
any materialist philosophy functioned at once as a call for peace and reconstruc-
tion and as a justification of Japan’s colonial rule in Asia. Culturalism purported 
to reform the Japanese and Korean “worlds” into one world of ideas based on a 
universalist concept of moral genus-being and homo culturalis, but it at the same 
time continued to demarcate national variations of humanity according to their 
relative distance from the teleological form of the human (the person). Prefiguring 
late-twentieth-century area studies paradigms, Kuwaki asserted the generality of 
culture and the transcendental status of the idea of Japan while at the same time 
using the concept of the world at cross-purposes—to refer simultaneously to the 
“world of ideas” of the colonized people and to the world at large that could poten-
tially unify the lives of colonizer and colonized under the rules of absolute cultural 
values (or what postwar US modernization theorists, in their concern with the 
“non-economic factors of growth,” called “convergence”).26
Therefore, when Kuwaki wrote of the difference between natural facts and cul-
tural values, he was not situating all Koreans in the sphere of natural objects, but 
he was warning both the colonizer and the colonized of the dire historical effects 
of remaining natural humans and a natural nation. He was concerned with sepa-
rating the realm of freedom of the human individual, as well as the entire process 
of human historical progress, from the causality of natural laws. Values are the 
a priori ideas that are actualized through the moral and cultural practice of in-
dividuals who make up a society and they therefore belong to an entirely differ-
ent causal order from nature. By emphasizing the autonomy of the human being 










































from natural laws, he could claim that left labor activists as well as Korean ethnic 
nationalists both had too materialist an understanding of the human being as a 
laboring machine, as the owner of natural rights, or as a member of a nation with 
a foundation in nature.27 The power of the cosmopolitan humanism of culturalism 
derived from this metaphysical claim that all philosophies that situated the human 
being in nature—as a primarily material being or as a being endowed with rights 
from nature—stripped the human of its moral freedom and the spontaneity it re-
quired to actualize what ought to be.
The concept of the world as both the totality of life and the discrete national 
spheres that make it up transformed Korea into an integrated cultural object of 
pragmatic anthropology, a place where ideas and worldviews could be actively 
transformed and molded. In this project, Korea actually resembles Japan, although 
the difference of its world is always reiterated through the imaginary boundary be-
tween our world and Korea. Through this structure, Korea can signify for Kuwaki 
an anxiety about a time lag between the cosmopolitan world of general values and 
the Japanese national subject who will enter that world by becoming a self-con-
scious, reasoning, and moral subject. Kuwaki suggests both that the Korean world 
is particularly steeped in the outdated epistemologies of the Meiji past and that 
Korean intellectuals’ reluctance to enter the purely human time of cosmopolitan 
history indicates the weakness of criticalism in “our world” (Japan proper) as well.
In this dualist world of cosmopolitan and natural nations, Koreans will even-
tually join cultural humanity, but it is impossible that the ideal person could be 
found first in Korea, because Korea’s development will always be a reflection of 
the advancements made by its teacher. The notion of teacher and student is at 
the foundation of this mode of assimilation and discrimination. As part of the 
project of Japaneseness critiquing Japanese self-consciously, Kuwaki also took up 
the social mission to educate Koreans by drawing them away from natural-sci-
entific epistemologies and politicized materialist philosophies (that is, Marxism). 
Yet, as the case of Korean cultural nationalism shows, the most powerful ideas 
of assimilation and discrimination in the Japanese empire were such humanist 
ones, because they posited a realm of freedom belonging to all of humanity at the 
same time as they ethnicized and normed space. These two moves were appeal-
ing to cultural nationalists in Korea who were interested in the project of national 
enlightenment and, in the 1940s, to those Korean intellectuals who thought that 
becoming Japanese was a condition for belonging to humanity and world history. 
Kuwaki’s simultaneous distinction between and conflation of “our world of ideas” 
and the “Korean world of ideas” also reflect how an ethnicized cultural border was 
necessary in order to posit the unity of world humanity suitable to colonial gov-
ernmentality. Later in this chapter I will analyze how this border can be regulative 
in a universal sense and differentiating in an anthropological sense only through 
another notion of the border, which is the communicative translation between 










































nations and national languages. The idea that communicative translation between 
national languages can serve as the foundation for the transmission of the tran-
scendental subject is intimately related to the biopolitics of culturalism, to its other 
assertion that regulative general values allow its transcendental epistemology to 
give organic unity to cultural life.
POLITICAL EC ONOMY AND CULTUR AL EC ONOMY: 
THE LIMIT C ONCEPT IN SŌDA KIICHIRŌ
Despite its claims to have risen above politics through its focus on morality and 
spirit, culturalism was obviously very political, not least of all because culturalists 
proclaimed it to be a form of democracy superior to the shared sovereignty of and 
natural equality between all people. Culturalists developed theories of democratic 
society based on cosmopolitan cultural values and other anthropological criteria, 
a social contract whose utopian image was akin to Kant’s kingdom of ends rather 
than a contract guaranteeing natural rights. For Kant, “A rational being belongs 
as a member to the kingdom of ends when he gives universal laws in it but is also 
himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, as lawgiving, he 
is not subject to the will of any other.”28 Therefore, one can only belong to the state 
and live under the laws of the state if one is capable of legislating one’s morality 
universally for the public good; the benefits and responsibilities of living under the 
laws of the state are not given by nature. Along these lines, Sōda Kiichirō criticized 
Voltaire and the socialist political economist Anton Menger for arguing that both 
political rights and a portion of the social product were guaranteed to individuals 
solely because they were Gattungsexemplar (or one natural instance of the hu-
man genus), and he organized his culturalist political and economic philosophy 
around self-legislated morality as Gattungswesen (or genus-being).29 In his cul-
turalist theory of political conduct, no one is human in the given sense of natural 
rights, but everyone must try nonetheless to belong to the moral general culture, 
the kingdom of ends, through the proper use of their freedom.
Because culturalist imperialism was an economic venture overlaid with the 
discourses of general culture and moral practice, political economy underwent a 
transformation into cultural economy. The intersection between the transcenden-
tal and empirical aspects of culturalism occurred most concretely in Sōda’s field 
of “national economy studies” (Volkswirtschaftslehre, kokumin keizaigaku). In this 
discipline, the transcendental philosophy of value became social science. The im-
age of the national economy it presents is an imperialist one in which the limits of 
the national economy are precisely where cosmopolitan values must be asserted, 
where humanization and culturalization must improve upon nature, transforming 
the natural human into the cultural human through the pragmatic institution of 
abstraction and exchange, and through the teleological image of an organic totality 










































of proper human subjects living under the rule of ideas (that is, general values). 
While working as a banker, Sōda Kiichirō wrote a number of significant texts in 
national economy studies, as well as essays in culturalist philosophy.30 He wrote 
many works on more strictly economic topics, such as the credit system, Adam 
Smith’s and David Ricardo’s criticisms of mercantilism, and critiques of the eco-
nomic theories of syndicalists and socialists.31 However, like Smith before him, 
Sōda put a great deal of philosophical reflection into the question of the subjec-
tivity that could sustain a well-functioning world market. His work in political 
economy was concerned with how the formation of the national and world econo-
mies could be reconsidered as problems of culture. Sōda’s reading of the national 
economy in culturalist terms provides an image of the society that culturalists de-
sired to create. His defense of this image of society required a rearticulation of 
the limits of culturalist epistemology—or what may not be known about (other) 
humans—as the very site where humanism’s regulative principles come to govern 
the world anthropologically and pragmatically.
During his time living abroad in Germany, Sōda published, in German, two 
major texts in economics, Money and Value (1909) and The Logical Nature of Eco-
nomic Laws (1912).32 In each of these texts, Sōda applied perspectives on epistemol-
ogy and logic garnered from neo-Kantian cultural science to questions of money, 
value, and economic laws. He attempted to synthesize this cultural and moral 
genus-being with a cruder utilitarian one: homo economicus, or the human as self-
interested, rational economic actor. In the introduction to Money and Value, Sōda 
explains that the cultural cosmopolitanism that had been asserted in German un-
derstandings of culture since the late eighteenth century came to influence his 
research into economics:
I want to return, in my research concerning the essence of money and value, to the 
German classical period and, in general, to the fountain of youth of German culture. 
National economy studies are no longer to me a mere “bread-and-butter issue,” but 
rather a huge cultural question for all of mankind. I am especially thankful to the 
German sciences for having given me this conviction.33
By 1909 Sōda was reading political economy through his appreciation for Goethe, 
Kant, and others in the pantheon of “German thought,” and had come to consider 
economic problems to be problems of cultural life. Sōda’s return to the “fountain 
of youth” of German thought resulted in the application of Kantian philosophy to 
the field of economics. Such an application has been rare, and Simmel’s Philosophy 
of Money is probably one of the only works still read widely from this conver-
gence at the turn of the century.34 In both Simmel’s work and Sōda’s reading of it, 
series of financial and commodity exchanges in capitalism make up a manifold 
of experiences that must be unified under an idea. For Simmel, money is both 
ideal and material. As the quintessential sign for the idea of exchangeability, it 










































brings together the manifold of exchanges under the rule of the transcendental; 
however, as a thing in the material world, it unifies these manifold experiences in 
actuality, not solely in the realm of noumenal concepts.35 At the same time, what 
makes things equal is the human subject of judgment, the economic actor who 
determines according to his aesthetic and cultural judgment that a certain object 
is rightly considered exchangeable with another.
Many significant lapses and dead ends in transcendental philosophy become 
clear when it is explicitly displaced into the field of political economy in this man-
ner. The version of national economy studies that Sōda undertook was a liberal 
alternative to the increasingly powerful socialist and communist movements in 
Germany and the rest of Europe. The works of the economists that Sōda cites in 
Money and Value—Carl Johannes Fuchs, Georg Simmel, and so on—tend to ignore 
the labor theory of value and focus mostly on money, exchange, and consumption. 
Even in the realm of exchange, there were problems that emerged when trying to 
read money through transcendental philosophy, problems that are very related to 
the semiotic limits of the philosophy of culturalism. The philosophy of cultural-
ism was Sōda’s attempt to solve the ethical issues presented by Simmel’s formula-
tion that money is the form that governs and rules all the various experiences and 
transactions occurring in the capitalist system. Just as Kuwaki’s discussion of the 
person was an attempt to transform questions of material inequalities into spiri-
tual and moral questions, Sōda recognized that if money is the sole value govern-
ing exchanges in society, then human agency is reduced to the mechanical acting 
out of a principle external to itself. In developing a culturalist understanding of 
the human subject, in which general cultural values are what govern the formation 
of the national economy, he tried to improve on the instrumental understand-
ing of money, value, and causality. He made the issue of exploitation and surplus 
value that Marx located in the movement of Money-Commodity-Money into an 
issue of morality and personhood. The limit of capitalism, Sōda thinks, is not the 
incapacity to fully transform surplus value into profit, as Marx theorized. Rather 
than recognize that incapacity as the limit to capital accumulation and expansion, 
Sōda developed a moral philosophy of the limit, asserting an anthropological dis-
tinction between the properly cultural agent of the national economy and those 
humans who remained trapped in the mechanism of natural phenomena. This 
maneuver in his moral philosophy racialized and gendered, through cosmopolitan 
rhetoric, the borders of the national economy.
Sōda’s philosophy of culture and cultural value is quite complex, but I would 
like to focus on three main aspects: his understanding of the causality in his-
tory, his introduction of the “limit concept” into cultural science, and the way 
that he used anthropological distinctions in order to present the “system of cul-
tural values” as an organic system with no clear distinction between itself and 
an outside, but rather an internal border constituted through the figuration of 










































the national language and its others, as well as the binary between cultural and 
natural humans.
Sōda’s rejection of the narrative logic of chronology proper to positivist his-
torical science is explicit in his criticism of the application of what Kant called the 
“schema of succession” to the causality of historical events.36 Rather than given 
causes producing given effects in history, history is rather the realm of individual 
freedom, but a freedom that should be guided by morality and purpose. He states 
in “The Logic of Individual Causality” that in order to differentiate between cause 
and effect there must be an ethical position from which this real distinction is 
made—the division of material into cause and effect never occurs autonomously 
from the subject’s actualization of general values.37 Because he defines positions 
according to the “purpose of knowledge” to which they are dedicated, the epis-
temological subject is essentially practical and teleological (that is, moral in the 
sense of Kantian universal self-legislation). He argues that science establishes a 
position whenever it is oriented toward its final purpose, and only through this 
purpose can the epistemological subject define historical events and their causal 
relations. Causality does not occur mechanically, with one event or value produc-
ing a certain effect; rather, the cultural scientist can decide what causes an event 
only retrospectively by way of the final purpose for interpreting the event. For 
Sōda, the human was divided between the lived experience of individual life and 
the transcendental conditions under which he experienced history, and connect-
ing these two realms of individual life was the purpose of the interpretations made 
by cultural science. This was a matter of reason applying what ought to be (Sollen) 
to the study and formation of what is (Sein). Nonmechanistic time as the basis 
for historical thought and action intervened in both the empirical and transcen-
dental registers of human life. What gave form and purpose to these two registers 
of human life was not the categories and laws of nature, including the law of me-
chanical causality, but rather a historical process of natural humans developing 
into a morally and politically liberated human genus.
Within this dualism, how did Sōda arrive at limit concepts as the teleology 
of cultural science and the person as the teleology of daily cultural life? Sōda 
dedicated Cultural Value and the Limit Concept to Heinrich Rickert, but he was 
critical of certain aspects of Rickert’s theory of value formation. “The process of 
the actualization of cultural value” remains central to his philosophy of cultural-
ism, but he disagrees with Rickert that values are categories of actuality (Wirklich-
keitskategorie), or characteristics of an object that precede our experience of it 
(for example, characteristics belonging to quantity, quality, unity, and modality).38 
Sōda claims that values do not structure historical experience in this way. Values 
are not so closely related to the categories of natural science, but are pure con-
cepts with no relation to experience; in other words, they are ideas. In order to 
explain this difference, he turns to the second half of the Critique of Pure Reason, 










































which deals with transcendental philosophy and reason’s attempt to regulate itself 
through regulative ideas. He refers to these regulative ideas as “limit concepts,” 
concepts that define the teleological purpose of fields of knowledge beyond the 
categories through which the understanding comprehends nature. Limit concepts 
are ideas with no relation to cultural experiences of otherness, or any experience 
at all; they are pure concepts through which the subject can imagine the complete 
rationality of the system of cultural values. This wholeness, this organic unity, 
is not given in nature, but actualized through the effort of individuals free from 
nature’s mechanical causality.
Paul Natorp, in his neo-Kantian rereading of the thing-in-itself, situated the 
limit concept where Kant himself asserted a more fundamental and uncrossable 
divide, or “block,” between the transcendental and the empirical.39 By rearticulat-
ing the thing-in-itself as a limit concept, or in Kant’s terms a “regulative principle” 
for science, Natorp argued that even if it is never cognized fully, the thing-in-itself 
nonetheless remains the goal of scientific pursuits, and can therefore serve as the 
teleology of scientific progress.40 In Kant and Contemporary Philosophy, Kuwaki 
posited the person as the thing-in-itself, making the formation of a perfectly moral 
subject the teleology of a continuous cultural development.41 The figure of the per-
son was always present, but only as an absent ideal, a lack in the existing human. 
Sōda also appropriated the limit concept for cultural science, displacing it into the 
human sciences, so that the formation of the cosmopolitan individual became the 
teleological purpose of the whole realm of human activity referred to as culture. 
In Cultural Value and the Limit Concept, Sōda displaces the limit concept from the 
natural sciences into the cultural sciences, discussing general values as values that 
guide human development toward the telos of “transindividual general conscious-
ness” (or, in moral rather than epistemological terms, the person). In the natural 
sciences of the time, the limit concept represented an admission that there are 
physical and natural phenomena beyond the conceptual grasp of the human be-
ing. It was also expressive of a kind of scientific sublime, a feeling that the human 
subject can potentially comprehend the chaos of nature and conceive it as a total-
ity, despite the incongruency of concept and reality.42
In discussing “general values” as the limit concepts for the philosophy of cul-
turalism, limit concepts that should guide the cultural and moral development 
of the national economy, Sōda similarly transformed the external limits of the 
social system into internal limits; the limit at which the “system of cultural values” 
(bunka kachi no taikei) was incomplete in its comprehension of reality was reart-
iculated as this system’s very teleology, its regulative principle. Therefore, Sōda 
discussed the limit concepts governing the economic system—particularly money 
and general cultural values—not as contradictory concepts partially inadequate 
to the “thing-in-itself ” of the real economic and cultural system, but rather as the 
very signs that would allow for cultural life and cultural science to undergo their 










































proper formations. As I show in the next part, this transformation of external 
limits into internal limits was made possible by the idea of the national language 
and its formation into a world-scientific language. It also required a moral binary 
between natural humans and cultural humans; the system of cultural values could 
only be presented as an organic whole by supplementing it with an external ele-
ment, the natural human, and a master-signifier (the person).
Just as Foucault pointed out that Kant’s anthropology belonged to the realm of 
transcendental philosophy, Sōda’s philosophy of the limit concept was anthropo-
logical precisely because it was transcendental. Once reason regulates itself with 
concepts that have no relation to a possible experience, but rather are simply te-
leological concepts that allow one to imagine that the conditions of possibility for 
experience have been fulfilled, then the question arises: what is the identity of the 
being that is capable of regulating its own reason in this manner? Therefore, in order 
to ground his transcendental philosophy of culture, and to give it a wholeness and 
systematicity, Sōda simultaneously relied on an anthropological distinction between 
the person and the natural human that maintained an empirical dimension. The an-
thropological side of Sōda’s transcendental philosophy of culture is most apparent in 
the models he provided for the human’s cultivation out of nature toward his genus-
being, his cultural and moral subjectivity. His discussion of historical interpretation 
described a split subject of culture that appeared in the empirical as a historical 
individual and projected itself in the transcendental as the interpreter of history.
In “Cultural Value as Limit Concept,” Sōda describes the metamorphosis of 
the subject from a mere physiological being, to a psychological being, to general 
consciousness as a process of the natural raw material of the human developing 
toward its ideal form:
For example, let us take the Ought (Sollen) of general consciousness. In the transition 
from the physiological ego to the psychological ego, and from judgmental conscious-
ness to transindividual general consciousness, general consciousness serves as an 
ideal (Ideal). Therefore, in its content, general consciousness is a singular idea. When 
a direction is given to the transition from the physiological self to the psychologi-
cal self, the rise toward the extreme point of this direction must arrive at the ideal 
of transindividual general consciousness, or the “limit concept” of this transition.43
If culture is regulated by cultural values as limit concepts, as well as the teleology 
of cultural-historical development, the development of the subject is governed by 
the regulative principle of its most ideal form. For Sōda, the Ought of subjectivity 
is general consciousness, a subject whose thoughts and values are generally valid 
for all of humanity. Again, transcendental philosophy turned to the empirical phi-
losophy of anthropology to discuss how the transcendental could take objective 
form, because the human being was the only possible object of experience once 
nature was bracketed as unfree mechanism.










































How, then, was Sōda able to present this anthropocentric system of cultural 
values as an organic totality? In his teleological and prescriptive version of cultural 
science, the purpose of the process of the actualization of cultural value (the per-
son) was linked to an ideal organization of social life, as a kind of second nature 
of modern capitalist society, rather than to Kant’s image of nature as intelligent 
design. As the final purpose of culture, the person could not be related to any other 
conditions of possibility. Culture was to serve as the foundation for the actualiza-
tion of this teleological principle: “Culture is the location in which the teleological 
principle of the person should be actualized.”44 The teleological judgment of the 
interpreter of cultural history could recognize the ideal organization of the mate-
rial world, and the market of cultural objects, as the products of intention. Neither 
this rational organization nor the subjects who created it were subject to natural 
laws. Rather, the organization was reflective of, and reflected in, the intentionality 
of the individual persons who were free actors upon its surface. In turn, the realm 
of culture was where individuals could progress toward their complete individua-
tion as persons, and toward the ideal identity between their historical individuality 
and general consciousness.
Sōda’s understanding of final purpose and intentionality was entirely anthro-
pocentric. The objectification of the ideal cultural system was a result of human 
rather than divine intentionality. Nonetheless, there is a clear reference to Kant’s 
teleological view of nature in the relationship between form and intentionality in 
Sōda’s image of the ideal social system:
Cultural goods [including technology, morality, law, and economy] are the products 
of a single effort occurring in the background of cultural life. These goods serve 
various individual purposes, working collectively and supplementing the actualiza-
tion of a defined norm. Putting it in more conventional terms, these goods have an 
organic organization. We call this organization “the unity of cultural goods,” and we 
name this unity “culture.” Only when we view culture as a process of the actualiza-
tion of value does it gain its complete significance, which it must have as a force op-
posed to nature. Cultural value is the Ought (Sollen) that creates culture, and carries 
with it the direction and purpose of culture. A person recognizes his own individual 
significance by seeking to preserve his own value in the process of realizing cultural 
value and to avoid being replaced by others (in other words, by promoting his own 
importance and value through contact with the products and creations of culture). 
Cultural value is the object that includes immanently its own logic and the person 
is the subject who gives it meaning. There can be no cultural value without persons 
and no persons without cultural value. He who is not oriented toward cultural value 
is only a natural human; personhood can only exist in a cultural human. Therefore, 
culturalism seeks the following: that each person is an individual in the process of 
the realization of value, but is not buried beneath the surface of the process; that each 
person ensures its individual position on the surface and that persons are assembled 
by one obligation, one law, and one order; that cultural values emerge as norms and 










































purposes, and, moreover, that their logical and universal validity is actualized in 
content and in fact, in accordance with the person. In other words, culturalism is 
“humanism” and personalism, which attempt to understand, on the basis of a phi-
losophy of cultural value, a person and a culture.45
In describing the cultural system that cultural science was to produce and un-
derstand, Sōda developed an image of a national economy in which the whole of 
the system was reflective of the intentions of individual actors. He endowed the 
surface of identical cultural value with real existence through a teleological argu-
ment. Though he considered the ideal subjects and objects of culture—persons 
and values—to be ends in themselves, and therefore cultural phenomena free from 
external conditions, he simultaneously claimed that culture organized social life 
into an organic organization that resembled a natural phenomenon. The organon 
of culture confronted and improved upon nature, and brought individuals out of 
their stagnancy as natural humans; it also reified the human subject by placing it 
within the “organization of cultural goods.” As organic products of the intention-
ality of individual actors, society, the national economy, and the world economy 
were analogous to organic natural phenomena that grew naturally toward their 
ultimate cosmopolitan purpose. This notion of the “second nature” of capitalism, 
articulated through Kantian teleology, situated Sōda within the liberal tradition of 
naturalizing capitalist social relations.
Sōda does not examine the problem of surplus value or connect the concept of 
value to labor power (he almost completely ignored the labor theory of value in 
either the Ricardian or the Marxian version). Instead, he displaces the production 
process into the “process of the actualization of cultural value,” and seeks the es-
sence of money as a nonquantifying determinant of value. The bourgeois notion 
of individual freedom in exchange, regulated by the concept of money and the 
subjective valuation of objects, was the starting point and end point of Sōda’s eco-
nomics. Political economy was one primary field in which concepts (for example, 
money) were to regulate the process of rationalization, and thus draw the cultural 
system and cultural community into an organic organization. The historical un-
certainty of politics and economy, epitomized by the often chaotic movements of 
capital, seems to have demanded that his political economy not rely on the me-
chanical causality of natural science, but also that it be able to overcome, through 
regulative principles and a theory of moral practice, the potential chaos that might 
be exposed through the pure individuation of phenomena. The infinite substitu-
tion of cultural values came to require limit concepts at the level of epistemology 
and teleology at the level of the sign. In her reading of Kant’s teleology, Gayatri 
Spivak points out that the process of making-whole within the Kantian system, or 
supplementation (Ergänzung), comes to require the binary signs of God and Man 
in the Raw, as well as a moral and aesthetic but ultimately anthropological distinc-
tion between those who experience the sublime and those who cannot.46 In the 










































more secular discourse of the philosophy of culturalism, this supplementation oc-
curred with the person and the natural human as the two axes. In order to establish 
the national economy as an object of knowledge, Sōda made the external internal 
through epistemology (the limit concept articulates the boundary as a norm) and 
supplementarity (the whole is made such by the insertion of a master-signifier 
that both belongs to the system and is outside it—the person, the fully constituted 
moral subject, in that contradictory position where God had once been).
As in Kuwaki’s theory of the social state, both of these maneuvers required 
anthropology and the negative figure of the natural human in order to present 
culture as an organic system. This transformation of an external border (the limit 
of the system) into an internal border (the limit concept, or norm for the system) 
also became a matter of national language as the universalizing medium that al-
lowed for the localization of the transcendental, moral subject of general culture. 
Kuwaki’s idea of a unified world of humanity made up of various national worlds 
required a poetics of national language and a communicative notion of transla-
tion, as did Sōda’s internalization of the external, or the transformation of the lim-
its of knowledge into the very foundation for rationality.
TR ANSL ATING THE HUMAN, C OMMUNICATING 
C ONCEPT S,  NATIONAL L ANGUAGE
Culturalism was characterized by an abstract and schematic mode of historical 
interpretation. Its transcendental method resulted in the subjection of history to 
philosophical logic, an organicist understanding of social totality, and a view of 
historical time as universal, developmental, and form-giving. Despite these ideal-
ist foundations, culturalism was also highly pragmatic, and its abstractions were 
transformed into strategies, as the case of cultural policy attests. One powerful 
means of connecting the abstract logic and teleology of cultural history to the 
historical present and to the everyday was through ideas of national language. 
If culturalism’s ideas for a universal human community seemed out of reach in 
history, national subject formation and national language formation could serve 
as prosthesis, and were often perceived as a means toward ascending to “general 
consciousness” within a particular territory.
Rickert, Sōda, and Yi Kwang-su all argued that a communicative national lan-
guage could maintain and invigorate the spirit of culture, as well as the subject 
who studies and lives general culture. Although cultural science attempted to 
study culture through a generally valid methodology and by way of cultural val-
ues, it also encountered the limits of the conceptual determination of cultural life. 
Concepts seemed to lose their universality in the face of radical spatial, histori-
cal, and linguistic differences within the generally human. At the margins of their 
texts, culturalists proposed the unifying power of national language, and the pos-










































sibility of communicative translation between national languages, as the means 
of grounding the concepts of the transcendental subject within a local sphere of 
anthropological difference.
The question of the role of national language for science, as well as the semiotic 
limits to a scientific understanding of the human, did not emerge for Sōda in a 
language that he thought of as his own. Language was not an important part of 
Sōda’s philosophy of culture. However, in the introduction to Money and Value, 
addressed to his mentor Carl Johannes Fuchs, he makes a significant mention of 
the “mother tongue,” which takes a tone similar to Kuwaki’s critique of Oriental-
ism. He implicitly questions Fuchs’s Orientalism and, as in Kuwaki’s response to 
Madame Butterfly, he asserts the need for Japanese science to take its place in the 
pantheon of human generality. Writing in German, he argues for the power of the 
mother tongue to communicate or transmit the concepts of this science across 
Asia and to the world:
As I submit this work, I would not only like to express personal gratitude for letting 
me experience during the past four years both directly and indirectly, both socially 
and scientifically, unlimited and indefatigable support and unwavering friendship, 
but also like to take the opportunity to give due expression to my acknowledgment of 
the wonderful inspiration that I have received from the German spirit generally. I am 
fully aware that you are an admirer and an aficionado of the art of our ancestors, the 
ancient Japanese, and that you might miss that old beauty in this work, the product 
of a “modern Japanese.” To build something on our own Japanese, or even Asian, sci-
ence alone—which has not yet received significant acknowledgment from European 
scholars and which appears to me to be a sleeping giant that must only be woken, and 
is, despite various prejudicial opinions, a rare and extraordinarily refined cultural 
product of humankind in general—that is only a task for the future. However, if I 
once have the pleasure to be able to claim for myself a small fraction of your own ap-
preciation for ancient Japanese art, my scholarly hope that I hold as a member of this 
people, whose mother tongue has not yet been accepted as a generally understood 
world language of science, would have been fulfilled even within my generation.47
This text, written by an “Asian” student whose modern subjectivity seems to have 
been in question by his professor, subordinates the past to science and implicitly 
to the German language’s status as a world-scientific language. German allows 
the intellectual a capacity for applied aesthetic judgment, and it is this capacity 
that Sōda wants to secure for his mother tongue and its “Japanese or even Asian 
science.” He implies that German has already developed to the degree that it 
allows the subject to appreciate the artwork of the Japanese past, whereas such 
an appreciation can only occur for him when his language becomes properly 
scientific. The potential collapse of the concepts of cultural science occurs at 
the level of language; Sōda suggests that the underdevelopment of the mother 
tongue threatens to render aesthetic judgment mute and somnolent. However, 










































the rescue of science, or the awakening of science, also occurs through the uni-
versalizing power of language, because the development of the mother tongue 
could potentially enliven and ground a Japanese science (or, in a turn of linguis-
tic imperialism, “Asian science”). This new scientific language would allow Sōda’s 
generation to determine the value of the artifacts of its own past and the Asian 
past more generally. It is in this way that cultural scientists posited national lan-
guage as a universalizing medium.
Sōda’s assertion of national language as the basis for a scientific understand-
ing of the national cultural past is given in part as a response to the Oriental-
ist fascination of Fuchs with ancient Japanese art. This Orientalism is apparent 
not in the mere fact of Fuchs’s aesthetic taste, but rather in Sōda’s intimation 
that Fuchs will be disappointed to read a book of economic theory written by a 
“modern Japanese,” because it lacks the “ancient beauty” of Japanese art. Sōda’s 
mother tongue remains outside of the sphere of scientific communicability called 
“Europe,” which is contrasted to its other, “Asia.” Japan will become scientific as 
scientists and intellectuals develop the mother tongue to the point where it too 
can properly communicate scientific concepts and methods. Sōda expressed this 
desire for his mother tongue to become a “world language of science” only three 
years after the institution of compulsory Japanese-language education at normal 
schools in Korea (1906).48 This timing was not coincidental, as the enlivening 
of a native Asian and Japanese science through the Japanese national language 
entailed the production of native and nonnative speakers and the unification of 
the national language through its (colonial) pedagogical formation.
The significance of the Europe/non-Europe distinction, and its linguistic deter-
mination, is apparent also in the following quotation by Rickert, which appears in 
the introduction to The One, the Unity, and the Oneness (dedicated to “my Japanese 
colleagues”).49 Rickert sought an objective relationship between individuals and 
values that were generally valid. His tautological view of society ascribed general 
validity to the everyday representations that formed individuals’ relationships to 
singular events; however, the dependency of this general validity upon a commu-
nicative notion of human culture, and therefore of translation, becomes apparent 
at the margins of his texts. He writes in this introduction,
As for the matters that have been important in my exchanges with Japanese re-
searchers, there is a particular point to be emphasized. In Germany today one has, 
in philosophy, lost the belief in an “object” (Sache) that exists independently from 
the composition of an individual man, and that approaches him as something im-
personal. One thinks that in “worldviews” (Weltanschauung) everything depends on 
either the individual or the historical and national conditions under which groups 
live. “Objective” science, therefore, cannot provide the objects (Sache) for philosophy 
and occasionally—and this is only “consequent”—one would like to know nothing 
more, in general, from science. Our “youth” . . . view different national and historical 










































cultures in their totality as forms, which emerge and dissolve like mere creatures, 
and between them there is to be found no overlapping, objective community that 
realizes, through various peoples and times, a continuous development of a “gen-
eral human” culture. There are, one says, many sciences that come and go, but not a 
single, permanent science, least of all in philosophy. One calls it “relativism” and it 
appears—despite Plato’s Theatatus—very “evident.”
In this regard, exchanges with my Japanese colleagues have been very instruc-
tive. In them we are confronted with agents of a culture that not only originates in 
a locale far removed spatially, but also is one whose differences in content are more 
drastic than those between the European cultures with which we are acquainted. 
The difficulties of mutual understanding must be greater than those that standardly 
exist between the various nations of Europe. Nonetheless, as I “experienced” it, these 
colleagues were sooner or later brought, not only in the realm of logic (quickly over-
come), but also in questions of aesthetics, ethics, and even religious philosophy, to a 
common and purely objective realm, such that discussions of national and historical 
differences no longer played an essential role.50
In this introduction, Rickert is addressing the cultural relativists in Germany, 
whose ethnic nationalism was already beginning (in 1924) to undermine the cos-
mopolitan idea of culture that was at the foundations of cultural science. In the 
face of these worldview philosophies, Rickert tried to reestablish an objective rela-
tionship between the individual subject and the matters of philosophical inquiry. 
In exhibiting an admiration of his Japanese colleagues, he was criticizing the rise 
of ethnic nationalism in Germany, whose historical basis lay in World War I, as 
well as in colonialism in Africa and, to a lesser extent, Asia.51 Therefore, his aca-
demic interactions with students from Japan became a test case for the universality 
of German cosmopolitanism. Just as Sōda saw Europe as a separate unity from 
Japan and Asia, Rickert thought of the agents of Japanese culture as representatives 
of a homogeneous people from outside Europe. Cultural and linguistic distinc-
tions allowed for the demarcation of Europe and non-Europe. He asserted the 
capacity of world culture to overcome ethnic nationalism within the nation and 
the continent of Europe more broadly. However, Rickert failed to notice a cer-
tain compatibility between the ethnic nationalisms he criticized and his idea of an 
“overlapping, objective community” that could be established through a historical 
development that would “move through the multiplicity of peoples and times.” His 
idea that there did exist, or should exist, an objective unity to global community 
instituted a homogeneity of historical time that conflated the cosmopolitan and 
the national. Through logic quite similar to ideas of assimilation in colonial Ko-
rea, Rickert marked his Japanese colleagues as both cultural outsiders to Europe 
and tremendous assimilators, anthropological proof of the power of the German 
language and German philosophy to mediate the communications of the general 
cosmopolitan community and not just a single ethnos.










































While the German state had yet to reassert its imperial ambitions in the mid-
1920s, questions of national language and translation in culturalism are rendered 
more complex by the history of culturalism’s place within the Japanese imperial 
project. The figuration of dominant and subordinate languages was not precisely 
the same for colonized intellectuals, such as the subject of the next chapter, the 
Korean novelist Yi Kwang-su. However subordinated Japanese science was to 
European science for Sōda, and however reminiscent Rickert’s views on culture 
are of Japan’s assimilation policies, the relationship between their societies was not 
precisely colonial. Historians in South Korea have traced the educational policies of 
the Japanese colonial state’s Department of Education following the Treaty of Ports-
mouth of 1905 and the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910. In her informative 
study of education policy, Kim Kyŏng-mi emphasizes the centrality of Japanese-
language education in policies for middle school–aged children.52 The Department 
of Education justified the emphasis on language education in normal schools by 
claiming that knowledge of the Japanese language was common knowledge neces-
sary in everyday life. In this way, the spread of Japanese was meant to expand the 
sphere of communicability between national subjects to the colony. The idea of 
necessary common knowledge initially served the instrumental needs of the colo-
nial state in its expansion of Japanese national education into the colony. It was the 
colonial aspect of the process of Japanese becoming what Sōda calls a “generally 
understood world language of science.” As Kim points out, as Japanese became 
regarded as the language of science and commerce, and a means toward upward 
mobility, acquiring knowledge of Japanese could lead to the improvement of one’s 
economic and social standing (although she also discusses the problem of overedu-
cation and unemployment).53
The ease with which the Department of Education bureaucrats posited the 
unity of Japanese in their theories of colonial education is striking. Since the 
1980s, there has been a great deal of scholarly work on the genbun itchi (unifica-
tion of speech and writing) movements of the late Meiji period. Karatani Kojin 
historicized this movement as part of Japan’s nation-building project in the late 
nineteenth century, and compared it to other national language projects, from 
Dante’s use of the Italian vernacular to earlier discussions of language in Japan’s 
Tokugawa-period national studies (kokugaku).54 Considering that the debates 
on the unification of speech and writings had reached their apex only a couple 
decades earlier, it is significant that the Department of Education documents 
that Kim cites refer to “Japanese” and “the spread of Japanese” without any un-
certainty concerning the unity of the language or the identity of its spoken and 
written forms. As Gauri Viswanathan first showed in relation to British impe-
rialism in India, the national language and the national literary tradition were 
only canonized and organized through colonial education.55 Likewise, intellec-
tuals and bureaucrats declared the complete unification of speech and writing 










































and the self-identity of the speaking subject of Japanese—in other words, the 
formation of the national language—contemporaneously with the institution of 
colonial education and the figuration of Taiwanese and Koreans as nonnative 
speakers.
In the 1920s, under cultural policy, the governor-general did not place an 
outright ban on the use of the Korean language in schools or eliminate han’gŭl 
publication, even as Japanese became the primary language of global science 
and commerce for the empire. In addition to responding to perceived threats 
to the ethnic language, which were well founded despite the easing of censor-
ship and regulation that came about through cultural policy, most attempts to 
form the Korean national language, such as the work of the Korean Language 
Research Group, nonetheless departed from the culturalist principle that na-
tional language is one requirement for belonging to modern humanity. Many of 
the colonized intellectuals who worked to develop a Korean national language 
were also involved in the discourses of culturalism and cultural science, and 
drew from the models provided by the German Reformation, Romanticism, and 
neo-Kantianism, as well as discourses in Japan proper such as the unification of 
speech and writing.
One unfortunate consequence of the culturalist view of national language in 
colonial Korea was that it granted the linguistic unity of Japanese, and therefore 
legitimated it in colonial assimilation, in order to provide a model for Korean 
national language and communicative translation. As in colonial social theories 
of personhood, however, this view of the Japanese language was often referenced 
vis-à-vis German intellectual history. For Yi Kwang-su, the spread of han’gŭl had 
a Christian basis, and Martin Luther’s conscious creation of a vernacular German 
national language through the translation of the Bible became his model for the 
development of Korean.56 In a series of essays in which he delineates the posi-
tive and negative aspects that Christianity had brought to Korea (1917), Yi lists 
the formation of a Korean national language as one of Christianity’s significant 
contributions:
The sixth benefit that Christianity has brought to Korea is the spread of han’gŭl. The 
Christian church is actually what has given to Koreans the idea that han’gŭl is also 
writing. The invaluable Old and New Testaments and the Psalms have been trans-
lated into han’gŭl, and since then the authority of han’gŭl has emerged and spread. In 
the past, there were colloquial interpretations of Chinese scriptures, but these were 
not widespread and were so unskillful that one could hardly call them translations. 
They were just spewed forth.
However, we can say that even though it is not yet complete, the translation of the 
Bible is pure Korean language. If Korean writing and Korean language are to truly 
become dishes on which we can serve elevated thought, then the translation of the 
Bible is a good beginning.










































If in the future Korean literature is constructed, then on the first page of the his-
tory of this literature, the translation of the Old and the New Testaments will be 
recorded.57
The idea of cosmopolitan individuality in the Japanese empire was often con-
nected to some version of Christianity and Yi claims that the very foundations of 
the national language and national literature lay in the possibility of translating 
scripture. Missionaries and Christian nationalists saw the language created from a 
translation of the Bible to be a potential foundation for a national language com-
munity. For Yi, who sought more than anything to free the Korean language from 
what he saw as the premodern, imperial, and overly pictographic regime of literary 
Chinese, the nationalization of the individual depended upon the formation and 
spread of literary han’gŭl, which he imagined to be a pure signification of the oral-
ity of the Korean language as opposed to the imposition of the regime of writing 
that Chinese characters had placed on Korean national subjectivity.
As a critic of Confucianism and the stagnation of traditional Chinese literary 
culture, Yi also turned to Japan for a model of translation and speech suitable to mo-
dernity. In the following passage from a later essay, “On the Korean Nation” (1933), 
he reiterates the culturalist idea that culture is the totality of human historical activ-
ity, but turns to the universalizing capacity of language in stating that language is 
the foundation and the spirit of this encompassing culture. He also explains why 
translation is necessary for this cosmopolitan view of modern nationality:
That which constructs the essential elements of the nation is culture. Politics, phi-
losophy, literature, art, science, customs, interests, and so on are included in culture. 
However, needless to say, what lies at the foundation of all of these is language.
Language is the spirit of a nation, because language alone conveys the thoughts 
and emotions of the nation, allowing for conversation between one another, and for 
transmission to the next generation. . . . If the Koreans had not read the Four Books 
and the Three Classics in Chinese characters, but rather translated them into Korean, 
then they would not have been Sinicized.
Even when the Japanese nation read Chinese writing, they interpreted (segida) 
it precisely into Japanese; therefore, they were not Sinicized like the Korean upper 
classes and sustained the characteristics and spirit of the Japanese nation.58
Yi Kwang-su attributes the modernity of Japanese thought to the history and tradi-
tion of speaking and transliterating Chinese characters into Japanese. Yi sees such 
a tradition of translation between image and oral national language as a prereq-
uisite for cultural autonomy, going so far as to claim that the Korean intellectual 
class of the Chosŏn period could not nationalize, and therefore was colonized, 
because it did not establish the “regime of translation” necessary for belonging to 
modern humanity.59 As in Rickert’s and Sōda’s understanding, national language is 
not simply the preexisting mode of communication belonging to an ethnic group, 










































but a medium through which the modern cosmopolitan view of culture can poeti-
cally establish its universality within a particular context. As I will describe in the 
next chapter, nationalizing the language and speech of the Korean peninsula was, 
for Yi, one of many means of humanizing the life of the population, of drawing Ko-
reans out of the state of nature and into the world of culture. Positing the cultural 
nation in colonial Korea was not a way to break with imperial humanist discourse. 
Rather the nation was a concept through which to introduce a wholly new space 
and time in which the self-determining, free human subject establishes its national 
borders as internal borders between communicative national languages, thereby 
attributing to language the universalizing capacity to bring cultural practices and 
cultural life under the sway of the transcendental.
JAPAN’S  AREA STUDIES:  KOREA AS CULTUR AL AND 
LITER ARY REGION
The figuration of national language and the communicative translation between 
national languages is related to culturalism’s cosmopolitan geography, and there-
fore to the racialization and normalization of space and the discursive construc-
tion of areas. In twentieth-century Japan and Korea, as well as in US area studies 
after 1945, liberal cosmopolitanism often arrived at the delineation of the nation as 
an area precisely through such a movement from the metaphysics of morals to the 
pragmatism of anthropology, or rather through the reciprocal relation between 
them. What Charles Mills refers to as the norming of space, which is involved in 
the movement from morality to anthropology, was powerful from Japan’s insti-
tution of cultural policy in 1919 through the early Cold War era, when US area 
studies disciplines like modernization theory and cultural anthropology reworked 
many of the same principles that the discourses of culturalism in the Japanese 
empire had already articulated.60 Modernization theory proposed a US-centered 
model of universal history, but empirical disciplines like cultural anthropology 
were necessary supplements, because they showed how the universals of modern-
ization could at once mark the local differences within humanity and also contrib-
ute to the pragmatic transformation of local national contexts. Similarly, under 
cultural policy, the Korean nation form was the anthropological means to give a 
space and time to the transcendental principles of culturalism for colonial officials, 
Korean cultural nationalists, and migrant Japanese alike.
The collaboration between Japan’s cultural rule and Korean cultural nation-
alists was characterized by a push and pull between different modes of anthro-
pologizing universal history. For example, Ch’oe Nam-sŏn’s debate with Japanese 
archaeologists was not about whether or not national history could make uni-
versal history commensurable with particular histories, but rather about the spe-
cific origins, cultural makeup, and geography of ancient Korea.61 Reversing the 










































relation between the world and Korea, Ch’oe went so far as to claim that Korea is 
the cultural and linguistic origin of Asia and humankind at large, in articles with 
titles like “Korea and the Common Language of the World.”62 Likewise, migrant 
Japanese writers and intellectuals rarely questioned the cultural homogeneity of 
Korea or the continuity of its cultural history, although with a very different sense 
of how Korean particularity related to cosmopolitan universality. Just as Kuwaki 
and Sōda thought of culture as the aggregate of all human historical activity in its 
fundamental difference with nature, prominent colonial Japanese writers such as 
Arai Tetsu and Kitagawa Sukehito defined the “local color” of Korea through a 
comprehensive and encyclopedic cultural history that included art, literature, ar-
chitecture, language, politics, myth, and any other object that could be interpreted 
through the human sciences. In this way, the culturalist framework of universal 
history inaugurated modern area studies in East Asia. By transforming empirical 
anthropology into the epistemological double of a priori universal history, cultur-
alism did not simply construct Koreans as the primitive Other; it also constructed 
the area and the nation form called Korea as a local, spatiotemporal incarnation of 
the transcendental human as defined by the human sciences.
The area studies texts produced about Korea during the Japanese empire are in-
numerable, particularly if we include metropolitan political science, colonial gov-
ernment documents, and scholarly histories. However, the literature and scholarly 
work of Japanese migrants to Korea are perhaps the most revealing because they 
show the degree to which culturalist ideas informed the organization of knowl-
edge and the mediation of cultural difference even for those living their everyday 
lives in colonial Korea. In the preface to The Dictionary of the Intrinsic Colors of 
Korea, a significant document of Japan’s area studies, the editor Kitagawa Sukehito 
writes,
In order to clearly exhibit the intrinsic color—the local color or regional color—of 
Korea, I decided to seek out and pick more than two thousand terms from the fields of 
custom, convention, religion, religious festivals, music, sport, astronomy, geography, 
governmental institutions, education, hygiene, commerce, finance, industrial arts, 
mining, farming, forestry, fishing, aquatic products, animals, plant life, and history.63
Printed in colonial Keijō, or present day Seoul, in 1932, this text can be character-
ized as a form of area studies knowledge because of the broad disciplinary ori-
entations that are included in its lexicographic mode of organization. The only 
unity that could possibly hold together these various fields of knowledge in a 
single text is the area Korea, a hypothetical space in which the various objects 
of these various sciences connect with one another under the specificity of the 
anthropologically and linguistically defined territory. In terms of temporality, all 
of these very different objects are related to one another because they are part of 
the same cultural history and cultural history includes everything performed and 










































constructed consciously by humans. However, the human is more than the tran-
scendental subject of cultural history; it must take local, empirical forms. It is not 
just the definition of “Korea” as a territory that makes it an object of area studies 
in the Japanese empire, but also this interplay between transcendental ideas about 
human historical activity and the localization of these ideas through the nation 
form. “Local color” was the most prominent anthropologizing concept for colo-
nial culturalists like Kitagawa.
Poetry was one field in which culturalist discourse confronted the limits to its 
knowledge without being able to return coherently to the transcendental deter-
mination of space, time, and the human. In its migratory forms of knowledge and 
literature, Japan’s area studies opened up culturalism to the possibility of its dis-
orientation. Probably the most important poet with a culturalist bent who wrote 
in colonial Korea is Arai Tetsu. Pushing against the unity of national language 
proposed by many culturalists, Arai became a kind of bilingual writer, titling his 
collection of haiku poems about Korea カチ (1930) (a katakana transliteration of 
the Korean word for “together”). While themes of assimilation and brotherhood 
between colonizer and colonized are undoubtedly a significant part of his poetry, 
it also tends to move outside, however occasionally and inadvertently, the typical 
play between Japanese national exceptionalism and the logic of cosmopolitan as-
similation.
Compared to the philosophy of culturalism, Arai’s poems often speak for the 
colonized in a more transcultured and translated voice. In the following poem, 
“The Magic of Architecture,” Arai uses the Korean word for “the universe” or “the 
whole world” (unae), marking textually the translation involved in positing the 
concept of the world. He marks the foreignness of the word with diacritic points, 
italicized in my translation, as if to at once cite, appropriate, and be transformed 
by the speech of the colonized. He does the same with the name for heated water 
pipes placed in the floors of buildings, or ondol, which were an object of fascina-
tion for many migrant architects and writers.
The Magic of Architecture (1930)
 Arai Tetsu
When I walked one day
The whole world
Was an expansive field
When I walked one day
The whole world was crushed
There were tens of trees set up there
When I walked one day
A magnificent ondol was built
Supported by earth and small stones










































In fewer than five days
It was constructed
The magic of architecture
The architecture of the simple
And we could say free
Ondol
Thick earthen walls
Shut out the midsummer sun
And fill the air with coolness
The fire beneath the floor
Re-creates the joy of the southern countries
While the snow flies in the dead of winter
Making the indoors into heaven
With muddy walls




Out of the surrounding nature
These houses formed themselves
Truly
There live the natural people wearing white clothes
Magic we should praise
Transported to the present world
From ancient origins
The mysterious architecture of the ondol64
Arai’s mode of foreignizing and domesticizing in this poem is in many ways 
caught in the movement of supplementation involved in the philosophy of cul-
turalism, whereby the whole world is reflected in Korea as anthropological object 
and Korea, in turn, becomes worldly as its “ancient origins” gain a “magical” con-
nection to the general human capacity for architecture. He writes of the “natural 
people wearing white clothes,” the traditional clothing of the Korean peasantry, 
and puts himself in the position of speaking the language of modern culture for 
them. On the other hand, the poem also imagines the limits to the world some-
what differently from the philosophy of culturalism’s articulation of external 
borders as internal ones through the regime of translation and its transforma-
tion of the limits of knowledge into the very regulative principles of knowledge. 
There is a suggestion, at least, of a bilingual poetic language through which the 
human being might write not as a localized transcendental subject, but rather 
as a constantly translating and translated being. In the philosophy of culturalism, 
cultural value contributes to the architectonic of reason, to the extension of its 










































constructive power to its fullest potential. Arai’s poem inverts constructive reason 
into “the magic of architecture.” On the one hand, he occludes the subjectivity of 
Koreans, who as “natural people” perform their architecture unconsciously. On 
the other hand, like Rousseau’s noble savage, the architecture of the natural Ko-
reans is idealized for its simplicity and freedom. He praises its lack of ostentation 
and the way it seems to emerge magically out of the landscape. This invocation of 
magic points to another kind of telos in culturalist anthropology, a discourse that 
otherwise sees the goal of a fully formed person as existing at the opposite pole 
from the lack of consciousness found in nature and natural humans.
In my reading of culturalism, there is not a stable binary between civilization 
and barbarism, but rather this sort of interplay between the signs of civilization 
and barbarism, and the eventual arrest of this play through the arbitrary distinc-
tion between the person and the natural people. Arai’s poetry, like most migrant 
culturalist discourse, points at once to the instability of transcendental knowledge 
in a region of translation where self and other, transcendental and empirical, and 
civilization and barbarism threaten to blur permanently into each other. In this 
poem, however, we can also see how “magic” as the inversion of reason can func-
tion just as normatively. The cultivated spectator is still the subject who sees and 
reasons about what he sees. The poetic voice is alienated from the spontaneity of 
natural people and the divine, and therefore must speak for them in order to ar-
rest the play of signs that exposes the properly human subject to the limits of the 
colonizing culture. The poetic voice speaks for the natural people by declaring, 
through a celebration of local color, the magic of its own thinking reflected back 
to it as an ideal otherness.
Despite this inversion of reason and magic in which each becomes the mirror 
of the other on each side of the binary of culture and nature, the virtue of Arai’s 
poetry is that it points more clearly to the problem of the limit in the anthropol-
ogy of culturalism. Whereas the philosophy of culturalism posited the pure form 
of general cultural value as the limit concept for knowledge, turning what is be-
yond the scope of concepts into the very ethical norms for concept formation, his 
poetry recognizes the limit of what he can know as the migrant colonial subject, 
particularly in the turn to bilingual writing and the disruption of the hypothetical 
unity of national language upon which the philosophy of culturalism established 
the localized transcendental subject. His use of the Korean word unae rather than 
sekai as the proper name for the world inserts the difference of translation pre-
cisely at the limit where the philosophy of culturalism hypothesizes the unity of 
the idea grounded in national language. It suggests that the proper name for the 
world is not an idea through which ethnic worlds and the cosmopolitan world can 
be unified, but only ever a translation or transliteration of its foreign name. Arai 
recognizes the convolution of languages, which remains largely hidden in the lo-
calization of the universal that we find in the communicative model of translation 










































belonging to the philosophy of culturalism. The connection between the univer-
sal moral practice of the human subject and its particular origins only gains its 
coherency through the translation of a modern anthropological universal. Arai’s 
poems suggest that we can only represent this translation as a direct communica-
tion between two ethnic worlds by shrouding the magic of poetics in the abstrac-
tion of the human will and its general culture. However unintended, this ability of 
the anthropological perspective of the area studies intellectual “in the field” to be 
disrupted in translation brings to the fore the semiotic limits of the idealism of the 
philosophy of culturalism, even if Arai does not directly confront the way that the 
inversion of reason into magic also means that the binaries of culture and nature, 
the person and the natural people, are themselves myths, part of a magical think-
ing invented to mediate his experience of social difference.
62
2
The Colony and the World
Nation, Poetics, and Biopolitics in Yi Kwang-su
What is the difference between a nation that has the life view that “the uni-
verse is a production of the ego” and “the essence of the ego is perpetual activ-
ity and conquest” (Fichte), and a nation that can only cry out, “Alas! There is 
nothing you can do about Fate”?
—Yi Kwang-su
In Yi Kwang-su’s early stories, such as “Maybe Love” (1909) and “Yun Kwang-ho” 
(1918), he portrays the internal emptiness and coldness of his young protagonists.1 
The eponymous protagonist Kwang-ho receives a scholarship to study in Japan, 
but feels isolated, disconnected, and alone. Even as he is externally very successful 
as an economics student at K University (Keio), Yi compares his interiority to an 
icy cave, to a void deepening inside of him. His family and friends warn him not 
to work too hard, but he remains driven to exhaust himself in his studies. The gap 
between his external successes and his internal feeling of extreme lack reaches a 
crisis point when he feels that he can have no ideals concerning society because he 
has not felt and expressed romantic love. After his feelings for another young man, 
P, are unrequited, he commits suicide.
How do such stories of lack, isolation, and disappointment relate to Yi’s other 
works, in which the nation and the enlightenment of the nation provide a political 
framework to rethink the relationship between desire, love, morality, and national 
community? What happens to Yi’s ideas and his fiction in the passage from finitude, 
death, and the meaninglessness of individuality to the idea that a national com-
munity with a national literature and language can extend the life of the individual 
beyond his or her own mortality? Yi conceives of the Korean cultural nation and 
Korean national literature as a means of conquering finitude and finding a way into 
humanity and the world through the poetic formation of the national self. In or-
der to understand how he does so, and how this project amounts to a biopolitical 










































project of literature and philosophy, it is necessary to compare his work with that of 
his teacher, Kuwaki Gen’yoku, but to also situate them, despite all of their peculiari-
ties, within the problem of the human in modernity. More specifically, I read Yi’s 
works through the problem of the moral genus-being and the way that Yi turned 
to culture, aesthetics, and education at the point of uncertain connection between 
universal morality and the unformed external and internal landscapes of the co-
lonial nation and the national self.2 Yi began this biopolitical project of reforming 
individual life practices with the Korean nation as its purpose, but by 1941, in “The 
Relation between Life and Death,” he was conceiving of this life-and-death relation 
between the individual and the totality vis-à-vis the Japanese nation-state and its 
world-historical mission: “That which most often demands death from a human life 
is the state. It is not an exaggeration to say that in the history of humanity war never 
ceases and that the majority of history is war or preparation for war. How many 
wars have there been throughout the world in the last fifty years?”3 In examining the 
assimilatory effects of the philosophy of culturalism and life philosophy in colonial 
Korea, it is important to trace how the attempt to construct a moral Korean self in 
the 1920s was epistemologically and politically compatible with Yi’s later advocacy 
of using individual Korean lives for the perpetuation of the Japanese nation-state. 
I argue that this compatibility was enabled principally through moral concepts of 
universality, the connections made between morality and aesthetic education, and 
a biopolitical relation between the individual and the totality expressed through an 
anthropological discourse.
As mentioned in the introduction, in order to confront the freedom of action in 
modernity, a whole network of discourses around practice developed in the Japa-
nese empire of the 1920s. In culturalist discussions of practice, education was pri-
mary, and it was the means toward cultural development. Although it was no lon-
ger suitable for ethical action to be mechanical behavior, culture gave the subject a 
foundation for sound judgment and facilitated the internalization of moral max-
ims. It provided the human with a proper ethics without practice being reduced 
to the mechanistic adherence to principles of morality. Yi Kwang-su distinguished 
the cultural development of an autonomous, moral individual from the “natural” 
or “mechanical” education of Chosŏn period (1392–1897) Confucianism.4 He cir-
cumvented the question of popular sovereignty and developed a cultural national-
ization project that emerged out of distinctions between heteronomous, sovereign 
law and the internal, spiritual cultivation of modernity.
Therefore, beginning with “On the Reconstruction of the Nation” (henceforth 
“Reconstruction”), he emphasized that the reconstruction of Korean national char-
acter toward the telos of the person (in’gyŏk), the exemplar of self-legislated and 
universal morality, was more urgent than national liberation in the sense of politi-
cal sovereignty, and was indeed foundational preparation for it. Therefore, national 
reconstruction was to begin and end with morality as visible anthropologically and 










































empirically in cultural practices: “In reconstructing a nation, we must begin from 
morality, which is the foundation of its nationality (minjoksŏng).”5 Furthermore, 
Yi tied the capacity for a specifically self-legislated and self-conscious morality to 
aesthetics and art, because for the human subject to act both autonomously and 
universally he or she had to arrive at moral freedom through aesthetic and cul-
tural experience rather than by following a heteronomous law dictated by prede-
termined relations. One could certainly call this a displacement of the problem of 
colonialism and Korea’s loss of sovereignty into a cultural and aesthetic problem-
atic. However, this displacement is politically ambiguous and not “antinational” 
(panminjok), because everything that culturalists argued concerning the formation 
of a Korean national self suggests a popular nation-building project mediated by 
journalism and literature, a project that asked the people of the Korean peninsula 
to make themselves into modern Koreans by committing to the moral and cultural 
practices of the ideal individual, the person. In connecting the Korean nation to the 
world through anthropology and moral universality, Korean cultural nationalists 
such as Yi imagined that the colonized nation could gain a cultural connection to 
humanity that transcended the mechanical workings of sovereignty and statecraft. 
However, just as culturalism differentiated humanity anthropologically in relation 
to the regulative idea of the person, Yi’s project to cultivate individuals capable of 
moral practice also depended on anthropological and psychological concepts that 
could code the differences internal to the Korean nation—traits, behaviors, emo-
tions, languages, and customs.
In 1922, Yi called the conscious transformation of human cultural life “recon-
struction” (kaejo), a term borrowed from the post–World War I Wilson Doctrine.6 
However, in place of the doctrine’s term for sovereignty, “self-determination,” 
he used a term derived from Japanese translations of Kant, “self-consciousness” 
(Selbst bewusstsein, chagak). Yi’s political essays and fiction show how in the af-
termath of the March First Movement, the culturalist idea of the self-conscious 
subject became integral to the cosmopolitan and liberal understanding of the in-
dividual, his or her education and formation, and his or her relation to the nation 
and the world. Yi’s political essays and his fiction are all expressive of a philosophy 
of practice that states that the individual must transform himself or herself into 
a cosmopolitan person at the same time as the national spirit, the vernacular na-
tional language, and the technology of national literature promise to preserve the 
life of this individual beyond his or her death. In this sense, Yi’s notion of recon-
structing Koreans is a pragmatic political project of reforming human life so that 
it can belong to both general world culture and national culture as the local sphere 
of difference.
Yi’s intellectual path led from an early engagement with neo-Kantianism, 
Lev Tolstoy, and the White Birch Group (Shirakaba), through an admiration of 
Adolph Hitler’s patriotism and blood nationalism, to support for the ethnic unity 










































of Japanese and Koreans in the 1940s. The overall trajectory of Yi’s work from the 
1910s to the 1940s shows that a culturalist cosmopolitanism centered on morality, 
with its teleological claim to be gradually forming a community of persons, could 
transmogrify into a mythopoeic and fascist discourse of blood, ideal leadership, 
and the nation as organic totality. For much of the scholarship on Yi, the difficult 
contradiction to understand is how Yi then came to give up altogether on the 
Korean nation in changing his name to Kayama Mitsurō and supporting the com-
plete subsumption of Korea into Japan in the 1940s. I would certainly not argue 
that Yi’s whole career is somehow continuous, or that the transformations in his 
thought are simply variations of his essential “pro-Japanese” character. However, 
in general epistemological terms, there are important continuities between the 
modes of enlightenment that he advocated in the early 1920s, the period of Ko-
rean blood nationalism, and his attempt to appropriate Japanese nationality and 
culture. These are the continuities with which I am interested.
The centrality of a moral cosmopolitanism in Yi’s nationalist ideas cannot be 
overemphasized. In fact, one could say that the anthropological construct of a fu-
ture moral world took precedence over the nation, but that the nation was vital 
to the survival of the cosmopolitan individual, because without it that individual 
would remain anonymous, internally empty, and without a community to pre-
serve his or her life. The biopolitics of the individual and the nation we find in his 
work was a biopolitics of cultural cosmopolitanism, because making the nation 
adequate to the world meant first transforming the individual’s everyday life to 
suit the requirements of modernity. In this sense, the path of Yi’s thought presents 
us with a concrete case of how a cosmopolitan humanism that seeks the biopo-
litical transformation of life through the pragmatic application of anthropology is 
compatible with the imperial project. In the way that this mode of cosmopolitan 
humanism discusses the cultivation of the anthropologically defined natural sub-
strate in order to form a world community and a national community guided by 
leaders, such humanism is also a prefiguration of the biopolitics of the late Japa-
nese empire.
Assimilation in Korea has historically been discussed as a question of the na-
tional status of ethnic minorities in the Japanese empire. However, scholars such 
as Kim Hyŏn-ju and Hwang Chong-yŏn have looked in more detail at the episte-
mological and scientific underpinnings of Yi’s and other intellectuals’ gradualist 
nationalism and their support for Japanese empire.7 Kim has shown that Yi’s ap-
propriation of ideas of culture and civilization led him to view the capacity for col-
lective planning, particularly in the realm of spirit, as a necessary condition for the 
formation of a nation-state and a modern society. Hwang has explained how no-
tions of civilizational, historical, and scientific progress informed Yi’s naturaliza-
tion of modern, secular subjectivity. This chapter departs from similar concerns, 
but it addresses more specifically Yi’s reading of the empirico-transcendental 










































doublet of modern humanism, and the ways that the very notion of the human 
being as the subject and object of knowledge in modernity contributed to the as-
similation of colonial intellectuals. In order to do so, it emphasizes three central 
concerns of culturalist philosophy that Yi picked up from Kuwaki Gen’yoku and 
applied in each of his phases: life, morality, and art.
For a cosmopolitan intellectual like Yi, assimilation did not primarily mean 
becoming Japanese in the 1920s, but rather assimilating to the culturalist notion 
of the human being as a genus formed through the reconstruction of everyday 
cultural practice and the bios that enacted it. He thought of this reconstruction as 
a contribution to the unity of world culture. The discourse of assimilation meant 
more than the imposition of Japanese national identity; it asked Korean individ-
uals to consciously transform the raw material of their natures into something 
worldly and culturally human. It meant liberating human life from nature while at 
the same time teaching it to obey the laws and duties of freedom. It meant recon-
structing human life according to its genus-being, or self-legislated morality, and 
through modern aesthetic means, or art.
CULTUR AL REC ONSTRUCTION
Culturalism was most influential among those Korean liberals who were con-
cerned with the enlightenment and modernization of individuals and the creation 
of a national culture through which individual cultural achievements could be 
preserved. At Waseda University in Tokyo, Yi Kwang-su studied in the philoso-
phy department, where he was a student of Kuwaki Gen’yoku from 1915 to 1918. 
During this period, he began to formulate his theses for the reconstruction of the 
Korean nation. Because he started his project for national reconstruction before 
Japan’s institution of cultural policy in 1919, his fiction and philosophy were by no 
means only a response to changes in colonial policy. However, after 1919 there was 
an increased emphasis on the cultivation and self-empowerment of the subject in 
discourses of Korean nationality, a kind of cultural nationalism that Sin Ch’ae-ho, 
in an essay from 1923, showed was quite compatible with Japanese colonial rule.8
In Yi’s understanding of cultural history in the 1920s, appearing most famously 
in “Reconstruction” (1922), cultural reform and historical progress required the 
formation of the individual national self, but forming this national self was also 
a process of humanization, and therefore a cosmopolitan project.9 Yi borrowed 
the term “reconstruction” from post–World War I discussions, but emphasized its 
spiritual and moral meaning more than its material and infrastructural one. For 
him, “reconstruction” in Korea referred to something more fundamental than the 
call for social reforms, democratization, and the liberation of women. It referred 
to the complete pragmatic reconstruction of the national character of Koreans, 
from their current entrapment in the fatalism of nature to a self-conscious and free 










































national self formed through culture. In an earlier essay that questions the idea of 
fate and promotes self-strengthening as a practice of freedom, Yi writes, “What 
is the difference between a nation that has the life view that ‘the universe is the 
property of the ego’ and ‘the essence of the ego is perpetual activity and conquest’ 
(Fichte), and a nation that can only cry out, ‘Alas! There is nothing you can do 
about Fate.’ ”10 Yi’s quotation of Fichte is apt, because the philosophical concerns of 
his essays and fiction are closely related to those of German idealism: how to over-
come mechanism and create an organic relation between the individual and the 
national totality; how to engender self-consciousness in national individuals; how 
to manufacture a national self through language, culture, and literature; how to 
establish institutions of education that could nationalize students while promoting 
and guiding their use of freedom.
Yi begins “Reconstruction” by situating the problem of reform in Korean soci-
ety within a global concern for reconstruction in the aftermath of World War I. He 
invokes a world mood for reconstruction in order to make his argument for na-
tionalization, a mood that requires an emotive response on the part of Koreans. He 
states that the “thoughts of world citizens (segyein)” are commanded by the need 
to rebuild the world out of the ashes of war: “All of the voices of the contemporary 
world of thought are saying, ‘reconstruct the world of imperialism into the world 
of democracy,’ ‘reconstruct the world of competition for survival into a world of 
mutual aid,’ and ‘reconstruct the world of respect for men and the denigration of 
women into a world of equal rights for men and women.’ ”11 The call for the funda-
mental reconstruction of the Korean national character does not come from any 
local political situation, but rather from “the human heart.”12 The world’s desire for 
reconstruction provides an emotive impetus for the movement for reconstruction 
in Korea and the pronoun “we” shifts rather effortlessly between a community of 
world citizens and Korean national subjectivity. The reader is drawn into a crucial 
moment in global politics, a moment of both crisis and potential. The nation and 
the historical individual are both spurred on by the collective mood of the world. 
To be interpellated by Yi’s discussion of the nation was also to be hailed as a sub-
ject of a world human community, a community with sensibilities and emotions 
tied to the circumstances of a collective human history. A decade later, in 1932, he 
would discuss this ongoing crisis and opportunity as an “exceptional time,” a time 
that required the spiritual dedication of “exceptional individuals.”13
In “Reconstruction,” Yi used two main anthropological criteria for the mod-
ernization of Korean national subjectivity: the neo-Kantian distinction between 
cultural and natural phenomena and Gustav Le Bon’s differentiation between 
fundamental and attributed traits of national peoples.14 Yi’s mode of historical 
comparison references culturalism when he discusses the difference between nat-
ural change and purposive change. According to Yi, civilized individuals and na-
tions are characterized by their capacity for planning historical transformations. 










































They participate in the creation of cultural phenomena because they are free 
and because they belong to a cosmopolitan nation that can preserve the worldly 
meaning of their actions. On the other hand, individuals and nations without 
self-consciousness experience only natural, incidental changes. This distinction 
between nature and culture was derived from neo-Kantianism’s distinction be-
tween the epistemologies of natural science and cultural science, with all of the 
entailed contrasts between mechanism and organism, spontaneity and freedom, 
fate and purposive consciousness. Through the discussion of human culture as 
something metaphysical and entirely outside of nature, Yi was able to code every 
previous event in Korean history, even the very recent March First Uprising, as 
having occurred in nature, as merely incidental occurrences without the mark of 
human will.15
To give the distinction between natural and cultural phenomena an anthropo-
logically observable content, Yi borrowed the conservative sociologist Gustav Le 
Bon’s differentiation between fundamental national characteristics and attributed 
national characteristics.16 He stated that leaders could not transform the funda-
mental anatomical and psychological traits of individual members of the nation, 
but that they could change attributed traits that had developed historically. If 
Koreans hoped to reconstruct their national characters, to educate their daily life 
to fit the conditions of modern humanity, these attributed national characteristics 
had to be located and worked on pragmatically through social science, literature, 
and aesthetic philosophy. The leaders who could change these characteristics and 
bring about a cultural transformation were those individuals who had the fewest 
negative attributed traits. The human genus as regulative principle returns to the 
problem of governmentality in Yi’s colonial nationalization project.
Yi gives many examples of other national reconstruction efforts, but focuses in 
particular on Socrates.17 Socrates attempted to reconstruct the “nation” of Athens 
by going to the agora and discussing matters with the youth. While Yi states that 
Socrates should serve as a model for the intellectual leaders of national recon-
struction, he was wary of Socrates’s failure and his execution by the state that 
he attempted to transform. According to Yi, Socrates failed because his efforts 
at reconstruction did not create a collectivity that could transcend the finite in-
dividual.18 Without such a collectivity, the possibility that the gains made by a 
single individual would be lost to history threatened the longevity of the enter-
prise of reconstruction. The collectivity capable of transcending the finitude of 
the individual is, in broad terms, the nation and, in narrower terms, the group of 
intellectuals capable of guiding reconstruction. In this sense, Yi thought that the 
logos of the individual, his or her ability to think with conceptual categories and 
self-consciousness, could only be sustained by a group with a shared language, 
a shared historical purpose, and a shared sentiment toward the global situation. 
The term “nation” (minjok) in Korea, as in Japan, was not a simplistic expression 










































of ethnic nationalism that negated the histories of other nations, or a natural-
scientific term for race, or an idea of the nation directly bound to political sov-
ereignty. For cultural nationalists, the nation mediated between the individual 
intellectual, an international system of nations referred to as the world, and the 
local population that the individual sought to govern.
Yi refers to many past cases of individuals driving reconstruction, including 
the leaders of Japan’s Meiji Restoration, Socrates and his failed attempts to reform 
Athens, and Lenin leading the Russian Revolution.19 Yi thought of these sorts 
of historical comparisons between national histories as an example of applying 
reason, of bringing together the general and the particular. This mode of com-
parison led to inapt statements, such as his equation of the historical significance 
of the American Revolution and Russian Revolution as national reconstruction 
efforts. However, through such comparisons he introduced a powerful form of 
historical consciousness into the public sphere of colonial Korea. For better or 
worse, in the 1920s and 1930s it became common for intellectuals to reflect on 
the Korean national situation through universal history, which did not neces-
sarily entail cooperation with imperialism, but could facilitate such cooperation. 
Through the philosophy of culturalism, for which the free acts of individuals 
are valued primarily, Yi elaborated a model of cosmopolitan history in which 
the cultivation of individual subjects of judgment (p’andan chugwan), acting in 
the interest of national and world culture, brings about the pragmatic recon-
struction of the Korean national character.20 As in the Japanese political scientist 
Yoshino Sakuzō’s theory of mimponshugi, which he distinguished from popular 
democratic sovereignty, the sovereignty of the people was less important than the 
cultivation of leaders who were capable of leading in the interest of the people. 
Such a group of leaders would transform Koreans and Korean national culture 
through art, literature, and daily practice, in order to bring them in line with 
general world culture.
Yi’s views on reconstruction were based on cosmopolitan ideas concerning 
the universal faculties and values of the human subject. He early on appropriated 
a version of the Kantian system in asserting that the subject’s primary faculties 
are reason, morality, and emotion.21 Reason allows the subject to reflect upon 
its knowledge and judgment, in order to understand particular experiences in 
relation to the general knowledge that has accrued in civilization. It also enables 
one to view the Korean national situation by way of comparison with univer-
sal human history.22 Modulating the usual political definition of popular sover-
eignty, Yi wrote, “Even if human reason is incomplete, we have no more certain 
sovereign beyond reason, and nothing to believe in beyond reason.”23 Reason is 
sovereign because through it the human can become aware of itself as a legisla-
tor of the world and reflect on that belief and responsibility. More specifically, 
the subject that Yi refers to as the subject of judgment has the power to reason 










































about the relation between the general and the particular, to see Korea’s particu-
lar situation as reflective of general world trends.24 Reason allows the subject to 
reflect upon the application of the general knowledge of civilization to a lived 
experience that often seems incommensurable with that knowledge. However, 
because the particular did not always appear immediately commensurable with 
the general, Yi’s model for enlightenment was poetic—the application of the 
general to the particular required a reformation of the particular. He thought 
that human life as it should be did not exist empirically in colonial Korean so-
ciety, but that reason should bring it about. In his writings, “self-consciousness” 
means more than the epistemological subject’s passive reception of phenomena; 
it must actively transform phenomena. The relationship between the general and 
the particular is not solely theoretical, but also a pragmatic application of knowl-
edge, because reason becomes biologically and organically involved in a poetic 
process of forming the particular so that it can be commensurable with human 
culture in its generality.
This poetic relation between the general and the particular and its biopoliti-
cal dimension are the primary concerns of the remainder of this chapter. In this 
regard, Yi’s appropriation of Fichte’s idea of the “national self ” as an ego “whose 
essence is infinite activity and conquest” suggests complicity, rather than conflict, 
between the universalist ideas of imperialism and the particularist ideas of self-
formation of colonized nationalism.25 We should not dismiss Yi as someone who 
warped the modern and cosmopolitan Kant to fit a xenophobic and antimodern 
political platform; his ideas about national subjectivity are too endemic to moder-
nity, and too intimately intertwined with Kant’s transcendental philosophy and 
cosmopolitanism, to be considered merely an antimodern response to enlighten-
ment. Cultural nationalists’ attempts to bring the colonized nation in line with 
the world of humanity became an internal colonial project directed at the natural 
raw material of the colonized people. Just as Fichte argued that Germans needed 
to be sculpted and made self-conscious of their Germanness in order to become 
proper human beings, thereby translating the imperial Napoleonic Code into a na-
tionalist framework, Yi’s own project conflated humanization and nationalization, 
translating tenets of Japanese culturalism concerning the formation of the person 
into a model for the formation of a Korean national self. Yi discussed the national 
people variously as an artwork, as a group of students in need of education, and as 
the raw material to be given shape, but he always did so through the discourses of 
universalist humanism.
FORMING LIFE FOR HUMANIT Y
Comparatively less attention has been given to a text on aesthetics that Yi also 
published in 1922, “Art and Life: The New World and the Mission of the Korean 










































Nation.”26 In it, Yi discusses the relation between art and morality in the anthropo-
logical project of bringing the Korean nation into the world:
I think that the path to a happy life is in the teaching of Jesus “to make one’s life 
moral” and in the words of Tagore “to make one’s life artful.” For each individual to 
be happy, it is necessary to make one’s life artful, and for each individual to partici-
pate in the life of society, it is necessary to make one’s life moral. In general each of 
these sides is present in the life of the individual and cannot be divided; they are the 
same individual life and social life. . . .
How, then, does one make one’s life artful and moral?
There are two ways, but their basis is the same.
The first is the bodily and subjective reconstruction of the individual. Here, 
too, of course there is the moral side and the artful side. Through the moral we 
discard falsehood, slander, anger, indignation, resentment, and jealousy; however, 
other than falsehood and slander, which are matters of knowledge, all of these oth-
ers are emotions. Because the power of action is a function of feeling more than 
knowledge, the center of moral cultivation is in the restraint of the lower emo-
tions. Secondly, falsehood, slander, and all of the inferior emotions listed earlier 
were necessary to ensure one’s survival in the life of the animal world or the life 
of past humanity, which had inferior culture, but in human life’s construction of 
a happy new world close to the divine, we must root them out of the soul of every 
individual.27
Yi goes on to argue that such a rooting out of inferior thoughts and emotions is 
admittedly subjective (chugwanjŏk), but that without this educational process no 
change in the objective (kaekkwanjŏk) political and economic conditions will be 
able to create a “new world” worthy of humanity’s higher moral purpose. In this 
passage, Yi brings together many of his most central assertions about the need to 
transform human cultural life to make it both moral (Jesus) and artful (Tagore). 
First of all, subjective matters of spirit, particularly the emotions that are felt at 
the intersection between moral action, art, and aesthetics, are more significant 
than social and economic structures, and the moral and aesthetic education of the 
individual is a necessary condition for social change. In addition to his application 
of the idealism and normativity of culturalist causality to the individual, Yi adds 
a more overtly biopolitical dimension to the philosophy of culturalism in stating 
that “reconstructing” the individual culturally is primarily a matter of training the 
body, particularly the emotions that govern the states and actions of the individual 
body. Forming human life in Korea through culture and education will bring it in 
line with an incipient cosmopolitan order, a “new world,” but this program will be 
enacted at a micropolitical level of everyday behaviors and poetic creations. This 
telescoping of the cosmopolitan scale into the minute emotions and dispositions 
of the individual was a significant aspect of the colonial governmentality and bio-
politics of the philosophy of culturalism.










































According to Yi, in addition to their differing notions of time and causality, 
the natural sciences and the cultural sciences also adhere to different notions of 
life, and educating the human means distinguishing its life from that of natural 
phenomena.28 Intellectuals, educators, and students should lead the way in em-
bracing a new concept of the human bios as neither spontaneous activity (that is, 
unconscious and unfree activity) nor mechanical activity (that is, activity directed 
by external cause). Yi thought that life should rather be seen as a force of poetics.29 
The organicist metaphors for culture were appropriate, because they position free-
dom neither in the purely spontaneous activity of nature nor in the mechanism of 
natural laws, but rather at the point where the human being, through its conscious 
and vital use of life, forms life consciously and becomes conscious through life. 
Culture became biopolitical in colonial Korea through the idea that the human 
being’s primary vocation is to transform its bios (saengmul), to enter the poetic 
force of life and to guide it consciously, in order to make it suit the practical and 
theoretical requirements of modernity.30
Within the borders of the organismic nation, Yi imagined the formation of the 
national self as a pragmatic action directed both at one’s inner life and at the lives 
of others. This subject-and-object relation was often a complexly gendered rela-
tion. For example, the English teacher Hyŏng-sik, the main character of Yi’s first 
long novel, The Heartless (1917), tells of his desire to help “sculpt” his two love 
interests into proper human beings, or persons.31 Of the wealthier but less talented 
young woman, Kim Sŏn-hyŏng, he thinks of her as raw material and an uncon-
scious machine, not yet a cultured and civilized person:
She was like a machine that had been in a storage shed and never actually been used. 
She was not yet a person. . . .
One could say she was “virginal” and “pure of heart,” but she was certainly not 
a human being. She was only potential material for a human being. She was like 
marble that was to become a sculpture. Marble became a sculpture with eyes and a 
nose only after it had been worked with a chisel. Similarly, someone like Sŏn-hyŏng 
would become a true human being only after she had received the fiery baptism of 
life and the “person” within her had awakened.32
If Sŏn-hyŏng is moral and pure, but lacks consciousness and artfulness, the 
other female protagonist, Yŏng-ch’ae, is artistic and talented, but at first lacks an 
independent sense of morality. She has a traditional education and traditional 
talents, but little independence, and is forced to become a courtesan (kisaeng). A 
group of immoral, hypocritical men, including the dean of Hyŏng-sik’s school, 
rapes her. She believes that it is her fault and decides to commit suicide, only 
to be saved by a modern woman named Pyŏng-uk. Hyŏng-sik sees both Sŏn-
hyŏng and Yŏng-ch’ae as examples of human beings in their natural state, inca-
pable of becoming proper independent individuals, or persons, through the fu-
sion of art and morality discussed in “Art and Life.” The milieu within which the 










































protagonists will gradually become capable of both art and morality is cultural 
life and the cultural nation.
Although critical of the fatalism of his female counterparts, Hyŏng-sik does not 
assume that his own artistic and moral formation is complete. He takes on the role 
of pedagogue and patriarch simultaneously as he himself struggles with the forma-
tion of his own inner self. In its most effusive passages, the novel employs romantic 
metaphors of organic life to describe the formation and revelation of the inner self:
The inner self within Hyŏng-sik had opened its eyes. He could now see the inner 
meaning of all existence with his inner eyes. The inner self within Hyŏng-sik had 
been liberated. A pine seedling hides within its shell, and is confined there, for a 
long time until, under the warmth of spring, it bursts with great strength through its 
shell and sprouts outward into the pitilessly wide world. Then it becomes tendrils, 
branches, leaves, and flowers. The inner self within Hyŏng-sik similarly constituted 
the seed of the person named Hyŏng-sik. This inner self had broken through its 
shell, sprouted into the wide world, and started to grow endlessly in the sunshine 
and dew.33
In passages like these, the blossoming of the self appears like the kind of infinite 
expanse of the ego that Yi contrasts to Confucianism in his quotation of Fichte. 
In other passages, particularly those critical of Elder Kim’s superficial appropria-
tion of “civilization” and the self-interestedness of the men who rape Yŏng-ch’ae, 
Hyŏng-sik denounces the lack of internal spiritual culture and emotion in Korean 
society.34 He also laments the incompleteness of his own humanity. He struggles 
to apply the metaphors and technologies of self-formation to himself at the same 
time as he directs this artistry toward Sŏn-hyŏng and Yŏng-ch’ae, whom he per-
ceives both as love interests and as artworks. A great deal of the drama in Yi’s fic-
tion emerges through such allegories, in which characters struggle to form their 
own bodies and minds while educating and forming others. It is a struggle to radi-
cally transform life through an internal spiritual revolution.
However, in The Heartless, it is not Hyŏng-sik who is able to save Yŏng-ch’ae 
from suicide and to encourage her to become educated. Another female character, 
a modern woman Pyŏng-uk, convinces her to take her talents and develop them. 
This assignation of personhood to women is ambiguous; at the end of the novel, 
this female-female friendship is subsumed into the national narrative when all of 
the young people see their personal growth in light of national reconstruction. Yi 
advocated vigorously for the education of women, but only insofar as it contrib-
uted to the reconstruction of the nation and the creation of persons. By 1935, he 
had distilled his reason for advocating the education of women to the nation’s need 
for the biological reproduction and household training of persons:
We must reconstruct the Korean nation, but those who have the most responsibility 
in that regard are Korean women, the wives and mothers. . . . “Person” refers to the 
unity of various emotional customs established on foundational beliefs and the various 










































sensibilities, manners, customs, and so on that emerge in the house and become the 
foundation of a person, as in the saying “habits at three years old cannot be corrected 
at nine.” But women are the saints who carry the duty of household training.35
Yi’s advocacy of women’s education did ask that “women’s issues” be considered 
equally, but this value was assigned according to a culturalist idea of subjectivity 
and personhood whose teleology was the national reconstruction of customs and 
sensibilities rather than political equality. Therefore, despite the seemingly pro-
gressive ideas about female-female friendship and independent female person-
hood that appear in his works, one should understand them within the larger bio-
political project of reconstructing the cultural life of the nation, through which Yi 
was able to see the value of women’s education primarily in the production of good 
“persons” in the youngest stages of life in the household.
What, then, of the larger project of forming and reconstructing cultural life? 
The philosophy of culturalism articulated by Sōda Kiichirō and Yi’s teacher Ku-
waki Gen’yoku provided Yi with a model for the individual human’s development 
toward general consciousness (for example, cosmopolitan, transcendental subjec-
tivity). He transformed this model for development into a more overtly biopoliti-
cal concept by emphasizing the cultural reformation of “life,” by which he meant 
both biological life and everyday life, in his discussions of subject formation. Yi 
took up the idea that education is primary for moral training, but he was particu-
larly concerned that education be suitable to life as temporal activity, which he 
opposed to the idea that life belongs to static, inorganic nature. In “On the New 
Life,” he describes the difference between conscious and unconscious historical 
transformations by contrasting the differing temporalities of inorganic and or-
ganic nature.36 He argues that the lives of Koreans are becoming temporal, in other 
words, that Koreans are entering both the temporal multiplicity of modernity and 
the temporal homogeneity of history. In an organicist manner, he argues that this 
change is tantamount to passing from inorganic to organic nature, a passage indi-
cated by the modern character compound for “life”: “As the two characters in the 
word ‘life’ indicate (生活), life is not something that takes the shape of a stone, but 
rather something that flows and transforms like an animal.”37 Yi goes on to argue 
that the new education and the new culture must be adequate to the new life of 
the modern era, when life has begun to transform and flow at the speed of organic 
nature rather than the inorganic geological time of the stone. However, this new 
education and culture must also master life consciously, so that the transforma-
tions and flows of the organism will not be left to chance, but rather will be the 
effect of a human will and a human history guided by what Yi repeatedly refers to 
as “purpose” (mokjŏk).38
This biopolitical application of culturalism was explicit in Kuwaki’s discussions 
of the need to govern life by the universality of the moral law and in Sōda’s model for 










































subject formation. Taking up the culturalist mission to reform physiological being 
toward the limit concept of general consciousness, Yi Kwang-su wrote frequently 
on the need to completely revolutionize the individual’s life for both the individual 
and the nation to enter the modern era. In distinguishing between natural humans 
and cultural humans, and between natural education and cultural education, he 
translated the culturalist discourse of subject formation into colonial Korea, making 
colonial discourses concerning the necessity for culture to transform physiological 
being into the dominant idea of modernization. The universalism and biopolitics of 
culturalist ideas about subject formation allowed Yi, in the name of cosmopolitan 
community, to begin another colonial project internal to the colonial population. 
Nationalization in the name of cosmopolitan humanity can be considered an in-
ternal colonial project, and not only because Yi’s culturalist rhetoric was consonant 
with the Japanese colonial state’s appropriation of culturalism for cultural policy a 
few years later. The Heartless uses metaphors of organic life to figure the blossoming 
of the national self in the colonized country as a means of humanizing its popula-
tion, of bringing the supposedly unconscious subjects of Korean society into the 
modern world, which requires self-consciousness and moral purpose.
This biopolitical perspective on modernity was in many ways a logical outcome 
of the philosophy of culturalism’s discussions of cultural-historical time, cultural-
historical causality, and education. Culturalism introduced new notions of each 
of these into colonial Korea. For the philosophy of culturalism, cultural-historical 
time is the time of human freedom and history is a record of free actions under-
taken by individuals. Individual causality is the type of causality proper to cul-
tural history and is opposed to the mechanical causality of nature. While nature 
functions according to mechanical cause and effect, cultural history is created by 
moral actions that have no determining cause other than the will of the acting 
person.39 Education is necessary for this philosophy precisely because if human 
beings create history out of their own free will and their own free manipulation 
of life, then the will also has to be properly educated, so that it can form itself and 
form life according to some sort of self-administered law. In other words, without 
education, the teleology of cosmopolitan history could easily be jeopardized by 
the misuse of freedom, and the individual causality of human history could easily 
be the impetus for anarchy in history, historical knowledge, and the life to which 
they give shape.
Although Yi remained critical of many of the effects of Japanese colonialism, he 
appreciated the advancements in education made by Japan, particularly the way it 
had adapted educational methods to actual life (silsaenghwal). In an early essay ad-
dressed to educators in 1916, Yi argued that among the countries of the East, Japan 
had “destroyed the old dreams” and “sought a new education based on actual life,” 
and had therefore “become a powerful country in world civilization.”40 In more 
concrete terms, Yi supported basic Japanese national education as a foundation for 










































equality in work, between classes, and for society as a whole. This education would 
instill fundamental ideas that students would carry with them as they progressed 
to higher levels of education (at specialty schools and the like).41 However, upon 
this basic foundation, Yi also sought the more dynamic life of the cosmopolitan 
individual, in which he or she participated actively in the formulation of ideas that 
could transform the bios of the nation and the world. This education would be an 
improvement upon and refinement of the mere repetition of principles that Kim 
Kyŏng-mi described as the primary goal of early Japanese normal school educa-
tion in Korea.42
In his statements concerning the need for a new education, Yi echoes J. G. 
Fichte’s and Matthew Arnold’s criticisms of mechanism in education, referring 
to the old education as natural education and the new education as “manmade.”43 
Yi used the idea of new education, or “cultural education,” most forcefully in his 
many criticisms of Confucianism and Confucian schools (sŏdang), which he de-
rided as forms of “natural education.” In a criticism of Confucianism, he wrote, 
“A fourteen or fifteen year old who has received a manmade education is superior 
and stronger intellectually than an eighty-year-old man who received a natural 
education. Being human means being cultured.”44 Under natural education, the 
student is expected to gain practical knowledge through the repetition of pre-
scribed behaviors and ethical principles (she or he becomes spontaneous in the 
bad sense). Conversely, the new manmade, cultural education would create the 
capacity for self-conscious spontaneity, judgment, and reason, which were all nec-
essary for a sustained and reflective engagement with the cultural life of the nation 
and the world.
In “The Reform of the Individual’s Daily Life Is the Basis for National Power” 
(1926), Yi discusses the kinds of ethical principles that culture should locate and 
cultivate in the individual life.45 In this essay, Yi appeals to the seeds of good in the 
human and asks which older traits of the human should be developed through 
culture and education. Despite differences between individuals, he argues that 
there are certain customs that the national community can agree upon to be foun-
dational. These customs are largely based on Christian ethics, but he nonetheless 
presents them as age-old rules for the behavior of the national community.
These four are the custom and spirit that have become the basis for a healthy person.
Among readers there may be some who think that number 5 [Do not hate, do 
not be jealous, do not get angry. Love. Live for men. Forgive. Make men happy and 
beneficent] is not a custom. Of course, psychologists discuss these factors as lasting 
tendencies of emotion and refer to them as “temperament.” Shall we refer to them as 
“disposition”? However, “disposition” also results, after all, from the conventionaliza-
tion of the operation of the emotions. A child who has grown up and learned man-
ners under a wicked stepmother will develop, to a degree, the emotional tendencies 
of enmity, mistrust, and jealousy. Just the same, “disposition” is, after all, a custom 
of emotion, and in one’s daily efforts one can nurture good dispositions and one can 










































nurture bad dispositions. Furthermore, what ethicists call “sentiment” comes almost 
entirely from education and cultivation.46 The honor to love the truth and hate false-
hood, to love good and hate wickedness, and to love beauty and hate ugliness, or, to 
put it more conventionally, the sentiment for truth, justice, and beauty—all of these 
come, finally, from the cultivation of customs; we call cultivation the “training of 
character” for the same reason. If an individual or a race does not have these noble 
virtues it is because it lacks cultivation, and if it did not have these virtues, would it 
be capable of acting nobly for a state or humanity? Certainly not.
However, all of these customs are formed in everyday life. They are actualized 
each time we do something in everyday life; each time we use a word more often, 
each time we clean a room a little more, each time we encounter another person, 
each time we grow and mature. There are counterexamples of degradation, like when 
children who work in a cigarette factory become addicted to nicotine little by little, 
and after two or three years their skin becomes very yellow. Therefore, I say to all my 
readers, “Before carrying out any revolution, you must revolutionize yourself. The 
way to revolutionize yourself is to revolutionize your everyday life.”47
It is revealing that Yi presents most of these rules as maxims that everyone should 
immediately agree are important, while the inclusion of emotions such as love, 
hate, jealousy, and happiness (#5) in a tract on ethics requires further elaboration. 
He asserts that dispositions have a natural element, but are also cultural, because 
patterns of emotion are cultivated over time. Sentiments, or generally held moral 
emotions like sympathy, are entirely the product of cultivation. He again expresses 
the importance of emotions for the “training of character.”48 This moral training 
cannot occur suddenly, but is rather a matter of transforming the daily life of the 
nation by gradually reorganizing the daily practices and emotional states of the 
individual. As suggested by the earlier discussion of Jesus and Tagore, of the moral 
and the artful, this cultural project is also a project of bringing the nation into the 
world and world culture.
At the end of this passage, Yi argues that the individual must first transform 
himself or herself before any dramatic collective change can occur. The reference 
to industrial labor is significant in this regard, because Yi focused on the damage 
that factory labor causes to the individual person and ignored any class dimension 
of labor exploitation. The theme that social classes could be overcome through 
proper individual cultivation appears frequently in his writings, particularly in his 
critiques of proletarian literature.49 He argued often that social classes would dis-
appear through the collective organization of the nation through national culture. 
In this passage, Yi pays particular attention to those individual practices that have 
collective significance, such as work ethic (the production of value), hygiene (the 
prevention of communicable disease), and consideration for others (an ethics of 
responsibility). The biopolitical regulation of the individual was simultaneously 
for the individual’s own good and necessary for the overcoming of collective suf-
fering caused by underdevelopment and disease.










































Yi connects culture and cultivation to biopolitics; culture gives life to the indi-
vidual and lack of culture amounts to letting oneself and one’s nation die.50 This life-
giving capacity of culture is in its ability to perpetuate the life of an individual life 
beyond its own finite existence, to create a nation and a world that could preserve 
the works of the individual. Foucault’s analysis of governmentality is concerned not 
with developing a theory of the state, but rather more with this individuating di-
mension of political thought and political technologies in their liberal, neoliberal, 
and fascist modes. Foucault pointed out that along with figuring the population 
and the people, discourses of modern government have dictated the terms of the 
governance of one’s individual self. Governmentality implies an individual ethics 
that cultural nationalists like Yi Kwang-su assumed was underdeveloped during the 
Chosŏn period (1392–1895) and the Korean empire (1894–1910), which became an 
explanation for Korea’s colonization by Japan. For these nationalists, Korea became 
a site where the national population had to be given form through individual mo-
rality, precisely in order to also preserve the individual and his or her cultural work.
In 1936, a few years before casting off his Korean identity altogether and at-
tempting to “become Japanese,” Yi again used the language of a secularized Chris-
tian humanism, an idealist language of self-abnegation and sacrifice, to describe 
how some select Korean individuals could transform themselves into valuable his-
torical subjects and the Korean nation into a “world cultural nation”:
A life without ideas is a brutish life. The saying “in an intoxicated life, dreams die” 
expresses this fact. When people do not have ideas, they have already become slaves 
to the senses. When there is no task with greater meaning to which one strives and 
dedicates one’s body, the animal instinct for food, color, and so on governs the spirit. 
Therefore, such a life is “brutish.”
Those people who value nothing other than the body are no different from beasts. 
Jesus valued human love more than the body, and all the martyrs of religion, science, 
and patriotism valued righteousness and truth above it. They all began from the idea 
that the value of a life lies in something more important.
“Greater meaning” refers to this kind of idea. We call those who embrace this greater 
meaning “people of purpose” (chisa), and those who sacrifice their bodies for this greater 
meaning “righteous people” (ŭiin). The culture, freedom, and prosperity of a society are 
the flower that blooms from the blood of those people of purpose and righteous people 
who embrace the greater meaning that lies in these ideas. A society without people—
both men and women—who embrace this greater meaning cannot but fall into ruin.
The majority of people cannot hope to embrace a greater meaning and become 
people of purpose or righteous people. Still, in Korea those who have graduated from 
college or the university cannot be distinguished from among the ordinary people. 
In Korea, those who have graduated from college or the university receive a unique 
societal blessing and are a great force for reviving the whole of the Korean people.
If these graduates considered adequately the duty to accept the expectations of 
the people, and of themselves, they would be greatly inspired, and would burn with 
the desire to serve. Aren’t they the ones who will resolve the spiritual and material 










































poverty of Korea? Who else will educate the Korean people and lift them up to the 
highest levels of a world cultural nation?51
Through education, people of purpose become dedicated to a greater meaning by 
valuing more than their animal senses and their bodies, by valuing the ideas of 
freedom and culture that can only belong to human beings. Those who are capable 
of transforming their lives into something valuable become young leaders who 
will guide the Korean people, forming them into a cultural nation belonging to the 
world. Yi’s appeal to the moral genus-being of the human as cosmopolitan subject 
is embedded in a series of Christian oppositions between bodies and ideas, brut-
ishness and a valuable and meaningful life, and, ultimately, the purposelessness of 
nature and purposefulness of humanity. Despite this division between nature and 
culture, Yi states that the flowers of culture and freedom bloom from the blood 
of righteous people, incorporating nature metaphorically when discussing the te-
leological form of cultural life. Blood not only differentiates Koreans from other 
nations, but the righteous people and the people of purpose from the “majority of 
people” who “cannot hope to embrace a greater meaning.”52
Already in 1933, in “On the Korean Nation,” Yi made it clear that such patriotic 
invocations of the blood of righteous people were not only projective toward what 
Balibar calls the “ideal nation,” but also projective toward the past, toward a “fic-
tive ethnicity” of shared Korean origin:53
What are the essential components of a nation? First, blood lineage is one of the pri-
mary components. Although we can presume looking at past history that the blood 
of the Han race, the blood of the Mongol race, and the blood of [the Japanese race] 
have flowed in the Korean people in some proportion, within the limits that the 
record of our nation can trace, we are not any other nation. We are a nation that has 
received the particular blood lineage of the Korean race.54
Although Yi’s earlier enlightenment project for national reconstruction might 
seem at odds with this later discourse of blood lineage, these phases were in most 
respects continuous. The anthropological distinction in “Reconstruction” between 
fundamental and attributed traits brought to the fore the importance of distilling 
the positive natural and historical traits and developing them as aspects of mod-
ern life, consciously over time. Likewise, in “On the Korean Nation,” Yi follows 
this claim for a substratum of blood lineage with discussions of what the national 
subject can actively do in the passage from nature to culture, with sections on na-
tional character (constituted by culture and language), as well as religion. Blood is 
a mythic symbol of a substantive yet malleable cohesion that was already implied 
by the poetic confluence of the transcendental subject and anthropological deter-
mination we find in Yi’s earlier articulations of “Korean.”
Both the moral-artistic articulation and the blood lineage articulation of the 
cosmopolitan-national individual reflect much more than an internalization of 










































colonial racism. Although Yi’s denigration of the current state of Koreans does 
suggest such internalization, the more powerfully operative regime was the an-
thropocentrism centered on ideas of human generality. In order to norm the space 
of Korea according to a universalist anthropological model, Yi transformed the 
external borders of the nation—for example, borders as they would appear on a 
map—into internal borders that could differentiate proper national subjects from 
the blood lineages of Japan and China and from the unconscious and premodern 
forms of “natural” life that had held back the Korean people in history. It is further 
on in “On the Korean Nation” where Yi discusses language as the universalizing 
medium that brings all historical activity under the sign of cultural history, and 
the litterateurs as the “technicians” who mold this language (see chapter 1).55 In 
turning to literature as a technique for creating the national language, he was not 
simply inspiring civic spirit through art. He was attempting through the artwork 
to create an aesthetic experience of linguistic unity, cultural unity, and (by the 
1930s) sanguine unity. This aesthetic experience was to serve as a foundation for 
the transcendental moral subject of modernity within the local sphere of the world 
cultural nation. This was an act of poetics performed to instill the greater mean-
ing of a life governed by ideas within the vernacular sphere of communicative 
language and communicable sentiments, or common and general emotions that 
can direct proper practice.
In this respect, blood was simply the most naturalistic metaphor for the regula-
tive distinction between the national population and its outside, and between the 
instincts of beasts and the sentiments of the proper human. In order to actively 
and poetically overcome the taint of the beast and the lasting effects of “other” 
blood lineages, the aesthetic project of national literature had to create, actively 
and poetically, a Korean national community made up of cosmopolitan-national 
individuals. After becoming a Japanese imperial subject, Yi again brought together 
a model of developmental cultural history and a poetic notion of bios in essays 
such as “Faces Change,” which argues that the physical features of Koreans will 
gradually transform as they commit themselves to becoming Japanese.56 His early 
romantic portrayals of the biological formation of the national self were primarily 
metaphorical, but they already pointed toward the more concrete penetration and 
technological transformation of the bios that he imagined to be the primary task 
of his later thought and fiction.
C OSMOPOLITAN SENTIMENT AND THE ROLE OF 
LITER ATURE
One primary consistency in Yi’s conception of the bios, and in the mission to 
make life adhere to self-legislated moral laws, is his theories concerning emo-
tions and their representation in literature. In the quotation from “The Reform 










































of the Individual’s Daily Life Is the Basis for National Power,” Yi feels obliged to 
explain the new relation between emotions and ethics in modernity, because it 
is ultimately through emotions, particularly a love of others felt through love for 
the nation, that Koreans will also gain the capacity for universal moral practice 
necessary for modern subjectivity. For the life of the individual and the nation to 
belong to the culture of the modern world, subjects must not only revolutionize 
their behaviors and customs, but also cultivate their emotions over time, so that 
these emotions can properly guide their use of practical reason in history. For Yi, 
Confucian morality is based on principles of action entirely determined by one’s 
familial or social relations to others. When action is determined by a dictate in 
this manner, there is no free will, and there is therefore no need for a nonconcep-
tual source for moral judgment. Questions of beauty or artistry have no bearing 
on action, because in morality there is no need for a source of judgment besides 
the principle of action dictated by the type of relation. However, Yi argues that for 
free human individuals coming together to form a nation that supersedes social 
classes and the Confucian hierarchies, emotions must be freed from external de-
termination while also coming to inform ethical decisions. For example, in “What 
Is Literature?” (1916) Yi argues that the writer must abandon given social norms 
and not fall into didacticism, because emotions are autonomous from the will and 
the mind. However, he also states that the beauty that one discovers in literature 
should also contribute to the civilization and acculturation of the national sub-
ject.57 Emotions must be freed to pursue beauty but also must be an aspect of daily 
moral training and objects of cultivation throughout the lifetime of an individual 
and the history of a nation. Reforming the bios of the nation was not solely about 
behavior and custom, but also a matter of restructuring sensations, of providing 
an aesthetic and artistic education, so that emotions could become intentionally 
and consciously connected to practice.58
In various places Yi discusses this common emotion, created through liter-
ature, as a cure for the feudal class relations of the Chosŏn period and for the 
emerging class relations of colonial modernity. For example, in “Literature and 
‘Bourgeois’/‘Proletariat’ ” (1926), he criticizes proletarian literature for dividing 
thoughts and emotions only according to social class.59 He states that thoughts 
and emotions are different both for every individual member of humanity and 
also according to different social classes.60 At the end of the essay, he asks how 
these differences of thought and feeling between individuals and classes relate to 
“general culture,” including politics, religion, art, and philosophy.61 Therefore, de-
spite differences of thought and emotion, general culture is the historical horizon 
within which all individuals and classes think and feel. The assumption is that 
there should exist a cosmopolitan and national collectivity beyond social classes. 
However, this collectivity was not a race in the sense of a group sharing pheno-
typical traits. Yi rather defined the commonality of this collectivity in terms of 










































common emotion through a logical distinction between the general human and 
its various species. Common emotion allowed for subjects belonging to various 
species to come together toward a common, general purpose: “In Korea there has 
been a proliferation of ‘ethnicities’ (chongjok). They observe and confront one an-
other and they do not have any common emotion. The self should be able to cast 
off the class to which it was born and form a new class through its positing of 
a common purpose.”62 In such statements, Korean nationality is multiethnic and 
multiclass, because various regional and local affiliations—or what he calls “tribes” 
or “ethnicities” (chongjok)—are to be overcome by cultivating purposeful emo-
tions common to both humanity and the nation. The process of humanization is 
at the same time a process of nationalization, a process of forming the national self 
out of the various other existing modes of identification. It is more specifically the 
common emotions created through national literature and the formation of the 
national language that will transform Koreans from natural humans immersed in 
their shortsighted class and tribal conflicts into cultural humans with a common 
historical purpose.63
How could the global mood that Yi references in “Reconstruction” be trans-
formed into a common emotion with a specific purpose? In other words, how 
could the feeling that he gave his readers of belonging to the world be actively 
transformed into a cosmopolitan sentiment, a love of mankind with a bearing 
on moral and political action? In order to square cosmopolitan and national his-
tory through moral universality, he had to frame “common emotion” as both a 
cosmopolitan and a nationalist emotion, one belonging to humanity as a whole 
and to the Korean nation in particular. This attention to world sentiment and its 
subset of national sentiment comes across in both his theory of literature and his 
political essays. Yi charged literature with the task of creating this new connec-
tion between emotion and morality necessary for modernity and for participa-
tion in world culture. In his early essays “What Is Literature?” and “The Value 
of Literature” (1917), Yi appropriated Kant’s division of the faculties of the tran-
scendental subject into the understanding (知), the will (志), and emotion (情).64 
Although Kant’s aesthetic philosophy and his concept of sensus communis are 
more concerned with taste, and were slightly different from Yi’s romantic theory 
of emotion and sentiment, Yi clearly had Kant’s three critiques in mind when he 
proposed these three faculties of the subject. Yi argued that there was a strong 
tradition of knowledge and will in Korean thought, particularly in Confucianism, 
but that emotion, as well as emotion’s bearing on ethical decisions, was in need of 
development. The purpose of literature was to cultivate the emotions of readers, 
to transform emotions into shared sentiments that could serve the moral culture 
of the national collectivity. It is no accident that his first long novel, The Heart-
less (1917), is an allegory about individuals gradually overcoming the mechanical 
performance of inherited moral dictates and cultivating an emotional interiority 










































that will guide their actions. The novel discusses this as the process of becoming 
a human being, and the ending unveils the modern nation as the most important 
object of sentimental identification.
In other words, for Yi Kwang-su, writing novels was a matter of poetics, of 
forming the national language and a national community out of the raw mate-
rial of the Korean population. I have already discussed how culturalism assumed 
the communicative translatability of the cultural concept of the human across na-
tional boundaries, which was the linguistic basis for its cosmopolitanism. At the 
same time, it required the idea of distinct and internally whole national languages 
between which the concepts of humanism could be transmitted. However, as one 
of the first vernacular novelists in Korea, Yi knew that the languages of the Korean 
peninsula were far from unified, particularly if one took into account all of the 
variations in spoken dialects and the hybridity of the writing systems. In “On the 
Korean Nation,” he describes the role of men of letters as that of a “technician” who 
forms a national language where none existed previously: “Literature is the music 
that establishes the spirit of the nation and depicts its movement. Language is the 
fragments of the life of the nation, and literature is the sustained effort of life to 
gather these fragments and form something whole. And the technicians (kisulja) 
who do this work are the poets and the men of letters.”65
The national language is the foundation that could give life, spirit, and histori-
cal purpose to culture, and therefore its poetic formation is central to the cultural 
reformation of the national bios. National language is both universalizing, be-
cause it brings its speakers and readers into the human community, and a me-
dium for the expression of the particular, because it is connected to the spirit 
and life of the national people. National language can represent the temporal ex-
periences that are nonidentical to the field of available concepts in the human 
sciences; however, language can also bring such experiences under the sway of 
a priori concepts, giving the particular experiences of Koreans a universal im-
port. In imagining that language could bring experiences under the regulation 
of the transcendental, the transhistorical, and the purely translatable, he posited 
a communicative translation between the nation and the world. He also imput-
ed to literary language the capacity to give shape, in a “technical” manner, to 
those cosmopolitan and national sentiments required of the reader if his or her 
moral action were to be guided not by natural impulse, but rather by “common 
emotion.” Achieving general culture and the capacity for self-legislated morality 
was a matter of aesthetic experience, of transforming one’s sensorium, primarily 
through language, so that it could properly guide the freedom of will held by all 
civilized and modern people. This enlightenment connection between emotion 
and action makes Yi’s works quintessentially modern, but the collapse of morality 
and politics into art and aesthetics also opened up his philosophy and literature 
to the possibility of fascism.










































FINITUDE AND THE ALLEGORICAL NOVEL
The effort to represent the previously unrepresented through the formation of 
national language and national literature is a response to Yi’s philosophical prob-
lem of how to construct a nation out of nothing. Heidegger discussed poetics as a 
“bringing-forth” (Hervorbringen) and Yi refers to the poets and the men of letters 
as “technicians” who give shape to the national language and the national commu-
nity.66 Each thinker opposes his idea of technology and technique to any utilitarian 
or mechanical concept. Literature is a technique and its practitioners are techni-
cians because they give wholeness to the language through their literary produc-
tion, and in the process they form the people who come to speak the language. 
National literature, particularly fiction, is reflexive and allegorical, because the 
writer transforms himself into a national subject through his poetics but also rep-
resents this poetic process in his fictional characterizations. Nationalists imagine 
poetics as part of an internal civilizing mission, as a historical process of making 
human beings and national subjects out of the prenational, and indeed prelingual, 
masses. Literature “brings forth” a national people.
Both Paul de Man and Walter Benjamin, in their critiques of Romantic literary 
criticism, point to the temporal, fragmentary, and material qualities of allegory, 
which they contrast to the Romantic definition of the symbol as the organic inte-
gration of the idea and the material, the signifier and the signified, the divine and 
the natural, and the general and the particular.67 Yi’s national allegories represent 
ideas from his philosophies of history through typological characters that are af-
fected by sociological concepts, but they also allegorize the temporal movement 
of these concepts as they intersect with the everyday experiences and historical 
past of Korea. Yi’s narratives are not symbolic in the Romantic sense, but rather al-
legorical, because they are immersed in time and the very modern, historical, and 
temporal problem of how to make visible in an anthropological representation a 
model of history based on an abstract concept of the genus-being of the human—
for example, its developing capacity for self-legislated reason and morality. The 
human as empirico-transcendental doublet becomes a problem of allegory because, 
as Benjamin shows in his reading of the German Baroque sorrow-play, allegory is 
a response to a persistent and irreconcilable gap between the transhistorical and 
the historical. In the Japanese empire, modern allegorists, including national and 
Marxist literary allegorists, tried to reconcile their transcendental definitions of 
the human genus-being, derived from anthropology, with fragmented, finite, and 
spatiotemporal experiences. In his attempt to reconcile the transhistorical and the 
historical, the allegorist Yi turned to particular kinds of chronotopes in his novels.68
Yi’s particular turn to humanism had very much to do with an experience of 
alienation specific to the elite colonial intellectual, and it is the passage from de-
scriptions of nothingness to the committed nationalist novel that most clearly 
marks this turn. Yi’s descriptions of alienated life as an exchange student in Japan 










































occasionally resembled Japanese intellectuals’ discussions of their experiences in 
Europe during the same period. Yi’s cosmopolitanism was, like Kuwaki’s, a univer-
salist method of critiquing how external representations objectified the minority’s 
selfhood. Kuwaki’s citation of his viewing of Madame Butterfly in Berlin is one cul-
tural experience that convinced him of the need to reimagine Japanese culture as a 
world-historical development guided by a priori values, rather than a hodgepodge 
of fragmented clichés cobbled together by European and American Orientalists. 
Before his first long novel, The Heartless (1917), and his essays on the reforma-
tion of national cultural life, Yi described, in his short fiction, a similar feeling of 
misrecognition, although his narratives focus more on the difficulty of minority 
assimilation than on combating Orientalist misrepresentation.
Yi’s first published short story, “Maybe Love” (1909), written in Japanese when 
he was seventeen years old, depicts a Korean exchange student in Japan.69 This 
story describes the alienation of the male student Mun-gil and his unrequited de-
sire for a Japanese boy, Misao. His disappointed desire contributes to his thoughts 
of suicide as he crosses the train tracks in Shibuya. This story is easily read as a 
depiction of Mun-gil’s colonial desire to become Japanese, expressed through his 
attraction to Misao, and as an autobiographical reflection of Yi Kwang-su’s own 
experiences as an orphan and scholarship student in Tokyo. However, the descrip-
tion in the story of Mun-gil is not just a symptom of Yi’s colonial desire to become 
Japanese, and the story is not only a preamble to Yi’s later discovery of his Korean 
nationalism. In comparing “Maybe Love” to a similar story written eight years 
later in Korean, “Yun Kwang-ho,” and keeping in mind his later novels and politi-
cal theory, one of the most striking aspects of Yi’s early short fiction is its nihilism 
and its obsession with suicide and death. In both stories, this concern with the 
finitude of the individual is entangled with a perceived inaccessibility of love and 
the inadequacy of the mundane accolades and expectations that came with being 
one of a few students given the opportunity to leave colonial Korea to study in 
Japan. More generally, however, the stories describe the detachment of the modern 
subject, the fearful nihility that accompanies the act of writing the modern self, as 
much as they are concerned with the alienation of the immigrant, the desire for 
assimilation, and the negativity that leads to an assertion of colonial nationalism.
In order to understand the literary forms, devices of national self-formation, 
and humanist rhetoric that Yi came to use in his narratives of cultivation, it is im-
portant to recognize the diversity in his early portrayals of lack. The protagonist’s 
lack of a sovereign nation, his inability to be recognized as fully Japanese, and 
his unsatisfied same-sex desires are certainly present in Yi’s early works, but the 
nation and national culture would eventually enter his discourse at a more basic 
ontological and political level as well. Without the nation or the national self, the 
work of the individual, written as he confronts his own finitude, would be forgot-
ten to history and culture; hence the focus, taken from Kuwaki’s personalism, on 










































the need for “groups” of persons and not mere individuals.70 His later anxiety in 
the 1920s that the individual subject will have no reason to write himself into the 
modern world if he cannot belong to a national community with the language, 
spirit, and culture to sustain him emerged out of an early confrontation with death, 
the possibility that the finitude of modern secular humans means that their lives 
are without reason or purpose. His humanism and his view of national literature 
as a poetic enterprise of subject formation both intervened, from The Heartless 
until his embrace of Japanese identity and Japanese national literature, to fend off 
finitude and the nihility of modernity, so wrenchingly explored in his early fiction.
In “Yun Kwang-ho,” the eponymous protagonist feels great joy upon receiving a 
special invitation to study economics at K University in Japan. He studies so hard 
late into the evenings and during school breaks that his friends warn him that he is 
endangering his health. Even though he seems happy with his success, during his 
second year in Japan, at the age of twenty-four, he is overcome with melancholy: 
“However, there was a weakness in Kwang-ho’s heart. There was a large, deep void 
that was difficult to fill.”71 He is attracted to P, who, we find out in the last line of 
the story, is also a young man, but, like Mun-gil, he is rejected. Unlike Mun-gil, 
he commits suicide, which we discover in the final section, when his friend of ten 
years, Chun-wŏn, and the contrite P see an article about the incident in the news-
paper. Chun-wŏn writes on his tombstone, “The grave of Yun Kwang-ho, who was 
born in a world of ice, lived in a world of ice, and died in a world of ice.”72 Because 
P’s gender is revealed in the final line, Yi accentuates the same-sex attraction and 
the tragic consequence of it not being consummated, owing to Kwang-ho’s mis-
reading of P’s desire or, perhaps, the ethnic difference between the metropolitan 
student and the colonial exchange student. However, the void in Kwang-ho’s heart 
and the iciness of the world around him are not solely the result of unfulfilled sex-
ual desires. He feels detachment and lack toward the young women he sees on the 
train and toward P, but other uses of the term “love” (sarang) show that Kwang-ho’s 
desires, as well as his death-drive, are tied to other objects: “His love for human-
ity, his love for his brethren, his love for his friends, and his longing for his own 
honor and success could no longer satisfy him. He needed to embrace someone 
and be embraced by someone. He was not satisfied with tepid and abstract love 
and needed a burning and concrete love.”73 Lines like these seem to place romantic 
love above all other affections, but from Yi’s subsequent political writings it is clear 
that the problem is not simply that Kwang-ho needs a partner, but rather that his 
public forms of love feel abstract and disconnected from his libido.
Fictionally narrating the struggle to cultivate one’s inner self became Yi’s po-
etic endeavor to reform desire, to create new objects of affection, like the nation, 
toward which the individual could feel a concrete libidinal bond. From The Heart-
less onward, romantic desires become intertwined with love of nation and love of 
humanity, so that the former does not become entirely personal and the latter is 










































not just an abstract idea detached from desire. In Yi Kwang-su’s writings in defense 
of free love as opposed to arranged marriage, practicing the freedom to desire the 
person whom one consciously chooses to desire and freely directing one’s libidinal 
energy toward the nation together promise to give form to the formless void that 
plagues the interior life of Yi’s early characters. This confluence of themes points 
to the intersection of romantic literature, melodrama, and biopolitics in Yi’s fic-
tion and political philosophy, and in Korea in the 1920s more generally.74 In “Yun 
Kwang-ho,” the finitude of the individual human is both personal and perilous, 
because in pursuing romantic love Kwang-ho turns away from social relations and 
achievements that cannot fill his internal void. Because Kwang-ho’s self-affection 
is at odds with his external attachments, he cannot imagine that his life or his 
death could be meaningful to others.
Yi worked out his ideas of the nation, the political group, and the language 
community precisely around this problem. If a nation can be formed, then the in-
dividual life of the colonial subject can be sustained by the emotional attachment 
the individual has for the nation and the nation can extend the meaning of the 
individual life beyond personal finitude by preserving his or her works through its 
spirit, history, and language. Both “Maybe Love” and “Yun Kwang-ho” show that 
being an outsider and a colonial subject without a sovereign country contributed 
to the young elite students’ feelings that personal success is meaningless. Yi’s polit-
ical response in the 1920s was not anticolonial revolt, but rather to build a cultural 
nation through the creation of commonly held emotions in the readership of se-
rial fiction, the construction of an imagined community beyond family, brethren, 
or friends. The life world, or bios, of this community would be held together by a 
sentiment analogous to romantic love.75
In this model of cultural enlightenment, artists, writers, musicians, and scien-
tists are favored strongly against entrepreneurs, bankers, and capitalists, because 
they are concerned with the refinement of the spirit rather than with material gain. 
Therefore, another early long novel, Pioneers (1918), picks up thematically from the 
ending of The Heartless, in which the characters collectively dedicate themselves 
to the cultural progress of Korea. Pioneers portrays a young scientist, Sŏng-jae, 
whom other characters call “Tokyo big brother” because he has studied in Japan, 
and his sister, Sŏng-sun, who struggles to have her love of Min, a painter, recog-
nized by the still largely Confucian society. Rather than taking up a financially 
solvent vocation, Sŏng-jae spends seven years upon his return to Korea on a single 
scientific experiment, tirelessly working toward an adequate result. Even though 
an evil creditor, Ham Sag-wa, seizes the family home, the novel presents Sŏng-
jae as a noble and humble person who credits the world with his successes and 
himself with his failures.76 He remains dedicated to science, despite the economic 
failures it brings to him and his family, because the nation requires him to seek 
enlightenment and to eventually contribute his knowledge. Interestingly, the novel 










































values the fact that Sŏng-jae works in his laboratory every day, that he has mas-
tered the practice necessary to produce knowledge, even though his practice has 
yet to produce results. Similarly, Min is the object of Sŏng-sun’s affections because 
he eschews the careers of lawyer and banker and instead dedicates himself to “in-
troducing artistry to the artless Koreans.”77 Such melodramatic contrasts between 
spirit and material interests, between moral authenticity and deceptive self-interest, 
and between national culture and capitalism create a mode of enlightenment in Yi’s 
text that differs significantly from the rationalization process associated with capi-
talist modernization. This enlightenment is not antimodern per se, but rather em-
phasizes the modernization of emotions, morality, and the spirit as conditions for 
material or infrastructural development. As Sin Ch’ae-ho pointed out in immedi-
ate response, such a spiritual and cultural view of modernization was nonetheless 
a tacit justification of continued material exploitation.78
Although most of Yi’s novels could be described as “novels of ideas,” in that 
they allegorize his philosophy of life and philosophy of history, a number of am-
biguities arise in the fictional representation of his ideas. On the one hand, Yi’s 
advocacy of the liberation of women from feudal relations, and the liberation of 
male-female relationships from arranged marriages and Confucian dictates, pre-
sented progressive possibilities for the colonial bourgeoisie. On the other hand, 
he still tended to apply his concern that life be governed by self-legislated moral-
ity differentially according to gender and class positions. As socialism entered 
colonial Korea and became a powerful counterdiscourse to culturalism, Yi ap-
plied this feminization of questions of cultivation and morality to the political 
difference between culturalism and socialism, particularly through the figure of 
the “new woman.” In “Wife of a Revolutionary” (1930), Pang Chŏng-hŭi marries 
a socialist with whom she shares political ideals, but he dies when she does not 
care for him faithfully.79 She begins a relationship with a medical student who was 
treating her husband and carries his child. However, he deceives her, the baby is 
stillborn, and she dies of the effects of the labor. Yi approaches themes of life, ill-
ness, and death through a female focalizer, making the trials and failures of the 
cultivation of life a female matter. The failure to properly regulate life culturally, 
under the rule of the moral universal, becomes a failure of political ideology as 
much as of the personal limitations of female characters. Yi expresses an anxi-
ety concerning whether or not culturalism and bourgeois cosmopolitanism can 
compete ideologically with socialism in a place with Korea’s dire material con-
ditions, but he does so through a morality tale in which the personal choice of 
free love fails, melodramatically, when it becomes intertwined with macropolitcal 
concerns of capitalism and social class.
Yi’s historical novels reveal how his idea for the anthropological reform of the 
nation into a world cultural nation greatly affected how he saw the distant his-
torical past of Korea. Two of his major historical novels, The Hemp-Clad Prince 










































(1926–27) and The Sad History of Tanjong (1929), focus on a moment of acute po-
litical crisis in the history of Korea.80 He highlights the individual’s incapacity or 
lack of opportunity to affect the political situation for the benefit of the unification 
and prosperity of the nation. The Hemp-Clad Prince is set during the Later Three 
Kingdoms period (892–936 ad). This period was one of the most turbulent politi-
cally in the ancient history of the peninsula. Two short-lived kingdoms, Hubaekje 
and Taebong, were at war with the quickly fading Silla kingdom (668–935 ad), 
until Koryŏ, led by Wanggŏn, was able to unify the peninsula under a single gov-
ernment. Rather than presenting Wanggŏn as a national hero, however, Yi Kwang-
su makes the defeated leader of Taebong, Kung’ye, the protagonist of the novel. 
Meanwhile, the titular hemp-clad prince withdraws to the mountains early in the 
story and becomes an ascetic. A favorite among the readership of colonial Korea, 
The Hemp-Clad Prince provides few prescriptions for modern nation building. 
Yi’s turn to the national past is more in the style of a “sorrow-play” (Trauerspiel) 
in which the depiction of the despair over national history never arrives at the 
catharsis of a tragedy.81 The implication is that ancient Korean history does not pro-
vide material for the renewal of modern Korean subjectivities. Without a Korean 
state in the present, Yi could not present the history of dynastic rulers as a prehis-
tory to the nation-state. As a national allegory, The Hemp-Clad Prince conveys the 
problem of a past in which the dynastic state existed, but not a modern national 
self that could provide cultural unity during a tumultuous time of political divi-
sion. The Sad History of Tanjong recounts events in the history of fifteenth-century 
Chosŏn, but rather than focusing on the cultural and political successes of King 
Sejong, it rather takes up the history of Sejong’s grandson Tanjong, whose power 
was usurped by his uncle Suyang and who was exiled and eventually executed 
at the age of sixteen. The melodramatic and mournful themes and style of these 
historical novels certainly contributed to a popular sense of shared suffering and 
injustice among the colonial Korean readership, but the primary political lesson 
is that treachery and selfish ambition accompanied each moment of progress in 
Korean history, and that these intrusions had limited the possibility for the kind of 
fundamental reconstruction of national character necessary for modernity.
This long view of Korean history had a significant influence on the ways that Yi 
represented the contemporary political and social moment of colonial Korea, be-
cause his turn to quasi-mythical ideas for the origins of Korean national identity in 
the countryside and in blood emerged in part out of the difficulty he had in finding 
a cultural and moral national identity in the overly Sinocentric dynastic history 
of Korea. Some of the internal problems with Yi’s notion of cultural and spiritual 
enlightenment come through in his back-to-the-land novels, which echoed the 
Russian Narodnik movement of the nineteenth century. In the 1930s, Yi’s enlight-
enment narrative returned to the countryside, to the rural villages where most 
of his characters, and most of his readers, originated. Yi’s Soil (1933) inaugurated 










































a series of other back-to-the-land novels with varying political perspectives, in-
cluding Yi Ki-yŏng’s treatment of class conflict, Home Village (1933–34), and Sim 
Hun’s melodrama of idealist self-sacrifice, Evergreen (1936). The Marxist An Ham-
gwang criticized Yi’s kind of approach to the countryside as overly “metaphysical,” 
and associated it rightly with the European fascist aesthetic of blood and soil.82 
In the back-to-the-land novels, the connections between enlightenment and life 
that Yi formulated in his abstract political philosophy are expressed in concrete 
images of the human body in its physical metabolism with organic nature. The 
protagonist, Sung, has given up his life as a lawyer in order to return to his home 
village and help to enlighten the farmers, who have been resisting the Japanese. 
His wife, Chŏng-sŏn, remains in Seoul, eventually having an affair. His boyhood 
love, Sun, contrasts to his modern and licentious wife, and he comes to idealize 
her. Although a great deal of its action takes place in the city, the novel presents 
the urban petit-bourgeoisie’s return to the land of their ancestors as a solution to 
the problems of modernity and a pragmatic mode of cultural enlightenment in an 
increasingly stifling colonial situation.
The following passage describing Sung’s connection with Sun is “metaphysical,” 
in An’s sense, because it states that the soil has mixed the blood of the two main 
characters’ ancestors, allowing them to blossom in those fields like flowers:
Sung’s ancestors had cultivated these fields, probably along with Sun’s ancestors. 
They had cut down all the trees and dug up all their roots, made a reservoir to pro-
vide water to Sayŏul, and mixed their blood and sweat to plow the fields. Sung’s 
ancestors and Sun’s ancestors ate the rice grown in this field and lived and enjoyed 
life generation after generation. Weren’t the bone, flesh, and blood of Sun and Sung 
flowers that sprouted, grew, and blossomed in this soil where the blood and sweat of 
their ancestors mixed?
However, these fields for the most part no longer belonged to the houses of Sung 
and Sun. They had all become part of some company, bank, union, or plantation. 
These days those living in the village Sayŏul, Sung’s home village, had become like 
grass whose roots were cut. The sounds of the birds, dogs, beasts, horses, and oxen, 
which had risen peacefully and leisurely in the valley’s morning mist, had also di-
minished greatly this year. It wasn’t just that the number of animals had decreased, 
but that the peacefulness and leisureliness had left their voices. They were painful, 
weary, and resentful.83
The passage is critical of imperialism, on the one hand, because it contrasts the 
connection that Sung, Sun, and their ancestors once had with the land to the cur-
rent enclosure of those lands by finance capitalists, imperial companies, and the 
local landowners that they support. On the other hand, the use of images of or-
ganic nature in their dynamic metabolism with the laboring body idealizes the 
internal physiology that the families externalized into the land, figuring a natural 
substrate for the collective subjectivity of the nation. The ancestors of the village 










































stand in for a larger national community that was once tied to the land but has 
been displaced from this organic connection by the outside forces of capitalist 
modernity.
Considering that Yi Kwang-su was writing admiring essays about Adolph Hit-
ler around the same time that he wrote Soil, the fascist aesthetic in passages like 
these should not be ignored.84 There was a significant temporal compression in 
Yi’s intellectual path that can make this shift to blood nationalism seem like a 
sudden turn away from his earlier enlightenment discourse, and perhaps a sign 
of his inconsistency and confusion. However, Yi’s beginnings in the biopolitics of 
neo-Kantian thought are continuous in many ways with his blood nationalism. 
Whereas the romantic inner self grew out into the world like an infinitely expan-
sive plant in The Heartless, the young student who returns to the countryside to 
rediscover the soil nurtured by his ancestors’ bodies sees a more immediate but all 
the more metaphysical connection between the reproduction of humanity and the 
reproduction of organic life. This metaphor is consistent with Yi’s earlier version 
of enlightenment, although much more nostalgic, because Sung and Sun under-
stand their moral purpose only when they witness and “return to” a state when 
consciousness was integrated fully with organic life. In the 1920s, Yi saw this inte-
gration as a project directed toward the future—Koreans had to be reconstructed 
anthropologically to suit the new life of modernity. By 1933, this temporality was 
reversed, both in the back-to-the-land novels and the historical novels; modernity 
did not re-create life, but rather threatened it. This threat was not complete, how-
ever, and the fascist response to capitalist modernity would look at once toward 
the future technologization of life and toward the past as a mythical time when the 
community and the land had not yet been separated from each other.
Yi’s explicit support for Koreans becoming Japanese national subjects began 
in 1940. He soon changed his name to Kayama Mitsurō and called for the uni-
fication and expansion of East Asia under the Japanese nation-state. “You Can 
Become a Soldier” (1943) is an exemplary story supporting the implementation 
of the volunteer soldier system in Korea.85 A father’s first son dies of illness be-
cause he cannot join the Japanese military, but the second survives to become 
a Japanese soldier. Yi’s Japanese patriotism has been the object of a great deal of 
controversy, not just in the immediate aftermath of World War II, or within the 
national traditions created in South Korea and North Korea respectively, but even 
in present-day national canonization efforts. One primary question is what kinds 
of continuities and discontinuities can be drawn between his nationalist work in 
the 1920s and his Japanese patriotism. A continuity that has not been emphasized 
in statements that depend on a dichotomy between Korean and Japanese national 
identity is the generally modern problem of how human life comes to be governed 
under the regulation of the transcendental, and the connection between this con-
ceptualization and the regulation of life with political power. “You Can Become a 










































Soldier” and so many other literary and cinematic texts of the late Japanese empire 
celebrate the capacity to control the life and death of oneself and of others. In Yi’s 
belief that every young Korean man who died fighting for Japan would give mean-
ing to his life and contribute to the preservation of the national totality, there was 
an iteration of his previous celebration of modernity as the capacity to control life 
and death and to preserve life beyond death through the collective spirit and lan-
guage of the nation. In “You Can Become a Soldier” the father/narrator feels pride 
when his son can join the military, and the son’s volunteering saves him from the 
illnesses of his older brother. This kind of mastering of life and death through the 
sacrifice of the individual for the extension of the life of the nation-state was a very 
common and paradoxical logic in the biopolitical regime described in detail by Ta-
kashi Fujitani.86 Just as cultural policy was in many respects a preparation for this 
regime, because it transformed “culture” into the mediation between the life and 
death of the cosmopolitan-national individual and the life and death of the nation 
or nation-state, Yi’s life philosophy of the Korean nation, which situated the fini-
tude of the individual in direct relation to the potential infinity of the nation, had 
its own significant analogies with the work he wrote in explicit support of Japan.
Yi’s turn to the formation of the national self through literature was a response 
to the alienation and confrontations with finitude that appear in his early fiction 
on the experience of exchange students in Japan. The novels he wrote in an at-
tempt to form this national self became allegorical in a specific sense. By connect-
ing the lives of individual characters to the life of the nation, these two levels, of 
the individual and the totality, were linked through a model of universal history. 
Individual experiences became connected to collective experiences through de-
pictions that emphasized the emotional bonds of sympathy and ideological dedi-
cation that would enable the perpetual transformation of the Korean people into 
a nation belonging to the world. The allegorical novel for Yi was always a means 
of making individual life and death matters of the larger national community of 
sympathy, and this is one thing that did not change when he began writing for the 
Japanese state.
CRITIQUES OF CULTUR AL PERSONHO OD
There are multiple ways to criticize culturalism’s idea of moral personhood and to 
take a more materialist approach to humanism. One can contrast the universal-
ism of the idea of moral propriety with the historical circumstances under which 
morality is practiced. For example, in colonial Korea, where property relations 
elevated a few male landowners and industrialists to positions of power, the re-
placement of a natural law theory of equality with culturalism’s regulative notion 
of individual cultivation and the moral progress of humanity was clearly an ideo-
logical justification for gender and class exploitation. Nonetheless, culturalism’s 










































universal claims about the human transformed the terms of debate, even for those 
who were skeptical of its abstractly cosmopolitan perspective. Early criticisms of 
culturalism and cultural personhood show that rarely was culturalism confronted 
without asserting another problematic term for human subjectivity, another claim 
to the universal with a different set of parameters and limitations. Sin Ch’ae-ho op-
posed the Korean ethnos (chongjok) to culturalism and Im Chŏng-jae wrote of the 
popular masses. Eventually, in both Japan proper and colonial Korea, intellectuals 
posited the proletariat as a subject of history and subject of culture opposed to the 
individualism of the bourgeoisie. Even if the problems in culturalism were clear, 
the responses to it were not transparently subversive, particularly when it came to 
addressing the humanist desire to establish the unity of subjectivity.
The concern on the part of culturalists that their cosmopolitan ideas of culture 
and history would be criticized on political grounds was well founded. For example, 
as Sōda’s essays on cultural value, Kuwaki’s work on cultural reconstruction, and Yi 
Kwang-su’s “Reconstruction” were being published around 1922, the nationalist his-
torian Sin Ch’ae-ho was dismissing the idea of culture at the foundations of cultural 
policy. He continued to insist on the need for violent anticolonial revolution. In his 
earlier writings on historiography (1908), Sin argued that the formation of nations 
and national histories comes about through the dichotomy of self and other, the 
differentiation of the I from the non-I.87 In his later criticisms of cultural policy and 
studies of ancient history (1920–25), he developed a concept of the Korean nation 
that was tied to world history not through the concept of culture, but rather through 
a shared ethnic origin, on the one hand, and colonial war, on the other. For the for-
mer, he turned to the Tan’gun origin myth of the Korean people. For the latter, he in-
sisted that under conditions of colonialism, the mutually constitutive relation of the 
I to the non-I is transformed into a belligerent struggle between friend and enemy.
In “Manifesto for Korean Revolution” (1923), Sin attacks the idea of culture at 
the foundations of the cultural policy:
Who is calling for a cultural movement under the rule of the thief Japan? “Culture” is 
a term that refers to the developed accumulation of industry and cultural products, 
but if the very “preservation of the ethnos” is in doubt for a nation that has been 
deprived of its right to survival under a system of economic plunder, is there any 
possibility for cultural development? . . .
For this reason, we should declare to be our enemy all those who seek to compro-
mise with the enemy of our survival, the thief Japan (advocates of domestic indepen-
dence, self-rule, and the right to political participation), as well as those who adhere 
to ideologies that parasitize under the rule of the thief (for example, advocates of 
cultural movements).88
Yi Kwang-su had argued that national survival could be secured through cul-
tural development and cosmopolitan subjectivity. For Sin, on the other hand, 
national survival is an existential matter of life and death and the ethnos is in 










































danger of perishing as long as it is threatened by a foreign power. Colonization 
and imperialism are not means toward modernization and cultural development; 
rather, they have brought about a war between the powerful and the weak. For Sin, 
any view of history or culture that obscures this state of war between Japan and 
Korea is ideological and serves the enemy. Sin points out that the liberal attempt to 
develop civil society out of a cultural idea of politics tied the colonized bourgeoisie 
to a notion of history that masked the perpetuation of colonial exploitation.
Like his contemporary Carl Schmitt, Sin attacked the depoliticizing tenden-
cies of liberal cultural politics and thought of the political through the categories 
of self/other and friend/enemy.89 Prefiguring Korean nationalism after 1945 in 
both the South and the North, he attempted to reestablish and purify the connec-
tion between ethnos and political sovereignty, against the imposition of Japanese 
imperialism. Unlike later Marxian intellectuals, Sin did not develop a sophisti-
cated political economy or realist narrative form that could describe the various 
social relations and social institutions that perpetuated this exploitation. How-
ever, he did recognize that the effort to depoliticize the cultural basis for civic life 
was also an expression of political authority. It was this skepticism toward politi-
cal authority that later led him to an anarchist position.90 Despite his deduction 
of some of the ideological aspects of culturalism, there were significant problems 
in Sin’s view of the Korean nation and Korean national history, in addition to 
its obviously mythical dimension. At the turn of the century, Sin had written a 
historical defense for the expansion of the geographical territory of Korea into 
Manchuria, which ironically came about through the surrogate of Japanese impe-
rialism in the 1930s.91
Criticisms of culturalism did not come strictly from intellectuals whose pri-
mary unit of political thought was the colonized ethnic nation. The New Ten-
dency Group in colonial Korea was a precursor to KAPF (Korea Artista Proleta 
Federacio), a proletarian arts organization. Its members were the first in Korea 
to politicize the individualist view of culture from a class perspective. In 1923, in 
the journal The Opening, Im Chŏng-jae published “Advice to the Litterateurs,” in 
which he articulates a mass view of culture that was in opposition to culturalism’s 
focus on individual cultivation and expression. In a critique of the culturalist view 
of personhood, Im wrote,
Therefore, in art too [in addition to politics], acts of class consciousness, as forms of 
humanity, are expressed in the manner of a person (in’gyŏk-jŏk). The personal action 
of expressing the class “I’” occurs in art, and it becomes, for the practical human, an 
action that is directed toward the unity of a world idea.
In any class, self-perfection is gained through human expressive action. There-
fore, if art fails because it is pure self-expression or expresses only singular individu-
ality, this means stagnation in the perfection of the self as well.
In bourgeois art, the activity of the individual self crumbles into a fragmentary 
and imperfect deformation. Furthermore, as a partial object of pleasure, bourgeois 










































art produces further dissatisfaction with the unequal human rights and lack of free-
dom in human life. Because it lacks class content, bourgeois art becomes incapable 
of avoiding the creation of merely playful, vulgar, and pleasurable objects. The bour-
geois class has survived without having the space to develop historically; therefore, 
its artistic movements have been exclusive to a separate class (a class with special 
rights). . . .
If exclusive art is to be liberated from specialization and enter mass conscious-
ness, if it is to contribute to the progress of humanity and the perfection of society, 
then it is reasonable that it should be established upon a movement that seeks the 
liberation of the popular masses (minjung).92
Im Chŏng-jae formulates a humanism that would not rely on the culturalist ideal 
of the individual person as the teleology of cultural development. However, he 
also appropriated some culturalist terminology and resituated it within a theory 
for a popular art of the masses. He refers to “the person,” the teleological principle 
in Yi Kwang-su’s philosophy, as a class subject whose self-consciousness and cul-
tural activity are acts of class consciousness. He argues that an idea of culture that 
primarily seeks the cultivation of the individual cannot produce the desired effect 
of personal self-perfection. Individual expression is never entirely individual; it 
is also an act of class consciousness that requires some sort of basis in a collec-
tive class history. Because bourgeois art seeks this collective basis in an idea of 
humanity severed from historical conditions and is exclusive to a separate class 
with special rights, it can never achieve the moral and cultural perfection that is 
its ideal. The teleological principle of the completed person is in contradiction 
with the historical reality of class relationships in bourgeois society. Only by con-
necting art and culture to movements that seek the liberation of the whole of the 
popular masses could culturalism’s goal of the self-perfection of the individual also 
be accomplished.
Im’s assertion that bourgeois art is incapable of perfecting the self is partially a 
reflection of the colonial situation, in which attempts at an indigenous Bildungs-
roman, such as Yŏm Sang-sŏp’s Mansejŏn (1922), had revealed the instability of 
the naturalist literary perspective for colonial intellectuals who had returned from 
their studies in Japan proper.93 Such novels highlighted the sense of fragmenta-
tion felt by writers who had tried to translate the narrative forms of “bourgeois 
literature” into the colonial context. From the articles in White Tide until Im Hwa’s 
socialist realist study from 1937 of the history of Korean literature, the popular 
masses, and later the proletariat, were invested with the power to potentially over-
come this problem of what Im Hwa called the “transplantation (isik) of Western 
literary forms” into a Korean context that had yet to establish an autonomous and 
native “new literature.”94 The popular mass subject was a way to politicize cultural-
ism’s notion of disinterested individual cultivation and beauty, both of which met 
with a kind of crisis when they were “transplanted” into the political and economic 
atmosphere of colonial modernity.










































In Japan proper as well, confrontations with culturalism emerged from the left, as 
intellectuals questioned the aesthetic and cultural ideologies that had converged in 
a new manner with doctrines of political rule. Earlier in the century, Kōtoku Shusui 
had imported Lenin’s theory of imperialism and monopoly capitalism, and by the 
early 1920s Marxist social scientists were beginning to develop theories of economic 
development that accounted for the historical particularities of Japanese capitalism 
and imperialism.95 However, as culturalism became significant as a mode of govern-
mentality in the metropole and the colony, cultural critics added theories of culture 
to the political economic critique of capitalism. As with the New Tendency Group 
in Korea, early writers and critics of proletarian literature in Japan proper based 
their criticism of culturalism on class politics and on a criticism of the culture of 
individualism. By 1924, the opposition between the culture and cultivation of the 
proletariat and the culture and cultivation of the bourgeoisie had established itself 
as the primary opposition in cultural politics. That year the proletarian arts critic 
Aono Suekichi wrote,
Proletarian class consciousness is in no sense compatible with bourgeois individu-
alism. If we think of proletarian class consciousness as opposed to bourgeois indi-
vidualism, then it is really illuminated by the spirit of anti-individualism. People are 
often troubled by the relationship between socialism and individualism, and engage 
in arguments with concerns such as “if the world becomes socialist, then won’t the 
individual be annihilated?” However, if the content of the individual that is referred 
to in this question has a different meaning from what bourgeois individualism holds 
in high esteem, then the “individual” of bourgeois individualism should naturally 
die off in the future, when class society has disappeared under the rule of the pro-
letariat. This is clearer than pointing to the sun. The individualist spirit is only a 
moral principle that modern bourgeois society has perfected. As a product of ideas, 
this historical spirit assumes the place of eternity; it is something enshrined as a 
transtemporal, eternal ideal. The whole path of bourgeois cultivation has proceeded 
accordingly, and bourgeois rule, under the name of “cultivation,” gave rise to the illu-
sion of eternity. However, from below, revolutionary proletarian consciousness grew, 
and a mood with a new content spread, following its necessary advance.96
Similarly to Im Chŏng-jae, Aono argues that the bourgeois individual is an abstract 
ideal, and that culturalism’s ideology of individual cultivation creates the illusion 
that the bourgeois class would govern in perpetuity. Aono was one of the first crit-
ics to oppose the ideals of bourgeois individualism and cultivation to the prole-
tariat as historical subject. As the proletarian literature and culture movements ex-
panded, the proletariat as universal historical subject became the primary position 
from which culturalism could be challenged. From the early 1920s, two versions of 
universal history, two concepts of the subject, and, in a word, two humanisms—
culturalism and the proletarian arts—were in persistent political and theoretical 
conflict in Korea as well. Yi Puk-man, Kim Ki-jin, and Pak Yŏng-hŭi, in particular, 
translated Aono’s theory of purposive consciousness and used it to articulate the 










































“proletarian nation” as a conscious subject of history. In the late 1930s, this divide 
would come under critical scrutiny by fascist and other state-centered philosophies 
and literatures that sought a higher unity of culture that would be concerned nei-
ther with individual cultivation nor with class consciousness, but rather with the 
overcoming of this modern division through the practice of nation-state subjects.
Marxism and proletarian literature elaborated on these criticisms of bourgeois 
culture and were committed to their own reading of the human genus as the la-
boring and productive subject. In its modernizing mode, this turn to the figure of 
the human as producer eventually facilitated compromises with imperialism, but 
it also opened up possibilities for alternative narratives that exposed the disunity 
of humanity, or the disunity between laboring and producing, particularly within 
the actual lived spaces of production where the human’s labor to produce the 




Labor and Bildung in Marxism and 
the Proletarian Arts
We trust in the growth of the culture of the proletariat. However, what makes 
us committed to proletarian culture is the anti-individualist spirit that is 
truly oppositional to the individualist spirit, the basic origin of bourgeois 
culture.
—Aono Suekichi
In criticizing the “illusion of eternity” in the bourgeois idea of subject formation, 
or Bildung, Aono Suekichi drew a line in the sand between the individualistic, 
transtemporal view of arts and literature and a politically and historically engaged 
arts and literature. However, like so many proletarian arts critics, he did not re-
ject the terms of bourgeois humanism, but rather appropriated themes of culture, 
spirit, and humanity to give a foundation to an oppositional and collective subject 
in world history, the proletariat. Culturalism spoke of culture in terms of moral 
progress, individual achievement, and each nation’s place in universal history. 
Aono’s assertion of the “anti-individualist spirit” of proletarian culture seems to 
provide an alternative understanding of the human genus and its cultural histori-
cal forms. It would seem to follow Marx’s critique of Feuerbach’s abstract essen-
tializing of the genus without concern for sensuous activity and practice. How-
ever, taking up the proletariat as the subject of history, Aono subsumed sensuous 
activity and practice into the idea of culture. In this respect, culture remained at 
the center of the historical development of the human being, only now it gained 
new analogies with productive labor, rather than self-legislated morality, as the 
genus-being. The teleology of culturalism was a global society governed by in-
dividuals who had attained superior moral cultivation. Aono addresses the class 
difference that this view of the teleology of history both implies and masks, a 
difference between the culture of the elite individual and the culture of the pro-
letarian masses.










































Aono’s cosmology of a world divided into two classes suggests that the identi-
ties of the bourgeois subject and the proletarian subject have a material basis in 
the global capitalist system. In discussing the genus-being of the human not as 
morality, but rather as productive labor and productive relations, Marxists and the 
proletarian arts movement posited the unity of the international proletariat in the 
industrial stage of the genus-being. Aono also discusses the culture and spirit of 
these two class subjects, their distinct worldviews, cultural practices, and political 
positions in his narrative of universal history. However, if the economic system of 
capitalist modernity creates these two class subjects historically, then why must 
the proletariat have a culture and a spirit, that is, a subjectivity that exceeds mere 
economic conditions and is formed through culture? If the economic determinism 
of the stage theory of history guarantees a proletarian revolution and the transi-
tion to socialism, then why would history require a subject with its own knowl-
edge, culture, and spirit? How much do the notions of anti-individualism and the 
masses change the ideas of culture and spirit themselves?
As the problem of the role of culture and spirit in history suggests, Marxism and 
the proletarian arts of the Japanese empire were not the political or rhetorical ob-
verses to neo-Kantian thought, or culturalism more broadly, but rather belonged 
to the same field of discourse; likewise, they confronted many similar problems 
of the modern metaphysical and anthropocentric epistemologies. This intertex-
tuality between culturalism and Marxism is apparent in the shared search for the 
genus-being of the human. Despite their critiques of culturalism’s transhistorical 
and moral concept of the genus-being, Marxists and proletarian arts critics of-
ten took Marx’s concept of the human’s genus-being, or productive relations, and 
Georg Lukács’s figuration of the proletariat as the subject/object of history, as uni-
versals in world history, rather than as ideas with their own history of translation. 
In the language of Giorgio Agamben’s reading of Marx, they defined the human 
being as the being that “produces universally,” articulating the human’s essential 
practice as productive labor.1 They grappled with how to locate this transcendental 
essence in particular, identifiable, empirical traits within specific historical con-
texts. They imagined that the human as the object of knowledge progresses toward 
a regulative norm for modern subjectivity, the industrial worker. As I will show, 
the application of the idea of the genus-being as productive labor, represented in 
the world by productive laborers, led to a break from sensuous activity and revolu-
tionary practice (as articulated by Marx in his original critique of Feuerbach) and 
to an anthropological, social-scientific discourse of modernity that coded history, 
culture, and aesthetics according to developmental models.
Repeating the structure of the empirico-transcendental doublet that character-
ized neo-Kantianism, Marxism and the proletarian arts employed general anthro-
pological categories—including nation, race, gender, and social-class types—in 
order to make sense of the differences that persisted despite the general historical 










































transition to industrial capitalism, when the proletariat takes on its role as the 
primary subject of world history. Despite their universalist concept of produc-
tive labor as the substance of the human’s genus-being, they required anthropo-
logical categories and a theory of culture to articulate the historical process of 
the global proletariat overcoming its internal differences and eventually bringing 
about world communism. Furthermore, just as culturalism discussed cultivation 
and culture as the pragmatic processes through which difference could be actively 
subsumed into the universal, proletarian arts critics discussed proletarian cul-
ture, arts, and literature as aesthetic projects that could form the oppressed social 
classes into a single proletariat. The proletariat was the exemplar of the human’s 
genus-being—productive labor—in the capitalist stage. However, only through 
culture would the proletariat overcome its historical determination through its 
historical freedom, becoming the identical subject-object of world history that 
Lukács proclaimed it to be.2
Although critical of the reification of the human being in bourgeois ideol-
ogy, theories that pose the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history 
maintain a similar relation between transcendental and empirical to the one with 
which Kant inaugurated modern anthropocentric thought. As a symptom of this 
problematic of the empirico-transcendental doublet in Marxism, Nakano Shige-
haru thought of proletarian culture as an integrative culture that would unify the 
colonizer and the colonized in their shared revolt against imperial sovereignty, 
which defined the colonized peoples anthropologically while asserting their even-
tual sublation into the national proletariat and the national subject. His interlocu-
tor in Korea, Im Hwa, considered proletarian culture to be a means to human-
ize and modernize Koreans so that they could overcome the transplantation of 
Western literature and establish a subjective autonomy over culture.3 In each case, 
classes, genders, and ethnic minorities were united under the signs of the prole-
tariat and proletarian culture, understood as the ideal type of the genus-being in 
the capitalist stage.
The idea that the proletariat is the most essentially human of social classes in 
world history was central to the proletarian arts of the Japanese empire from the 
mid-1920s, when the proletarian arts organizations NAPF (Nippona Artista Pro-
leta Federacio) and KAPF (Korea Artista Proleta Federacio) were both founded. 
Writers and intellectuals often contrasted the proletarian subject’s full immer-
sion in capitalism to other, premodern, precapitalist exploited classes, such as the 
peasantry. The primary political and cultural problem that emerged in asserting 
a clear division between properly willful humanity, embodied in the proletariat, 
and the passive, represented classes of peasants, colonial subalterns, and ethnic 
minorities is that in the violent transition from feudal relations to capitalism, no 
individual subject belongs self-identically and a priori to the national proletariat. 
In colonial Korea, for example, there was no tradition, no longstanding forms 










































of consciousness, and no cultural precedent at all for those large numbers of 
people who were expelled from their lands through primitive accumulation and 
found themselves working in the dreary factories of Kyŏngsŏng (Seoul), In’chŏn, 
or Tokyo, the harbor of Pusan, or the mines of Tōhoku. Therefore, the proletarian 
arts movements could not seek to represent an existing social class with an exist-
ing class consciousness, but rather had to manufacture a class through culture 
in order to make social reality fit into the universal history that was defined by 
the most advanced social science of the time. It is this project—the production 
of a new social class through culture—that I refer to as proletarian Bildung. The 
proletarian arts were an aesthetic and cultural project that served as a solution 
to the problem of the human subject as it emerged in Marxist philosophy and 
social science.
Opening up the knowledge of Marxism to literary and other artistic represen-
tation also revealed certain limits to its capacity to represent the temporal and 
spatial complexity through its human scientific categories and its notions of uni-
versal history. Many discussions about the proletariat and the peasantry within 
proletarian literary theory, as well as the more complex leftist novels of the 1930s, 
became increasingly suspicious of the use of stable class categories like the pro-
letariat and the peasantry, particularly when they were understood to belong, re-
spectively, to the capitalist and precapitalist stages in universal or national history. 
Realist fiction became particularly adept at depicting social conflict while also 
revealing the multiple temporalities and multiple spaces that people inhabited 
in everyday life. Through what I call “other chronotopes,” the more complex an-
thropological knowledge and literary narratives showed how the reduction of the 
time of human life to the time of human history was a questionable abstraction 
of modern philosophy and modern social science. To trace the development of 
proletarian literature in colonial Korea, and the Japanese empire generally, from 
the simple early assertions of a unifying “proletarian culture” to expansive and 
highly intricate realist novels is to see Marxism in motion, not stilted by plati-
tudes about human history, but rather in constant need of refinement to fit the 
context into which it is translated. On the other hand, to read the philosophers of 
modernization of the same period, who utilized Marxist analysis in their support 
of the Japanese empire, is to see how the humanism in Marxism can also lead 
to a defense of imperialism as a temporary political process leading to a better 
economic and social condition in the future. As the concept of “culture” did for 
cosmopolitans who saw history as a gradual development toward a more per-
fected moral society, concepts of economic and cultural modernization allowed 
Marxists of the late Japanese empire to see imperialism as a necessary project for 
liberation from the past. This chapter and the next are concerned with these two 
tendencies in Marxist humanism, their relation to each other, and their eventual 
and necessary political opposition.










































AN UNCERTAIN INTERNATIONAL:  NAKANO 
SHIGEHARU AND IM HWA
In “Shinagawa Station in the Rain” (1929), a poem dedicated to two Korean so-
cialist critics who had been studying in Tokyo (Yi Puk-man and Kim Ho-yong), 
Nakano Shigeharu calls on the Korean proletariat to take the lead in the inter-
national revolution against the feudal emperor system, calling for the colonized 
working class and their vanguard to raid the halls of the Imperial Palace and to 
cut the throat of the sovereign. However, no one in Japan proper, except perhaps 
Nakano’s close confidantes, knew the precise content of his poem, because it ap-
peared heavily censored in its Japanese version. Nakano also rewrote the poem 
after the war, rethinking his interwar statements on colonialism and proletarian 
revolution and introducing into his work a complex layering of political sensibili-
ties concerning the problem of Japanese imperial rule. This censorship and rewrit-
ing are symptomatic of the difficult questions that Japanese colonialism posed to 
the metropolitan intellectual who viewed universal history through the lens of 
national proletarian revolution, particularly as national circumstances changed 
rapidly through war and defeat.
Although no readers in Japan proper at the time would have known its exact 
content due to censorship, Nakano’s poem was translated into Korean in 1929 and 
published with little censorship in Musanja. It is possible to fully reconstruct the 
original version only by way of these Korean translations, a task first undertaken 
by Mizuno Naoki and then Chŏng Sŭng-un in his book on Nakano and Korea.4 
Chŏng points out that Mizuno’s translation of the poem back into Japanese in 1975 
had some infelicities that suggested it was calling for Korean revolutionaries to 
stab the emperor in the throat and to “bathe in his blood.”5 Chŏng improves the 
translation and questions how Mizuno’s translation has Nakano calling for Kore-
ans to commit an act of terrorism. However, it is still clear from Chŏng’s transla-
tion that in the final lines Nakano calls on his Korean comrades to commit vio-
lence against the emperor, even if the graphic images of assassination in Mizuno’s 
translation were not true to the original:
Pass through Kobe and Nagoya and enter Tokyo
Approach his body
Appear before his face
Grab him
Push his throat and hold him
Press the blade against the nape of his neck
Blood surging through your whole body
Cry out in the delight of warm revenge6
Nakano’s metaphorical treatment of history figured Koreans’ act of messianic 
violence against the sovereign as a means to liberate themselves from the lifeless, 










































frozen, and shameless state of colonial society, to “go and break apart that hard 
thick ice” of colonial society and enliven a subjectivity that had been negated and 
stagnated by colonization.7 Although the poem is perhaps more metaphorical 
than propagandistic, it still uses a voluntarist rhetoric that should be analyzed 
critically. Nakano did not consider the political consequences of such a represen-
tation of violence, particularly the type of retaliation Koreans could expect from 
the Japanese state, were they to follow Nakano’s version of revolution (particularly 
following the popular and state backlash against resident Koreans and Chinese in 
the aftermath of the Kanto earthquake of 1923). Perhaps recognizing the foolhardi-
ness of suggesting such an act of violence, Im Hwa, in his Korean-language poem 
“Opening an Umbrella on Yokohama Pier” (1929), responded very ambiguously to 
Nakano’s call for Korean anticolonial revolution to lead the way for the proletarian 
revolution (see the appendix for my translation).8 As others have pointed out, Im’s 
poem is noticeably more personal in tone and is addressed to “the woman of Yo-
kohama,” with whom the male Korean voice of the poem has become a comrade 
and friend.9 While the voice refers to the imprisonment of Korean communists 
in Japan proper and his own banishment and return to Korea, the poem reads 
the colonial relationship through mundane and melodramatic images of suffering 
and struggle, in contrast to Nakano’s images of absolute, subject-forming revolt 
against sovereignty. The voice entreats the woman of Yokohama to forget “this 
man of the colonies” and to care for the suffering, colonial workers who remain 
in Japan proper.
The missing pieces of this important moment in modern Japanese and Korean 
literature, when Marxists tried to make good on the internationalist promise of 
Marxism, can only be retrospectively restored with an attention to the vicissitudes 
of translation. As with so much culture in an imperial context, however, the trans-
lation of Marxism and the proletarian arts at the time was for the most part a 
unidirectional transmission. Im’s poem was not translated into Japanese and what 
could have become an exchange confronted a barrier in the hierarchy of the two 
languages. This barrier and hierarchy of languages are unfortunate, because they 
mean that despite Nakano’s sympathy for the conditions in Japan’s colonies and 
Im’s critical reflections on the view of universal history expounded in the met-
ropolitan proletarian arts, a certain insurmountable divide remained within the 
international, drawn along the same colonial lines that determined so many at-
tempts to articulate oppositional political positions at the time.
As Miriam Silverberg mentions, Nakano later rethought the way that “Shi-
nagawa Station in the Rain” sought to mobilize Koreans to lead the charge against 
the emperor system, protecting and defending the “Japan proletariat” as its “front 
and rear shield.”10 Nakano’s casting of Koreans in the role of “shock troops”—as 
Silverberg put it—is a slippage, frequent in twentieth-century Marxism, between 
figures of anti-imperial nationalism and an ideal of proletarian subjectivity. This 










































slippage is a matter not simply of poetic language, but also of the social-scientif-
ic theories at the foundations of the Marxist view of universal history. Nakano’s 
manifesto is informed by Soviet theories concerning the role of colonized peoples 
and peasants within proletarian revolution. These theories have their origins in 
discourses of developmental history in the Soviet Union, which was undergoing 
its own dramatic processes of primitive accumulation and industrialization (and 
eventually the imperialist expansion of socialism in one country and Russifica-
tion). For Marxists who understood the proletariat in terms of national historical 
development, the colonized and the peasants occupied positions at the peripheries 
of the historical time of the proletariat proper. The aesthetics of this view of history 
entailed that the colonized and the peasantry be represented entering the universal 
historical process and its primary opposition between bourgeoisie and proletariat. 
In other words, the colonized and the peasantry, as supplements to the national 
proletarian revolution, could achieve their political and historical goals by subor-
dinating their interests to proletarian revolution. Nakano clearly had this devel-
opmental and Hegelian model of proletarian subjectivity in mind when he called 
on Koreans to lead and protect the Japan proletariat in an attack at the perceived 
center of political power. Nakano thought that such a proletarian revolution would 
also achieve the end of Japanese imperialism in Korea. And yet, paradoxically, and 
in a kind of reversal of the spatiotemporality of Hegelian world history, the origi-
nal context of his manifesto can only be read in translation, preserved as it was 
in the colonial periphery. At the time of its composition, it remained unknown 
to the metropolitan proletariat that he perceived as the primary agent of radical 
political change, despite his attempts to appropriate the political resentment of the 
colonized subaltern.11
With the knowledge that his poem would be translated into Korean, Nakano 
relied upon a model of universal history in order to figure his addressee. As I will 
show in a reading of “What Is Proletarian Art?” (1931), this figuring of the colo-
nized was derived from Soviet versions of multiculturalism that saw the ethnic 
cultures of the colonized and the peasantry (somehow conflated) as internal differ-
ences to be subsumed within the culture of the national proletariat. In “Shinagawa 
Station in the Rain,” the colonized has a determined place in national proletarian 
culture and that position provided Nakano with an optic for his manifesto. As 
the superexploited, the colonized are the most primed for revolutionary action 
against the sovereign, but as minorities within the national proletariat, the inter-
ests of the various classes of Korea were the same with one another and the same as 
the metropolitan proletariat. In viewing the colonized of Japan through the Soviet 
multiculturalism that emerged during the Soviet Union’s nation-building period, 
Nakano ignored the complex issue of national liberation within the political left in 
colonial Korea. He also assumed the internal unity of the Korean proletariat and 
the Japanese proletariat in their respective political spheres, as if the problem of 










































the divide between the countryside and the city could be overcome in each place 
through the imagination of an international. The possibility of this unity of the 
international was created through social science and was based on the assumption 
of the cultural and economic unity of the genus-being of the human (produc-
tive labor) in the capitalist stage of development (exemplified by the figure of the 
“proletariat”). The absolute negation of sovereignty proposed in the poem could 
occur because Japan and Korea were united in universal history, although the sign 
of “Korea” continued to reference the colonial difference in exploitation, as well as 
the persistent question of the relation between proletarian revolution and national 
liberation. Nakano views the colonized as the negated element of the process of 
world history, but also as history’s potential redeemer. His sublation of Korean na-
tionality into Japanese proletarian revolution is one instance of mimesis between 
the Hegelian logic of the negation of the negation as a representation of colonial 
revolt and a class-based version of the same logic. The unity of the Japanese and 
Korean proletariats is premised on the inclusion of Koreans within the dialecti-
cal and progressive history of Japan, a country supposedly divided primarily into 
two—bourgeoisie and proletariat—because it has uniformly entered the capitalist 
stage of development.
The many amendments he made to the poem, even years later, suggest a lin-
gering uncertainty about this figuration. Nakano confronted the “unevenness” of 
capitalist development (that is, the fallacy of reducing historical time to a stage 
theory) in attempting to position the colonized within universal historical time. 
However, as Brett de Bary points out in her introduction to a translation of Na-
kano’s novella from 1939, The House in the Village, Nakano was also deeply aware 
that despite capitalist development, older social relationships continued in Japan 
proper as well, particularly in the countryside.12 Upon returning to his home 
village—following his imprisonment, statement of conversion, and release—he 
wrote about rural daily life, and confronted the nonlinearity of historical time in a 
domestic setting. His observations of rural life suggested that political-economic 
development is not as uniform as many of the Marxists of his day, and some of his 
own theories of the proletarian arts, had proclaimed.
Despite the mobilization of the colonized for national revolt at the end of the 
poem, Nakano’s public expression of regret for his Korean comrades leaving Tokyo 
and his support of their desire for national liberation were certainly bold steps to 
take in the context of imperial Japan. In the historical context, it is remarkable 
that Nakano thought about the colonies in other than a governmental manner, 
and he is recalcitrant in his insistence that anticolonial revolution is a justified 
and necessary response to imperialism. Neither of these positions was easy to 
take, as evidenced by the illegibility of much of the poem following state censor-
ship. It is possible that the state backlash against proletarian literature was greatly 
influenced by the fear of such metropolitan support for anticolonial revolution. 










































The nationalization effort of enforced conversion was as much an attempt to crush 
the sprouts of a multinational affront to imperialist rule as it was a product of the 
fear of the Japan proletariat. There was something immediately threatening in in-
tellectuals’ willingness to place the collective struggle of a (vaguely defined) prole-
tarian class over the national interests of imperialism. Therefore, even if Nakano’s 
poem simplified the position of the colonized in history a great deal, his idea of an 
international proletarian subject was also an assertion of universality quite threat-
ening to the kind of moralistic governmentality we find in culturalism.
In reading the poem Im Hwa wrote in response to Nakano’s, we confront a very 
different sense of history, and a different sense of the possibility for international 
solidarity. Im’s lamentations to the “woman of Yokohama” are a stark contrast to 
the violent political agitation of Nakano’s poem. Im’s poem weaves together and 
contrasts the emotions of romantic love, and its loss, with the feeling of solidarity 
between the working classes of different countries. The impossibility of a romantic 
reconciliation between the woman of Yokohama and the poet is rendered analo-
gous to the impossible reconciliation between Japan and its colonized. The fate of 
the “woman from another country” and the fate of the poet are at odds, because 
his temporary banishment from Japan proper and the imprisonment of his fellow 
agitators mean that “they have not lived in the embrace of your country’s love / 
Nor have they lived in your beautiful heart.”13 The poet compares the failed em-
brace of Japan with the failed love between a “man of the colonies” and the woman 
of the metropole.
Despite his melodramatic proclamations of love, the poet maintains a certain 
stoic distance from the personal loss. Most of the overt expressions of personal loss 
and sadness are imputed to the feminine addressee. The poem entreats the woman 
to recognize the impossibility of their romantic love overcoming the macropoliti-
cal conflict between her country and its colonies. Rather than dwelling on his ban-
ishment to Korea, the poet insists that the woman should care for those comrades 
from the continent who remain in Japan, and who have been spurned and op-
pressed by her country. By taking care of those foreign workers and activists who 
remain in Japan, the woman of Yokohama can make amends for the cruelty of im-
perialism. The poet’s appeal for the woman to be hospitable toward the imprisoned 
men is a way to deflect the individuality of colonial desire, and to transform the 
gendered relationship into one of national debt and repayment. In the gendered 
aspects of the poem, therefore, the woman is figured as an unambiguous represen-
tative of her country. However, from the details of her life that we can gather from 
the poem, she is not a desirable national subject. She is a factory worker participat-
ing in dangerous labor demonstrations alongside foreign workers, and her future 
seems to be as tenuous as that of the colonial intellectual who is forced to return 
home. In this sense, the stability of her nationality is a fiction that allows the poet 
to introduce the problem of the colonial relationship.










































In his ostensible rejection of romantic nostalgia, the poet claims that the love 
between them is a result of their shared experience of daily life, work, and political 
struggle. The meaning of that daily life, and of their political ideals, will persist, 
despite individual fates and their intractable connection to nationality. The resis-
tance to romantic nostalgia is at once an assertion of masculine toughness in the 
face of personal loss and political repression and an affirmation of a higher ideal of 
love that is seemingly more political than individual. At the same time, the feeling 
of solidarity between working men would also lose its emotional content without 
the figure of the woman as addressee. The poet struggles to overcome the feeling 
of lost love in order to reassert the collective political struggle, but romantic de-
sire also provides an emotional charge to the poem’s expression of solidarity. The 
cadence and imagery of the poem follow this movement between romantic desire 
and an idea of love founded in labor and struggle. Because of the way that the poet 
perceives the problem of colonial rule through a gendered optic, the woman of 
Yokohama at once belongs to the colonizing nation unambiguously, and is also ca-
pable of a kindness and hospitality toward men that are necessary for international 
solidarity. The literary quality of Im’s poem lies in its capturing of the complexity 
of these various desires—colonial, romantic, political—as they conflict with one 
another in a situation of great existential uncertainty.
Unlike in Nakano’s poem, it is impossible for the “man of the colonies” to be-
long to Japan, or the Japan proletariat, much less perform something as world-
historical as an attack of the emperor. The exclusion and banishment of the “man 
of the colonies” are a matter not only of class revolt, but also of colonialism. In 
response to Nakano’s poem, Im seems rather indifferent to the call for the colo-
nized to struggle against empire by attacking its center. This indifference toward 
Nakano’s historical model is accompanied by a feminization of Japan. The model 
for masculinity is the foreign worker and activist who is at once victimized by 
capitalism and the imperial state, and owed a debt that the woman of the metro-
pole can repay with her kindness to his countrymen. The unfortunate limitation 
of Im’s poem is that in order to assert the internationalism of proletarian struggle, 
he nationalizes the feminine. This nationalization of the feminine is present in his 
representations of other women characters, including, most famously, Suni, except 
that in the case of the woman of Yokohama, she is a figure for the colonizing na-
tion.14 The subjectivity of men is at once national and international, whereas wom-
en are innately bound to national identity. In this sense, the nationalization of the 
feminine is a question not only of male national subjectivity, but, in this case, of 
the universality of the category of man in the internationalism of the period. Much 
as Yi Kwang-su used female characters as models for the cultivation of artistic and 
national subjectivity, Im suggests that the possibility for internationalism depends 
upon the awakening of the woman of Yokohama to her political duty. But like the 
character of Yŏng-ch’ae in The Heartless, whose personal development is likened to 










































the enlightenment of the Korean nation, the woman of Yokohama can be a model 
for humanity only insofar as she remains unambiguously Japanese.
In the literary exchange between Nakano Shigeharu and Im Hwa, various 
symptoms and problems of anthropocentrism take literary form. The exchange 
is symptomatic of how stage theory, the aesthetic and cultural philosophy of the 
proletarian arts, and the gendering of the proletarian subject all greatly affected 
how male intellectuals in the proletarian arts movements addressed one anoth-
er, particularly in translation, across the divide between imperial and colonized 
subjectivities. If Marxism and the proletarian arts required the illusion of com-
municative and transparent communication between national contexts for the 
formation of the international, the exchange between Nakano and Im shows 
that translation does not perform such a metaphysical function, but is instead 
profoundly historical. Our ability to read Nakano in Korean retrospectively 
does not provide a resolution to the question of the author’s politics; it rather 
forces us to understand how his views of history took shape, and the ways that 
the history of his poem’s translation and interlocution goes against the grain of 
his own human scientific understanding of history. In particular, the ways that 
Nakano and Im articulated theories of what I call proletarian Bildung reveal the 
degree to which the existing Marxist social science and Marxist aesthetics of 
the time were inadequate for understanding Japanese imperialism, the relations 
between metropolitan and colonial intellectuals, and the divide between city 
and countryside.
SOVIET DEBATES:  UNEVENNESS,  ANTHROPOLO GY, 
AND CULTURE
The questions about universal history and proletarian culture that emerged in the 
poetic exchange between Nakano and Im were greatly affected by each writer’s 
perspective on history, humanity, and proletarian culture. These perspectives, 
which become clearer in Nakano’s and Im’s literary criticism discussed in the next 
section, were very much translations of particular anthropocentric epistemologies 
that developed in pre-revolutionary Russia and in the Soviet Union. One blind spot 
in work on East Asian proletarian arts has been the formative debates around the 
concept of proletarian arts, culture, and literature in these contexts and a related 
conflation of the East Asian proletarian arts movements with Marxism-Leninism. 
In my view, it is necessary to determine why intellectuals turned to the proletarian 
arts as a specifically cultural, artistic, and aesthetic modernization project and, si-
multaneously, to show how their discourse was intertextual with both culturalism 
and the humanist language of empire. Furthermore, it is necessary to trace how in-
tellectuals and writers dealt with or failed to deal with the emergence of Stalinism, 
as well as the ideas through which intellectuals were able to reconcile their Stalinist 










































theories of culture, politics, and economy with the dominant cultural policies of 
the late Japanese empire, including the East Asian Community and the Greater 
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Lost in the tendency to conflate Marxism-Leninism and the proletarian arts 
movements is the early debate between V. I. Lenin and Alexander Bogdanov—one 
of the primary initiators of the Proletkult movement—as well as the ongoing con-
flict between Lenin and the various proletarian arts organizations in the post-rev-
olutionary Soviet Union.15 Despite the widespread view that East Asian proletarian 
arts are a direct legacy of the Russian Revolution, Lenin repeatedly denounced 
the establishment of proletarian culture organizations prior to the October Revo-
lution. His only extended philosophical text, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism 
(1908), was largely directed at the “reactionary” empirical philosophy of Bogda-
nov, which according to Lenin failed to overcome the apolitical humanist ideology 
of the bourgeois class, defined primarily by the confusion of immediate experience 
and divine intentionality.16 Only after the revolution, in a response to Lunacharsky 
in 1920, “On Proletarian Culture,” did Lenin make his first positive statements 
about Proletkult, but this was an explicitly political attempt to guarantee their lack 
of autonomy and their subordination to the educational work of the party and the 
commissar of education.17 In contrast to many who took up his legacy in East Asia, 
Lenin attributed little value to the idea of a cultural or artistic proletarian subject.
In Literature and Revolution (1924), Leon Trotsky echoed Lenin’s earlier criti-
cisms of Proletkult, directing his attack more specifically to the idea of proletarian 
culture:
The formless talk about proletarian culture, in antithesis to bourgeois culture, feeds 
on the extremely uncritical identification of the historic destinies of the proletariat 
with those of the bourgeoisie. A shallow and purely liberal method of making analo-
gies of historic forms has nothing in common with Marxism. There is no real anal-
ogy between the historic development of the bourgeoisie and of the working class.18
According to Trotsky, dominant classes require hundreds of years to create their 
cultures. Because the modern industrial proletariat was only some decades old 
and had had a state that represents its interests for only seven years, it was fool-
ish to expect that it had already created its own culture, or that it could do so in a 
matter of a few years. Furthermore, following Marx, Trotsky argued that the pro-
letariat is not a class like any other dominant class, but rather the class that brings 
about the end of social classes. Therefore, to speak of a proletarian culture was to 
simply mimic the bourgeois idea of culture and apply it mechanically to a different 
class, ignoring the universal historical purpose of the proletariat to seek the aboli-
tion of classes and the transition to socialism. Trotsky wrote of the possibility of a 
socialist art that could develop in the wake of revolution, and that would be built 
upon a critical engagement with the aesthetic legacies of classical, bourgeois, and 










































modern art and literature. However, he argued against the idea that proletarian 
culture already existed in a hypostatized state, and that it could be quickly created 
by opening up the practice of writing and artistic creation to workers.
Despite their use of Leninist terminology like “purposive consciousness,” the 
critical discourse of the proletarian arts in East Asia did not derive from Leninism, 
but rather echoed the most influential advocate of the cultural substantiality of 
proletarian consciousness in Russian and Soviet criticism, Lenin’s adversary and 
the Proletkult leader Alexander Bogdanov. It also took up the discussions that 
took place after 1932 of the socialist realist aesthetic system, which accorded to 
culture the capacity to form socialist subjectivities in post-revolutionary societies 
and revolutionary proletarian subjectivity in pre-revolutionary societies. In East 
Asia, therefore, Marxist-Leninist concepts like “purposive consciousness” took on 
a particularly cultural valence.
With his concern with systemic and organic integration, Bogdanov became 
influential not primarily in Marxism-Leninism, but in strands of moderniza-
tion theory and systems theory.19 He argued that workers, or the “executants” of 
modern economic systems, are historically and anthropologically superior to the 
“managers.” By virtue of their class position and their practical activity as laborers, 
the executants more perfectly embody the human’s genus-being of laborer. First 
in his Empirio-Monism (1904–06), and later in his three-volume work Tektolo-
gia (1912–20), Bogdanov attempted to produce a general science of organization 
that could explain how the human being comes to conquer nature through the 
organization of working collectives. He derived “tektology” from the Greek word 
tekton, or “builder,” and argued that nature, technology, and the human being are 
all organized into systems through a constant process of differentiation and uni-
fication, or what he referred to as “the formulating principle of ingression and the 
regulating principle of selection.”20 Bogdanov criticized Kant for locating organiz-
ing principles solely in the thinking subject, and sought the basis for organization 
in the empirical world. However, as Lenin pointed out, the force of organization in 
Bogdanov’s science resembles Hegel’s Absolute Spirit and Kant’s God, supplements 
through which the rationality of the world could be seen as a materialization of an 
ideal organism.21 Lenin was correct in pointing out that Bogdanov was masking 
his idealism in an empirical study of “man,” particularly through his designation 
of the historical role of the proletariat, proletarian perspective, and proletarian 
culture for a humanist epistemology.
Bogdanov sought an intersection of social organization and cultural forma-
tion similar to that of cultural science, but connected it to the perspective and 
historical purpose of the proletariat. He thought proletarian social existence 
was historically final, because it would create a collective subject of organization 
through the overcoming of specialization and the capitalist division of labor. He 
connected tektology to the primacy of the proletarian subject in world history: 










































“Mankind needed a point of view on a universal scale; in other words, a new 
mode of thought. But historical changes in thought occur only when a new or-
ganization of the entire society develops, or when there appears a new social 
class. In the 19th century exactly such a class came into being—the industrial 
proletariat.” For him, the proletariat is not a mode of becoming, but rather a state 
of being, a substantial subject whose perceptions, practices, and social organiza-
tion are a necessary result of the industrial mode of production. Although his 
idea of the proletariat had some analogy with Lukács’s view of this class as the 
“identical subject-object of history,” it is comparatively ahistorical and static.22 
He writes that the proletariat is capable of unifying the world into an organized 
system because of its identity as a subject that had already overcome, through 
its interactivity with machines, the division of labor between the organizers (or 
managers) and the executants (or workers). Like the person in the philosophy of 
culturalism, the proletariat is a teleological figure that regulates the epistemolog-
ical organization of human social life. The human being’s domination of nature 
through collective work and collective cultural activity is what provides order to 
the universe, an order regulated by principles of organization that originate in 
the ideal human form of the executant.
Once the proletariat is transformed into a “point of view on a universal scale” 
and executants are hypostasized as the ideal, historical embodiment of labor as 
the genus-being of the human, a duality between practical universality and em-
pirical anthropological difference very similar to culturalism begins to emerge. If 
only the “industrial proletariat” in the abstract can serve as the point of view on a 
universal scale, through what categories and concepts do we account for failures 
to obtain this perspective, whether or not the subject in question is engaged in 
industrial labor? In the first half of the twentieth century, the theoretical dispute 
in Marxism that tried to resolve, but was also the most symptomatic of, this prob-
lem of the anthropological difference implied by the unity of the proletariat was 
the debate between stage theory and “combined and uneven development.”23 The 
problems of anthropology and anthropological difference are embedded in even 
the most nuanced versions of theories of uneven development, suggesting that 
the concept of unevenness may not liberate Marxist thought from its traditional 
intersection with the categories of bourgeois anthropology: the nation, race, char-
acter, and types.
Rather than being solely an issue of historical modeling, what is called “un-
evenness” is a problem of the human sciences and how they affect the modes 
of translation and modes of address within the supposed unity of the Marxist 
international. Reading Trotsky’s critique of Stalin’s stage theory and situating it 
within the discursive contexts of the 1920s and 1930s, we can see a very similar 
sociological and anthropological problem in his reading of national social types. 
While he incisively deduces how the project of “socialism in one country” leads 










































to Stalin’s use of “uneven development” as an empty abstraction in phrases such 
as “socialist in content, national in form,” he nevertheless does not critique the 
notion of a national social type:
Stalin’s characterization of national peculiarities as a simple “supplement” to the 
general type is in crying and therewith not accidental contradiction to Stalin’s un-
derstanding (that is, his lack of understanding) of the law of uneven development of 
capitalism. With the help of the law of uneven development, which he has converted 
into an empty abstraction, Stalin tries to solve all the riddles of existence. But the 
astonishing thing is that he does not notice that national peculiarity is nothing else 
but the most general product of the unevenness of historical development, its summary 
result, so to say. . . . The peculiarity of national social type is the crystallization of the 
unevenness of its formation.24
Trotsky rightly questions Stalin’s reduction of (national) particularity to a supple-
ment to the universality of the general types of socialism and the proletariat. How-
ever, Trotsky does not completely undermine the human scientific concept of the 
“national social type,” a concept that allows the history of capitalism to be read 
through national history and national character. For Trotsky, the national social 
type is still a coherent anthropological category; he only questions Stalin’s reading 
of the particular type as a supplement rather than as an expression or crystalliza-
tion of the unevenness of development within a single nation. The problem is that 
the nation is assumed to be an integrated cultural and economic region, despite 
the recognition of temporal and geographic diversity within it.
Communists in the Japanese empire did not follow either Stalinist stage theory 
or Trotsky’s ideas about uneven development directly, but rather worked through 
them in both the social sciences and the arts. Many intellectuals involved in the 
proletarian arts recognized unevenness and the possibility of skipping stages of 
development when politically necessary, but they also tended to repeat the logic 
of supplementation in both Stalin’s theory of economic development and Trotsky’s 
critique. It is precisely this version of unevenness—the one that thinks through 
the existence of multiple modes of production and temporalities within a single 
milieu as ultimately expressed in a national social type—that the developed realist 
novels of the early 1930s, including some of Nakano’s own work, questioned fur-
ther. These novels, by breaking decisively with allegory and its consistency of the 
identity of the type, showed that economic development was neither even nor un-
even, but rather itself a fiction that required the reduction of the space and time of 
human life to the space and time of universal history. Through their representation 
of other chronotopes, they did not find a space outside of capitalism or modernity, 
but rather revealed the properly temporal, rather than human scientific, quality of 
the lived spaces of a peripheral modernity that belonged to capitalism proper in 
a way distinct from the anthropological view of temporal difference in both stage 
theory and the theory of uneven development.










































PROLETARIAN BILDUNG  IN EAST ASIA:  THE 
CULTUR AL FORMATION OF A NATIONAL 
PROLETARIAT
Why, then, did the proletarian culture and arts become the primary medium for 
the translation of Marxism-Leninism into the Japanese empire? Part of the answer 
is in the intertextuality between the cultural modernization project of culturalism 
and that of the proletarian arts organizations. Proletarian Bildung refers to this 
conflicted place of culture, art, spirit, and literature in many Marxian perspectives 
in the Japanese empire. One distinct feature of discussions of proletarian literature 
and culture in the Japanese empire was the way that critics tended to combine the 
Bogdanov position on culture with the Marxism-Leninism view of history and 
consciousness. Therefore, when Aono Suekichi, Kurahara Korehito, Hirabayashi 
Hatsunosuke, Kim Ki-jin, and Pak Yŏng-hŭi differentiated between the sponta-
neous consciousness of premodern political subjectivity and the purposive con-
sciousness of the modern proletariat, they did so through the binary of nature and 
culture. They read culture as the necessary mediation for the unity of the proletar-
ian class in a historical situation characterized by uneven development, ethnic dif-
ference, and gendered forms of exploitation. Somewhat adumbrating the socialist 
realist project of displacing political and economic conflict into the realm of the 
aesthetic, these critics tended to see culture as central to the formation of a class 
subject, a humanist claim for proletarian culture that differed from the political 
strategizing of Lenin’s or Trotsky’s mostly consistent separation of political ques-
tions from cultural ones. The specifically cultural formation of a unified class sub-
ject became central precisely because the political unity of this class, particularly 
between metropolitan Japan and its colonies, was only incipient and was very early 
on undermined and defeated by the state.
Aono argues that the human being in general and the proletariat in particular 
are conditioned by social relations but also culturally and spiritually exceed them. 
His references to the culture and spirit of the proletariat point mainly not to a 
real class conflict in history, but to an intellectual struggle over the foundations of 
humanity and human subjectivity. Both culturalism and his theory of proletarian 
culture delink the human from a reified Nature in order to isolate it as the subject 
and object of knowledge, culture, and spirit. His concern with the culture and 
spirit of the proletariat emerges out of his recognition that the proletariat does 
not come about spontaneously from the conditions of capitalist modernity, but 
has to be formed through culture, particularly in social contexts in which a very 
small percentage of the population is engaged in industrial labor. Employing an 
enlightenment distinction, similar to culturalism’s, between humans who are tied 
mechanically to spontaneous nature and humans who have both culture and free 
will, Aono and the other critics whom I will discuss examined proletarian class 
consciousness through the divide of nature and culture, and through a pragmatic 










































humanism that isolated human consciousness as the only proper object of the his-
torical arts and sciences.
After reading Lenin’s “What Is to Be Done?” Aono argued that proletarian 
consciousness does not come about naturally and spontaneously through capital-
ist development, but that the true historical purpose of this class could only be 
achieved when the class obtained purposive consciousness. In passages surpris-
ingly similar to Yi Kwang-su’s neo-Kantian discussions of subjectivity in “Recon-
struction,” Aono writes,
The proletarian class grows naturally. Along with it growing naturally, its desire for 
expression also grows naturally. One of its concrete expressions is proletarian litera-
ture. An intelligentsia that stood in the position of the proletariat emerged. Workers 
who wrote poetry emerged. Plays are produced from inside the factory. The hand of 
the peasant writes novels. This literature grew naturally.
However, even though these literatures emerge naturally, they are not a move-
ment. They became a proletarian literature movement because, in addition to natural 
growth, purposive consciousness arose. Where there is no purposive consciousness, 
there will be no movement.
What is purposive consciousness?
By themselves, descriptions of the life of the proletariat, or the proletariat’s search 
for expression, provide individual satisfaction; they are not whole class actions with 
the self-consciousness of the purpose of proletarian class struggle. Only when art is 
self-conscious of the purpose of proletarian class struggle can it become class art. In 
other words, only when it is guided by class consciousness does art become class art. 
The proletarian literature movement emerges, and has emerged, only under these 
circumstances.25
Aono’s discussion of purposive consciousness was enabled by a binary, very simi-
lar to the divide of culture and nature in cultural science, between the spontaneity 
of nature exemplified by the naturalist representation of the individual lives of 
workers and a purposive consciousness that represents the workers as a collective 
class subject. The theory of purposive consciousness is ostensibly derived from a 
Leninist political platform; however, it is here expressed primarily as a matter of 
aesthetic form and literary subjectivity, as part of a political program for art, or 
proletarian Bildung.
The theory of purposive consciousness worked against the natural and mecha-
nistic notion of causality that assumed that particular historical conditions nec-
essarily produce the effect of revolution, and the anthropocentric binary between 
culture and nature repeated itself. The theme of cultural and aesthetic education 
of consciousness became central, as it did in culturalism and cultural national-
ism. On the one hand, it was a matter of how to properly guide freedom, so that 
freedom would not become mere spontaneity or impulse (for example, anarchy 
and anarchism); on the other hand, it was a matter of creating, through culture, 
a subject that would be adequate to its objective position in world history. The 










































proletariat is the subject of world history that brings about total freedom from 
social classes, but if this subject can only be formed through the will and not by 
nature, then it must be constructed through the pragmatic intervention of cul-
ture. The idea of purposive consciousness echoes Japanese neo-Kantianism’s em-
phasis on Kant’s teleology and its concern for making transcendental knowledge 
pragmatic, for unifying humanity and nature through the mediation of culture. 
This analogous use of the term “purpose” reflects the intertextuality between two 
discourses that were otherwise politically opposed to each other throughout the 
1920s and early 1930s.
This intertextuality of culturalism and proletarian literature is expressed most 
clearly in their shared understanding of the human being as both a conditioned, 
historical species and the only genus whose consciousness and activity supersede 
its natural conditions. Theories of proletarian arts and culture were in this way tied 
epistemologically to the search for the general qualities of the human. Another 
early critic, Hirabayashi Hatsunosuke, drew from the neo-Kantian differentiation 
between the causal laws of nature and those of culture in order to explain how 
human relations and human consciousness exceed the determinism of nature. At 
the same time, he redefined the cultural and historical conditions that shaped the 
human being in order to challenge the moral universality upon which cultural-
ism based its regulatory knowledge of cultural history. In “Literary Methodology” 
(1927), Hirabayashi explains the difference between the human activity of literature 
and the workings of nature by referencing the problem of causality. Echoing Yi 
Kwang-su’s distinction between the speed of the organic life of human culture and 
the speed of geological time, Hirabayashi states that causality in the history of lit-
erature occurs at a much greater speed than anything imaginable in nature. How-
ever, he goes on to state that the general characteristic that separates the human 
from natural time and natural causality is not moral reason, but rather economic 
relations that precede the birth of any individual:
If we take natural conditions to be the single cause determining the vicissitudes of 
literature, then the cause will hardly change at all while the effects will change at 
a bewildering pace, and the principle of causality must be annulled. The human 
subjugates nature and its conditions do not remain simply compelled by it. This is 
something that the astounding progress of modern science and industry has demon-
strated. For the various transformations caused in a society’s ideology, and thereby 
in its literature, there must be a condition outside of nature, one that is more direct 
and that operates in a much shorter time frame. . . .
We are born into a natural environment and the imposition of the natural condi-
tions that are independent of our will is as stated above. However, natural conditions 
are not the only things that exist independently of our will before we are born. In 
addition there are definite economic conditions. Whether we like it or not, when we 
are born we enter into definite economic conditions according to which we must live, 
rightly or wrongly.26










































Drawing from Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach,” Hirabayashi defines the genus-
being of the human not as a transcendental essence, such as the capacity to apply 
a universal moral law to itself, but rather by the totality of economic relations 
through which humans dynamically transform nature, or the economic relations 
that precede the birth of individuals.27 Nonetheless, it was necessary to both bor-
row from and critique neo-Kantianism’s separation of nature and culture so that 
proletarian culture could be opposed to bourgeois culture within a framework of 
universal history that continued to assume a fundamental separation between the 
human being and nature. More specifically, in the discourses of proletarian lit-
erature, the neo-Kantian epistemological divide between natural science and cul-
tural science allowed critics to categorize all bourgeois realism of the nineteenth 
century as a kind of naturalism, an empirical or positivist mode of representa-
tion concerned only with facts, and to argue instead for a literature that revealed 
the dynamic social and ideological conflicts teeming beneath the surface of these 
facts, in the economic conditions that constitute the genus-being in a given period. 
The opposition between nature and naturalism, on the one hand, and the dynamic 
life of the human genus, on the other, led critics to discuss the struggle between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat as a conflict between the static spirit of bourgeois 
individualism and a more dynamic proletarian subjectivity that Aono references 
with terms like “culture” and “spirit.”
In this sense, the kind of dialectical critique of bourgeois humanism espoused 
by proletarian literature and culture critics (and in a different way by Marxist so-
cial scientists) required an appropriation and rearticulation of anthropological 
universals, not a more basic questioning of the epistemological premise of the 
human’s supersession of nature and natural laws. In addition to the two main an-
thropological categories introduced by Marxism and proletarian literature—the 
genus-being as productive relations and the proletariat as social class—they also 
borrowed other anthropological categories directly from the traditions of liberal 
thought, including, most prominently, the nation. As in culturalism, these anthro-
pological categories were conceptual means to address the problems of historical 
causality, subject formation, and freedom from necessity. In interpreting genus-
being in terms of productive relations in their totality, read through the modes 
and relations of production, they contested the idea of a transcendental human 
essence that inhered in each properly human individual and his or her cultural 
works. At the same time, because reading the genus-being in terms of productive 
relations meant seeing the human being as the being that produces universally 
in all periods, there was another strain in the discourse that defined the genus-
being of the human more abstractly, as the producer of the world, a being whose 
actions were a constant process of willful poetic creation more or less detached 
from nonhuman factors.28 In the proletarian arts movements, such a conceptu-
alization of production as the poetics of the human being is not simply a claim 










































about economic relations, but also a claim about culture and literature. Therefore 
Hirabayashi characterizes the producer of literature, the proletarian artist, as the 
subject whose capacity for literary language allows for the supersession of nature 
and an active entrance into history. In the analogies they drew between labor and 
culture, proletarian literature critics gave literature and culture the same capacity 
to contribute to human subject formation.
A statement from Kurahara Korehito in “The Content and Form of Proletarian 
Art” (1929) provides just one of many examples of how this translatability of labor 
and culture required anthropological categories as mediators, in this case the “na-
tion” (minzoku):
Nations with different relations of production have different artistic forms. For ex-
ample, the music of those nations engaged in hunting and the music of those nations 
engaged in agriculture have different rhythms, and so on. However, this is not just 
something to be said about completely external forms like rhythm. The same can 
be said of the subject matter of art. For example, as Ernst Grosse has already indi-
cated in his The Beginnings of Art, nations engaged in agriculture mainly make grass 
and trees the subject matter of their drawings, whereas nations engaged in hunting 
mainly make animals the subject matter of their drawings.
In other words, we can say that forms of art are determined in the last by the 
development of the means of production (technology) that determines the form of 
labor of a given period and a given society.29
Kurahara is able to conflate culture, art, and labor and to present their activity as 
unified in an organic way only through the idea of the nation, an anthropological 
universal referring to a community with a shared origin and a shared destiny. In 
the background of his discussion of art’s relation to labor is the stage theory of 
history that was gaining prominence in the Soviet Union at the time, which states 
that all nations are collectively at a single stage of development in the modes and 
relations of production. Kurahara assumes that the human being’s art and culture 
transform in direct correlation with such changes in the mode of production, and 
the underlying concern is to define the present as the stage of capitalism and to 
assert that the proletariat is the proper artistic and cultural subject of this stage.
Kurahara must borrow the concept of the nation from liberalism in order to 
manufacture a sense of economic homogeneity for a particular people at a particu-
lar stage. His discourse nationalizes the economy in order to assert the universality 
of proletarian culture and proletarian art, a move that appears, in my reading of 
Nakano Shigeharu, as a way of accounting for colonial difference. The project for 
the cultural formation of a class subject was therefore dependent on a conceptual 
confusion between labor and culture, and on the idea that both labor and culture 
are determining and liberating, conditioning and without condition. Within na-
tions that had entered the stage of capitalism, with its primary conflict between 










































the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, mass proletarian culture arose spontaneously 
out of historical conditions, but intellectuals had to step in to unify the exploited 
into a subject adequate to their objective conditions through culture’s active and 
pragmatic dimension. The analogies between proletarian Bildung and the model 
of individual cultivation in culturalism lay in this understanding of the political 
purpose of cultural, literary, and artistic activity both as conditioned by the eco-
nomic stages and as an active and conscious force in history.
The universalism of this theory of both the objective and the subjective condi-
tions required for modernization was highly translatable into the colonial ter-
ritories. The antinomic idea that nations were integrated communities passing 
through economic and cultural stages in universal history but that the exploited 
classes of the nation required culture to become a collective subject adequate 
to that image was extremely powerful in the proletarian literature, culture, and 
arts movements in colonial Korea. The first literary criticism that problematized 
the relationship between aesthetics and class appeared in the journal The Open-
ing (1920–25), where Im Chŏng-jae published his critical essay on the culturalist 
notion of personhood discussed in the last chapter. In his essay, he used the term 
“popular masses” (minjung), rather than “the proletariat.” With the founding of 
KAPF in 1925, the first chairman, Pak Yŏng-hŭi, coined the term “New Tendency 
Group” to refer to earlier attempts to write a literature of and for the popular 
masses. In the same year, Pak edited a publication of the New Tendency Group 
literature, gathering ten stories and one poem.30 The New Tendency Group had 
provided, for the first time, a developed forum in the public arena for discuss-
ing the conditions of colonial modernity in terms of class exploitation. It was an 
attempt to develop an aesthetic, and an idea of culture, that would turn the critical 
eye of the writer to everyday social conditions. This view of life contrasted with 
Yi Kwang-su’s early novels, in which “society” was more or less conflated with the 
nation and the improvement of social conditions was allegorized into a matter of 
individual-national cultivation. Pak and other members of KAPF took the New 
Tendency Group’s interest in the lives of the popular masses and provided it with 
a more dramatic narrative of universal history. While Im Chŏng-jae formulated 
a general criticism of culturalist elitism, Pak criticized Yi Kwang-su’s literature 
directly on class grounds, injecting the concept of class consciousness into the 
critique of bourgeois literature.31
Yi Puk-man, later the addressee of Nakano Shigeharu’s poem “Shinagawa Sta-
tion in the Rain,” imported the content of Aono’s essays on purposive conscious-
ness into colonial Korea from Japan proper; they had a significant effect on theo-
retical discussions in the KAPF organization. In an essay that compares the New 
Tendency Group to an emergent proletarian literature, Pak argues that proletar-
ian literary forms would elaborate on the accomplishments of the New Tendency 
Group, but with a more purposeful political program. Even though Pak sought to 










































shift the focus of the depiction of everyday struggle from the individual life to a 
collective class subject, he nationalized this class subject in referring to Korea as 
a “proletarian nation.” As proletarian culture was considered through theories of 
purposeful historical consciousness, national subject formation was often conflat-
ed with class subjectivity. At the same time, because the proletariat was a substan-
tial state of being, however unformed and incipient, Pak had to criticize Trotsky’s 
argument that proletarian culture did not exist and would not soon arise:
There is the argument that proletarian culture and art will embark toward becoming 
a perfected culture only after this class has [had its revolution]. Also, Trotsky insisted 
that a culture of the propertyless classes cannot arise. He thought that there is no op-
portunity to construct such a culture in the time of class conflict, and that after [the 
revolution] a classless culture for all of humankind would be constructed. However, 
Trotsky’s argument is very close to idealism.32
Pak’s accusation that Trotsky’s argument is “idealist” is revealing. Trotsky argued 
that if the historical purpose of the proletariat is to abolish social classes, then 
there is no reason to seek a culture proper to this specific class. However, in a situ-
ation in which revolution is practically impossible, what good is there for an art of 
the working classes to wait for revolution? Pak’s accusation of “idealism” is a criti-
cism of Trotsky’s historical model and a way to assert the substantial existence of a 
collective class culture and collective national subject in colonial Korea.
This criticism opened up a space for new modes of representation, because it 
questioned the desultory narratives of individuals living under oppressive condi-
tions and asked the writer to delve into and represent the collective dimension 
of political and social struggle. However, Pak did not critique nationalism as a 
bourgeois ideology, but rather maintained that Korea is a “propertyless nation” 
(musan minjok).33 This understanding of representation homogenized the class 
stratifications, various modes of production, and different temporalities that over-
lapped in Korea, reducing the whole of society to a synchronically unified subject 
of oppression. For Pak, Trotsky is idealist because he does not recognize this co-
herency of the capitalist stage and the national proletariat’s unified culture within 
it. Pak assigned to culture and literature the capacity to intervene to give purpose 
to consciousness, to enact the organization of class and national consciousness in 
colonial Korea.
The other prominent proletarian literature critic and founding member of 
KAPF, Kim Ki-jin, engaged in a number of debates with Pak Yŏng-hŭi in both 
The Opening and a later journal, Criticism. Having studied in Japan until the early 
1920s, he was present for the inaugural publications by Komaki Oki on Henri Bar-
busse and the Clarté movement.34 At around the same time as Komaki and Sasaki 
Takamaru were publishing their translation of Clarté and looking to Russia as a 
model, Kim wrote in The Opening, “What kind of literature is necessary in Korea 










































(and in Japan and China, too)? Prolekult is necessary. A pedagogical literature 
for the masses is necessary. . . . Thought that contributes to actual revolution, de-
termined by the changing of the times, the misery of life, and the brutality of the 
established class, must become a single bundle and engulf the world like a ball 
of fire.”35 Kim’s basic concern in his essays of this period is to criticize art for art’s 
sake and to advocate the pedagogical function of literature for the impoverished 
and largely peasant majority of Korea and East Asia. Similarly to Im Chŏng-jae’s 
statement that art could not fulfill its goal of perfecting the human being until a 
popular mass movement was created, Kim argued that the theory of “value” in 
culturalism and art for art’s sake was mistaken: “the literature after the revolution 
will exist for its own sake; literature before the revolution exists for a secondary 
purpose, which is the revolution.”36 Kim transformed the language of a movement 
of the popular masses into the language of proletarian revolution. In his work, 
the word “proletariat” does not refer to the industrial worker per se, but to the 
propertyless masses organized into a unified class through art, culture, and lit-
erature. Until proletarian revolution occurs in East Asia, literature must organize 
the masses into a revolutionary subject. The proletariat is more of an idea of the 
subject to be formed than anything that exists objectively in the historical pres-
ent. Kim’s foundational essays on proletarian culture represented another kind of 
cultural modernization project in colonial Korea, one based on an idealist theory 
of proletarian consciousness and cultural identity more than on political economy. 
As Kim Ki-jin and Pak Yŏng-hŭi had their debates on form and content, which I 
discuss in more detail in the next chapter, they began to question how literature 
should properly represent the spatiotemporal process of the proletarian subject 
becoming aware of its collective historical purpose.
In this way, critics in both Japan proper and colonial Korea called upon the 
project of proletarian culture to create a unity of proletarian subjectivity based on 
an aesthetic ideology where it did not yet exist as a unified political or historical 
subject. Just as culture, the arts, and literature in culturalism were the mediations 
that allowed for the human in its raw form to accede to its proper genus-being as 
moral subject, proletarian arts critics thought that the germs of class conscious-
ness existing within the highly differentiated masses had to gain a collective sense 
of purpose and accede to their own genus-being as an ideal laboring and revolu-
tionary class through these same mediations. Along the way, social differences 
were coded as deviations from the norm, as the supplementary cultures of minor-
ity nations, women, the colonized, peasants, and other types. What this view of 
proletarian culture as a poetics of the subject occluded most was the fact that most 
exploited people continued to live in multiple temporalities, multiple modes of 
production, and between multiple class, ethnic, and gender identities.
This coding of culture according to the norm of the proletariat comes through 
in Nakano’s theories of proletarian arts, in addition to his exchanges with Korean 










































communists. In the article “What Is Proletarian Art?” from 1931, Nakano Shige-
haru condenses many of his reflections on proletarian art. This essay is revealing 
as a document of proletarian Bildung; it combines the stage theory of history, an 
assertion of the primacy of the proletarian subject in world history, and an aes-
thetic theory of class consciousness in order to delineate the unity of the capitalist 
stage and the unity of the proletariat as the subject of transition to the next form of 
society. It is also a very anthropological text that uses the categories of the nation 
and the peasantry in order to explain the internal differences within this unified 
subject. Nakano begins his essay with a reading of Historical Materialism (1921), 
in which Nikolai Bukharin defines science as the systematization of thought, and 
art—including literature, music, dance, and architecture—as “a method for social-
izing the emotions.”37 Nakano echoes Bukharin and defines art as a method of or-
ganizing the emotions, but also states that in the performance of an artwork, ideas 
and thoughts are communicated as well. He writes that in singing a song like “The 
Internationale,” art organizes both thoughts and emotions. Interwoven in this 
song are “the idea of the internationality of proletarian struggle and the thought 
of international solidarity.”38 In much the same way as Im Chŏng-jae had tried to 
redefine personhood in terms of the popular masses, Nakano uses collective per-
formances as examples of how art is not merely reflective of a personal emotion, 
the way that bourgeois literature had imagined it, but rather a mode of socializing 
emotions and thoughts. Bukharin had relied on a dichotomy between reason as 
the organization of thought and art as the organization of emotions, but Nakano 
points out that it is not always so simple to separate scientific thought from art. A 
song can communicate a concept like internationality as much as it provides social 
meaning and organization to the desire to participate in a collective struggle.
Nakano then defines this organization of emotions more specifically as a class 
phenomenon. He writes, “Art is primarily a method of organizing the emotions, 
but thoughts and emotions are not the same for everyone. They are different for 
each person. But are they different only for individual people? No. They are differ-
ent for the classes to which people belong.”39 In other words, thoughts and emo-
tions are reflective of the historical positions of classes and the art and culture of 
classes organize those thoughts and emotions into a form. The object of proletar-
ian art and literature is the life of the proletariat, and the content of proletarian 
art is the thoughts and emotions of this historical subject. However, the form that 
proletarian art takes depends upon its mode of organizing emotion and thought. 
Nakano relates the history of art to what I referred to in the previous chapter as the 
poetics of the subject, or the giving of form to the formless. History and the history 
of art are what give form to proletarian art, because proletarian art appropriates 
the languages and ideas of all of the other classes to create something that is his-
torically unprecedented.40 He argues that proletarian art is not simply the left wing 
of a homogeneous art world, a label that suggests that bourgeois cosmopolitan 










































art and proletarian art are compatible opposites within a singular aesthetic field. 
Rather, proletarian art is the historical sublation of previous forms into the most 
historically advanced stage of art: “proletarian art is the historical development of 
earlier art, an art that creates the history of art.”41 Proletarian art is not the art of 
one class in a multiclass global society, but rather the historically necessary art for 
the historical present. It is superior and more historically advanced than all of the 
previous arts upon which it draws: “the movement of proletarian art is the con-
cretization of the historical superiority of proletarian art.”42 It is the final historical 
stage of art in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.
For Nakano, proletarian art is the aesthetic basis for the production and re-
production of a proletarian subject that exists but has not been organized into 
a complete form. Proletarian culture is a mode of cultivation that organizes the 
various thoughts and emotions of the proletarian classes into a unified political 
and historical subjectivity. This unified subject is international. Forms of art might 
maintain a national character, but they have to be created and interpreted from 
an international position: “even when we treat Japanese proletarian art, we must 
depart from an international position.”43 By 1931, this international position was 
defined in Stalinist terms of “socialism in one country” and Nakano also argued 
that socialist art should be “national in form” and “socialist in content.” Bukharin 
and Stalin had asserted the theory of “socialism in one country” between 1924 
and 1926, and the movements in Japan and Korea, as long as they derived their 
theoretical basis from Comintern doctrine, tended to maintain this view of the 
relationship between the national and the international.44 Stalin recognized that 
nations without states were still national communities and defended the linguistic 
and cultural autonomy of national minorities within the Soviet Union. Nakano 
applied this formula to the peasantry and to the colonized nations within the Japa-
nese empire, stating that their arts would also be national in form and socialist in 
content.
The way that Nakano imagined the Korean proletariat as his addressee was very 
much influenced by such a conflation of the metropolitan Japan proletariat with 
Moscow and colonial Korea with national minorities in the Soviet Union. Such a 
translation was only possible by way of the universality of Soviet human sciences, 
including Stalin’s various influential discussions of the nation.45 With the rather 
mechanical delineation of national form and socialist content, it was possible for 
Nakano to imagine the colonized as a homogeneous national subject and therefore 
attempt to mobilize them as a unified subject in “Shinagawa Station in the Rain.” 
With this view of the relationship between the national and the international, the 
metropolitan Marxist comes to imagine that metropolitan acts of violence are the 
only possibility for the social revolution of the colonized and a necessary means 
of subsuming the ethnic minority into the metropolitan party. Art is elevated to a 
method of socializing and organizing emotions toward such a national and social-










































ist solidarity between colonizer and colonized. Nakano’s dependence on the idea 
of “art in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism” shows the extent to 
which the historical determinism of stage theory came to serve as the foundation 
of the idea of proletarian art and culture. Along with this historical determin-
ism, the nation form became the ideal cultural form through which the socialist 
content of art could be expressed, which allowed for a number of political and 
economic issues related to imperialism, the state, and colonialism to be sublated 
into an aesthetic theory.
Nakano goes on to argue that organization is ideology considered as some-
thing social. Art is what organizes both thought and emotion, so he reduces all of 
ideology to an ideology of the aesthetic. This aestheticization of socialism reflects 
the shift to socialist realism occurring in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s. The 
idea that socialization occurs through the aesthetic is related to another promi-
nent phrase in proletarian arts discourse, that existence determines consciousness. 
Art is the way that perception is organized into a consciousness of existence, but 
existence also precedes this organization and is its very foundation. The proletar-
ian artistic subject is a universal, organizing aesthetic faculty with a foundation 
in the substance of class consciousness. Rather than referring specifically to the 
industrial working class, “proletariat” means this historical subject that is orga-
nized ideologically through the arts; it can therefore include all of the multiple 
class and ethnic origins within it. Barbara Foley has discussed the US Communist 
Party’s assertion that the colonial regime in the American South would be over-
come through the inclusion of African American struggles within the proletarian 
struggle.46 A similar sublation occurred in the aesthetic theories of proletarian lit-
erature in East Asia, as colonial subjects and peasants (somehow conflated) were 
to have their interests represented only as they were included within representa-
tions of metropolitan proletarian struggle. Therefore, Nakano called on Koreans 
to enter history by leading the charge against the emperor system in “Shinagawa 
Station in the Rain.”
The cultural formation of the proletarian class subject entailed two primary 
models of historical development concerning the human genus-being—on the 
one hand, productive relations of a given period determined the cultural forms 
of a nation and its classes; on the other hand, within the period of capitalism and 
the communist international, the transition to socialism could be accomplished 
through a cultural organization of humanity and its class representative, the pro-
letariat. This model of a modernization puts the development of productive rela-
tions at the foundation, but cultural and other superstructural processes are the 
key to the unity of ideology and subjectivity, to the organization of that which 
exceeds nature and society—human labor and human freedom. Although a com-
munist revolution had of course not occurred in East Asia, intellectuals in the 
Japanese empire nonetheless appropriated the project of socialist realism and the 










































transition to socialism, which, as Evgeny Dobrenko has analyzed, was primarily a 
project of discourse, representation, and the consumption of aestheticized images 
of socialism, rather than a revolutionary leveling of class relations and the end of 
exploitation.47 In addition to their severe suppression by the police, this discourse 
of cultural modernization became one of the primary languages through which 
Korean proletarian literary critics and writers came to reconcile themselves with 
Japanese empire, imperial subjectivity, and the gradual masking of capitalist crisis 
in humanist aesthetic forms.
The career of the poet and critic Im Hwa, who became the leader of KAPF in 
the 1930s, shows how the concept of a universal history of productive relations 
leading to the formation of the proletarian subject intersected with both human-
ism and empire in the context of colonial Korea. Im’s best-known statement on the 
“new Korean literature,” or Korean literature written after the late nineteenth cen-
tury, is that this literature is a “transplanted literature” (isik munhak).48 According 
to Im, a history of the first new literature in Korea, such as the works of Yi In-jik, 
should be approached as a combination of the history of Korean vernacular litera-
ture and the history of Korean literary Chinese. However, this combination only 
occurred through modernity and the transplantation of Western forms into Korea 
by way of the colonizer Japan. Therefore, there is nothing indigenous about the 
new Korean literature.49 According to “Method of the History of New Literature” 
(1940), which represents Im’s fully developed and schematized theory, the his-
tory of the new, transplanted literature must take into account six primary factors: 
objects, social base, environment, tradition, form, and spirit.50 As Kim Yun-sik 
argues, these categories of Im’s theory of literature refer to both the universal qual-
ities of modern literature and the regional, national, and local differences within 
these qualities; the theory is an attempt to find a method to study the media-
tion between modernity and universality, between the proliferation of differences 
entailed by modernity and the tendency toward a convergence of world literary 
culture. In this sense, Im did not suppose that a return to purely indigenous forms 
was possible after the influx of transplanted literature, but rather that the dialectic 
between transplantation and indigenization had to be explored through each of 
these six primary factors, with modernity being the shared condition for world 
history and world literature. Im turned to a theory of the anthropological condi-
tions of culture in order to create a logical coherency between the universality of 
productive labor, embodied in the propertyless classes, and the social and cultural 
issues particular to colonial modernity.
Im’s theory of transplanted literature, with its juxtaposition of concepts of both 
translation and organic rootedness, offers a more complex picture of the history 
of modern Korean literature than either the foreign literature group (for example, 
Yi Ha-yun and Chŏng Chin-sŏp) or the national literature group (for example, Yi 
Kwang-su and Ch’oe Nam-sŏn), which engaged in debates throughout the 1930s 










































and whom Im Hwa criticized as advocates of petit-bourgeois ideologies.51 As the 
chairman of KAPF in the 1930s, Im asserted the historical, culture, and political 
superiority of the propertyless class and their vanguard representatives. He also 
identified a colonial problem of time lag between Western literature and Korean 
literature, a time lag that potentially put into question whether or not the univer-
sal history of class struggle was truly as singular as the historical model of stage 
theory and the proletarian arts movements had assumed. However, what has been 
often ignored in Im’s work is how his universalist and culturally focused Marxist 
humanism offered him a way out of the problem of transplantation and the colo-
nial time lag, because by superimposing the universal history of culture upon a 
history of national culture, in much the same way as Nakano Shigeharu, Im could 
imagine that the history of new literature in Korea progressed in Hegelian fashion, 
through the gradual sublation of artistic forms.
Writing in the aftermath of the RAPP meetings in the Soviet Union in 1932, 
and the First Soviet Writers’ Congress in 1934, both of which mark the beginnings 
of the formation of the socialist realist aesthetic system, Im imputed to social-
ist realism, or “critical realism and revolutionary romanticism,” the capacity to 
overcome the underdevelopment of a native bourgeois literature.52 He made this 
argument regardless of the fact that nothing resembling a socialist revolution had 
occurred or was likely to occur in the late Japanese empire. Just as Stalinism gradu-
ally made culture and art the realm and the means for the “transition to socialism,” 
Im’s history of new Korean literature narrates the progressive sublation of liter-
ary forms toward the end point of socialist realism.53 He marked earlier attempts 
at a nonbourgeois literature as inadequate precursors, calling Ch’oe Sŏ-hae’s New 
Tendency works “naturalist” and Pak Yŏng-hŭi’s poetry and fiction “romantic.”54 
Like Nakano, Im found in socialist realism what he thought to be the most histori-
cally advanced cultural and literary form, one that was realist, but also mythical, 
romantic, and expressive of a historically grounded yet universal human spirit. 
That Im’s theory of literature participated in the problem of the empirico-tran-
scendental doublet is apparent in that, on the one hand, he insisted that literature 
overcome, through engagement with universal history and the class conscious-
ness of the proletariat, the kind of empirical and physiological determinism that 
he found in short stories such as Kim Nam-ch’ŏn’s “Water” and Yi Ki-yŏng’s “Rat 
Fire,” while, on the other hand, he came to ground this transcendental subject of 
history and revolution in the geographic context of the Korean nation and, eventu-
ally, the East Asian community.55
Im Hwa appropriated and rearticulated the precepts of socialist realism and 
historical materialism in order to deal with the perceived lack of a native modern 
literature, using the new ideas of Soviet humanism in order to challenge bourgeois 
literature, overcome the colonial time lag, and maintain an international proletar-
ian position.56 He only turned to socialist realism—with its emphasis on everyday 










































heroes, a new romanticism, and presentations of socialist man—after two major 
police crackdowns on KAPF (in 1931 and 1935), the latter of which led to his dis-
solution of the organization. Beginning in 1935, the central issue debated among 
the colonial Korea literati was the meaning of the “new humanism” and the Eu-
ropean antifascist movements. Following the International Writers’ Conference 
in Defense of Culture (in Paris in 1935), Paek Ch’ŏl and Kim O-sŏng connected 
their notions of humanism to the European Renaissance and to the ideas of Eu-
ropean antifascist writers like André Gide and George Orwell, eventually criticiz-
ing proletarian literature on these grounds.57 Im Hwa criticized the neohumanists’ 
discussions of the human as overly psychological and transhistorical, stating that 
in both life and literature the human should not be transformed into an “-ism” 
through mere symbolism, but that a worthy “-ism” must rather express the truth 
of the human and problematize all of previous human history.58 Along with Kim 
Tu-yong and An Ham-gwang, Im maintained a Bolshevik position on the human 
and human culture, which by this time had taken the form of socialist realism.59
Considering that the Japanese empire was entering a period of rule that has 
been described as fascist and the proletarian arts movements had been suppressed 
by the growing police state, these debates concerning humanism in Europe seem to 
be strangely disengaged from the historical present. However, in Im Hwa’s critique 
of the new humanism and in his appropriation of socialist realism to critique ahis-
torical ideas about the Renaissance, modernity, and the human, the problems of 
proletarian culture, genus-being, and imperial subjectivity intersect. He criticized 
the bourgeois and decadent quality of Paek Ch’ŏl’s new humanism, which treated 
the human as an abstract generality rather than as a social human; Im followed 
earlier proletarian arts criticisms of bourgeois culture in insisting that society and 
its productive relations condition the human being in its various historical mo-
ments.60 However, in The Logic of Literature (1939), he differentiated his approach 
from historical determinism, stating that the human being’s metabolism with and 
transformation of nature brings it into social relations, but that the human being 
also always exceeds both nature and social conditions.61 He discussed this exces-
sive human element in various ways—as the capacity to dream, as the capacity to 
labor consciously, and as the capacity to act freely in creating culture and history.62 
He argued that naturalism and the old nineteenth-century realist aesthetics were 
inadequate to this human subjectivity that transgresses nature and thereby comes 
to constitute and be constituted by objective, historical actuality. Again borrow-
ing from Gorky and Soviet socialist realism, he states that in order to capture this 
subjectivity in representation, revolutionary literature needs romanticism, which 
is not perspectival or epistemological, but practical, active, and expressive of the 
pathos of the subject’s historical experience: “Revolutionary romanticism is not 
essentially one side, aspect, or element of the new realism; it refers to our noble pa-
thos, which emerges not in the thoughts of an epistemological subject (chugwan), 










































but rather where our practical subjectivity (chuch’e) intersects with objective actu-
ality.”63 Translating and utilizing the philosophical distinction in Japanese between 
epistemological and practical subjectivity, and also adumbrating theories of so-
cialist realism that would later come to dominate literature and film in the DPRK, 
Im conflates the subject’s metabolism with nature—in other words, its labor—with 
the free activity of producing and witnessing, through romantic representation, 
the pathos and suffering of objective, historical actuality.
Just as critics formerly endowed the proletarian arts with the task of creating 
through culture and the aesthetic a world-historical class subject, Im’s class sub-
ject, his national subject, and ultimately his human subject intersect with objec-
tive history not through economy or politics, but rather through the mediation of 
the revolutionary romanticism of socialist realist representation. In essays such as 
“The Reconstruction of the Subject and the World of Literature” (1937), written 
in the aftermath of the disbanding of KAPF and at the beginning of Im’s turn to 
Japanese imperial nationalism, the subject refers to both the national subject and 
the human as social and historical subject.64
As in Paek Nam-un’s later theories of national economy, the generality of this 
subject was no longer precisely the genus-being of productive labor, but rather a 
universal culture, a state communist culture through which social class could dis-
appear. Proletarian Bildung and its eventual iteration as a socialist realist version 
of cultural modernization required a certain conflation of the activities of labor 
and culture, an assumption of translatability between the idea that labor is the 
substance of human subjectivity and the German idealist notion of culture from 
which Marx’s critique of transcendental humanism departed. Through anthropo-
logical categories like the nation and national culture, proletarian arts criticism 
was able to unify the proletariat theoretically as a collective subject of cultural 
production. This conflation of labor and culture allowed them to see the unity 
of the human genus-being, its labor, where in actuality there were differences of 
gender, class, and ethnicity. The aesthetic theories of proletarian literature and cul-
ture were perhaps the most effective in the colonies, because they made it possible 
to connect socialist revolution with a nationalization project. If the past of the 
colonized nation is disregarded and deliberately obscured by the colonizer, then 
proletarian literary and cultural criticism is one way to cull this past for the signs 
of socialist content, while at the same time giving it a progressively more national 
form. However, it was just as possible for Im Hwa to argue in the early 1940s, 
through the same logic and the same intersection of texts, that Japan’s new peasant 
literature would come to represent the universal home and origin of all East Asian 
state subjects.65 After reading proletarian literature as a national literature with 
both an origin and a telos, Im could later apply this structure of the nation form 
to a Japan-centered East Asia, finding in representations of the rural hometown 
in Japanese peasant literature a universal East Asian origin that also pointed to an 










































alternative modern future. Im transformed the idea of a realist and secular peas-
ant literature that was to unify the proletariat and the peasantry in the capitalist 
stage, as proposed by An Ham-gwang, into an imperial literature that could bring 
together various ethnicities and social classes under a Japanese and East Asian 
state.66 Genus-being transformed from productive relations to nation-state subjec-
tivity, and state art became the means for the dialectical and aesthetic overcoming 
of both imported culture and the alienation of the East Asian proletariat from its 
origin and its social essence.
EC ONOMIC STAGES OF GENUS-BEING:  PAEK NAM-UN
One result of reading the national economy and universal history in tandem was 
that Marxist political economists grappled with economic questions in terms of 
national history. The primary issues in the debates on Japanese capitalism were 
stated in the language of national history: How could one explain the persistence 
of feudal relations? And was the Meiji Restoration a bourgeois revolution? The 
famous debates on Japanese capitalism in the 1930s between the Lectures School 
and the Labor-Peasant School concerning the possibility of revolution in Japan, 
as well as the various discussions of the “Asiatic Mode of Production” (AMP), at-
tempted to understand Japan’s position within the progress of the global history of 
capitalism. The Lectures School argued that a bourgeois revolution was required 
before proletarian revolution could occur, while the Labor-Peasant School argued 
that stages could be skipped. Among the Korean intelligentsia as well, Marxist po-
litical economists such as Paek Nam-un applied the stage theory of development 
to Korean economic history, and theorized the effects of Japanese imperialism on 
Korean economic development.67
Paek Nam-un’s writing of Korean national history as a history of stages, both 
during the colonial period and as Minister of Culture during the founding of the 
DPRK, is one significant example of how the return to humanist metaphysics can 
occur, even when one would expect that the concrete social conditions of Korea 
would have led social science to different conclusions.68 As in Im Chŏng-jae’s theory 
that personhood would be actualized through popular struggle, or in Aono Sue-
kichi’s theory of the proletariat as an anti-individual subjectivity, the stage theory of 
history also had its critical edge and its critical usefulness. Paek Nam-un began by 
critiquing the neo-Kantian concept of cultural value through “social science” (sa-
hoe kwahak).69 He wrote that society is formed through social relations between 
humans, and more specifically relations of production, not through the ethnic, na-
tional, and cosmopolitan identities discussed by culturalists. As he presented in his 
most famous work, The Economic History of Korean Society (1933), Paek thought 
of history as a series of modes of production transitioning from primitive com-
munism, to feudalism, to capitalism, socialism, and finally communism, mechani-










































cally matching these stages to periods in the dynastic history of Korea, asserting the 
primitive communism of Tan’gun’s ancient kingdom, the slave state of Unified Silla, 
the feudalism of the Chosŏn period, and contemporary capitalism.70 He opposed 
this theory of history and its basis in the relations of production to the dubious 
geographic determinism of culturalists, whose area studies made a region of Korea. 
Drawing from the work of his Japanese mentor, Hani Gorō, he insightfully pointed 
out that the return to geography in the work of culturalists like Watsuji Tetsurō, or 
Ch’oe Nam-sŏn in the Korean context, was a last-ditch effort for moral philosophers 
to give a sense of spatial location to their metaphysical claims. This return to geogra-
phy in Kantian cosmopolitan framework is apparent in Kant’s attempts to delineate 
the boundaries of Europe or in Watsuji’s search for a geographic determination of 
national culture. For Paek, the stage theory of history at least took social relations 
out of the abstract spatial normativity of cosmopolitan geography and assumed that 
social relations are what determine the genus-being of humanity at a given time in 
history. Despite his cogent critique of geographic determinism, however, he did not 
intervene significantly in the spatiotemporality of national historical narrative, and 
remained tied to a kind of humanist metaphysics in his assumption that the space of 
the Korean population transformed uniformly from one economic stage to the next.
In addition to showing that the neo-Kantian theory of cultural value was too 
disconnected from social relations, and connecting this abstraction to the prob-
lematic culturalist geographies that accompanied culturalist colonial discourse, 
through his introduction of Marxist social science into colonial Korea Paek also 
tried to formulate a different way of connecting the universal and the particular, 
one quite distinct from the cultural nationalist tendency to see national culture 
as the particular means toward the internalization of modern moral universals. 
He was especially critical of what he called the “particularistic view of history,” by 
which he meant ethnic national histories that assumed the uniqueness and par-
ticularity of Korea. He wrote,
In looking at the history of a cultural nation, the historical facts of that country are 
not something seen only in that country. The feudal system is not something that ex-
isted only in England or Japan; it existed throughout the world; looking at the history 
of the development of culture, we can see that in ancient times there was primitive 
communism throughout the world and after that there were slave states.
From the above it is clear that the particularistic view of history is very dangerous 
and illogical.71
Paek refers to culturalists like Ch’oe Nam-sŏn and ethnic nationalists like Sin 
Ch’ae-ho in his criticisms of the particularistic view. While he was aware that cul-
turalists and ethnic nationalists had their own notions about universal history, he 
was mainly concerned with the way that cultural history eventually returned to 
an essentialist idea about the particular character of the nation. He thought that 










































stage theory provided a more accurate way to connect the generality of humanity 
to the particularity of national history: “Finally, I would like to say that we cannot 
complete a history of Korea through the particularistic view of history that thinks 
in a particular or singular way through fragmentary facts, and that we can only 
complete this history through a universalist view of history.”72 This universalist 
view of history is the history of the stages of economic development. Paek ap-
propriated this universalist history in order to write a more complete and accurate 
national history. He did not entirely replace a particularistic view of history with 
a universalist one, as he himself claimed, but rather articulated a different relation 
of translation between national history and the human, defined generically as a 
producer whose form of labor is determined by the economic stage. For Paek, 
the general model is the stages of productive relations, the particular is Korean 
national history, and labor, as the practical activity that defines the genus-being 
of the human, is the generality that connects the nation to world history. In this 
respect, both culturalism and Marxist social science worked within the logic of 
anthropocentric thought, the universality of which allowed for translation and 
cooperation between empire and colony.
Despite his critique of culturalism, however, Paek eventually returned to a 
moral idea of practice when he began to write and speak in favor of the Japanese 
state as the agent of social reformation, from a society that values profit above 
all else to a society that satisfies the needs of humanity as a whole. In his discus-
sion of the state control of the economy in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, he began to write of the ethics of the economy, and how the state could 
step in as the “subject” (chuch’e) guiding the economy in a more ethical fashion 
than the drive for personal profit.73 Paek’s humanism of stage theory returned to 
a subjective ethical theory in which the Japanese empire could fulfill the ultimate 
purpose of human history, for the human being to return to its essence as laborer 
by producing only what is socially necessary, with an anthropomorphized state 
regulating production and consumption according to universal ethical laws. The 
communist Sŏ In-sik argued similarly that the appearance of the “socialized hu-
man” in communist society would mean the overcoming of the human’s alienation 
from its essence as laborer, and saw the Japanese empire, or East Asian Commu-
nity, as the historical subject that would bring about this socialization.74 This type 
of “conversion” was only possible because two different transcendental definitions 
of the genus-being of the human—laborer and moral personhood—became trans-
latable. The translatability between the proletariat and the state allowed the state 
as the moral and sovereign actor to reorder production and consumption in order 
to solve the problem of crisis through what Paek imagined as a culturally and ethi-
cally superior form of Keynesian intervention. In the conflict over the meaning of 
the genus-being, the productivist ethic and the state as the embodiment of human 
will became the dominant social-scientific concepts.










































In order to mark his sociological break from German idealism, Marx wrote of 
stages of development in the mode of production and property relations (tribal, 
ancient communal, feudal, capitalist), particularly early on in “The German Ideol-
ogy.”75 However, based on such sketches, the Comintern developed a simplistic 
doctrine on the modes and relations of production, which greatly affected his-
toriography in later imperialist countries like Japan, as well as in their colonial 
territories. Stage theory became a political problem in Korea, which was marked 
by obvious uneven development (or underdevelopment) and, under the Comin-
tern’s “one country, one party” policy (1928), was unable to maintain communist 
parties that were autonomous from those of their imperial rulers (which made 
it difficult to theorize the economics of imperialism and colonialism within the 
context of the international).76 In the case of Paek, this political problem is a matter 
that touches on the more general question of humanism, as well as the coherency 
between Paek’s support for the Japanese empire and his previous understanding of 
universal history and the genus-being of the human. A planned economy, run by a 
strong central state, was, according to Paek in the 1940s, a historical necessity. He 
recognized this tendency in world history equally in the New Deal of the United 
States and the fascist states of Europe, but sought a better form of state regula-
tion of the economy in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, enacted by the morally superior 
pragmatics of the Japanese state.
In Paek’s stage theory, the subject of social relations is the entirety of human-
ity, and the genus-being is determined by the relations of production. However, 
when it came to advocating the state in the arena of world history, the state stood 
in place of the proletariat, but more importantly came to represent humanity as 
a whole. This is an example of how the practice of the proletarian subject, under-
stood in humanist terms as the exemplar of universal production in the capitalist 
period, can become imperialist. Once we take up an abstract social science and 
imagine that the proletariat is unified within the capitalist stage of history, the 
intervention of the imperial state on behalf of humanity seems rational, and the 
universalism of imperialism asserts itself. By intervening ethically on behalf of the 
needs of people, the state replaces the working class as the subject guiding history 
toward its final, utopian end. The state overcomes division in a manner analogous 
to Lukács’s notion of the proletariat as the historical subject that will dissolve alien-
ation. Through the ethical action of the state, the human being also regains its es-
sence, but only through the same kind of humanist reading of the genus-being that 
Marx gradually left behind. For the major philosophers and economists in Korea, 
the role of the state in world history and the degree to which the state could act in 
the interests of humanity as a whole became the primary questions. In literature 
and the arts as well, critics on the left grappled with the humanism of the socialist 
realist aesthetic and whether or not this humanism could be distinguished from 
the kind produced in support of the Japanese imperial state. Only through the 










































figure of the human and the positing of the possibility for a new ethical humanism 
could the Japanese state replace the proletariat’s position in world history. Paek’s 
humanism began with economic stages of the genus-being and a conflation of 
national economic development and universal history; it passed through a sup-
port for the Japanese imperial state’s intervention, as an ethical subject, in the crisis 
of the national and world economy; it ended in a nation-building project for the 
postcolonial DPRK, one in which a “democratic ethic,” a “democratic culture,” and 
a “democratic economy,” all instituted by the “subjectivity” of the state, would unite 
nationalism (and its goal of national liberation) with communism (the science of 
universal history).77
PROLETARIAN CULTURE AND THE EAST ASIAN 
C OMMUNIT Y
One unfortunate consequence of the figuration of productive labor as the human’s 
genus-being is that it allowed intellectuals to eventually see the Japanese imperial 
state as a historically necessary subject of world history and as a redeemer of the 
humanist aspirations of colonizing and colonized subjects alike. In the late 1930s, 
many Marxists began to argue that the East Asian Community, with the Japanese 
state at its center and a regional East Asian culture as its mediation, would create a 
new human being and a new human society. In his earlier Marxist-Leninist works 
on the “culture of communism,” and its superiority to both liberal and fascist cul-
tures, Sŏ In-sik called this new human being the “socialized human.”78 In his later 
speculations about an East Asian culture that would be multiethnic, imperial, 
state-centered, and historically unprecedented, he made a similar formulation in 
his discussion of “heroism,” keeping human culture at the center: “The human as 
the substratum of history is the oppositional unity of subjective action and objec-
tive being.”79 Thus for those Marxists and proletarian literature critics who came 
to support the Japanese empire, it was the idea of culture, and more specifically 
proletarian or communist culture, that allowed them to rethink the class subject 
as an imperial subject and the genus-being of the human (that is, the totality of 
its social relations) as rather a new form of universal cultural practice. The meta-
phorical and real relations between the concept of culture and the concept of labor, 
a relation deeply ensconced in nineteenth-century European epistemologies and 
the rise of the human sciences, allowed for a translation of human genus-being 
and the class consciousness of the propertyless into the cultural subject of empire. 
Analyzing Marxist and proletarian arts interpretations of the human as the being 
that “produces universally” is to also reflect on the imperial humanisms of the late 
Japanese empire and their theories of culture. In the case of Im Hwa, the fungabil-
ity between the concepts of culture and labor allowed him to propose in the 1940s 
a literature of the laboring countryside as a national literature for the whole empire 










































(thereby ignoring, like Paek Nam-un, the ongoing problem of primitive accumu-
lation in the countryside, which was the focus of radical feminist writers such as 
Kang Kyŏng-ae, who were able to connect the class problems of the countryside 
and the city without relying on a state-centered culturalist model).80
Only through such an articulation of the genus-being could philosophies in the 
Soviet Union, as well as some versions of the East Asian Community, arrive at the 
idea that a particular nation-state can represent all of humanity in more authenti-
cally representing the proletariat, the most essentially human social class. Such 
humanist ideals concerning history and subjectivity contributed to some colonial 
Korean intellectuals’ capitulations to the Japanese empire and the hegemonic ver-
sions of world history. This capitulation required the structure of the empirico-
transcendental doublet and an illusion of its universal translatability, as well as the 
concomitant practice of locating in one historical and particular national identity 
a representative of the human’s essential social practice. Therefore, despite the con-
tinuation of exploitation and the reproduction of hierarchical class relations in the 
late Japanese empire, certain modes of Marxist humanism allowed intellectuals to 
see the Japanese imperial state as a representative of the East Asian proletariat, and 
humanity at large, in world history.
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Other Chronotopes in Realist Literature
The image of man is always intrinsically chronotopic.
—Mikhail Bakhtin
“So, all you, is name proletariat. Understand?”
—A Chinese worker in Kobayashi Takiji’s The Crab Cannery Ship
CHRONOTOPE AND HUMANISM
In 1924, a year after the Kanto earthquake and the subsequent racist attacks against 
Korean and Chinese minorities in Japan proper, Yoshino Sakuzō began publishing 
the works of the Meiji Culture Research Group, celebrating the cultural legacy of 
Meiji and bemoaning the new complexities of ethnic and class politics.1 Cultural 
policy was in full swing in Korea, and Sōda Kiichirō was continuing to formalize 
the philosophy of culturalism. In the same year, Etsuzandō published The View of 
Life of Death Row Inmates by Nakanishi Inosuke, a leftist writer from Japan who 
spent a good deal of time in Korea and was critical of Japanese colonial racism 
against Koreans.2 This text is remarkable in many ways, but particularly in how it 
uses the chronotope of the prison to test the coherency of the empirico-transcen-
dental doublet of culturalist humanism.
Nakanishi himself was incarcerated in Tokyo’s Ichigaya and Nakano prisons as 
well as in Korea. The final chapter of The View of Life of Death Row Inmates, “Life 
in a Korean Prison,” compares the prisons in Japan proper with colonial prisons, 
testifying to the more horrific conditions inside the latter. The text is not solely a 
work of social criticism, however; it is also a work of philosophical anthropology 
with many insights into the history of humanist thinking. In contrast to much 
more abstract and academic works on human life later written in the mode of 
philosophical anthropology, such as Miki Kiyoshi’s Notes on Human Life (1941) 
or Watsuji Tetsurō’s Ethics as the Study of the Human (1934), Nakanishi’s text re-
sists the attempt to find some sort of regulative solution to the antinomy between 










































the transcendental and empirical aspects of humanism.3 Rather than figuring the 
nation and the world as hypothetical unities that could give the metaphysics of 
morals some kind of ideal space in which to be actualized, he instead argues that 
experiences of life are too manifold and complex in their social and institutional 
contexts to belong so easily to the organic wholes imagined by anthropocentric 
epistemologies. Human life could never come under complete regulation of the 
concept, the way that the philosophy of culturalism asserted through the limit 
concept. More interesting, however, is the way that Nakanishi arrived at this in-
sight by situating his philosophical anthropology in another general chronotope 
of modernity: the prison.
Nakanishi’s contextualized anthropology of the prison included direct rebuttals 
to the neo-Kantian philosophy of culturalism espoused by Kuwaki, Sōda, and the 
administrators of cultural policy:
If the life view belonging to this person were what Kant calls “a priori,” and if it ad-
hered to his twelve categories, then it would have to be knowledge; however, the life 
view belonging to each person or individual does not adhere to Kant’s a priori syn-
thetic judgment. Therefore, life views are not the same as what Kant calls knowledge.
Shall we say that while knowledge can mean understanding a thing, such as a 
table, it cannot mean understanding human life? What causes this contradiction?
The material given to our understanding causes this failure. Certain materials 
for understanding—such as a table, a teacup, a dog, a cat, or a cow—can easily be 
transformed into knowledge. However, as the materials for understanding become 
more complex, understanding becomes more difficult. For material as confounding 
as human life, even if sensation can produce the concept of one life, understanding 
and reason are perplexed to find any organized unity, and therefore cannot find an a 
priori synthetic judgment that has universal necessity. For an object like human life, 
art can emerge through the movement of sensation, but what Kant calls knowledge 
cannot emerge. Therefore, we can propose this idea: views of human life are actually 
not knowledge, but rather a kind of art.4
Nakanishi states that human life cannot be an object of knowledge, because it is 
too complex to be organized into a unity that corresponds to the a priori categories 
of the transcendental subject. The underlying argument of Nakanishi’s text is that 
the transcendental subject cannot entirely account for the individual’s existence 
and intuitions, because the everyday practices and perspectives of the individual 
occur in a political and social context constituted by institutional power relations 
that are dispersed within a complex field, represented in this work by the chrono-
tope of the prison. Anticipating Nishida Kitarō’s critique of Sōda three years later, 
Nakanishi questions the identity of the knowledge of the transcendental subject 
with the active intuitions of the individual.5 The material of human life and views 
of human life are too complex as objects to be considered knowledge in the Kan-
tian sense. Kant also recognized the artistry involved in the empirical philosophy 










































of the Anthropology, but the ultimate point of doing anthropology for him was to 
define empirically the essence of that being (the human) that makes all knowledge 
possible, to arrive at knowledge of the totality of the world through knowledge of 
its most important part, the human. Nakanishi questions humanism’s attempts to 
come to a total knowledge of the world through the human by refusing to bracket 
the human from the political, social, and institutional context, a bracketing en-
acted through the philosophical chronotopes of the nation, the world, and their 
histories. In taking up the chronotope of the life of prisoners awaiting execution, 
he introduced another sense of space and time, one in which life and death, beauty 
and ugliness, sentiment and thought are not metaphysical abstractions pertaining 
to the developing genus-being of the human, but rather modes of existing as an 
individual within a regulated, political space and time. Nakanishi uses the chro-
notope of the prison not only to expose some of the real social conditions at the 
foundations of the Japanese empire and its cosmopolitan cultural policy, but to 
show that the very division in anthropocentric knowledge between the empirical 
and the transcendental originates in or is consubstantial with modern institutions 
like the prison.
The intervention is remarkable because it shows how anthropocentric 
thought—with its regulative concepts of the genus-being and its positing of the 
limit as the very unifying principle of knowledge about the human—must work 
politically and socially against other senses of space and time. This is the case even 
for seemingly counterhegemonic discourses. For example, the appropriation of 
stage theory by Marxist social scientists and proletarian literature critics is indica-
tive of the force that abstract humanist models of space, time, and history had 
even for those discourses that critiqued the philosophy of culturalism. Nakani-
shi’s point was not merely to question bourgeois morality as the genus-being of 
the human by posing another idea of the human’s historical essence (for example, 
productive labor). He rather questioned humanism by pointing to another experi-
ence of space and time—that of the death row prisoner—while at the same time 
insisting that human life is too complex to be unified under transcendental ideas, 
transhistorical substances, or the empty time that they imply. Like many writers 
of realist works who confronted the hegemony of culturalism and cultural policy, 
Nakanishi questioned transcendental humanist thinking effectively by challenging 
the chronotope of world history, which in both its culturalist and its Marxist ver-
sions sought the unity of humanity in the confluence of the world and the nation. 
The chronotope of the prisoner awaiting execution allowed him to explore the 
finitude of life and the subject without redeeming death under the transcendental 
laws of cosmopolitanism or nationalism. The death row inmate cannot posit a 
view of human life transcendentally, because he or she confronts the finitude of his 
or her existence at every moment, unable to see one’s own death from a transcen-
dental perspective. Furthermore, Nakanishi generalized this confrontation with 










































death, rather than arguing, like culturalists, that the purpose of cultural generality 
and national particularity is to preserve the individual’s life after his or her death: 
“Human life is one large ward of death row inmates. How many among them have 
received a verdict from God, ‘you will not die, eternally’? Isn’t the human being 
nothing other than a death row inmate with an indefinite time limit, one who has 
been given the verdict ‘you must die.’ ”6
The theme of death is common in philosophy and literature in the 1920s, the 
most iconic example being Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927), in which 
he explores the limits of the transcendental subject through the ontology of finite 
Being. However, Nakanishi’s text develops another kind of anthropology out of this 
philosophical problem of finitude, with sections on the psychology of death row 
inmates, the morality of the death penalty, the problem of false prosecutions, and 
the like. Heidegger would articulate a broken metaphysics of being-in-the-world 
precisely within this problematic, whereas Nakanishi instead develops an allegori-
cal and taxonomical discussion of being-on-death-row. This anthropology makes 
observations within a field of power relations governing human lives differentially 
and individually. If modernity is considered a matter of giving form to the raw ma-
terial of the human body, then time is reduced to the unfolding of human history 
within individual and collective consciousness and space is reduced to national 
space as the container in which the individual lives out the progress and travail of 
universal history. The colonial prison is another time and space—another chrono-
tope—through which Nakanishi exposes the institutional and governmental tech-
niques at the heart of the regulation of life by anthropocentric knowledge.
Nakanishi’s analysis and critique of the prison show how culturalism was 
not simply a form of knowledge, but a form of knowledge embedded in con-
crete practices and techniques of government—the prison, the colonial school, 
the metropolitan university. Nakanishi’s turn to the chronotope of the prison is 
explicitly directed toward culturalism as a colonial discourse, but it presents a 
challenge to colonized cultural nationalism as well. Yi Kwang-su’s fiction shows 
how in colonized nationalism, national allegory and melodrama were used to 
overcome temporal and spatial differences within the national territory through 
the allegorical representation of the cultural nation, which redeems the finitude 
and meaninglessness of the individual life by situating it within the time of cos-
mopolitan history and the spaces of the nation and the world. In order to redeem 
the loss of the nation and to unify what has been broken into multiple, local 
spaces and times, Yi’s national allegorical novels seek the transcendental unity of 
cosmopolitan history through the national community’s emergence into world 
culture and the transcendental unity of national consciousness through the cre-
ation of a unified interiority. Nakanishi discusses how such an imaginary unity 
of human life is materially dependent on institutional methods of representation 
and control.










































Later colonial Korean novels, such as Kang Kyŏng-ae’s From Wonso Pond 
(1934)—or, with its original cosmopolitan title, Human Problems—also critiqued 
the enlightenment nationalist version of the countryside precisely by situating the 
discourse and rhetoric of enlightenment within a fuller chronotope of the rural 
village Yongyŏn, the growing port city of Inch’ŏn, and the roads in between.7 While 
the complexity of Kang’s chronotope suggests the advances made in realism by 
the mid-1930s, proletarian literature novels in the Japanese empire often tended 
toward national allegory, figuring the problem of spatial and temporal difference 
within the homogeneous empty time of the nation and the world. The exchange 
between Nakano Shigeharu and Im Hwa shows that proletarian literature had its 
own idealist allegories of politics and history, particularly when it sought to con-
form to the paradigm of universal history and its situating of nations and popu-
lations within a spectrum of possibilities defined by what Paek Nam-un called 
“social science.” The types of Marxist social science easily became the types of 
historical allegory, whether of the cultural nationalist or proletarian arts variety. 
Imagining lived time and space otherwise than through an allegorical narrative of 
history required a great deal of critique and experimentation. The chronotopes of 
humanism were primary and set precedents, but critical debates and writing prac-
tices gradually came to reveal the complexity and overdetermination of social life, 
particularly through the creation of more detailed descriptions and narratives that 
took into account both the radical transformation of time and space in modernity 
and the differences within this transformation—the nonconvergence, the incom-
mensurable elements, and the ignored places.
In his analysis of the chronotopes of the novel form, Bakhtin pointed to this 
kind of frictional relation between modern anthropological thought and the chro-
notope of the novel. He was very much indebted to the way that Kant gave primacy 
to space and time as indispensable forms of intuition, but he explained how his 
work on the novel broke from the image of the human as empirico-transcendental 
doublet, and therefore with national and world culture in the modern sense. In a 
footnote to his statement “the image of man is intrinsically chronotopic,” Bakhtin 
echoes his contemporary Nakanishi in thinking the chronotope against the grain 
of Kantian thought and, more generally, against the abstraction of space and time 
that is an aspect of humanist epistemologies:
In his “Transcendental Aesthetic” (one of the main sections of his Critique of Pure 
Reason) Kant defines space and time as indispensable forms of any cognition, begin-
ning with elementary perceptions and representations. Here we employ the Kantian 
evaluation of the importance of these forms in the cognitive process, but differ from 
Kant in taking them not as “transcendental” but as forms of the most immediate 
reality. We shall attempt to show the role these forms play in the process of concrete 
artistic cognition (artistic visualization) under conditions obtaining in the genre of 
the novel.8










































The empirico-transcendental doublet is the image of man that belongs to the 
Kantian system in which space and time are a priori intuitions. While Bakhtin 
and Nakanishi begin with the premise that images of the human and human life 
are intrinsically chronotopic, they explain that when the a priori forms of space 
and time are understood instead as forms of immediate reality, representation 
transforms. Representation becomes a matter of an intuition about life that ex-
ceeds any complete determination by concepts and knowledge. As a novelist who 
came to write extensively about Korea and Manchuria, in novels such as Man-
churia (1929), Nakanishi understood the great potential in the genre of the novel 
for exploring this complexity of lived space and time in the colonial context.9 
Nakanishi’s text on the life of prisoners also shows how arriving at a novel form 
with a fuller chronotopic imaginary may also require another mode of anthropol-
ogy and social science. This was certainly the case for realist novels of proletarian 
literature, the forms of which, as I showed in the last chapter, were intimately 
related to social-scientific discourse. The literary texts of the period show that 
the relationships between peasant and landlord, uneven processes of industrial-
ization and proletarianization, and the collective experience of primitive accu-
mulation were comparable problems in the metropole and the colony. Although 
in practical terms political solidarity between Japanese migrants like Nakanishi 
and colonial writers like Kang Kyŏng-ae or Yi Ki-yŏng was not easy to create or 
maintain, they shared a concern with formulating other modes of representing 
the politics of space and time.
ALLEGORY AND REALISM IN FICTION AND 
CRITICISM
The intermixture of spaces, times, languages, and perspectives belongs to the nov-
el form in general. However, I differentiate and compare two modes of Bakhtin’s 
“heteroglossia,” connecting them to his other concept of the “chronotope.” These 
modes are allegory and realism. As I stated in relation to Yi Kwang-su’s fiction, 
modern allegory is immersed in historical time and the historical and temporal 
problem of how to make visible in an anthropological representation a model of 
history based on an abstract concept of the genus-being. Allegory seeks to unify 
time through a historical model, and unify heteroglossia into national language, 
while at the same time apportioning spatial differences within this unity of time. 
This apportioning of spatial differences within the unity of time inevitably accords 
to different spaces a position within the unity of time. Spaces are thereby normed 
through the spatialization of time, and time is, paradoxically, differentiated again 
according to a teleology or norm. We only need to think of the place of “The Ori-
ental World” in Hegel’s universal world history or the “Asiatic mode of production” 
in Marxism to see how the unity of time called History leads to the imagination 










































of spaces existing at different points in that unity, according a different historical 
time to these different spaces.10 The relation between anthropological concepts and 
allegorical narrative is apparent in the works of both Yi Kwang-su and Nakano 
Shigeharu, even though they lived in the colony and the metropole respectively 
and were also on disparate ends of the political spectrum.11
Realist narrative, on the other hand, tarries more consistently with the spa-
tial and temporal problems of progress and memory. There are clear differences 
between Im Hwa’s notion of socialist realism as the dialectical fusion of romanti-
cism and realism and the gradual transformation of allegorical representation in 
an attempt to expose the multiple temporalities, economies, and subject positions 
within the proletariat as subject of history. However, the turn to this other mode of 
realism did not emerge in any immediate way, as the strong influence of Yi Kwang-
su on leftist writers in colonial Korea attests.12 Although debates about bourgeois 
and proletarian literature in the Japanese empire often took shape around the ques-
tion of whether to pursue art for art’s sake, the cultural movements, or engaged art, 
this division cannot account for the intertextuality between the works of writers 
with varying political positions, particularly as they engaged in allegorizing his-
tory. Critical or social realism in the Japanese empire was not, from its inaugura-
tion, a complete turn to “reality” and turn away from the merely symbolic. Alle-
gory was the mediating form, and realism often remained allegorical, particularly 
as Marxist models of history proliferated and were incorporated into politically 
engaged literature. In the criticisms of mere naturalism that we find in theories of 
critical realist art, we see that the difference between the national allegories of Yi 
Kwang-su and realist novels of the time was in the different political ideas around 
which representation took shape, and therefore different chronotopic images of 
the intersection between ideas and the material, the signifier and the signified, and 
the general and the particular.13 Realism did not mean a rejection of symbols and 
allegory, but rather a transformation of the chronotope of allegory, a deepening of 
its temporal dimension. Realism was a chronotopic transformation of allegory, not 
a direct turn to reality.
This chronotopic transformation of allegory into critical realism was gradual. 
In order to understand how it occurred, it is necessary to trace debates in literary 
criticism in addition to analyzing fiction and poetry from the early 1920s into the 
1930s. Modern literary criticism began in colonial Korea in the early 1920s, when 
Kim Tong-in and Yŏm Sang-sŏp, in the journals Creation and Ruins, discussed 
the role of the critic and the criteria that should be applied in the interpretation of 
literature. The first discussions concerned Kim Hwan’s short story “Consciousness 
of Nature.”14 Kim Tong-in argued, in the journal Creation, that Hwan’s story failed 
to describe the psychology of the protagonist P in any depth and that it lacked any 
philosophical principle or life view that could unify its elements. Yŏm also argued, 
in another journal, Modernity, that the story lacked both adequate description 










































and personhood, adding that it read like blatant self-promotion on the part of the 
author. Therefore, the first literary criticism in Korea centered on how writ-
ers should depict lifelike characters in a natural style, giving them psychologi-
cal depth and ideological motivations beyond the writer’s desire to self-fashion. 
Although they basically agreed about why Kim Hwan’s story was not good fiction, 
Kim Tong-in and Yŏm Sang-sŏp continued to debate the issue of authorship. Kim 
made a “formalist” argument that only the work should be considered in criticism, 
whereas Yŏm insisted that facts about the writer’s life and personhood were rel-
evant and applicable to an evaluation of literary texts. Despite this disagreement, 
both writers continued to refer obliquely to the personal conflicts within the small 
group of literary journal writers and editors in Korea at the time.
Significant in these discussions of the purpose of literary criticism is the at-
tempt to articulate how space, time, characters, and action should be represented 
in modern fiction, a set of questions that would continue to be debated in the fol-
lowing decades. Although Kim Tong-in is often referred to as a “naturalist,” his call 
to unify description through a life view or a philosophy points to his concern with 
morality, the primary motivation behind his use of melodramatic scenarios. In 
criticizing the didacticism in Yi Kwang-su’s national allegories, Kim Tong-in advo-
cated the inherent value of literature beyond politics and history. However, as with 
most of Kim’s criticism, this argument was not always reflected in his own literary 
texts. His most famous story, “Potatoes” (1925), certainly lives up to the naturalist 
demand for lifelike psychologies and settings, but it is also a morality tale about 
the dangers of idleness, infidelity, and subordination to Chinese hegemony (all 
familiar themes in modern Korean film and literature). Pong-nyŏ, a young woman 
whose family was formerly of the scholar class but became farmers, gets sold by 
her father to a man twenty years older. This man sells his family’s last bit of land for 
the purchase. Pong-nyŏ’s husband is too lazy to properly farm the fields he rents 
as a tenant famer and shirks his work after they move to Pyongyang to become 
laborers. They end up living as beggars near Seven Star Gate and she eventually 
becomes a prostitute. Her “moral attitude” transforms and she and her husband 
see no shame in her selling her body, eventually to a wealthy Chinese man named 
Wang. She becomes jealous when Wang is about to marry another young woman 
and she follows him to his home and kicks the bride in the head. Wang retaliates, 
killing Pong-nyŏ.
However critical Kim Tong-in was of Yi Kwang-su’s political and moral didacti-
cism, “Potatoes” is a melodramatic moral allegory about the dangers of being idle, 
licentious, and jealous. It is a story that is in many ways about primitive accumula-
tion, the process of a Confucian social order collapsing, and the precariousness 
of those who have lost out in the transition to private ownership of rural lands 
and the formation of an urban proletariat. However, all of these social processes 
are represented naturalistically, as circumstances that befall individual characters 










































because of their psychological attitudes and their behaviors. The melodramatic 
aspect of the story is that the sacrifice of Pong-nyŏ is a tragic fate brought about by 
her own moral decay, one that serves to articulate a universe in which the failure to 
become properly modern leads to internal corruption and to external exploitation 
by ethnic Chinese. The space of this allegory moves from the countryside to the 
city, but only insofar as this transition highlights changes in the individual char-
acter. Likewise, its time is that of a gradual four-year fall from precarious social 
standing to untimely death. Therefore, while the subject matter refers obliquely 
to the massive social transformations occurring in colonial Korea at the time, its 
chronotope stays limited to two iconic spaces (the countryside and Seven Star 
Gate) and the life of a single individual. The story does not have a purely symbolic 
meaning, but rather it addresses the temporal and material problems of primitive 
accumulation, urbanization, and poverty through a moral, allegorical, and ulti-
mately melodramatic mode of description and narrative. In literature the relations 
between humanist morality, historical change, and modern temporality are often 
represented through such an allegorical mode of mimesis.
The chronotope of Kim Tong-in’s moral allegory can be usefully compared 
and contrasted to allegorical short stories of KAPF, such as Pak Yŏng-hŭi’s “The 
Hound” (1925) and Kim Ki-jin’s “The Red Mouse” (1924).15 When KAPF was first 
established, a critical realist aesthetic did not emerge suddenly out of the importa-
tion of the Marxist view of history. Pak and Kim rather wrote in an allegorical style 
similar to Kim Tong-in, but instead of representing historical transformations as 
individual moral conflicts, they rather represented the Marxist-Leninist view of 
universal history. Working independently in Korea and Japan proper, these writ-
ers and writers such as Kobayashi Takiji developed a genre that I will refer to as 
“proletarian allegory.”
As discussed in the previous chapter, Pak, along with Yi Puk-man, introduced 
the concepts of proletarian culture, purposive consciousness, and the propertyless 
nation into colonial Korea. However, like his colleagues Kim Ki-jin and Im Hwa, 
he was also a fiction writer. In his early works he tended toward aestheticism, and 
he published mostly poetry in the journal White Tide (Paekjo). He would eventu-
ally return to this aestheticism, and to assertions of the autonomy of art, following 
his conversion to Japanese nationalism in 1934. In 1925, he moved from poetry to 
short stories, which was followed by another turn, in 1927, to writing solely criti-
cism.16 In 1927, Pak appropriated the demand for collective purpose in Aono’s aes-
thetic and political philosophy, and applied it to literary and cultural production. 
In his collation and interpretive readings of New Tendency Group literature, he 
was favorable to its depiction of the struggles of the popular masses, but thought 
that the kind of psychological description that appeared in Ch’oe Sŏ-hae and other 
writers’ texts did not sufficiently connect the representation of individual experi-
ences of destitution and oppression to the historical purpose of a class subject, the 










































proletariat.17 The rearticulation of the “popular masses” (minjung) as proletariat 
involved redefining literary narrative as a mode of storytelling that drew particular 
individual and national experiences of oppression into relation with the purpose-
ful time of universal history.
The first attempts to transform individual psychology into an expression of 
class consciousness were not expansively realist, but rather more localized and al-
legorical. Before his introduction of a theory of proletarian culture into Korea, Pak 
had already been using a more allegorical narrative approach in his New Tendency 
Group writings. Pak’s most famous story, “The Hound” (1925), marks his turn to 
Marxism-Leninism. It recounts the demise of a paranoid landowner who attempts 
to protect his money and property by buying a dog, but who is then killed by the 
dog. The dog has usually been interpreted as a direct symbol for the proletariat, 
even though the story has more to do with the greed of rural landowners than 
with capitalists. Pak represents an idea of the social whole through a localized in-
dividual conflict; in distinction from Yi Kwang-su’s allegory, however, individual 
characters stand in for social classes, rather than present or future national leaders. 
Pak’s allegory gives similar attention to the individual psychological effects of eco-
nomic relationships. However, instead of focusing on the tragedy or moral corrup-
tion of individual characters living in poverty, Pak depicts class conflict within a 
moral allegory about the greed of the wealthy. In his attempts to protect and hoard 
his money, the landowner brings the dog into his isolated world—a symbol for the 
confrontation of social classes in modernity—only to suffer the ironic effect of his 
desire for security and protection.
Although Pak wrote “The Hound” two years before publishing on “purposive 
consciousness,” the story is exemplary of the transition toward connecting dis-
persed depictions of poverty and hardship—or what Aono and Pak later called 
“spontaneous consciousness”—to the macropolitical and historical opposition 
between oppressors and oppressed, propertied and proletariat. In an allegorical 
narrative of history, the individual character is more than an object of description 
or subject of thought; he or she is a social type situated in history understood as 
a history of class struggle. The idea that narrative should more forcefully assert a 
historical subject led to the perception that New Tendency writings were contigu-
ous with nature and naturalism, and lacked both culture and historical purpose. 
Pak’s early allegorical narratives show that he was developing his own allegory of 
universal history, one that was more suited to a “propertyless nation” in which a 
few wealthy landowners, in collusion with Japanese imperial rule, had taken over 
large swathes of land and subjected the majority of the population to very pre-
carious tenant farming. In “The Hound,” political commitment does not lead to 
collective class conflict, but he did begin to use social types in his characteriza-
tion of economic and social conflict, while situating types, actions, psychology, 
and morality within an allegorized political and historical context. Along with the 










































theorization of spontaneous and purposive consciousness, the genre of proletarian 
allegory developed as a mode of narration that allowed isolated confrontations to 
be represented as part of a grander movement of history. The moral condemnation 
of the landlord’s greed encapsulates the social failures of his class and his death is 
an allegory for revolution and the dialectical laws of human history that dictate the 
necessity of revolution.
Kim Ki-jin’s early works are similarly concerned with representing the history 
of capitalism through the mirror of an individual’s psychology. “The Red Mouse” 
(1924) is one of the first stories of proletarian literature written in Korea. The intel-
lectual Hyŏng-jun has become nihilistic and impoverished in the aftermath of the 
March First Movement and comes to question the “contradictions” in the “civi-
lization of capitalism” and in Japan’s colonial rule: “What is the cause of under-
nourishment? It is a particular quality of the civilization of capitalism. It is solely 
a result of the curse of commercialism and collectivism. Who would say that mass 
production and colonial policies do not all originate in capitalism? The world has 
been disgraced by it.”18 He has become nihilistic about the ideals of humanity by 
comparing the material conditions in Korea with the rhetoric of cultural policy: 
“At present, in his head, there were no lofty ideals, no superior aspirations, none 
of the happiness of humanity, no relief measures for Korea, no procedure for en-
gagement, and no theory of edification.”19 Stopping his walk through the city and 
lying down on a bench, Hyŏng-jun sees a bloody red mouse on the ground and 
“the corpse of this nameless animal” leads him to reflect on how it managed to get 
there despite being attacked.20 He determines that human beings are no different 
from mice, and in a play on the “life philosophy” of Yi Kwang-su’s culturalism, 
he thinks, “For the sake of life (saengmyŏng), which we cannot throw away even 
though we try, we cannot but act until we have exhausted it—this is the ‘life phi-
losophy’ of the mouse.”21 Feeling hunger pangs, he brandishes a pistol and steals a 
watch, a ring, some bread, and some fruit. While being chased by the Japanese co-
lonial police, he gets hit by a fire truck and dies bloody on the side of the road. The 
police arrest three other youths in connection with the pistol, but the newspaper in 
Seoul carries a “false report on the incident.”22 Similarly to Nakanishi’s anthropol-
ogy of the death row inmate’s relation to death, Kim’s story politicizes the concept 
of life that was at the foundations of culturalism by introducing hunger and under-
nourishment, rather than moral values, as the true limits to the economic system 
of “the civilization of capitalism.” Like Kim Sa-ryang twenty years later, he also 
introduces the figure of the animal as a being that exists both inside and outside 
of the cultural system, and prefers the struggle of this nameless creature to survive 
the negation of life to the concept of the human’s mastering and overcoming of its 
historical conditions through the power of its practical will.
The year before, in 1923, Sin Ch’ae-ho had criticized Yi Kwang-su, the cultural 
movements, and self-rule on similarly materialist grounds, stating that cultural 










































and spiritual development was impossible under the impoverished conditions 
caused by colonialism. The term “capitalism” began to circulate in Korea as Kim 
and others translated Marx’s theory of the extraction of surplus value and other 
basics of Capital in the early 1920s. This introduction of the term “capitalism” shift-
ed the language from Sin’s ethnic national struggle to one that saw Japan’s colonial 
policies and the creation of the system of mass production as emerging out of an 
integrated and global economic system. At the same time, Hyŏng-jun’s thought 
retains and critiques the term “civilization,” which was at the center of the debate 
between Yi Kwang-su and Sin Ch’ae-ho, connecting the ideology of technologi-
cal-spiritual progress in Yi’s culturalist discussions of civilization to imperialism 
as an expansion of a nation-state’s capital beyond its national borders. Like Pak’s 
“The Hound,” Kim Ki-jin’s early works represent capitalism and the continuation 
of agrarian class conflict through the depiction of a single character’s coming into 
class consciousness. However, in both “The Red Mouse” and “Death of a Young 
Idealist” (1924), in which a protagonist similar to Hyŏng-jun commits suicide due 
to his loss of ideals, an awareness of the economic and ontological limits to ac-
cumulation and the fallacies of culturalism as a resolution to the crisis do not lead 
to any possibility for a collective confrontation with power.23 Most importantly in 
the context, however, the endings of these stories do not presuppose, like the Yi 
Kwang-su of The Heartless, that the cultural nation can resolve the historical and 
economic effects of colonial modernity.
There were two main approaches that leftist writers and critics took to this 
problem of how to relate the life-and-death struggle of individuals living under 
colonial capitalism to a collective political project. The first I have discussed at 
length, which was to imagine that the “proletariat” and the “proletarian nation” 
were subjects unified by the capitalist system, but in need of an aesthetically manu-
factured “purposive consciousness” in order to organize their spontaneous revolts 
into world-historical subjectivity. The other approach was to reimagine the subject 
of literature and the subject of revolt not as a group of individuals united into 
a class or a nation, but rather as a dispersed and fragmented subject made up 
of displaced peasants, idealist intellectuals, an emerging industrial working class, 
domestic laborers (particularly women), and a number of other positions over-
lapping in time and space. The transformation of allegory into realism entailed 
the creation of a literary form less unified in time and space than Kim Tong-in’s 
melodramatic naturalism, less concentrated through the prism of an individual 
type than the works of Pak Yŏng-hŭi and Kim Ki-jin, and more expansive in their 
attention to the intersection of multiple temporalities and multiples spaces within 
the singular system of capitalist modernity. The transformation of allegory into 
realism required another way of imagining the human within a chronotope, one 
that recognized that there is only one modernity, but that did not then assume that 
this unity was a cultural unity in which the national subject and world culture were 










































reconciled through morality, productive labor, nation-state subjectivity, or other 
iterations of the generally human.
In the late 1920s, debates on form and content emerged in both Japan proper 
and colonial Korea in order to address the question of how to make NAPF and 
KAPF texts not simply political statements, but also more elaborate literary con-
structions. In the debate on form and content in Korea, Kim Ki-jin questioned 
the extent to which the depiction of class conflict through the allegorization of 
the psychological conflicts of individual subjects achieved an acceptable liter-
ary form. Even if these allegories represented the way that proletarian purposive 
consciousness could come about, their spatial and temporal fields were limited 
and lacking the kind of architectonic form that Yi Kwang-su had developed for 
the representation of cosmopolitan history in his national allegories. The debate 
concerning form and content began when Kim Ki-jin suggested that proletarian 
literature should not function solely as propaganda for revolution, or present a 
symbolic model for action, but should also develop an advanced literary sensibil-
ity and a literary form of its own.24 In other words, proletarian literature should 
not be the pure expression or description of mentalities (content), but should 
develop a structure proper to realist literature (form). His analogy was with ar-
chitecture; he argued that just as a building cannot stand without pillars, litera-
ture does not have political or aesthetic value without foundational structural 
elements. Pak Yŏng-hŭi responded that Kim Ki-jin was returning to bourgeois 
aestheticism, and sided with Proletkult’s criticism of Trotsky and his defense of 
bourgeois culture. Kim eventually recanted his criticism, and the issue gradually 
dissipated into other debates, including those on anarchism, on the purpose of 
peasant literature, on Bolshevik vs. popularized literature, on class vs. national 
literature, and eventually on fascism and the new humanism of the late 1930s. 
Nonetheless, the debate on form and content in many respects established the 
ground for these other debates, because it pointed to the problem of how realist 
literature could at once convey an abstract idea about history and have the formal 
complexity of a lifelike imitation of social relations and the multiplicity of spaces, 
times, and ideologies in colonial Korea.
The debate on form and content was one impetus for the creation of an alle-
gorical type of realism that expanded the chronotope of historical allegory beyond 
individual consciousness and represented the coevalness of rural primitive accu-
mulation with urban industrialization, the syncreticity between the feudal ideol-
ogy of landlords and their modern practices of land accumulation and tenancy, 
and contradictions in the communist and socialist movements themselves (such 
as the need to modernize but to also overcome capitalism, or the need to educate 
the population without reestablishing the hegemony of a dominant class). Works 
written after the debates on form and content, such as Yi Ki-yǒng’s Home Village 
(1933) and Kang Kyŏng-ae’s From Wonso Pond (1934), have more complex formal 










































structures and chronotopic imaginaries that allow for the exploration of all of 
these spatial, temporal, and ideological differences within the collective everyday 
experience of colonial modernity.25 Kang in particular, by moving from the rural 
village, to the landlord’s house, to the factories of Inch’ŏn, focuses in on the differ-
ent experiences of colonial modernity had by men and women, as well as by the 
urban proletariat, migratory displaced peasants, and rural domestic workers. The 
necessary dispersion and fragmentation of proletarian subjectivity that emerge 
out of such a complex tapestry of social types constantly on the move mean that 
her realist allegory of history is never reflected through a single universal point of 
action. Therefore, at the end of the novel, when Sŏnbi has died from tuberculosis 
and the intellectual Sin-ch’ŏl has converted to Japanese nationalism, the tenant 
farmer who is now a worker and activist, Ch’ŏtch’ae, thinks: “These human prob-
lems! More than anything we need to find a solution to them. People have fought 
for hundreds and thousands of years in an effort to solve them. But still no one has 
come up with a solution! And if that’s the case, just which human beings will actu-
ally solve these problems in the future? Just who?”26 Just as Im Hwa was beginning 
to imagine a new synthesis of realism and revolutionary romanticism, created by 
the practical human subject of history (chuch’e), Kang posed the identity of the 
collective subject of action to her readers as an unanswered question. By situating 
the human being as a set of “human problems” to which the “human being” itself 
cannot be an adequate answer, she also politicized the notion of what it means to 
invoke “personhood” or the “subject” in a male-dominated society founded on 
and reproduced through the physical, mental, economic, and political exploitation 
of the subaltern female worker.
Before returning to these novels by Yi Ki-yŏng and Kang Kyŏng-ae in order 
to see how they relate the countryside to the city, I would like to discuss in the 
context of Japan proper this kind of poignant image of the proletariat as an empty 
space rather than a substance, but relate it more directly to the question of transla-
tion as it appears in Kobayashi Takiji’s The Crab Cannery Ship.27 Although contem-
porary scholars of the proletarian arts movements of Japan proper have discussed 
how ethnically Japanese writers viewed colonialism and imperialism, there have 
been few comparisons of the shared literary debates and literary forms developed 
in Japan proper and the colonies around the Marxist-Leninist view of history. By 
introducing the term “proletarian allegory,” I would like to call attention to the fact 
that in both Korea and Japan, transforming the naturalist or, in Japan, I-novel de-
scription of individual psychology into a fictional and allegorical representation of 
universal history and class consciousness required both criticism and experimen-
tation. Likewise, further criticism and experimentation were required to trans-
form proletarian allegory into a more detailed realism that combined a model for 
universal history with more expansive and detailed chronotopes representing the 
complex intersections of social classes.










































In this regard, writers in Japan proper confronted many of the same questions 
concerning the relation between literary form and the content of universal history. 
Early works of proletarian literature appearing in Bungei sensen, such as Hayashi 
Fusao’s “Apple” or Sata Ineko’s “From the Caramel Factory,” tended to focus on the 
everyday lives and psychology of individual workers.28 However, in the works of 
Kobayashi Takiji we find allegories of universal history that expand spatially and 
temporally to include not just a representation of psychological states as an expres-
sion of class consciousness, but also an attention to dialogism and the multiple 
languages and historical relations that contribute to the constitution of class con-
sciousness and the instigation of revolution in an international context. Kobayashi’s 
attempt to allegorize proletarian revolution as the next logical step in history and 
to create a unity of differences by symbolizing proletarian subjectivity still presents 
class consciousness as a unity; however, the expansion of the chronotope of his 
novels also serves to bring to light the spatial and temporal multiplicity within the 
proletariat and the overdetermination of each situation of capitalism.
Kobayashi’s The Crab Cannery Ship is one of the most elaborate and memo-
rable proletarian allegories written during the time of the Japanese empire, and 
has experienced a somewhat anachronistic resurgence in popularity in the last ten 
years in Japan. Kobayashi sought to do away with the description of individual 
thoughts and actions, and to describe how classes became opposed to one another 
in the capitalist system. At the same time, his later work “Life of a Party Member” 
and his diaries suggest that he was also concerned with literary persona, and with 
depicting the everyday consciousness of a vanguard intellectual.29 The attempt to 
limit character development in the stories that dealt directly with class conflict 
and his use of a more personal style in his autobiographical works show a certain 
dualism in the role of the party cadre as part of the intellectual vanguard. He de-
picted his own life in terms of personal mission and purpose, and the real political 
dangers to which this exposed him, while describing the “social totality” as the 
interaction of political and economic groups and social types. As Foley shows, 
the genre of the intellectual Bildungsroman—to which Kobayashi’s autobiographi-
cal writings were similar—was widespread globally in communist writings of this 
period.30 The genre difference between the political as personal commitment and 
the political as social movement in Kobayashi’s work is indicative of his attempt 
to, on the one hand, create a literary narrative that could represent the historical 
evolution of proletarian subjectivity and, on the other hand, describe the heroic 
life of the vanguard intellectual who conveyed the necessity for revolution to the 
working class.
Many passages in The Crab Cannery Ship show that among the novelists and 
poets of his day, he had developed one of the clearest images of the economic and 
political order of the Japanese empire. Like his counterparts in Marxist political 
economy, such as Yamada Moritarō, he understood many of the complexities of 










































capitalism in its imperialist phase, including the various interrelationships between 
primitive accumulation, the cooperation of monopoly corporations, overproduc-
tion, the role of the state, colonial projects as a salve for domestic class conflict, 
relationships between the city and countryside, imperial nationalism, nonregular 
workers, the use of scabs, interworker colonial racism, and so on.31 In reading his 
works solely as “literature,” and judging them only according to their aesthetic 
value, one misses his reading of Marxist political economy as a discourse not of 
modernization, but rather of the various overdetermined situations of imperial 
capitalism.
In contrast to Pak’s “The Hound,” in The Crab Cannery Ship, individual char-
acters are immersed in the action of the narrative and their internal sensibilities 
are less intricate, but situated more fully in a social context. At the same time, the 
novel maintains an allegorical dimension in the way it imagines the progress of 
universal history moving from the Soviet Union to the factories and ships of Japan. 
It is set on a crabbing ship, the Hakkōmaru, which is fishing in the waters north 
of Hokkaido, near Sakhalin Island. The plot focuses on the conflicts between the 
workers on the ship and the agents of the company (particularly the superinten-
dent, who is a brutish and oppressive manager). The main characters among the 
workers are “Big Talk,” the student, Shibaura, and the stutterer. The ship, particu-
larly the workers’ quarters, is depicted as a dirty, hellish place, worse than a prison. 
Telling lewd stories and circulating pornographic photos take up the workers’ mo-
ments of reprieve. The workers’ understanding of the hopelessness of the situation 
opens the story, when one tells another, “Buddy, we’re off to hell!”32
The allegorical form of the narrative is partially a function of its setting, the 
Hakkōmaru. Kobayashi based the story on information he had gathered from 
newspapers concerning strikes occurring on fishing vessels. The isolated context 
of a ship moving along the border with Communist Russia provided a situation 
in which the workers’ strike—a collective effort to slow production—could be dis-
tilled into a very localized conflict (even more so than if he had described an urban 
factory). At the same time, the setting allows for the influence of Russian workers 
on the fishermen, which occurs by way of a Chinese translator when one of the 
trawlers runs ashore on Kamchatka. The impetus for the strike occurs through the 
fishermen on this boat recounting this experience ashore. The theoretical distinc-
tion between “spontaneous consciousness” and “purposive consciousness” is ap-
parent in the inspiration to strike that the workers gain from the encounter with 
the Russian and Chinese communists. The suggestion is that the degrading eco-
nomic conditions of the proletariat will encourage revolt against capitalism and 
imperial Japan, but that the history of the Russian Revolution is what will make 
workers conscious that historical change is possible. The chronotope of the nar-
rative is greatly affected by Kobayashi’s view of universal history, and its advance-
ment from Russia to East Asia. As Kobayashi’s tragic death at the hands of the 










































police in 1933 suggests, these counternarratives of universal human history were 
threatening for officials of the imperial state.
One advantage of Kobayashi’s choice of scene was that it allowed him to give an 
image of capitalism’s constant expansion into new territories, including imperial-
ism, and also to criticize the political imaginary that supported this expansion. In 
the story, Kobayashi discusses the constant pushing of the border of the nation-
state outward as a result of domestic class conflict. He claims that new territories 
had to be assimilated into Japan because the available workers in Tokyo and the 
other metropolitan centers of Japan proper had become unruly:
When workers on the mainland grew “arrogant” and could no longer be forced to 
overwork, and when markets reached an impasse and refused to expand any fur-
ther, then capitalists stretched out their claws, “To Hokkaido! To Karafuto!” There 
they could mistreat people to their hearts’ content, ride them as brutally as they did 
in their colonies of Korea and Taiwan. The capitalists understood quite clearly that 
there would be no one to complain.33
Kobayashi states that the colonized suffers most from this imperialist expansion, not 
primarily because of the loss of national sovereignty, but because they are treated 
most cruelly by both the managers and the nationalized domestic workers.34 He does 
reify the “colonized” into a stable category; however, he also describes the colonial 
projects in Hokkaido and other outlying regions as inspiring displaced mainland 
Japanese to pursue the utopian possibilities of settler colonialism, only to fall further 
into poverty. In this story, imperial expansion is a process that draws workers into 
potential combative relationships between one another, but it also allows them to 
gain consciousness of world history and the oppositional forces within it.
As the workers on the ship become politicized through their contact with 
Russian and Chinese workers, another picture of the international begins to 
emerge, one in which the translation of proletarian politics across borders is 
no longer a transparent communication of the principles of universal history 
through discrete nationalized proletariats, but rather a message delivered in the 
pidgin language of peripheral encounters. In the middle of the story, one of the 
fishing boats goes missing, but eventually returns to the Hakkōmaru with the 
crew alive and well. The narrative recounts how they had been washed up on 
the shores of Kamchatka and saved by a Russian family. At first the Japanese 
workers find the different appearance and language of this family to be “eerie”; 
“However, it soon dawned on them: ‘Hey, they’re human beings, same as us!’ ”35 
The crew plans to return to the Hakkōmaru, but the night before they leave one 
of the Russians has a message for them that a Chinese man is asked to translate:
At a word from the Russian, the Chinese who had been watching him began to speak 
in Japanese. It was a jumbled sort of Japanese, with words out of sequence, scattering 
and staggering about as if drunk.
“All you, sure thing, have no money.”











































“All you, is poor.”
“That’s right.”
“So, all you, is name proletariat. Understand?”
“Sure.”
The Russian, laughing, began to pace about. Sometimes he stopped and looked 
at them.
“Rich mans do this all you.” (He grabbed himself by the neck, as if in a choke-
hold). “Rich mans get more, more big.” (He indicated an expanded stomach.) “All 
you, no good, get more, more poor. Understand? Japan, no good. Working people, 
this.” (He frowned, making a face as though he were ill.) “Rich man boss, this. Ahem. 
Ahem.” (He strutted about.)36
The Chinese man continues, telling the stranded fishermen that in Russia there 
are no capitalists or exploited workers and to not believe the lies told to them 
about the evilness of “turning Red.” The scene highlights the problem of transla-
tion within the international and gives a different narrative of the emergence of 
class consciousness. Whereas the theories of purposive consciousness insist that 
the vanguard intellectual must step in to transmit his knowledge of history to the 
exploited but unformed masses (giving them a unified identity as the proletariat), 
in this passage proletarian identity is delivered in a pidgin Japanese at the periph-
ery of the empire, in a simple but accurate combination of stuttered words and 
pantomime. This difference in the translation of proletarian identity is important, 
particularly if we compare this encounter to the idea of modernity and class con-
sciousness present in proletarian arts criticism, which tended to assume, following 
the social science, that certain modes and relations of production create certain 
cultural forms, and that the national proletariat emerges out of the nation’s stage 
of economic development. In The Crab Cannery Ship, the Japan proletariat only 
comes to recognize itself as such through an encounter at the periphery, where in-
tegration and inclusion within the national economy and the ethos of imperialism 
come into question. This chronotope maintains a sense of a Hegelian spatialized 
history, as historical time moves from Russia to imperial Japan, but it also disrupts 
the emanationist model, because it is at the peripheries of Japan proper where the 
site of exploitation has moved and where the possibility for revolutionary opposi-
tion, transmitted in a pidgin language, has begun to emerge.
This recounting of the fishermen’s experiences of landing in Kamchatka and 
encountering Russian and Chinese communists becomes significant, because it is 
through this geographic proximity to Russia that the fishermen of the Hakkōmaru 
begin to organize against the bosses. When another ship has to land on the shores 
of Kamchatka for a repair, the fishermen bring back “Red propaganda” translated 
into Japanese that describes the injustices of Japanese capitalism and imperialism. 
The fishermen begin to see their exploitation as unjust and to agitate and make 
demands to the bosses. In the novel’s allegory of universal history, Russia is Japan’s 










































ideal future, and the fishing vessels’ chronotopic proximity to that future, as well as 
its sheer isolation, allows for a class conflict to arise. By putting historical allegory 
to work for critical realism, Kobayashi shifted its focus from the representation 
of singular experiences of individuals to the mass experiences of industrial labor, 
political movements, and geopolitics, as well as newspapers and propaganda as the 
media that report these events. In this expanded chronotope in which the national 
proletariat is both inside and outside the space of the nation, the meaning of the 
Japanese fishermens’ recognition of the humanity of the Russian family that saves 
them has a very different semantics from the invocation of the human in Marxist 
discourses that claimed that national culture is an expression of a nation-state’s 
stage in human history.
As communist, socialist, and proletarian literature writers came under increas-
ing repression by the police, the place of national culture within the international 
became more and more significant. Many early proponents of the proletarian arts 
such as Hayashi Fusao and Sata Ineko began to apply the techniques of realism 
for the purposes of documenting and supporting Japanese imperialism and the 
war effort, rather than proletarian internationalism. Sata, who had written about 
the daily life of female workers, including Korean women, traveled to Korea and 
Manchuria and wrote positively about the new gender and class relations enabled 
by the imperial project. In a chapter of The Words of Women (1941) titled “From 
Peace Industry to a Wartime System,” Sata remarks how reading Hayashi’s Conti-
nent Bride (1939) in the newspaper helped to convince her that Japanese women 
should emulate the dedication to war of European and American women by im-
migrating to Manchuria as brides or taking jobs in the factories.37 She writes about 
receiving an inspiring letter from a woman who had given up her position at a 
bank in order to work in a large factory.38 In both Hayashi’s and Sata’s wartime 
fictions and essays, the figure of the industrial worker has transformed from an 
ideally modern type into an ethnicized nation-state subject that expends its life for 
the total war effort. In many ways this turn from proletarian identity to national 
identity was prepared for by the concept of the national proletariat that existed 
from the outset of the proletarian arts movements, no matter how much the vio-
lence of police interrogation was the ultimate motivation for many instances of 
political “conversion.”
Colonial proletarian writers were just as prone to translating their former pro-
letarian politics into Japanese patriotism, despite the harsh conditions and coer-
cion under which the workers and peasants of the empire labored. Pak Yŏng-hŭi’s 
recantation of proletarian literature, very similar to Hayashi’s, marked a similar 
return to art for art’s sake, a disavowal of political art, and eventually patriotic sup-
port for Japan’s war effort.39 In the patriotism of the former political left in both 
Japan proper and Korea, Japanese national literature—sometimes articulated as 
monoethnic and sometimes as multiethnic—was no longer imagined as a porous 










































culture that bordered sites of justified political revolt against capitalism and em-
pire. Such imperial literature and culture developed new chronotopes that includ-
ed continental experiences, but it also territorialized culture, language, and poli-
tics under the power of the state. As the communist In Chŏng-sik’s essays on the 
need for cultural and linguistic unity in the late 1930s show, the pidgin language 
of the international found in Kobayashi’s novel had to be supplanted by Japanese 
national language and culture for both the imperial project and the mainstream 
of Marxism to transition to the era of Japanese-Korean unification (naisen-ittai).40
CH’OE SŎ-HAE:  MIGR ATION,  LET TERS,  AND DEATH
Although one might imagine, like Kobayashi did, that the colonies would be the 
site of superexploitation and uniform proletarianization, and therefore that these 
spaces constituted a pure periphery of empire, in actuality a very similar question 
of center and periphery existed within both cultural nationalism and the prole-
tarian arts in Korea. This question was also responded to with similar humanist 
discourses that could norm the historical space and time of the colony while also 
accounting for temporal and spatial difference through anthropological catego-
ries. Therefore, for Yi Kwang-su, the Korean countryside became the place where 
“races” and “tribes” that needed to be nationalized still existed, but it was also the 
object of nostalgia and an origin that could be tapped into in imagining Korea’s 
future. This anthropological view of Korea was very influenced by Yi’s proximity 
to the centers of imperial knowledge through his elite educational experiences 
in Japan, and was an expression of the chronotopic imaginary of the colonial-
cosmopolitan intellectual. For KAPF writers and critics as well, the political and 
historical meaning of the countryside became more and more important in urban 
writers’ attempts to represent national class politics and the modernization proj-
ect. How could the Marxist-Leninist narrative of history, with its focus on the 
national urban proletariat, account for the vast rural areas of Korea without falling 
into nationalist nostalgia? This was the concern of theorists of peasant literature 
such as An Ham-gwang.41
Within this dynamic of center and periphery, coded as it was by a variety of 
humanist discourses, areas beyond the border of Korea, particularly the Kando 
region to the north, became increasingly important as a colonial frontier. Like 
Hokkaido in Kobayashi’s stories, Kando was not the rural origin (or “home vil-
lage”) to which the urban writer returned; it rather offered a future to those who 
were expelled from their lands or otherwise excluded from the national economy. 
It was a place to which the displaced tenant farmers of Korea could migrate and 
settle, and a semicolonial environment that promised to offer an escape from the 
harsh conditions in the Korean countryside. At the same time, because it offered 
a place for excess population to migrate, Kando also became a site of imperial 










































governance, particularly as the Japanese empire expanded into Manchuria and 
China. Writers who wrote about the experience of Kando migration, particularly 
Kang Kyŏng-ae and Ch’oe Sŏ-hae, developed a very different chronotopic sense of 
Korea, including its internal spatial and temporal differences, compared to both 
the enlightenment perspective of Yi Kwang-su and the Marxist-Leninists who saw 
Korea as a unified proletarian nation.
At the age of eighteen, most aspiring intellectuals and writers in colonial Korea 
were likely to try to study abroad in Japan, if their families could afford it or they 
could obtain a scholarship. In 1918, the eighteen-year-old Ch’oe Sŏ-hae, born into a 
poor farming family, instead decided to divorce his wife and migrate to the Kando 
region, or the present-day Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture of the PRC.42 
Before going to Kando, Ch’oe was greatly inspired by Yi Kwang-su’s The Heart-
less, but he must have taken notice of a large gap between his own life and those 
of the main characters, who upon devoting themselves to improving the Korean 
nation choose to study abroad in Japan and the United States and mainly concern 
themselves with individual cultural improvement and the national education of 
the people.43 Upon returning to Korea in 1923 and gradually establishing himself 
as a writer, Ch’oe had some contact with Yi. However, his stories of migration and 
return do not follow the familiar trope of a Korean man who has returned from 
Japan a modernized intellectual and is alternately nostalgic and dismayed in ob-
serving the present conditions in Korea. Ch’oe’s stories of migration and return 
are concerned instead with the loss of spatial proximity and emotional intimacy 
between family members and friends caused by attempts to escape grinding ru-
ral poverty. Ch’oe effectively uses the epistolary form, diaries, framed stories, and 
other modes of personal address to highlight the sense of distance, loss, and social 
fragmentation in colonial modernity. Rather than representing a failed Bildungsro-
man for the vanguard intellectual that we find in Kim Ki-jin’s “The Red Mouse,” 
Ch’oe’s stories rather represent the failed attempt of displaced tenant farmers to 
construct a life within the social and economic crisis of colonial Korea, particu-
larly the massive displacement of rural peoples to both the growing cities and the 
expanding frontier of Kando.
Ch’oe was a writer of the New Tendency Group, and an early member of KAPF, 
but he tended to maintain some distance from the organization and did not get 
directly involved in the debates between the main theorists. Unlike those theorists, 
he worked a number of proletarian jobs. He also died at the age of thirty-two of 
stomach illness likely brought about by extended periods of hunger. As the critic 
Kwak Kŭn has written,
Of course, other writers of the time, such as Na To-hyang, Hyŏn Chin-gŏn, and Yŏm 
Sang-sŏp, lamented and were heartbroken about the reality of extreme poverty; it 
is also true that others, such as Kim Ki-jin and Pak Yŏng-hŭi, did not disregard it. 
However, the former recognized it from the standpoint of an observer or thinker and 










































the latter grasped it too conceptually and schematically. Compared to these writers, 
Ch’oe Sŏ-hae, who himself experienced acutely the realities of extreme poverty, was 
more able than anyone to give form to it objectively and factually. Therefore, Ch’oe’s 
fiction, which exposed the truth of that time, was definitely remarkable, and gar-
nered the sympathy and response of the literati.44
For an intellectual class made up largely of nationalists and Marxists, Ch’oe brought 
to literature an “authentic” national and class experience of exploitation that they 
had also tried to represent in their own works.
On the other hand, Ch’oe’s stories also left very little hope for individual or 
collective redemption, and critics wondered whether they were too tied to tragic 
personal experiences to contribute to a political project based on the principles of 
human history. Therefore, Pak Yŏng-hŭi questioned whether or not the characters 
in New Tendency Group fiction lacked purposive consciousness.45 The gradual 
deepening of proletarian allegory into a structured portrayal of class conflict con-
stituted the main Marxist-Leninist thread of literary experimentation and criti-
cism in proletarian literature of the Japanese empire. However, the drive for class 
unity and purposive consciousness often led to the facile dismissal of earlier works 
that did not narrate universal history in a local context, but were still works of so-
cial criticism that brought to light important aspects of the political and economic 
system. In his dialectical and progressive history of modern Korean literature, 
which eventually culminated in a defense of socialist realism, Im Hwa argued that 
Ch’oe Sŏ-hae’s stories are examples of “naturalism.”46 He stated that they portray 
the spontaneous and misguided revolt of individuals against their conditions, but 
lack any unity of political consciousness or dedication to collective emancipation. 
Although Im presented his critique on political grounds, what was really at stake 
was that the chronotopes of Ch’oe’s stories did not fit the narrative of national 
literary progress, in which various forms were sublated through the development 
of the modern subject, ending in a proper synthesis of realism and romanticism. 
In this sense, Ch’oe’s stories provide various ways of reading the space and time 
of colonial modernity against the grain of the cultural modernization projects of 
both cultural nationalism and the proletarian arts.
The anthology The Reillumination of Ch’oe Sŏ-hae’s Literature and Kwŏn 
Bodŭrae’s The Era of Love have attempted to explain in which ways Ch’oe’s works 
are modern and to defend their form, content, and aesthetic against the kind of 
historical claim made by Im Hwa (that his works are overly fragmentary and lack-
ing in characters with modern consciousness).47 There are two main consequences 
for politics that we can retrospectively recognize in Ch’oe’s works: (1) that his foci 
on primitive accumulation, rural poverty, migration, broken families, and partisan 
struggle are more representative of the prevalent social conflicts of colonial Korea, 
compared to the romantic, urban Marxism-Leninism of Pak Yŏng-hŭi or Kim Ki-
jin, who abstractly and allegorically declared Korea a proletarian nation; (2) that 










































his use of the epistolary form, as well as diaries and other private genres, made 
his works appear more fragmentary compared to what I am calling proletarian 
allegory, but that the mediated fragmentariness of letters addressed between char-
acters disrupted notions of a unified human, national, or class subject, revealing 
the relationality involved in self-expression, confession, and other modern speech. 
In addition to these observations already made by Kwŏn, I argue additionally that 
Ch’oe’s texts present another chronotope of colonial Korean society. In Ch’oe’s chro-
notopes, time is the time of migration from the countryside to the frontier region 
(Kando) or to Seoul, as well as the time of the delays created by sending, receiving, 
and missing news about one’s family and friends. The space of Korea is neither 
the underdeveloped home country to which the elite intellectual returns, nor an 
anthropologically defined space of the ethnic nation or national proletariat, but 
rather a porous territory with dramatic internal spatial and temporal differences 
as well as its own frontiers that promise a better, decolonized future, but whose 
realities are as grim as the troubled situations that the displaced farmer attempts 
to escape. Through these other chronotopes, his stories effectively emphasize rela-
tionality rather than subjectivity, borders rather than nations, and the intractability 
of rural poverty rather than the unity of the urban proletariat.
Some of Ch’oe Sŏ-hae’s stories focus on urban migration, such as “Paekkŭm” 
(which is a semi-autobiographical account of a father who moves to Seoul to work 
as a laborer, becoming estranged from his family and learning only secondhand 
of the death of his young daughter, Paekkŭm) or “Farewell” (an epistolary fiction, 
written in 1926, that Ch’oe imagined as a letter from a younger brother, who has 
migrated to Seoul and become a shoeshine, to his older brother).48 However, he is 
associated more with rural migration to Northeast Manchuria, because many of 
his stories of migration are drawn from his own experience of moving to Kando as 
a young man. Hyun-ok Park has written a thorough modern history of the Kando 
region, detailing the history of sovereignty disputes, colonial government, land-
ownership laws, flows of labor, and the burgeoning of the North Korean revolu-
tion.49 Japan had attempted to colonize Kando between 1907 and 1909, but during 
the Kando Convention of 1909 it agreed to cede the territory to Qing China in 
exchange for railroad rights. Afterward, and particularly with the establishment of 
the Manchurian puppet state in 1931, Japan actively encouraged Korean migration 
to Kando, because Koreans were imperial Japanese subjects and increasing their 
already large presence in the region helped to provide legitimacy to Japan’s rule of 
Manchuria.50 In 1918, when Ch’oe moved there, Kando was still an ambiguous ter-
ritory to which Japan, China, and Korean nationalists such as Sin Ch’ae-ho all laid 
claimed. For thousands of rural Koreans who were displaced through the enclo-
sures of Japan’s cadastral surveys, who were exploited by tenant farming practices, 
and who suffered under intense and growing rural poverty, Kando was a frontier 
that offered the possibility for better economic and social conditions. In the Korean 










































literary and cultural imaginary of the 1920s and 1930s, Kando was the site of both 
hope and despair. It represented the possibility of escaping the imperialist econom-
ic conditions in Korea and was a centerpiece of nationalist ideology and the guer-
rilla movements for national liberation. It was also a place where Koreans were an 
ethnic minority and where migrants encountered similar economic uncertainties 
and discrimination (for example, from native Chinese ethnic groups).
Ch’oe’s five years in the Kando region working as a dockworker, a cook, a mes-
senger, and a Korean-language teacher were formative for both the themes and 
the forms of his fiction. In Ch’oe’s second published story, “Native Land” (1924), 
Na Un-sim has just returned to the city of Hoeryŏng from Western Kando: “It was 
the middle of March 1923, when the shadow of Un-sim, who had left his native 
land with great aspirations, appeared again on Korean soil.”51 He tells how im-
mediately after the March First Movement he went to Kando and found a place 
where various Koreans escaping from the crimes or failures of their past gathered 
to hunt, farm, or steal: “Therefore, there were no ethics, morality, or education.”52 
As for the local Chinese, “the policemen arrest opium dealers and beat them, while 
themselves eating opium.”53 Such depictions by a writer returned from Kando were 
certainly cast as adventure stories, of a sort, for the Seoul literati. At the same time, 
they revealed the seriousness of the economic and political crisis brought about 
by Japanese colonial expansion, which appeared very differently when approached 
from the peripheries of the empire compared to metropolitan Tokyo or the colo-
nial capital of Seoul.
“Record of Escape” (1924) is typical of Ch’oe’s stories set in Kando.54 Like other 
of Ch’oe’s stories, it is an epistolary fiction, narrated by Mr. Pak and addressed to 
Mr. Kim. The story begins with Pak thanking Kim for his letter, which he seems to 
have received quite some time ago. In this letter, Kim had implored Pak to return 
to his family and his role as household provider. Pak’s response comprises the en-
tirety of the text. He is partly embarrassed and partly defensive about having aban-
doned his mother and wife, and insists repeatedly that he is also a human with 
emotions. He writes that he wants to explain to Kim why he left his family, so his 
friend will better understand his circumstances. Pak begins by describing how he 
left his home village for Kando five years previously. He had heard that it was very 
easy to farm there and that there was plenty of wood to be had from the mountain 
forests. With great hopes and high ideals, he set out with his mother and wife. 
However, when he arrived in Kando, he could not find any land to farm and his 
family lived on the edge of starvation. He tried to establish a bean curd business, 
but it was unsuccessful. He resorted to salvaging wood from the mountaintops, 
but was caught by a landowner and taken in by the police. Out of his frustration 
and embarrassment at not being able to feed his family, he decided to leave. In 
the only censored portion of the text, he writes that he entered the XX group (the 
censored part probably states “Liberation Army,” as in other of his stories).










































Kwŏn Bodŭrae has written extensively about the significance of the epistolary 
novel in Korea in the 1920s, and reads stories like “Record of Escape” as part of a 
broader tendency in Korean fiction in the early 1920s.55 In this story, Ch’oe uses 
letters to great effect, as the reader’s glimpse into the scene of writing and the 
performativity of the narrative provides an added stylistic complexity. Kwŏn states 
that scholars tend to view the epistolary form in terms of the expression of sub-
jectivity and the self-fashioning of confession. However, she argues that epistolary 
literature is not merely about subjectification (chuch’ehwa), but also relationality. 
She interprets this aspect most poignantly in her readings of the new ideas of ro-
mance that emerged along with the postal system and the practice of letter writ-
ing.56 Because of the letter form of Ch’oe’s story, the reader is figured as a second 
addressee, and feels the ethical conundrum of the plot more strongly. The hints of 
embarrassment and regret that appear in the narrator’s letter increase the sense of 
tragedy, because the position of the reader as addressee is that of a sympathetic 
friend, rather than an anonymous observer. The relation between narrative voice 
and reader is more vital and demanding, because the reader is drawn not only into 
the expressive world of an author, but also into the relationship between author 
and addressee.
Kwŏn argues that as proletarian literature became the dominant mode of rep-
resenting the popular experience of colonial modernity, the epistolary novel un-
fortunately lost its prominence.57 She situates Ch’oe Sŏ-hae’s fiction in between the 
“era of love” and the ascendency of socialist literature in the mid-1920s. Like other 
recent readings of Ch’oe, she sees his work as committed to representing the eco-
nomic hardships of the popular masses, but in literary forms that better capture 
the new possibilities for social life that emerged in the 1920s. Later proletarian lit-
erature and literary theory, emblematized in Im Hwa’s synthesis of the humanism 
of socialist realism with the humanism of the late Japanese empire, were weighed 
down by the dogmatic claims of dialectical historical development. Ch’oe’s works 
provide one model for a politically committed literature that did not subject the 
lives of its characters to the abstractions of dialectical logic and the imaginary 
unity of the proletarian subject.
Ch’oe’s stories tend to treat economic and social problems through a depiction 
of their psychological and emotional effects on individual subjects, and he did 
not attune his stories to the possibility of a collective subject of political struggle. 
Many of Ch’oe’s stories portray the progressive destitution of a struggling family 
man who is eventually led, by way of his ressentiment, to commit acts of murder or 
arson. In “Bloody Flames” (1926), a migrant tenant farmer who has lost his land in 
Kyŏnggi-do moves to Western Kando, only to become indebted to a Chinese land-
lord, In-ga.58 He is forced to give his daughter Yong-nye to In-ga as payment for 
overdue rent, but then kills In-ga with a hatchet in order to rescue his daughter. In 
“Starvation and Slaughter” (1925), Kyŏng-su’s family is barely surviving in Kando. 










































He has no work and is forced to steal and sell trees. His wife is sick with palsy, but 
the doctor will not treat her because he has no money. His mother is bit by a rabid 
dog belonging to a Chinese man. Experiencing dislocation, unemployment, and 
starvation, as well as racism on the part of the native Chinese, he kills his family, 
stabs others, and is eventually shot and killed at the police station.59
How to view such depictions of violent criminal acts is an important ques-
tion in an evaluation of Ch’oe’s works. Some see this violence as an expression of 
the inability of the colonized intellectual to escape the logic of imperial rule, and 
the reduction of political revolt to barbaric crime as a reproduction of imperial 
enlightenment ideology. Others have related this violence to the relatively un-
modern character of Ch’oe’s works, and their dispersive, rather than integrative, 
aesthetic. Because his impoverished and desperate characters have no context in 
which to organize into a proletarian subject, they remain psychological individu-
als who can only respond to oppression through spontaneous acts of violence, 
rather than with purposive consciousness (to use the binary that KAPF eventually 
applied to such New Tendency Literature). However, there is nothing unmod-
ern about Ch’oe’s depictions of the violent psychological effects of alienating and 
impoverishing economic and social conditions. The moral question of whether 
or not crime is a proper or improper response to economic inequity or familial 
conflict is at the basis of many modern stories, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime and 
Punishment and Brothers Karamazov being just two famous examples. Further-
more, the acts of violence are always contextualized, particularly within the re-
alistic economic and social struggles of Korean migrants to Kando. Rather than 
poverty and violence being depicted as primarily questions of morality, as they 
are in Kim Tong-in’s naturalism, the violence of Ch’oe’s male protagonists is not 
judged in ethical terms, but rather as images of the failure to survive conditions 
that in many ways are unlivable.
In this respect, Yi Kwang-su’s development of a modern vernacular certainly 
inspired Ch’oe’s emergence as a writer, but in choosing Kando as his frontier, rather 
than Japan, which remained out of reach, he represented both a different chrono-
tope for modernity and a different sense of the relationship between writing and 
questions of life and death. For the cultural nationalist Yi, writing in the Korean 
national language, and then in Japanese, was a matter of surviving death, because 
nations, as organic and preservative communities, allowed for the continuation of 
the individual beyond his or her mortal existence. In stories like “Starvation and 
Slaughter,” as well as “The Death of Pak Dol,” in which Pak dies because he cannot 
afford medicine, death is not a fact to be overcome through a higher meaning, 
but rather a real material limit that gains its clearest image at the borders, where 
the stateless and nationless individual, even when he embraces the hopes of the 
frontier and a new life, confronts the impossibility of “escape.” Such stories were 
popular and interesting to the literati of Seoul in part because they offered another 










































image of the colony proper, where the overcoming of death was politicized by 
culturalism and cultural policy, but remained an abstraction for the majority of 
Koreans whom Yi saw as the raw material for modernization and cultural devel-
opment. In this sense, despite being critiqued for his depictions of “spontaneous 
consciousness,” Ch’oe’s stories are in many ways the most reflective of the crisis 
of a rapidly expanding Japanese capitalism, in which massive numbers of people 
were displaced from rural areas and left to try, and in Ch’oe’s stories always fail 
in, various preindustrial economic ventures at the edges of the economic system. 
Ch’oe stories were critiqued by KAPF because their chronotope challenged the de-
velopmental image of Marxism preferred by the Marxist-Leninists who preferred 
to think of capitalism not as a system of crisis and the maintenance of crisis, but 
rather as a stage within which the emergence of the national proletariat could be 
assumed as a historical eventuality and a completion of the allegory of history. The 
maintenance of crisis was political, and the Japanese state eventually intervened 
to try to remake Kando and the rest of Manchuria, and in this sense Ch’oe’s im-
age of Kando was also a kind of political and ethical warning against seeing the 
imperial frontier as the place of opportunity it would eventually be presented as to 
displaced rural Koreans.
Rather than seeking ever further levels of integration into national history, 
Ch’oe Sŏ-hae’s chronotopes direct our spatial consciousness to the frontier, where 
historical progress dissipates or is channeled into rural partisan struggle; they di-
rect our sense of time to the tremendous and irrecuperable loss brought about by 
colonial modernity and rural poverty, and to the melodrama of arriving too late 
to a destination or missing an important letter from a long-lost family member or 
friend. His focus on the irredeemable death of the migrant as the limit to both the 
imperial economic system and nationalist politics questions the crisis and crisis 
management of Japanese imperial capitalism, with the understanding that the pri-
macy of historical necessity in metropolitan and colonial Marxisms could come 
to legitimate imperialism. In this respect, his stories are an important counterdis-
course to the abstract assertions of the dialectics of cultural development through 
which Im Hwa asserted the human being as the subject of history.
C OUNTRYSIDE,  CIT Y,  PRIMITIVE AC CUMUL ATION
Ch’oe Sŏ-hae’s stories depict an experience of rural displacement and poverty that 
was not specific to Korea, even though Kando was the particular destination and 
hope for resolution to the incredible gaps between the growth of the colonial capi-
tal and the underdevelopment of the countryside. Japan proper gradually became 
a place where not only the intellectual elite but also displaced tenant farmers mi-
grated to find jobs in industrial labor, eventually by force beginning in the late 
1930s. In proletarian literature, there was a gradual attempt to make sense of these 










































kinds of migrations in the context of the expansion of the empire. In Kobayashi’s 
Takiji’s The Absentee Landlord, he explores the process of primitive accumulation 
in the context of Hokkaido, where displaced farmers travel from Honshū as part 
of a government settlement project, only to find themselves subordinated to land-
owners, managers, and soldiers. Kobayashi compares the situation of the Hok-
kaido farmer with Koreans living on the outskirts of the city:
It was more than likely that the peasant, who got up earlier than any city laborer and 
who stooped for hours at his work, led a more miserable life than any Korean living 
in squalor in a hovel on the outskirts of a city. Did the young men on the farm really 
deserve to be called frivolous and undisciplined? Was more to be expected of them, 
in addition to their labor? Enough of your hypocrisy, thought Ken.60
The comparison between the Japanese peasant and the urban Korean worker and 
the recognition of a differential exploitation not easily mapped onto a model of 
national development were a significant reversal of the anthropological concepts 
informing Nakano’s theory of proletarian art. Nakano divided class cultures be-
tween the metropolitan national proletariat and its various others, particularly 
the cultures of the colonial nations and the peasantry. In Kobayashi’s description, 
again formulated through a chronotope of frontier expansion, the Japanese peas-
ant is shown to work within an ordering of time more ruthless than even that of 
the ethnic migrant worker.
The character Ken’s parsing of the degrees of exploitation is less interesting 
than the attention to paradoxical class relations that emerge within a capitalist 
regime reproduced through the management of populations. Kobayashi’s com-
parison between the Japanese peasant and the migrant Korean worker reflects the 
increasing attention of Marxism and the proletarian arts concerning how to rep-
resent the countryside, present in both the debates between the Lectures School 
and the Labor-Farmer School on Japanese capitalism and the debates on the peas-
ant novel in proletarian literature. In colonial Korea, Paek Nam-un sided with 
an even more stagist theory of history than the more complex positions in the 
Lectures School itself, reading capitalism as a story of a nation’s uniform passage 
between synchronically integrated systems that would eventually become influ-
ential, through Paek’s notion of “national communism,” in the founding of the 
DPRK. Paek’s perspective was consistent, in spatiotemporal terms, with his later 
position that the Japanese state is a subject that intervenes to unify the economic 
system under a more ethical governing of production and consumption. In the 
language of Louis Althusser, Paek’s position as a colonial stage theorist shows that 
the history of the economic base is not determinant of the superstructure, but 
that the translation of (humanist) intellectual and literary discourse has a “relative 
autonomy” in relation to the economy, even if the economic system is “deter-
minant in the last instance.”61 Furthermore, as Paek’s national history shows, the 










































idea of the base is itself relatively autonomous from the economic base, if ideas 
of the stages of the productive relations (or genus-being) can be translated and 
applied to new contexts with the sole mediation and difference in the translation 
being the particular content of the nation form. In this respect, breaking with the 
chronotope of stages of national history, particularly in the vein of the Lectures 
School or Paek Nam-un, was a matter of the politics of representation, through 
which a paradoxical comparison like Kobayashi’s, between the Japanese peasant 
and the Korean migrant worker, could unmoor Marxism from its anthropologi-
cal reductions. This is significant, because in Paek’s case, it was precisely this an-
thropological reduction that underlay “conversion” to support for the East Asian 
Community and other state projects of crisis management in the late Japanese 
empire.62 Likewise, Im Hwa could propose that a socialist realist peasant literature 
could become the foundational canon for the whole of the East Asian Community 
only by assuming that social classes were unified under anthropological categories 
such as the nation or regional community.63
In place of the parsing of relative degrees of exploitation between the vari-
ous positions of peasants and workers, Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation 
provides a more useful way of connecting the forced and coerced movements of 
populations with the general logic of the accumulation of capital. Marx theorized 
primitive accumulation as the separation of the peasant from his means of subsis-
tence through the cordoning off of rural lands and villages into private property.64 
Rosa Luxemburg expanded Marx’s concept of accumulation to discuss imperialist 
expansion as an effect of capitalism’s inability to make the circuit of production and 
consumption an even cyclical process.65 In order to continue to accumulate, the 
monopoly form of capitalism had to expand in order to incorporate new, “external” 
territories by transforming them into new consumer markets, new sources of 
commodifiable variable capital (workers), and, we can add, new areas for natural 
resource extraction. More recently Marxists have expanded the notion of primitive 
accumulation so that it no longer represents a singular moment in time, such as 
sixteenth-century England, but rather a basic principle of accumulation itself—the 
constant need for capitalism to separate the “commons” from their autonomous 
means of subsistence.
In literature and social science this historical process can of course be rep-
resented in multiple ways, with important political differences resulting. In his 
works on the stages of the genus-being and the “ethicality of the command econo-
my,” Paek Nam-un symptomatically did not theorize primitive accumulation, be-
cause this would have introduced the very political problem of how the state will 
resolve, ethically, the need for capitalism’s circuits of production and consumption 
to incorporate new territories and new populations. Paek could only imagine the 
Japanese state as the anthropomorphized agent for the passage to the next stage of 
development by ignoring the “ethical,” or rather political, dimension of Japanese 










































capital and military expansion in Manchuria and China. Yi Kwang-su, on the oth-
er hand, focused intently on primitive accumulation, but through a metaphysical 
and romantic nationalism connected, in 1933, to fascist notions of the moral au-
thenticity of the petit-bourgeois intellectual in his identification with rural farm-
ers. In the version of nationalist rural enlightenment that Yi Kwang-su presents 
in Soil, which is equally nostalgic and modernizing, he imagines the process of 
primitive accumulation both as a transhistorical and as a historical process, both 
as a singular moment in mythical time when the organic nation was separated 
from its essential connection to the land and as an ongoing imperialist negation 
of the potential for artistry and self-formation in both urbanites returning to the 
countryside and rural people imagined as (potential) Koreans. Using metaphors 
of blood, soil, and the rural toil of ancestors, he saw primitive accumulation as a 
loss of national origin to be overcome through modern technologies of national 
self-formation (for example, the serial, vernacular novel).
If we return now to Yi Ki-yŏng and Kang Kyŏng-ae, it is apparent how the 
representation of primitive accumulation became significant in leftist literature 
as well. The representation of multiple contradictions between various classes 
emerged with the portrayal of characters living in between feudal peasant rela-
tions and the life of the industrial proletariat. Yi Ki-yŏng’s Home Village (1933) 
draws together concerns of history, subjectivity, and political economy into a 
well-told narrative structure. Like Soil, Home Village deals with the position of 
a colonial intellectual (Kim Hŭi-jun, just returned from studying in Japan), the 
conditions and struggles of farmers, the emergence of an industrial workplace, 
the divisions between city and countryside, and the maintenance of feudal land 
relations by Japanese colonial rule. A realist attention to detail is brought to bear 
on most of the important debates within KAPF, and the true complexity of class 
relations and class ideologies within everyday life is exposed. In this narrative, we 
see that the abstract category of the “proletariat” was somewhat naïve in its his-
toricism, not only because of the persistence of rural peasant life, but also because 
industrialization was creating workers who often lived between peasant existence 
and industrial wage labor. Although the entrance into factory labor represents a 
certain crossing of a threshold for younger characters in the novel, particularly 
Kapsugi and Kyŏng-ho, characters continue to move between their jobs in textiles 
and other factory labor and the peasant farming life of their families.
The main class conflict in Home Village does not occur in the factory, but rather 
between the farm supervisor An Sŭng-hak and the tenant farmers who work the 
land. What Yi reveals through the juxtaposition of different modes of production 
operating simultaneously in a single economic system is that the deduction of the 
urban proletariat as the revolutionary subject of history and certainly the confla-
tion of national liberation with proletarian revolution were based upon an idealist 
conception of time that smoothed over the movements between rural life and the 










































linear temporality of abstract labor. In this regard, Yi does insert a vanguard intel-
lectual in his narrative, but unlike Kim Ki-jin he does not turn to the allegorical 
representation of his subjective experience of the injustice of capitalist civilization 
as the primary source for the narrative structure. This realist move away from 
works like “The Red Mouse” was a significant change in proletarian literature in 
Korea and owed some of its sophistication to the aesthetic debates on form and 
content and on the peasant novel within KAPF.
From Wonso Pond also presents a more developed picture of class relations in 
colonial Korea, but Kang’s inclusion of a more nuanced reading of colonial-period 
gender politics gives the novel a different perspective on the problem of primitive 
accumulation. As in Home Village, the fullness and diversity of workers’ temporal 
experiences come to the fore as the novel moves from sites of peasant labor to sites 
of industrialized labor. In this sense, the novel is a story of primitive accumulation, 
but the narrative is much more linear in the sense that the enlightenment project 
of the engaged and nostalgic intellectual is a much less significant element. The 
male intellectual, Sin-ch’ŏl, first has a romantic interest in the countryside and then 
unsuccessfully tries his hand at factory labor. However, the majority of the novel 
focuses on the passage from countryside to city as experienced by the female subal-
tern Sŏn-bi, not the male intellectual, and eventual Japanese imperialist, Sin-ch’ŏl.
With its focus on subaltern female subjects, From Wonso Pond is unique in its 
treatment of gender issues within the context of proletarian literature, and critics 
have discussed the gendered forms of violence and the seduction narratives that 
appear in the work, as well as the reading of Kang’s writing as “masculine” by her 
male counterparts.66 Like Ch’oe Sŏ-hae, Kang wrote on the periphery of KAPF and 
lived in the Kando region in Manchuria between 1932 and 1942. From Wonso Pond 
can be usefully read alongside Home Village because in each novel we are present-
ed with the problem of primitive accumulation and representations of women’s 
experiences with factory labor and with romantic, Platonic, and violent gender 
relations. However, Yi Ki-yŏng uses the love-triangle trope between the supervi-
sor An’s daughter Kapsugi, the illegitimate son of an aristocrat, Kyŏng-ho, and the 
intellectual Kim Hŭi-jun. Yi presents the new public presence of women coming 
about through their entrance into industrial labor in somewhat more ideal terms. 
The subaltern woman does not have a strong presence and Kapsugi enters the tex-
tile factory only because her parents disapprove of her relationship with Kyŏng-ho. 
Her admiration for Hŭi-jun leads her to enlightenment about her father’s position 
in the village and the plight of the workers and peasants of the region, and her 
Platonic friendship with him at the end of the story becomes a symbol for solidar-
ity in struggle. The story is inspiring in its depiction of the possibility of political 
solidarity across gender lines, but it relies on a certain occlusion of the subaltern 
female subject position through which the entirety of From Wonso Pond and most 
of Kang’s other stories are focalized.










































From Wonso Pond depicts the particularly repressive relations that women were 
forced into through primitive accumulation in the process of industrialization, 
and therefore provides an important counterpoint to Yi’s treatment of gender dif-
ference as a matter of romantic love. This difference in the treatment of gender is 
related to the chronotope of each novel. In both novels, the process of primitive 
accumulation takes precedence, as peasants who formerly practiced subsistence 
farming, or participated in the village organization of agriculture, are forced into 
tenant farming and eventually industrial labor. The separation of the farmer from 
his means of subsistence through the tenancy system is the fundamental problem 
and each novel presents it as a problem of class rather than of the nation. However, 
From Wonso Pond breaks completely with the back-to-the-land storyline of both 
Soil and Home Village. At the beginning of the novel, the female protagonist, Sŏn-
bi, is taken in as a domestic servant by the landlord, Tŏk-ho, who has killed her 
father, his former tax collector. Tŏk-ho hides that he killed her father, takes her in 
as a “daughter,” and rapes her repeatedly. The male farmer Ch’ŏtchae is displaced 
from his land when he and a friend revolt against the unfair taxation and ten-
ant debt in the village. Both Ch’ŏtchae and Sŏn-bi flee the village and the second 
half of the novel takes place in Inch’ŏn, where both become involved in the urban 
labor movement as a dockworker and a textile factory worker, respectively. The 
novel completely elides any possibility of returning to the land in order to rein-
tegrate with nature or to reform the practices of farm supervisors and landlords. 
The intellectual Sin-ch’ŏl momentarily feels nostalgia in the countryside through 
his attraction to Sŏn-bi, and joins the labor movement briefly in Inch’ŏn, but by 
the end of the story he has become a Japanese patriot and has left for Manchuria. 
There is no reason that Sŏn-bi or Ch’ŏtchae would return to the village, because 
they would undoubtedly be punished severely by Tŏk-ho. Sŏn-bi is forced to work 
for her father’s murderer, who promises to be her father and to educate her, but 
instead subjects her to sexual violence. She becomes a “free laborer” by leaving the 
village, but ends up in a factory where the sexual abuse continues and where she 
eventually dies of tuberculosis.
In Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale, Maria Mies discusses primi-
tive accumulation not as an originary moment in the past or as the time before 
wage labor and capital, but rather as an ongoing and violent process.67 This pro-
cess is gendered, not only because the desire to dominate “nature,” to cordon it 
off as property, is a desire of patriarchy, but also because “subsistence labor” is 
often feminized labor, from childbirth to household labor to, we could add, affec-
tive and sexual labor. The separation of peasants and workers from their means 
of self-reproduction is therefore, necessarily, a gendered form of violence. Kang 
takes as her protagonist a subaltern domestic servant whose labor is not valued, in 
the traditional sense of wage labor and capital, until the final chapters, when she 
works in the textile factory. Yet this novel about the passage from the countryside 










































to the city provides us with the most intricate realist depiction of capitalism in co-
lonial Korea, its maintenance of the landlord system, its dependence on gendered 
violence, its displacements and forced migrations, and the incapacity of the male 
intelligentsia to respond without repeating the mentality of patriarchy.
Although returning to the countryside and rural enlightenment are impossible 
in the novel, primitive accumulation is present at every moment, both as the gen-
eral condition of the passage to wage labor and as a literary metaphorics. The first 
scene of From Wonso Pond describes the pond in the village as a life-giving force 
and tells the story of how it was formed by the tears of suffering peasants who 
starved while the warehouse of the landowner was filled with their harvest. This 
opening registers the sense of loss and the dramatic feeling of displacement from 
the commons that accompany industrialization and the commodification of land, 
but it does not fall into nostalgia about the precapitalist past; the image presents 
both the feudalism of the past and the tenancy system as a means for appropriat-
ing life and the means of subsistence. The pond of tears sets the stage for Kang’s 
exploration of the “human problems” of her time, in which the lot of the peasantry 
and the workers, particularly women, has not improved through cadastral surveys 
and industrialization. This sort of image of the lost past can be usefully distin-
guished from national allegory, because there is no illusion that what has been 
lost can somehow be regained in its full form. The image lingers melancholically 
without becoming a presence such as the blood and sweat of ancestors, which Yi 
Kwang-su imagined could be regained through a new practice and new poetics of 
the national subject.
Kang saw the danger in the attempt to recuperate the lost past, and to close its 
gap with the historical present. Her writings show that there is neither an ideal past 
to which one can return nor a desirable future without a radical transformation of 
the gendered economic and political system. Her descriptions of the inescapable 
flux experienced by those who lived between the countryside and the city were 
one mode of narrative that allowed literary representation to break away from its 
ideal wholes and to capture the lived spaces of modernity as spaces of differen-
tiation, rather than of historical convergence. Arriving at such realist representa-
tions was more difficult than one might expect, as chronotopes that homogenized 
historical time, ignoring its inconsistencies and its relation to the unvalued and 
“unproductive” labor of the subaltern subjects, carried a universalist appeal to the 
national proletariat, the embodiment of genus-being, that was not easy to resist. 
If Nakanishi approached his critique of the subject of governmentality through 
the chronotope of the prison, Kang did so by rearticulating the “human problem” 
of proletarian literature as in part a question of how to represent gendered labor 
and the alienation of life and labor in production through a chronotope proper to 
colonial capitalism. This is a position that distinguishes her work from both cul-
turalism and the mainstream of proletarian literature.
167
THE WORLD-HISTORICAL STATE
In an essay from 1943, “On the Characteristics and Direction of Korean Literature,” 
An Ham-kwang, a Korean proletarian literature critic who became a supporter 
of imperial Japan and then a prominent South Korean critic, wrote, “History is 
not something established by nature or the human, nor by reason or through a 
consciousness of the forces of production; it is, in actuality, something created and 
preserved by the state.”1 In 1931, An was critical of “metaphysical” representations 
of the countryside, particularly in fascist literature.2 However, in promoting the 
Japanese state’s intervention into capitalist crisis, he ended up advocating a politics 
that was not ethnic nationalist, but did imagine the Japanese state’s mobilization of 
rural Koreans for the war effort as marking Korea’s entrance into world history. At 
the height of the Pacific War, An defended state-centered culture and literature in a 
manner typical of People’s Literature, a mostly Japanese-language journal published 
in colonial Seoul (1941–44). He also criticized the formerly dominant perspectives 
on history—that of culturalism, which considered the human in general to be the 
subject of history, and Marxism, which considered the forces of production to 
be the motor of history. In positing Japan as a world-historical state, he followed 
many of his contemporaries in arguing that the generality of humanity was in cri-
sis and could only be salvaged if a specific imperial state made up of nation-state 
subjects intervened concretely into world history in order to represent the general-
ity of the genus homo. Genus-being, or that category that mediated between the 
transcendental ideas of cosmopolitan humanity and its empirical manifestations, 
became nation-state subjectivity, and Koreans were obliged by history to become 
5
World History and Minor Literature
A fundamental quality of subjective culture lies in breaking from anthropo-
centrism, even as one returns to anthropocentrism.
—Kōyama Iwao










































state subjects of Japan, now explicitly cast as an inclusive and multiethnic national 
community.
Like many other colonial and metropolitan subjects whose Japanese patrio-
tism led them to proclaim a complete break from the ideologies of the past, An 
criticizes the ideas of history in the epistemologies of the past: natural science, 
culturalism, and Marxism. He argues that the general characteristics of the human 
being—its nature, its moral reason, and its labor—do not directly and immediately 
affect its primary determination, History. As in Hegel’s philosophy of history, only 
the state and the spirit of the state can be truly historical, because it is the subject 
that gradually and dialectically actualizes the political and moral destiny of man-
kind. An states that the human does not make history, but by this ahistorical hu-
man he means the general, abstract human, the cosmopolitan and merely formal 
human that is not necessarily or not yet a state subject. For imperial nationalists, 
the cosmopolitan individual of culturalism had become what Hegel called deri-
sively the “sheer empty unit of the person.”3 Despite such critiques of cosmopoli-
tanism and defenses of the historical primacy of state subjectivity, An and other 
imperial nationalists did not break from humanism. They critiqued culturalism 
and its cosmopolitan rhetoric and appropriated cosmopolitan claims to the uni-
versal in defense of the role of the Japanese state in world history. This discourse of 
world history assumes that empires, states, and nations gradually overcome others 
through war and cultural conflict for the eventual betterment of general humanity. 
It still posits the human’s return to its essential identity as the telos of historical 
development. This discourse also performs what I refer to as the “anthropomor-
phizing of the state,” the figuration of state power as an individual and collective 
acting-out of human will.
In the case of the Japanese empire, arguments for the world-historical state 
should not be conflated with European fascist ideology and its symptomatic re-
lation to enlightenment. While European fascist ideology naturalized race and 
nation through the assumption of an essential relation between morality and 
origin, imperial nationalists in Japan often broke from such a simplistic expres-
sion of the empirico-transcendental doublet. An’s critique of any natural, cul-
tural, or generally human foundation for history is an idea of the state distinct 
from the natural view of race in National Socialism and the ethnonationalist 
Hegelian philosophies of Italian fascists such as Giovanni Gentile (both strongly 
criticized in imperial Japan).4 For imperial nationalists, the state is the earthly 
representative of general humanist principles and of the progress of world his-
tory, and therefore should not be ethnocentric, culturally specific, or based on 
racial science. Unlike culturalists, who often returned to some kind of substan-
tial connection between national or racial origin and the faculty of practical 
reason, imperial nationalists delinked moral practice from origin and empha-
sized the futurity of the Japanese state, which would be inclusive of those ethnic 










































minorities who sacrificed their lives to belong to it. Because they required a 
theory of the state that would allow for Korean individuals to be included in the 
national political community, Korean intellectuals were particularly drawn to 
deethnicized ideas of the state that would supposedly allow colonizer and colo-
nized to overcome the ethnocentrism of National Socialism, Italian Fascism, and 
Japanese ethnic nationalism.
For former Marxists in Korea like An Ham-kwang, Sŏ In-sik, Im Hwa, and 
others, such a notion of an inclusive Japanese nation-state was in many ways an 
extension of their previous works criticizing fascism. An had previously written 
on the problem of peasant literature within the proletarian literature movement, 
where he established himself as an advocate of Marxist universalism. He made im-
portant critical insights into the metaphysical representation of the countryside, 
relating the romantic and lyrical depictions of rural life and nature in colonial 
Korean literature to the false organicist ideology of fascism, and calling for a real-
ist and secular peasant literature that would contribute to its unification with the 
proletarian class.5 Sŏ made a more complex dialectical critique of fascism, stating 
that it was the most dangerous expression of the enlightenment subject’s need for 
identity and that the way its “intellect” subjected thought to the national totality 
could not solve the economic and cultural problems of capitalism.6 Both remained 
skeptical of ethnocentrism and religiosity in their later works extolling the virtues 
of the multiethnic Japanese state. When they argued in the late 1930s and early 
1940s that the state creates and preserves history, they were referring not to the 
emperor as the monarch or religious figurehead of a monoethnic society, or to the 
leader-centered and ethnocentric state of European fascism. Yet through a secular 
and humanist model of world history still loosely connected to the history of capi-
talism, An nonetheless anthropomorphized the state by elevating it to the status of 
a being: “The expansion of capitalism happens along with the establishment of the 
state. The state is at the center of this expansion. Today we must grasp the state as 
the highest being in world history.”7
As in Paek Nam-un’s argument for a Japanese state that could govern the 
economy ethically in order to overcome the global economic depression, An 
and Sŏ impute universal historical agency and historical subjectivity to the 
state. The economy is something generally human that the state should inter-
vene into in order to regulate it in a universally valid manner. In referring to 
the state as a “being,” An anthropomorphizes it in a similar manner as Paek, not 
precisely through the figure of the morally perfected person, but as a subject 
formed through the ethical actions of the individuals that it governs. Just as it is 
not entirely possible to conflate the culturalist concept of the “person” with the 
Japanese emperor, anthropomorphizing the state entails something more than 
representing the state by a single figurehead, particularly for an ex-Marxist like 
An. The universality of subjective action is at once collective and totalizing, 










































because autonomous individual humans are free only when their free actions 
contribute to the nation-state’s spiritual mission in world history. For Korean 
intellectuals such as An and Sŏ, this mission was to liberate East Asia from 
European imperialism, European racism, and even the economic and cultural 
crises of capitalism, all of which were most symptomatically expressed in the 
European fascist social formation.
In order to discuss the state as the earthly representative of ideal mankind and 
as a deethnicized political body, imperial nationalist philosophers, particularly 
Tanabe Hajime, reorganized the Kantian taxonomy of races. They discussed the 
species (shu, chong) not as one racial or ethnic variation within the genus human, 
but rather as the historical and self-determining nation-state that could mediate 
between individuals and world history. The species was no longer a specific racial 
or ethnic variation belonging to the genus homo, as in the Linnaean system inher-
ited by Kant in his Anthropology. Tanabe Hajime and Sŏ In-sik considered such 
a notion of a unified human genus divided into species to be an illusion of the 
past.8 They considered the substantial racial, national, or geographic connection 
between the individual and the world to be broken and the species of the multi-
ethnic state had to intervene for individuals to again become worldly. To connect 
the individual human again to universality, the state, as the necessarily particular, 
historical, and concrete embodiment of general humanist principles, had to shed 
its racial, national, and ethnic particularity.9
Sŏ In-sik, who began as a Marxist-Leninist but eventually supported the idea 
of the East Asia Community, explained the role of the category of species within 
the logic of a Japan-centered East Asian regional body, drawing from various in-
terlocutors, but particularly Tanabe. Sŏ differentiated his idea of the East Asian 
Community from European fascism, while also critiquing the kind of liberal cos-
mopolitan perspective that assumes a direct connection can be sustained between 
the individual and the world despite the crises and contradictions of capitalism. 
For him, the contemporary cultural crisis made it impossible for the individual, 
the nation, and the world to be integrated in the simplistic way imagined by neo-
Kantian liberals, but ethnocentric fascism—referred to as “totalism”—was also an 
inadequate and atavistic response to the crisis of modern liberal culture and its 
“modern intellect.” In writing about what the species (that is, Japan or East Asia) 
can do for the individual and humanity at large, Sŏ considers how the political 
community of the nation can live up to universal humanist principles while also 
having a concrete historical subjectivity:
Is not contemporary “totalism” an intellect that cannot have the principle of uni-
versalization in individuality, in opposition to the modern intellect that fails to 
have the principle of individualization within the universal? Looking at the basic 
trends in contemporary culture’s central structure, the path that leads directly from 
genetic origin to the world appears broken. And in this sense the nation and the 










































world appear as absolutely contradictory concepts in the current stage of historical 
progress. If so, is not a middle term that can mediate humanity’s passage from the 
nation to the world necessary? The concept of species is always required to mediate 
the individual and the general. Therefore, only the standpoint that establishes the 
concept of the species as the subject again can sublate the nation and world, which 
cannot be reconciled from the standpoint of contemporary culture.10
As Naoki Sakai has explained in his reading of Tanabe, philosophies of the multi-
ethnic state require that state subjectivity be delinked from ethnicity and origin, 
that its theories, in Sŏ’s terms, “seek the principle of universalization in individual-
ity.” For Sŏ, the breaking of any direct line between genetic origin and the world 
is a product of the cultural crisis of global capitalism, which both enables the 
possibility for a cosmopolitan community and makes such a community impos-
sible, because it deterritorializes the human from any natural and originary cos-
mopolitan order while also encouraging the ethnicization of bourgeois society. 
For any ethnicity, or genetic origin, to become worldly within the cultural crisis of 
capitalism, it must have a historical state, or a species, that can mediate between 
the individual and the universal and sublate the relation between the nation and 
the world—this species must seek to deethnicize in order to act as a universal in 
world history. Sŏ asserts an insurmountable distance between the species and any 
natural origin, which highlights the historical constructedness of the mediating 
term of the species, as well as its national culture. The species that sublates the 
nation and the world does not refer to a natural race or ethnicity, but rather to 
the imperial state in its dynamic historical, social, and political relation with its 
internal and external others.
Although philosophers at the time often presented the Japanese empire as an 
ideal dialectical synthesis, or the One that could incorporate the Many, it is not 
physically possible to actualize a completely universal state detached from all par-
ticular experiences. Dealing with the seeming detachment of the world-historical 
state from any particular identity, figure, or tangible expression remained a prob-
lem of anthropology, despite philosophers’ best efforts to evacuate the universal 
of any particularity. Another Kyoto School philosopher, Kōsaka Masaaki, in his 
Philosophy of the Nation (1942), clarifies how the universalist perspective on the 
state remains anthropological in the attempt to define how it is that actual liv-
ing people might assimilate themselves to the ideal picture of dialectical synthesis 
that we find in many metropolitan and colonial writings that advocated imperial 
Japan. In Kōsaka’s work we find that what An Ham-kwang calls the “being” of the 
state cannot be completely evacuated of anthropological content. In the following 
statement, as throughout the text, nation, or minzoku, is a sign of this difficulty. 
When he adds “nation” and arrives at the term “nation-state” (kokka-teki minzoku) 
to refer to the chief actor in world history, he simultaneously makes an anthropo-
logical differentiation between natural nations, cultural nations, and nation-states, 










































using the language of nationalism to rearticulate earlier culturalist claims about 
the cultivation and development of the individual human:
I will differentiate three stages for the nation. These are natural nation, cultural na-
tion, and the nation-state. Among the six aspects stated above, the natural nation 
is a nation that is defined mainly according to blood and soil. A cultural nation is 
a nation that is defined mainly according to religion and language. What is called 
the “nation-state” is a nation that has become a single historical subject through the 
formation of the state. However, I do not intend to think of the differences between 
these three nations in a superficial manner. I intend to consider these three nations 
practically, actively, and in stages, setting up the natural nation in the way of a sub-
stratum, the nation-state in the way of a subject, and the cultural nation as the media-
tion of these. The nation is not simply natural, but subjective, self-determining and 
powerful, with culture as the mediation of these actions. In being self-determining, 
and, moreover, something in the world, the nation must be ethical.11
In Kōsaka’s argument in The Philosophy of Nation, culture and the cultural 
nation mediate between nature and self-determination, specifically between the 
substratum of the natural nation and the subjectivity and self-determination of 
the nation-state.12 Whereas Kuwaki divided humanity into cultural and natural 
nations, Kōsaka adds the third level of self-determination and the modifier “static” 
(kokka-teki) to the requirements for generality. Culture cannot itself be the motor 
of historical development; however, the state as subject of history requires cul-
ture—religion and language—in order to mediate the various natural nations (or 
ethnicities) that participate in its formation. In other words, Japanese national 
culture is to mediate between the given Korean or Taiwanese ethnic difference 
and the subjectivity of the nation-state. The notion of national culture and na-
tional languages as the mediations between the state and given ethnicities brings 
the anthropological back into the universality of the world-historical state. If the 
multiethnic state is not to remain an empty universal, the mediation of national 
culture—including national language, national literature, and national custom—
must construct and rearticulate the nation of the nation-state. For Sōda Kiichirō, 
individuals develop from physiological beings, to psychological beings, to owners 
of transindividual general consciousness. Kōsaka sets up a similar arc of historical 
development from nature to self-determination, but the anthropological knowl-
edge of consciousness has become more explicitly centered on the state and state 
formation has replaced the development of the cosmopolitan person as the telos 
of human development. As a being that is self-determining and worldly, the state 
must be ethical, creating an anthropological analogy between the Kantian cosmo-
politan individual who self-legislates his morality and the state that is the unity of 
individual ethical actions.
Therefore, even as Tanabe was criticizing the conservative cosmopolitan ver-
sion of culturalism in essays such as “The Limits of Culture,” and arguing instead 










































that students should give their lives to the state rather than dedicating it solely 
to culture, and as many were arguing for the universality of the specific imperial 
state, anthropological thought and the idea of culture both remained central to the 
project of empire.13 The leading literary critic in Korea, Ch’oe Chae-sŏ, changed 
the name of the most important general humanities journal, Humanities Critique 
(Inmun py’ongnon), to People’s Literature (Kokumin bungaku), advocating national 
literature and the national language (kokugo) rather than world culture; however, 
the journal maintained its concern with formulating a humanist response to mod-
ern cultural crisis. Despite his background in the modernizing project of Marxism- 
Leninism, Sŏ began to discuss the need for a dynamic engagement with the shared 
cultural tradition of the East Asian Community (one that would not be a feudal 
mythology).14 In 1941, Miki Kiyoshi published his philosophical anthropology, 
Notes on Life, and Kōyama Iwao synthesized a number of ideas on the cultures of 
the East and the West, national geography and culture, and world history in his 
Research on the Typology of Culture.15 In colonial Korea, these new codifications 
of anthropological knowledge were collectively discussed as the “new humanism,” 
which incorporated both antifascist European humanism and ideas about a supe-
rior East Asian modernity.16 Both bourgeois humanists like Paek Ch’ŏl and former 
Marxist-Leninists like Sŏ In-sik came to identify with versions of the utopian idea 
of a new “East Asian humanism,” and even Im Hwa, who was critical of the “liberal 
ideology” of the new humanism, sought the most advanced human culture in a 
rurally based socialist realism, which he thought could become a proper mediation 
between Korea and the progress of world history represented in the Japanese state.17 
In other words, the world-historical state remained a world-historical nation-state, 
one that required new artistic and cultural practices that were adequate to a state 
that included differences, but was also a cultural, linguistic, and political unity.
Kōyama’s text is perhaps the most expressive of a contradiction in the philo-
sophical projects that advocated the East Asian Community and a multiethnic 
Japanese nation-state: he appropriated distinctions between the West and the East 
first discussed in the anthropocentric epistemologies of European Orientalism, 
particularly by Hegel in his Philosophy of History, and used them to claim that 
Western culture is anthropocentric (ningenchushinshugi-teki) and that Eastern 
culture is anti-anthropocentric (hanningenchushinshugi-teki).18 Referring to the 
Kantian worldviews, including that of the philosophy of culturalism, as “objective” 
(kyakkan-teki) and the Eastern worldview as “subjective” (shutai-teki), he claimed 
that Western culture separated the human from both the divine and nature where-
as anti-anthropocentric Eastern culture integrated them:
I think we can say that the communal thought that unifies the three elements of the 
divine, the human, and nature is something that has run through Eastern thinking 
for a long time, and actually constitutes its fundamental character, whereas it is a 
quality we cannot find in the objective culture of the West. Therefore, as we find 










































ourselves in these communal relations, or rather because we find ourselves in these 
subjective, communal relations, I think the point that the ideal of the human being is 
not anthropocentric will be important and requires serious reflection. A fundamen-
tal quality of subjective culture lies in breaking from anthropocentrism, even as one 
returns to anthropocentrism.19
The Copernican turn of enlightenment humanism distinguished the human 
from both the divine and nature and made it the constituting and constituted 
agent of knowledge. In opposition to this objective culture of modern Western 
science, as well as the uncritical translators of Kantian anthropocentrism in Japan 
in the 1920s, the (practical) subjective culture of the East integrates the divine and 
nature with the human, through an ethical community centered on the “home” 
(uchi) and brought about by an acting, transindividual subject (shutai).20 Like 
many intellectuals in East Asia at the time, Kōyama diagnosed a crisis in Euro-
pean humanism, but used this humanism’s very cultural categories in order to 
posit the Japanese nation-state as a world-historical community that would unify 
the East according to its shared cultural principles, at the same time reintegrat-
ing the acting human subject with nature and the divine. Most importantly for 
colonial subjects and colonial intellectuals, this discourse stated that overcoming 
Western modernity was a universal matter for humanity at large. The Japanese 
nation-state, with its particular culture, space, and history, not only represented 
the other nations of East Asia, but was also responsible for solving the problems 
of Western metaphysics for the world at large. Kōyama expresses this problematic 
confluence of universal and particular quite self-consciously, but nonetheless in 
a politically coercive and contradictory way, when he states that the new “subjec-
tive culture” of East Asia entails “breaking from anthropocentrism, even as one 
returns to anthropocentrism.”
Leo Ching has discussed the shift to the policies of kōminka (imperial subjec-
tification) and its meaning for colonial subjects in Taiwan. In debates about the 
policy of Japan-Korea Unity in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the issue of imperial 
subjectification was central. Therefore, Ching’s analysis of imperial subjectification 
is relevant, despite the different colonial contexts. Ching writes,
Unlike dōka, which remained an unrealizable ideal of colonial integration, what 
kōminka entailed for the colonized, then, as exemplified in the construction of a 
“good and loyal Japanese” and the so-called kōmin literature, is the “interiorization” 
of an objective colonial and class antagonism into a subjective struggle within, not 
between, colonial identities. In other words, cultural representations under kōminka 
displaced the concrete problematic of the social and replaced it with the ontology of 
the personal.21
According to Ching’s clarifying reading, a displacement occurred from the con-
crete problematic of the social—which includes the interrelated hierarchies of 
metropole and periphery, Japanese and non-Japanese, man and woman, bourgeois/










































proletariat/peasant, and so on—into the ontology of the personal. The burden of 
overcoming the colonial relationship was put on the colonized, whose ascension 
to the position and ethical practice of a loyal nation-state subject would allow for 
the transcendence of the concrete situation of colonialism. As Ching points out, 
the focus on the internal struggle between ethnic identity and Japanese imperial 
subjectivity is still prominent in many readings of minority texts from the period. 
However, this internal struggle is not natural, but historically conditioned by the 
colonial ideologies of imperial subjectification and Japan-Korea unification. As 
I will show, the fact that the most prominent Korean advocate for a multiethnic 
Japanese national literature, Choe Chae-sŏ, framed the problem of people’s litera-
ture in terms of personal ontology—in his view, as the overcoming of the modern 
humanist division between the level of consciousness and the level of existence—
reflects these larger historical tendencies in colonial discourse.
The remainder of this chapter is primarily concerned with theories of national 
literature and culture as mediation for the universalist and multiethnic state sub-
ject, as well as the way that the minor literature of writers such as Kim Sa-ryang 
and Kim Nam-chŏn intervened into the dialectical, concentric circle that was the 
dominant image for this new cultural-national subjectivity and its world. One 
primary approach taken by minor literature was to contextualize the philosophi-
cal idealism of national literature within the mundane urban spaces occupied by 
imperial subjects and within the modern institutions through which the imperial 
state actually asserted its power and its laws of history (for example, the courts and 
the prisons). Another approach was to highlight a gap between the ideal notions of 
practice demanded by the state—speaking the language, sacrificing one’s life, and 
acting as a state subject in the name of general humanity—and the performative 
aspect of this practice, which was always situated and contingent. In taking up 
characters like a former communist brought to court to perform the role of con-
vert, a proletarian stage actor whose proclamations of his humanity are nothing 
but a psychotic delusion, and a colonial writer who begs divinity to transform him 
into a proper Japanese (naichijin), their texts of minor literature show that indi-
vidual action does not concretize the ethical substance of the imperial state, in the 
manner of Ching’s “ontology of the personal,” but is rather only a performance that 
is always fragile and tenuous, or, even beyond the absolute sacrifice of dying for the 
Japanese state, completely impossible. In his most radical stories of the early 1940s, 
Kim Sa-ryang creates a relay with Franz Kafka and prefigures Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari in suggesting “becoming-animal” as an alternative ontology to that 
of the national subject’s cultivation.22 By reversing the process of cultivation, liter-
ary characters who turn to the animal as the teleological figure for individual de-
velopment at the onset of total war question the ontology of imperial subjectifica-
tion, which continued to rely on tropes of the human’s self-mastery, its overcoming 
of its fear of death, and its capacity to willfully define the conditions for its future.











































In her history of Manchuria and Korean migration, Hyun Ok Park refers to the 
form of colonial assimilation in the late Japanese empire as a kind of “osmosis.”23 In 
Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze writes of the concentric circles of dialecti-
cal thought and the way that Hegel’s philosophy, through “Orgiastic representation,” 
incorporates difference through the expansion and contraction of the subject and 
the constant internalization of externalized, negative difference.24 Drawing from 
Louis Althusser, Frederic Jameson, in The Political Unconscious, critiques the “ex-
pressive causality” of the Hegelian dialectic, which improves upon the mechanistic 
causality of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, but still masks the over-
determination (or multiple causes) of any situation of capitalism.25 Each of these 
readings of the assimilation of difference through dialectics addresses itself to the 
subject as osmotic being and expression as the causality of the dialectical totality. In 
the period of the discourses of the world-historical nation-state in the late Japanese 
empire, expression, which was also anthropologically defined in terms of national 
language and national culture, was understood as the cultural mediation through 
which identity and nonidentity, the positive and the negative, the present and the 
past, and space and time could be united. Expression became central to the practice 
of the imperial subject, and therefore speech and action were often conflated. To 
speak in support of the empire was at the same time to act in its interests. The idea 
that the nation-state as expressive totality is the subject of the world and world his-
tory requires such a conflation between speech and action. The projects of Japanese 
national literature and national language took on a renewed urgency in colonial 
Korea, while at the same time critical minor literature addressed the contingency 
of the performance of imperial subjectivity, of speaking in the language of empire.
Philosophies of the world-historical nation-state in the Japanese empire imag-
ined that culture could mediate and facilitate the process of osmosis and dialectical 
incorporation. Read in sociological terms, Hegel argued that the moral action of the 
state synthesizes the idea of the nation and this idea’s externalized elements.26 In the 
Science of Logic, Hegel defined the absolute as the “identity of identity and noniden-
tity.”27 In terms of nation-state building, the subject that acts and thinks in history 
synthesizes the positive idea of the nation-state with what is negated, nonidentical, 
or internally external to this idea (the feminized, the minoritized, the colonized, the 
proletarianized, and so on). The nation-state subject is formed when the nonidenti-
cal is again contained in identity through a shared sense of absolute historical pur-
pose and the collective action of the members of an inclusive nation-state. Diverse 
thinkers in the Japanese empire agreed that it was through practice that those who 
were Japanese in a given sense and those who were somehow excluded or negated 
by this identity could come to form a single, self-determining national subject. This 
practice was the practice of national literature, the practice of national language, 
and ultimately the practice of committing oneself to the cause of the war.










































One of the earliest and most complex philosophical discussions of the osmotic 
movement of the Japanese imperial subject is Tanabe Hajime’s “From the Schema of 
‘Time’ to the Schema of ‘World’ ” (1932).28 This essay was the first essay in his series 
“The Logic of Species,” and a detailed discussion of the aesthetic and spatiotemporal 
dimension of his model for imperial subjectivity.29 For Tanabe, an international state 
representing the entirety of the human genus (rui) was impossible, or an absolutely 
negative possibility; however, the species, which was a possible and actual world-
historical state, could mediate between the genus and the individual.30 In his earliest 
aesthetic articulation of the subjectivity of this imperial nation-state, Tanabe begins 
with the term “schematism.” For Kant schematism is that inexplicable capacity of 
the human to give form to an idea. For example, one might know what a rectangle 
is a priori, before any experience of objects, but in order to build a table, it is neces-
sary to be able to draw a rectangle, at least in the mind’s eye. This ability to draw the 
rectangle, to give it an image, is the work of schematism. Therefore, schemas medi-
ate between the ideal and the material world and allow us to imagine that our ideas 
may be adequate to the objects that present themselves to our intuition. Arguing 
against Heidegger, who Tanabe states prioritized time over space and interpreted 
Kant’s schematism only in relation to the temporality of Dasein, Tanabe asserts that 
without the external intuition of space, there could be no schematism. In particu-
lar, without the external intuition of Otherness, of something that approaches us 
from outside of our own internal sense of time, we would remain only in a state of 
autoaffection, sensing only our internal time. Space, as an external sense, allows us 
to externalize our own internal sense; it allows us to give figures and schemas to 
our ideas. In this sense, space and time do not simply oppose each other, but rather 
space and time are both opposed and unified through dialectics.
Tanabe deduced that while space is determined by time, time is also deter-
mined by space, and stated that schemas are neither strictly spatial nor temporal, 
but are rather the oppositional (or dialectical) unity of space and time. He calls the 
dialectical unity of space and time the “world.” Therefore, being-in-the-world is 
not strictly a matter of the internal time sense of the individual Dasein. Through 
the faculty of schematism, our internal intuition of time is externalized and the 
external intuition of space is internalized. However, space and time are not imme-
diately unified through this activity of creating and applying schemas. The world 
is not a stable and given external object. Space and time, and other and self, come 
into constant opposition with one another. The unification of space and time, of 
the internal time sense and the spatial sense of an outside, does not take the form 
of a seamless organism. The world is a schema, and not a thing-in-itself, because 
it is provisional, and subject to both constant change and constant imagination. 
Nonetheless, the world is also an ideal future toward which the subject of history 
projects itself. The theme of unity through change that marks the world of Hege-
lian world history is apparent.










































Following Park’s reference to osmosis, I term Tanabe’s schema of the world as 
a kind of “osmotic space” whose spatial boundary is not a limit beyond which the 
world becomes foreign, but rather an active site of communion between identity 
and negativity, where there occurs a constant confrontation with and sublation 
of the otherness of space and the otherness of the historical past. In osmosis, the 
organism’s boundary, which limits it as an organism, is also its means of internal-
izing the outside and externalizing its inside. The border of an osmotic organism 
is what allows it to constitute and reconstitute itself, to transform at the same time 
as it survives. The difference between osmotic space and the spatiotemporality of 
culturalism is clear. Despite the neo-Kantian foundations of his scientific distinc-
tions and his teleology, Tanabe’s world is not that realm of general cultural value 
through which a cultural artifact, as an expression of an individual creator and his 
national particularity, can become part of the larger cosmopolitan community. 
That world was a formal construction that allowed for a communicative transla-
tion between general, particular, and individual. It lacked the dynamism of space 
and time we see in the world imagined as an osmotic space-time.
In the same essay, Tanabe becomes concerned about the relation between the 
past and the present, and uses the term “expression” to discuss how it is that the 
past can become alienated from the present, but also recaptured by it:
Expression is both an expression of the ego and an existence that opposes the ego; 
that it carries the significance of being proper to another ego that opposes the ego 
of the present is because it contains the principle of the nonego that negates the 
ego, and yet expression is unified with the ego of the present, and I am aware that 
the expression is my manifestation because expression is something formed by the 
absolutely negative unity of the ego.31
If we consider expression to be the externalization of the ego in space, as in a writ-
ten text, photograph, or oral statement, this externalization necessarily drifts into 
the past and becomes separated from the subject by time. Again, an externaliza-
tion of the ego in space can never be entirely spatial, because the world is both 
temporal and spatial, so the expression immediately enters time and the subject 
becomes temporally alienated from its former self. However, what allows the ego 
of the past to again be present is that expression in the present is formed by the 
absolute negative unity of the ego. The ego is only identical to itself insofar as it is 
not itself; the fact that the subject is not the same as it once was is what allows it 
to be a subject.
He refers to an absolute negative unity because it is a unity only recognized 
through nonbeing, through the recognition of the difference between the ego of 
the present and the ego of the past:
As the past becomes conscious as something that opposes the present, its content 
is at once extinguished from the interior and preserved in the exterior. However, 










































because consciousness is the unity of internal and external, in which the external 
becomes the internal again, this past must be synthesized with the present in a pro-
jected manner. This structure that is both external and internal is nothing other than 
expression.32
Expression holds together the continuity of past and present, space and time, in 
their actuality. Further on, he writes,
Expression is the manifestation of worldly existence, but is, at the same time, the 
manifestation of human existence. In expression, the exterior existence of space is 
unified with the past of time. . . . The world’s unified structure of space and time is 
concretized in expression. We understand that the schema of the world as the unity 
of space and time has the character of expression. Schema as world is a principle of 
expression, and is an a priori expression.33
It is expression that holds together the space-time continuum of Tanabe’s world in 
its actuality, and it is deeply connected to the collective and personal ontology of 
the human, or what Tanabe calls “social existence.”34 The schema of the world is 
the a priori schema that has no relation to experience, whereas expression is the 
actual being of this ideal unity of the world. This giving of ontological form to the 
schema of the world is what alienates the subject from itself, because this expres-
sion necessarily drifts into the past. However, this past can always be recuperated 
back into the present through dialectical logic and the dialectic process of history, 
which is also expressive. The boundary of the osmotic space of Tanabe’s world is 
not only between the subject and its others, but between the present and the past; 
however, this past can always be reinvigorated and drawn back into the present by 
way of the movement, formed through expression, between externalization and 
internalization. Expression is what allows for this actual, historical aspect of the 
world to be reconciled with its a priori, natural unification of space and time. This 
entails a constant reintegration of the past into the present, an integration that 
does not resemble the immediacy of tradition and modernity that I discussed in 
relation to culturalism. This integration does not really occur between two dis-
crete languages, or between the particular and the general, but rather between two 
simultaneous but disjunctive moments that negate each other, but can neverthe-
less be unified through expression—expression being that mode of externalization 
that, in its absolute negativity, can unify the past and the present, space and time, 
in their concrete actuality.
Not surprisingly, considering this linkage between external and internal sense 
through concrete expression, Tanabe’s discussion eventually moves on to the prob-
lem of aesthetic judgment and its purposiveness, drawing from Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment.35 Tanabe states,
[The present] enacts the absolute negative actualization of intuitive understanding 
that is the unified principle of the “world.” The place of the practical subject who acts 










































with absolute purposiveness, in obeyance with “purposiveness without a purpose,” is 
none other than the present. Because expression is such an action, it has the charac-
ter of the unity of the epistemological subject (shukan) and the object.36
For Kant, the epitome of this purposiveness without a purpose was the aesthetic 
object, toward which the subject of judgment maintains a disinterested pleasure, 
and in which it comes to recognize the possibility of its own form in the form of a 
beautiful external object (particularly in nature, but also, perhaps, in an artwork).
This move to aesthetic judgment in Tanabe’s understanding of expression is 
significant because it is where a link can be made between his imperial philosophi-
cal project, centered on the practice of the state subject, and art. How did Tanabe’s 
ideas concerning reflexive judgment relate to the schema of the world? I argue that 
Tanabe’s discussion of culture and aesthetics here is implicitly monolingual, and 
explicitly logocentric, not only because expression, or what we would now think 
of as writing or text, remains a supplement to the a priori ideality of the world as 
schema, but also because the translation that occurs in the ecstatic temporality 
that forms the world occurs only through the absolute negative unity of expres-
sion. In other words, this concrete form of expression is nothing but the material-
ization of logos. Expression is subsumed into the osmosis of the imperial subject, 
with its dynamic incorporation of the outside through the externalization of its 
inside. At the same time as expression materializes at this boundary between ego 
and nonego, it draws the nonego into the subject.
CH’OE CHAE-SŎ AND PEOPLE’ S  LITER ATURE :  THE 
CRISIS  OF MODERN HUMANISM
Echoing the German idealist and late Kyoto School philosophical assertion that 
the human subject is the free and active center of such a dialectical process, the 
Korean critic Ch’oe Chae-sŏ referred to this osmotic subject of the world-historical 
state with the term “people’s standpoint” (kokumin-teki tachiba).37 He did not char-
acterize this subject with given racial or ethnic characteristics; the term rather in-
dicated a dynamic mode of consciousness, practice, and expression similar to Ta-
nabe’s image of a concentric dialectical circle as the spatiotemporal, human subject 
that gives form to the world. Just as “expression” was the absolute mediation that 
for Tanabe could unify space with time, as well as the a priori world with concrete 
human existence, Ch’oe discussed a poetic and expressive national language as the 
form-giving mediation for a multiethnic national culture. However universalistic 
the notion of the world-historical state became, it was impossible to avoid such a 
turn to the anthropological, to a philosophical understanding of the language and 
culture through which the seemingly deethnicized idea of the world could take 
on a concrete form inclusive and exclusive of its internal others. Ch’oe identified 










































how the detachment of the human subject from any natural origin was a symptom 
of a crisis in cosmopolitan humanism, one to which the world-historical state, 
the multiethnic empire, and his own project of Japanese national literature must 
respond. In the essays he published in the journal People’s Literature (Kokumin 
bungaku, 1941–45), of which he was editor, Ch’oe demanded that colonial writ-
ers write from the people’s standpoint, meaning through the cultural, linguistic, 
and political practices of a Japanese national subject situated in world history. Yi 
Kwang-su’s Japanese-language writings during the war are exemplary of people’s 
literature in that they depict the reformation of the colonial subject’s practice as 
the means for colonial subjects to become Japanese national subjects. In addition 
to going to war for Japan, writing in the national language and mediating one’s 
consciousness entirely through national culture were the primary conditions for 
Korean writers to become Japanese.
Ch’oe was a literary critic with a background in English literature, a famous 
interpreter of the modernist poet Yi Sang in the 1930s, and a translator of Shake-
speare into Korean in the 1950s and 1960s.38 In the 1940s, he drew from his read-
ings of I. A. Richards, European Romanticism, and T. S. Eliot’s idea of tradition in 
order to formulate a theory of a politically unified, monolingual Japanese national 
literary culture in which colonial writers from all over the empire would partici-
pate. Ch’oe approached assimilation in terms of the inheritance of and elaboration 
upon the Japanese national tradition.
In Korean Literature in a Time of Transition, published in 1943, Ch’oe dis-
cusses the cultural crisis of modernity and modern individualism and asserts 
that people’s literature will constitute the cultural overcoming of this crisis. Just 
as philosophers reconsidered the logical and political relations between nations, 
states, and the world in the late 1930s, a number of literary scholars formulated 
new theories of people’s literature, world literature, and their connections. Niizeki 
Ryōzō’s People’s Literature and World Literature, which appeared two years before 
Ch’oe’s book, undoubtedly influenced some of his formulations.39 Niizeki argues 
that literature is both specific to nations and peoples and has a general humanity 
(ningensei), and that the current task of criticism is to understand this connec-
tion anew. He claims that literature that is only world literature, in the sense that 
it only addresses universal themes in a dislocated, individual way, cannot achieve 
true universality, or be effective in a global time of war and national strife. This 
notion of world literature’s universality is “as naïve a dream as the idea of world 
peace.”40 On the other hand, people’s literature, which is “born of the people and 
exists for the people” without devolving into either mere intellectual play or trivial 
mass culture, can become true world literature precisely by being immersed in the 
concerns and experiences of its particular national community.41 Ch’oe articulated 
a similar skepticism toward any concept of cosmopolitanism unmediated by the 
nation-state, and defended people’s literature as the overcoming of both detached 










































intellectual individualism and mass culture, but he did so from the position of a 
colonial subject. The idea that belonging to a state and a national community was 
necessary in order to participate in the general theater of human history was both 
a rhetorical means of addressing a perceived crisis in colonial modernity and itself 
a technology of colonial governmentality.
Writing from the people’s standpoint required giving political support to Japan’s 
war in Asia. It also meant returning to a more organic and primordial poetics that 
was a particularly romantic variation on ideas for a multiethnic national language 
community put forward by linguists such as Tokieda Motoki, then a professor at 
Keijō Imperial University in Seoul.42 In asserting the subject position of the people’s 
standpoint, Ch’oe sought a more egalitarian and more inclusive Japanese national 
literature founded on a flexible notion of Japanese national tradition. According to 
Ch’oe, for Korean writers to become true national subjects and to write from the 
people’s standpoint, they not only would have to write exclusively in the national 
language, but would also have to appropriate the national traditions, ways of think-
ing, and dispositions of the Japanese people: “As for the truth in literature, the 
idea of merging with the traditions and disposition of the Japanese people will be 
adopted and the symbols and inferences of the arts will appear with a new mean-
ing.”43 His appropriation of tradition was ambiguous insofar as Japanese national 
culture, on the one hand, would be unprecedented and future-oriented in its over-
coming of modern individualism and its transformation through the inclusion of 
Korean literature, and, on the other hand, would be based upon the traditions, 
morality, and ways of thinking of Japan. The appropriation of Japanese tradition 
and Japanese spirit amounted to more than performing Japanese ethnicity, espe-
cially in its concern with transforming Japanese national culture internally. Tradi-
tion designated a continuous cultural sphere that opened out onto both the future 
and the frontier—Korea and the rest of the Asian continent—while it masked or 
repressed any relationality or border between the imperial nation-state and its 
alterity. In relation to Christian cultural reunion, Eliot had written, “The ideal 
reunion of all Christians does not, of course, imply an eventual uniform culture the 
world over: it implies simply a ‘Christian culture’ of which all local cultures should 
be variants.”44 In effect, Ch’oe replaced Christian with Japanese and, also drawing 
from Eliot, Scottish and Irish with Korean in order to articulate a Japanese national 
culture no longer troubled by ethnic and sectarian divisions, a multiethnic culture 
politically unified and linguistically homogeneous.
The first thing one notices in reading Korean Literature in a Time of Transi-
tion is that Korean literature is not mentioned until the seventh chapter of the 
book and is, despite the title, a somewhat minor topic compared to the discussion 
of modernity in general. The main theoretical argument of the first chapters ad-
dresses the importance of People’s Literature in relation to the cultural and moral 
crisis of modern individualism. Being a scholar of English literature interested in 










































the history of world literature, Ch’oe periodizes the break that gave rise to modern 
individuality with reference to the Renaissance. For him, Renaissance humanism 
posited the modern individual in its criticism of medieval feudalism and the me-
dieval view of the world. Though Italian Renaissance humanism was the begin-
ning of modern individualism, the humanist individual remained connected to 
the nation through the adoption of Roman texts and a dedication to moral and 
aesthetic cultivation. Beginning with nineteenth-century Romanticism, however, 
the individual became totally disconnected from the nation and cosmopolitan-
ism was born. Using the poems of Shelley and Byron as examples of this dena-
tionalized cosmopolitanism, he states that the Romantic expression of, on the one 
hand, great genius and heroism and, on the other, lowly cowardice shows how 
the modern individual fell into progressively more exaggerated states of illness 
and weakness. Ch’oe argued that the illness of the modern individual had reached 
its greatest proportions with Freudian psychoanalysis and modernist literature, 
which accentuate the pathologies of individual psyches and reflect a total discon-
nection of the individual from national culture.45 In order to show that such litera-
ture was quickly coming to an end, he quotes an article from the New York Times 
by the Austrian exile Stefan Zweig, which states that the kind of literature that told 
the story of a boy meeting a girl and falling in love can no longer be meaningful 
under the present historical circumstances.
Ch’oe’s reading of Romanticism is a misreading, because it ignores its obvious 
connections to nationalism and highlights only the illness of its cosmopolitanism. 
However, Ch’oe is reading the situation of Korean colonial modernity through 
the lens of European intellectual and literary history, and we can intuit that his 
statement about Romanticism has more to do with the failure to establish a cul-
tural nation. By reading Romanticism as an early cosmopolitan literature, Ch’oe 
is able to criticize the native bourgeois literature that failed to become a national 
literature in colonial Korea while simultaneously calling for a new nationalization 
effort that would solve the illness of colonial modernity and its failed forms of 
individuality. Ch’oe recasts the crisis of Japan’s colonization of Korea as a moral 
and cultural crisis internal to the past individualism of Japanese national culture. 
By articulating the crisis in this way, he could lay claim to a minority Japanese 
national subjectivity and offer what he saw as an adequate solution to the crisis of 
modern humanism.
Ch’oe’s emphasis on the cultural and moral nature of crisis is clear in his dis-
cussion of capitalism, or “profit society.” For him, capitalism was not primarily an 
economic problem, but rather a cultural one. He states that “culture for culture’s 
sake” and “profit for profit’s sake” are two sides of the same crisis of modern in-
dividualism because both are abstract in relation to the daily life of the nation.46 
The modern individual does cultural, economic, intellectual, and scholarly work 
and becomes dedicated to an abstract internationalism that lacks any connection 










































to the national masses. Scholars are especially prone to this individualism, which 
is the result of the autonomy of the international economy from the nation-state:
The autonomization of the economy, as I already stated above, removes the national 
base and must establish international, traversing combinations. However, if scholar-
ship is sought for the sake of scholarship, then it is easy to employ oneself for an 
abstract internationalism rather than for the daily life of the people (kokumin).47
In this way, Ch’oe connected a modern individualism that seeks culture or scholar-
ship to “abstract internationalism,” using modernist literature (for example, James 
Joyce) as an example of the worst form of this cosmopolitan individualism. The 
crisis of modernity was for him economic only in a subjective or cultural sense, 
which allowed him to argue that capitalism could be overcome along with the 
subjective overcoming of internationalism and individualism. Against Marxists 
who argued that internationalism arose through the unification of the world by a 
crisis-ridden capitalist system, he argued that the basis of the crisis of internation-
alism lies solely in a subjective problem of the modern individual. In his analysis 
of fascism, Nicolas Poulantzas described this sort of petit-bourgeois critique of 
capitalism as “status quo”—an anticapitalism that complains about economic cor-
ruption but more in terms of culture or morality than in terms of class struggle.48
In his criticism of the crisis of culture in modern individualism and its 
groundless internationalism, Ch’oe pointed to two states of division in which 
this crisis had been expressed. He stated one division, referring to existentialist 
philosophy, as a division between the level of existence and the level of con-
sciousness. Quoting Oswald Spengler, he argued that this division gives rise to 
spiritual uneasiness and is indicative of a crisis of morality and tradition that 
occurred along with urbanization and industrialization. This division between 
consciousness and existence leads to the notion that literature is an expression 
that reflects consciousness. For people’s literature, according to Ch’oe, the level of 
consciousness should reflect the level of existence correctly or else it will devolve 
into simple word play or a literature of self-consolation.49
The second division that Ch’oe identified lay within the nation between the 
culture of daily life and culturalism. The culture of daily life refers to daily habits, 
including wearing Western clothes, watching films, drinking black tea, owning a 
radio and a record player, and other activities that were superficial imitations of 
daily life in Euro-America. For him, all of these activities lack belief and spirit. In 
opposition to these habits, the intellectual proponents of culturalism had sepa-
rated themselves from those wrapped up in the culture of daily life and attempted 
to wrest culture away from their frivolous activities. Ch’oe was confident that in 
the period of transition into People’s Literature, the masses, because their contact 
with Euro-American culture was superficial, would easily accept the new con-
ditions (which, of course, meant that they would have no choice in the matter). 










































Ch’oe, then, addressed himself to the culturalists who were more deeply involved 
in Euro-American culture and were therefore more susceptible to continuing their 
cosmopolitan individualism.50
In positing these two states of division as parallel problems in the crisis of cul-
ture, Ch’oe was able to argue for a single solution: the formation of a new people’s 
literature through the reimmersion of cultural elites back into the daily life of the 
masses. Because both states of division supposedly result from the same separa-
tion between the individual and the masses, he could assert that in the cultural-
ists’ return to the nation through the creation of People’s Literature, the level of 
existence would come to be reflected by the level of consciousness and literature 
would no longer be mere individual expression. Using this future-oriented logic 
that articulated something yet to be formed, he could criticize leftist and class lit-
erature on the same grounds as he did the “literature of individual consciousness.” 
In his logic, the depiction of class division reflected the same crisis of division in 
the individual as novels that dealt with psychological or family problems. Ch’oe 
asserts that leftist literature tries to depict objective divisions within society but it 
does not realize that this objectification of society is made possible and perpetu-
ated by a division within the subject. For example, leftist literature took workers 
and peasants as its object, but failed to recognize that these classes have their own 
spirit, that they are subjects who can be objectified only if the writer divides him-
self through the assertion of a metaphysical position in relation to his object. Con-
versely, literature of individual consciousness dealt with psychological, aesthetic, 
and family problems in a very subjective manner without the writer realizing he 
is objectively separated from the national masses. In the case of Japan, the I-novel 
was for Ch’oe one example of this tendency toward the personalization of narrative 
and aesthetic form. People’s Literature was to establish a new harmony between 
mass literature and the artistic literature of individuals. The agent that would me-
diate this harmony was the state; however, the state was not to dictate the content 
of literature to the passive masses. Rather, in order to unify the nation through 
national culture, this culture had to be believed in, supported by, and actively pro-
duced by the entire nation. The entirety of this nation was to be measured not in 
terms of sheer numbers, but rather in terms of classes. In other words, it was not 
necessary for every individual to believe in and support the state; rather, it was 
necessary for people from every class—in terms of both social class and social 
types—to participate in the production of national culture.
If the crisis of modern culture was tangible in the divisions within the individual 
that were to be overcome in the process of the creation of People’s Literature, some 
idea of the agent of this creation was required. Although Ch’oe rarely if ever used 
terms like shutai, shugo, or shukan, which are some of the Japanese translations, all 
with different nuances, for the word “subject,” he was theorizing the formation of 
a national subject insofar as overcoming the crisis of modern culture demanded a 










































different kind of perception, a different language, and a different kind of participa-
tion of the writer in the life of the masses. The term in Ch’oe’s argument that most 
directly suggests a subjective position is kokumin-teki tachiba (the people’s stand-
point), which refers to more than siding with the nation in a debate or to seeing 
oneself objectively as a national subject. As with national culture, this standpoint 
is something to be developed through certain forms of practice, including writing 
in the national language, treating national themes in literature, and concerning 
oneself with and addressing oneself to the national masses. The people’s stand-
point was also meant to mark a distinction between collaborating with the state 
and resisting the state through Korean nationalism (the elimination of antistate 
nationalism being one of his main requirements for People’s Literature). Some of 
the other requirements for the people’s standpoint were to stimulate the martial 
spirit of the nation, to collaborate with national policies, and to work toward the 
inclusion of Korean literature within the national culture of Japan. He argued from 
an antimodernist position that the general crisis of modernity required a national-
ization of culture, and in so doing made very strict demands about what could and 
could not be said in literature. However, he distinguished the role of the state from 
the role it had taken under National Socialism by stating that requirements for 
literary critics to enroll as journalists, such as Josef Goebbels had instituted, were 
not tenable for Japan, and that any sort of criticism or publication should be al-
lowed as long as it was not directed at the state. Literature was not to become mere 
propaganda or policy, but rather convey national policies, or what would now be 
termed “national interests,” through cultural products legible to the masses.
According to Ch’oe’s principles, the people’s standpoint was to ensure the na-
tional quality of literature mainly through its treatment of subjects (shudai) re-
lated to the nation (shudai generally referring to a topic of writing or contempla-
tion). However, Ch’oe’s discussions of shudai returned to problems of shutai, or the 
practical subject—that is, the actions and behaviors that would allow writers to 
write from the people’s standpoint.51 These forms of practice were differentiated in 
a strict way from the consideration of conflicts generally thought productive for 
literature: subjective antinomies, class struggles, family or generational disputes, 
and so on. This intense emphasis on the practice of the subject, rather than on the 
object of his representation, is already implicit in his criticism of modern individ-
ualism. In order to overcome the states of divisions within the modern individual, 
he argued, it was necessary for writers to internalize national consciousness com-
pletely. Eventually, what they wrote about would not matter so much as the source, 
or, rather, the position from which they enunciated. Therefore, one of the most 
important practices was acting as a discursive subject of the national language.
In this way, the burden of occupying the people’s standpoint was put on the 
writer and became an ontological imperative to be obeyed actively. To occupy the 
people’s standpoint, the writer himself had to make sure that he had suppressed 










































any other language that could disrupt the identity of the discursive subject. This 
made People’s Literature an arena in which minority subjects could prove their 
loyalty to the Japanese nation. The popularity of confessions by colonized subjects 
that attested to the difficulty of learning the language and to the great effort they 
were putting forth to do so suggests that the desire of the colonized to become 
a Japanese national subject was, in the realm of People’s Literature, made into a 
kind of spectacle in which being a discursive subject of the national language was 
grounds for inclusion within the nation-state. In this sense, the national language 
was not imagined in the same way as area studies has traditionally imagined the 
Japanese language because it was not superimposed with a Japanese ethnic iden-
tity or even a group of native speakers.
For Ch’oe, this is where the use of a unified and communicative national lan-
guage emerged in a powerful way as the mediation that would allow for Koreans 
to appropriate Japanese traditions. That this appropriation and re-creation of 
Japanese cultural nationality was to occur through the formation of an imperi-
al national subject is clear in his favorable readings of the German writer Hans 
Grimm, whom Kim Sa-ryang criticized contemporaneously as an ultranational-
ist who had given up on the Enlightenment ideals of the age of Goethe.52 The 
disagreement between Ch’oe and Kim concerning Japanese nationalism occurred 
by way of their differing readings of German literary history and cosmopolitan-
ism (Kim defending the German Enlightenment and the Jewish writer Heinrich 
Heine and Ch’oe appropriating National Socialist discourse for a multiethnic con-
text). On Ch’oe’s part, he wrote that Hans Grimm’s People without Land is power-
ful because it takes the German nation’s need for land as its subject (shudai).53 In 
his reading of Grimm, Ch’oe approaches a “blood and soil” defense of Japanese 
nationality, whereas in other places he focuses on the flexible ideas of spirit and 
tradition. However, it is important to note that Ch’oe emphasizes soil and that he 
was using this reference to criticize Hayashi Fusao for stating that even if Kore-
ans committed conversion (tenkō) they had no homeland to which to return. In 
other words, National Socialism and its idea of Lebensraum (living space) were 
a means for Ch’oe to argue that in becoming Japanese national subjects Koreans 
would also gain a homeland. The project of constructing national culture was to 
be predicated on the traditions and origins of a nation that could oppose itself to 
an international and cosmopolitan modernity, and therefore the empire had to be 
a single nation; however, at the same time, the creation of a homeland for Koreans 
required that the spirit and traditions of Japan shed the ethnocentric orientation 
they had gained in Japanism (nihon-shugi). The very idea of a single culture and 
language as the primary mediation for an imperial nation-state is, despite any 
claim to a future egalitarianism, necessarily a way to ignore colonial hierarchies. 
As Ch’oe’s discourse shows, however, such an idea can also be very attractive for 
colonial subjects who have been subjected to inequality and oppression and who 










































see an alternative in becoming an imperial subject. In the process of becoming a 
national minority, and no longer being a colonial subject, Ch’oe imagines that the 
nation he or she seems to have left behind is actually gained territorially through 
assimilation.
Ch’oe distinguishes his assertion of an inclusive and mediatory national culture 
from a claim for political citizenship. He criticizes citizenship (kokuseki) as the 
other side of a bad cosmopolitan internationalism, which is consonant with his 
overall distaste for modern individuality.54 He claims that it was due to the very 
fact that the modern individual was a citizen of the nation-state that he was able 
to criticize the nation from a cosmopolitan perspective. Ch’oe’s politics were more 
overtly fascist than T. S. Eliot’s particular brand of monarchism and the poetics 
of the people’s standpoint was also a poetics of death for which the dissolution 
of the individual into the warring masses became a means of inclusion within 
the nation-state. The stories that were written in line with Ch’oe’s program were 
fascinated with the solemnity of war. For example, Yi Kwang-su’s short story “You 
Can Become a Soldier” (1943) portrays war as the resolution to the psychological 
and social problems of colonial modernity. In this story, the Korean father of two 
young boys is elated when the governor-general establishes the volunteer soldier 
system in Korea. While the first son dies because of his despair over not being 
able to become a soldier, his second son is given a new life because he can join the 
Japanese military. To die fighting for Japan was to belong to Japan, to have one’s 
death gain a social significance. In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger wrote that 
one’s “anticipatory resoluteness toward death” enabled the authentic temporality 
of Dasein.55 This authentic temporality was not only that of the individual, but 
ultimately that of a political community. The philosophical project of fundamental 
ontology did not escape Ch’oe. In his terms, the willful collapsing of the “level of 
consciousness” into the “level of existence” was one way to think of the becoming-
national of Korean writers. Going to war offers the most concrete way to imagine 
what Ch’oe meant by the individual’s complete incorporation into a poetic totality 
with no alterity.
Ch’oe imagines this aesthetics of immersing oneself into the imperial nation as 
a poetic act. In “What Is Poetic?” Ch’oe writes:
It is possible for beauty to be perceived in the actions or poses of individual chil-
dren, but we feel something truly beautiful when we see all the children of a na-
tional school marching in file. There is a cooperative beauty there that cannot be 
explained thoroughly with formalist aesthetic concepts like the beauty of order or 
the beauty of groups. Individual humans are demonstrating their own power to 
the greatest limit; however, they are by no means desirous. Because they are being 
conducted by one absolute idea, they show a majesty that has no individual plan 
and in this a sublime beauty is produced. This also differs from a formalist rhythmic 
beauty that arises from a wooden doll or machine that is only moving mechanically. 
There is a condition of strain between extreme repression and the demonstration 










































of extreme life and there shines forth an austere beauty that seeks only to scatter 
sparks. For that matter, one can say that modern warfare demonstrates the pinnacle 
of cooperative beauty.56
Through Ch’oe’s notion of “cooperative beauty” he suggests what the cooperation 
of the East Asian Cooperative Community often meant in aesthetic terms (aes-
thetic in the narrow meaning of sense perception). There are two aesthetic experi-
ences here: (a) witnessing the spectacle of cooperation and recognizing its beauty 
and (b) the experience of the children themselves in their state of “extreme repres-
sion” and “demonstration of extreme life.” Ideally, it seems, these two experiences 
would be part of a single poetics; the adult onlooker feels the same strain visible in 
the children. This is what allows him to assert that the observation of this spectacle 
is not formalist (or a kind of disinterested pleasure in Kant’s terms). The sublimity 
and austerity of the spectacle call upon the viewer to become part of the scene, 
to disappear into its beauty. Total participation in the poetics occurs through the 
renunciation of individual desires and casting the absolute idea as the sole object. 
While this absolute idea represses the child soldiers in taming their individual 
desires, it also allows them to demonstrate extreme life because they no longer 
suffer from the illness and divisions of modern individual subjectivity. This rebirth 
through the totality is beautiful in that the point of tension between the exertion of 
individual power through the totality and the repression of individual conscious-
ness gives off a fiery energy. Warfare is the ultimate example of cooperative beauty, 
as it requires this tension to be its most acute. Because this aesthetics denies any 
formalism or any outside position, it engulfs the viewer and the dissolution of his 
separation becomes the sublime aesthetic experience.
Ch’oe developed this idea of poetics, as well as its relation to the crisis of mod-
ern culture, through his study of English literature, especially the critic I. A. Rich-
ards. While Richards’s Romantic claims about the loss of organic poetics in mo-
dernity were perhaps not as extreme as this highly aestheticized poetics of war, the 
connection suggests that ideas of “cultural crisis” and the loss of a pure poetic pro-
duction are not tropes to be taken lightly when considering their political effects. 
One wonders if Ch’oe would have taken a different position if an intense focus on 
cultural crisis had not been instilled through his studies at the university. This “cri-
sis” is the most consistent theme in his writings and shows how modernist angst 
transformed into something very grave in the context of imperial war. To put it too 
crudely, his antimodernism was an elaboration of his modernism and eventually 
returned, by way of capitalist modernity, to a fascist politics and fascist aesthetics.
While Ch’oe claims that People’s Literature would overcome the division between 
the proletarian arts and culturalism through a new mode of practice and writ-
ing, Korea hardly disappears as an anthropological object. The difference is that 
the anthropological objectification of Korea requires at the same time the Korean 
intellectual’s complete immersion in the poetic totality of the Japanese empire. 










































The Japanese state is now the representative of humanity at large, the subject of 
world history. In a roundtable discussion that appeared in People’s Literature, Paek 
Ch’ŏl provides an interesting metaphor for the new situation of Korean literature, 
which shows that the problem of the anthropologization of Korea did not get 
resolved in People’s Literature’s attempt to articulate a minority Japanese national 
subjectivity. If anything, the way Korea was made into an object and into a rem-
nant carried by Korean-Japanese subjects became more banal. During a round-
table discussion in the inaugural issue of People’s Literature, Paek offers an apt 
metaphor for the relationship between imperial space and the “area” as anthropo-
logical territory:
I think what Mr. Ch’oe (Chae-sŏ) says is right, that there is no meaning in Korean 
literature setting forth as one wing of Japanese culture unless it can add something 
and enrich Japanese literature. However, there is the problem that Mr. Terada stated. 
In other words, there is one atmosphere in Korean literature, and if this atmosphere 
is not broken then there will be no attempt to get outside. For example, if there is 
a river running here and the natural landscape in this region is beautiful, then the 
flow of the river itself will also be extremely beautiful and writers must of course go 
along depicting the uniqueness of this river. However, the problem is that the flow 
of this river does not pass a single large sea or mountain range. Thus, what I want to 
insist is that before depicting this river, we first view the flow of this river from the 
sea. Now, the next time, when we look again, from the position of understanding 
the sea, at what we saw and felt in the atmosphere of the river, I think we will grasp 
a real uniqueness. I think that the uniqueness of Korean literature must be asserted 
in this way.57
Paek’s assertion is that for the identity of Korean literature to make a contribu-
tion to Japanese literature, writers must break out of the confines of the territory 
of colonial Korea. Although there was dissent in the discussion about the kind 
of approach that would emphasize the uniqueness of Korean literature only in 
relation to the vantage point that the Japanese nation-state could provide, Paek’s 
metaphor of breaking out, territorially and perceptually, from the confines of 
the Korean situation in order to better depict what was experienced there is an 
apt description of the way that the major figures of People’s Literature perceived 
the direction of Korean culture at the time. An anthropological structure was at 
work. Koreans could view Korea from an outside position and thus construct their 
ethnicity as an object of their perception and creation. While this seems counter 
to Ch’oe’s criticism of viewing nations from a metaphysical position, there was a 
double standard whereby Japan had no border that would allow it to be objectified 
(a boundless sea) and Korea was an object for contemplation (a river viewed from 
the sea). Such an intuition of the space of the empire reflects the pressure for the 
colonized to objectify his own ethnicity while actively producing national culture. 
This anthropological situation played itself out in People’s Literature, where Ch’oe 










































and others often served as native informants about Korea in roundtable discus-
sions with Japanese intellectuals.58
Ch’oe discussed culture as a realm of value that could overcome class contra-
dictions and colonial hierarchies. He grounded this realm of value in a traditional 
past that, while originally foreign, could nonetheless be appropriated to negate the 
antinomies of modernity and the divisions within the individual caused by the 
situation of colonial modernity. The aesthetics that emerged from this negation of 
the present was also an anaesthetic, in the sense that the horizon of death prom-
ised a teleological end to the crisis of humanism and the attendant crisis of vision 
and ontology.59 The action of war and the anticipation of an identity achieved in 
death were ways of overcoming the perceptual and physical violence of colonial 
modernity. The perceptual violence of modernity that led to divisions within the 
individual was to be resolved further by language becoming metaphysical again, 
not in the sense of a transcendental concept, but through the invocation of a spirit 
in language, internally undivided and expressive of an untranslatable and territori-
al real, the nation. Ch’oe’s discourse negated worldly perception, which he deemed 
metaphysical, and asserted the metaphysical within language as the central locus 
of culture. This reinscription of the metaphysical was not political solely because 
Ch’oe was a minority. However, as minority discourse, his writings show that only 
through extreme violence, and the aesthetics of violence, can a national language 
become a replacement for translation and a sign for indivisible community.
TR ANSL ATION AS TACTIC
Thus within the Korean intelligentsia of the metropole and the colonial capital 
Seoul, national language was linked to military mobilization, through the kind of 
confluence of romantic metaphors and militarist metaphors of poesis that we find 
in Ch’oe Chae-sŏ’s writings on people’s literature. Within this context, theories that 
reintroduced differences between and within national languages were not sim-
ply nostalgic appeals to the kind of liberal cosmopolitan world of communicative 
translation imagined by culturalists of the 1920s. For theorists of translation and 
writers of minor literature such as Kim Sa-ryang, the difference between Japanese 
national literature and Japanophone literature, as well as the difference between 
national language as the spirit of the totality and national languages as limited and 
differentiated spheres of discourse, amounted to the difference between imagining 
the survival of a global sense of the generally human and capitulating to a state-
centered art that presented nation-state subjectivity as the only possible position 
in world history.
Kim Sa-ryang, in addition to being the most interesting, respected, and deco-
rated Japanophone writer from Korea, studied German literature at Tokyo Impe-
rial University, producing a master’s thesis in German on the Jewish litterateur 










































and Parisian expatriate Heinrich Heine.60 Meanwhile, he remained active in the 
Korean literary and theater scene in Japan proper, including being nominated for 
the Akutagawa Prize, before returning to Korea in the early 1940s. While writing 
in Japan proper, he drew from German Classicism and Romanticism in his very 
different formulations about the cultural and vehicular status of “the language of 
Japan proper” during a period when colonial policy was demanding patriotism, 
monolingualism, and the political and cultural unity of Japan proper and Korea.
Kim Sa-ryang and Chang Hyŏk-ju are the two most significant Korean writ-
ers of Japanophone literature, understanding this term in the following sense: 
Japanophone literature describes a context in which a variety of languages, litera-
tures, and intellectual traditions came into contact by way of Japanese as the major 
vehicular language, particularly in the more long-standing colonies of Okinawa, 
Taiwan, and Korea.61 While many members of the intellectual classes in the colo-
nies were adept at multiple languages, they often used Japanese translations of 
English, French, German, Russian, Sanskrit, and other literatures. They also wrote 
a great deal of fiction and criticism in Japanese, which allowed their works to be 
read by writers and intellectuals in other parts of the empire. At the same time as 
Japanese served this vehicular function, in the late 1930s it was increasingly cast 
as the national language of the whole empire. Therefore, the spiritual, cultural, 
and metaphysical status of Japanese as a national language was increasingly at the 
center of issues of national subjectivity and the preservation of local traditions, 
languages, and identities.
Kim Sa-ryang’s ideas for Japanophone literature differed significantly from 
those of People’s Literature. In Kim Sa-ryang’s narrative of Korean modernity, the 
possibility for autonomy and self-determination is also mediated by culture, and 
he repeats a discourse similar to Kōsaka’s philosophy of the multiethnic nation. 
However, whereas both Kōsaka and Ch’oe displaced the violence of colonialism 
into national war (the act of self-assertion and self-determination) and incorpo-
rated language and culture within a metaphysics and dialectics of the nation, Kim 
complicated the idea of national culture by revealing its dependence upon a rela-
tionship with alterity determined by translation. While one of Kim’s figurations of 
translation inadvertently reproduced colonial hierarchies, his ideas and practice 
of bilingual writing did not attempt to arrest the proliferation of difference that 
occurs through translation. This writing appears as a challenge to the metaphor 
and metaphysics of nationhood and as an exploration into the allegorization of 
concrete problems of colonial domination.
Looking to local ideas, practices, and refusals of translation defamiliarizes 
the very notion of a single Japanese language, as when we find that among the 
Korean intellectual class of the 1930s and 1940s there were multiple names for 
this language. Ch’oe Chae-sŏ referred to it as the national language (kokugo) 
and Kim Sa-ryang referred to it as the language of Japan proper (naichigo), 










































a distinction that carried significant political and cultural stakes. Comparing 
Ch’oe’s ideas for a monolingual Japanese national literature with Kim’s plan to 
simultaneously preserve Korean literature through translation and transform 
the imperial language and imperial politics through a practice of bilingual 
writing shows how the questions of Japanophone studies are very pertinent to 
contemporary issues of canon formation, imperial histories, and minoritarian 
politics in the context of Asian studies.
Kim Sa-ryang’s narrative of modernity differed from Ch’oe’s in that he offered 
no criticism of the modern individual or political internationalism and he was 
careful not to invoke a cultural crisis in either Korean or Japanese national cul-
tures. While he did maintain that the present was a period of transition for prob-
lems of language and culture, and that Korean culture would unify with Japanese 
national culture in some manner, this unification was not a matter of overcom-
ing the alienations of colonial modernity through Japanese national subjectivity. 
According to Kim, the modern development of Korean culture occurred through 
a process of imitation and differentiation whereby outside literary and cultural 
forms were imported, worked upon, and eventually developed into something 
autonomous from other national cultures.
In 1939, Kim’s ideas about transmitting Korean national culture relied upon a 
communicative notion of translation between ancient and modern Korean and 
between modern Korean and modern Japanese. Korean literature, once it had 
been written by a Korean national subject, and under the protection of the na-
tion’s cultural autonomy, could nonetheless be translated transparently into the 
language of Japan proper, thereby becoming part of Japanese and world culture. In 
his discussion of the role of translation in this historical process, he wrote:
Considering the current situation in which Korean writers simply cannot write in 
the language of Japan proper, the demand to do so is certainly unreasonable. Instead 
we must create an organization that can translate Korean literature and announce 
that Korean literature must be written in Korean. For the moment, it would be fine 
if the governor-general of Korea took the lead and established a translation bureau, 
embarking on a profitable cultural enterprise. If not, there should be a desire among 
graduates of the Department of Korean Literature at Keijō Imperial University to 
translate and introduce ancient literature. The translation of contemporary literature, 
and, of course, of the literature of the Koryŏ and Chosŏn periods, must in large part 
be borne by the strength of students like these. This would broaden the respect for 
Korean literature at home and abroad and would also be one means to reward and 
encourage the labor of Korean writers themselves. . . . I think that in translation we 
must conceive of a way to keep alive as much as possible the nuances, maxims, and 
linguistic feelings of Korean.62
The idea of a nation-within-a-nation requires transmission as a metaphor for cul-
tural translation and cultural translation as a metaphor for transmission. In this 










































passage, Kim hopes that the “nuances, maxims, and linguistic feeling of Korean” 
can be revivified and preserved through the translation of ancient texts into mod-
ern Korean and the translation of both ancient and contemporary texts into the 
language of Japan proper.
At a time when the elimination of Korean writing was a legitimate fear and 
the demand for Korean writers to write in the language of Japan proper was both 
unreasonable and politically authoritarian, the preservative role of translation 
gained a heightened historical connotation. The task of preserving Korean culture 
through translation echoes the significance of afterlives in a text written contem-
poraneously, Walter Benjamin’s “The Translator’s Task.”63 Benjamin proposed that 
translation contributes to the survival of texts by reintroducing them into a later 
historical period and into a new linguistic and cultural context. For Kim, it was 
the danger that the language would be written out of history that required that the 
Korean intelligentsia engage in translation as a preservative act.
Kim Sa-ryang’s discussion of cultural translation as a practice of unifying and 
modernizing the history of Korean literature through the communicative and 
preservative function of Japanese can be read alongside the structuralist view of 
translation put forward by Roman Jakobson in his essay “On Linguistic Aspects 
of Translation.”64 Jakobson distinguished between interlingual, intralingual, and 
intersemiotic translation: translation between two languages, translation with-
in one language, and translation between linguistic and nonlinguistic signs. In 
his discussion of interlingual translation, or what he called “translation proper,” 
he recognized the differences between languages, particularly at the level of the 
code-unit, but nonetheless asserted that two discrete languages have the capacity 
to communicate the same whole message. Kim’s notion of transmitting Korean 
national culture also assumes the type of equivalence-in-difference that Jakobson 
discusses in relation to interlingual translation, or translation proper. This model 
establishes a mimetic relationship between the ethnic language and the imperial 
language and allowed Kim to imagine continuity between ethnic identity, imperial 
subjectivity, and world culture.
Jakobson’s strict distinction between intralingual and interlingual translation 
falsely assumes that an interlingual translation will not also require an intralingual 
translation, and that equivalence-in-difference can be guaranteed by the hypotheti-
cal unity of two national languages. As Jacques Derrida points out in his reading 
of Jakobson, if one considers how “translation proper” relates to intralingual and 
intersemiotic translation, then “one starts down a road that quickly reveals how this 
reassuring tripartition can be problematic.”65 Kim was similarly aware of this prob-
lematic and his ideas concerning translation were more complicated than the com-
municative idea of translation that appears in his narrative of literary moderniza-
tion and in his project for cultural preservation. Particularly in relation to bilingual 
writing, he understood the difficulty of translating transparently, especially within 










































the imperial public sphere, where miscommunication and misapprehension were 
augmented. He was aware of the necessity for a different notion of translation that 
did not assume an immediate communicability between national culture, imperial 
culture, and world culture:
Secondly, let us assume that one is filled with enthusiasm and motivation in the so-
ciety or environment of Korea and would like to give shape to the contents that one 
grasps there. If one tries to write in the language of Japan proper rather than in Ko-
rean, the work will definitely be troubled by Japanese feelings and sensations. Sensa-
tions, feelings, and contents are connected to words when they first arise in the gut. 
To state it in an extreme manner, we not only know happiness and remember sadness 
with Korean sensations and feelings, but the expression of these will not come across 
unless it is through the Korean words that are inextricably connected to them. For 
example, if one tries to transmit either sadness or curse words into the language of 
Japan proper, one must translate intuitions or feelings in a very circuitous fashion. 
If this cannot be done, one will switch to purely Japanese sensations in composing 
the work.66
In bilingual writing, the intention toward perceptions is not determinable from a 
transcendental position where one could find equivalences in different languages 
for the same perception. Rather, sensations, feelings, and contents are already 
connected to words when they “arise in the gut.” Language is not instanced in 
messages that have conceptual contents separable from sensation, but is itself a 
physical sensation with a metonymic relationship to other “nonlinguistic” percep-
tions (a relationship between language and the physical that puts into question the 
abstraction of the concept of interlingual translation as translation proper). These 
word-sensations are not completely untranslatable, but writing them in the lan-
guage of Japan proper requires roundabout or circuitous (mawari kudoi) transla-
tions. If writers ignore the detours that change the target language internally, then 
they will reproduce Japanese literary expressions formalistically and language will 
lose its necessary connection to the materiality of signs. The attention here to dis-
parities between an original word related to sensation and its translation into the 
language of Japan proper problematizes the idea of transmission between two dis-
tinct and stable languages and cultures.
In his study on the relationship between modern Japanese and Korean lit-
eratures, Kim Yun-sik referred to the formalistic Japanese used by some Korean 
writers, such as Yi Hyo-sǒk, as an “artificial language” (in’gongŏ).67 In Kim 
Sa-ryang’s view, the artificiality of Japanese was not inevitable for Korean writ-
ers, but rather occurred from their inability to convey their most ontologically 
primary thoughts and perceptions adequately. Counterintuitively, “adequately” 
meant without adequation between original and translation, without a notion of 
equivalence-in-difference. The practice of translation in bilingual writing had a 










































different historicity than the modernization and transmission of Korean national 
culture. Two contemporaneous presents, asymmetrical in their power, confront-
ed, mixed, and folded into each other. Translation did not serve solely the preser-
vation of national tradition, but was also productive, and the text produced was 
the afterlife of a submerged and nonidentical original belonging to the ethnic lan-
guage. This sort of creation through translation is one aspect of minor literature, 
whose authorship can be usefully distinguished from the social-scientific defini-
tion of minority.68 Minor literature arises where origins, community, and culture 
are the territory of the dominant and where the literature of the translated and 
translating minority deterritorializes culture. The metaphors of organicity promi-
nent in both culturalism and the anthropological turn in theories of the world-
historical state are disintegrated by the metonymies of sound, hallucination, and 
irony. This second mode of translation, which is not necessarily a translation 
between national languages, but could also be a translation between discursive 
regimes, returns the language of literature to the physical and the material, ex-
ploring an ontology that can perhaps confound that of imperial subjectification.
There are multiple links between Kim’s ideas concerning translation and his fic-
tional works, because the idea of being a minority and becoming a Japanese subject 
is dependent on the possibility of direct translation between the ethnic language 
and the imperial language; breaking away from this particular structure of ontol-
ogy required an indirect translation and the consciousness that one was changing 
the imperial language “intralingually.” This change of the imperial language did 
not necessarily occur at the level of syntax or phonetics, but rather in the figura-
tive quality of the literary language. This literary language shifts the language of 
personal ontology and identity into an allegory of the social. This allegory of the 
social draws language away from its national-cultural territorialization, toward a 
differential and relational perspective on the identity of the subject. In so doing, it 
also rearticulates the meaning of acting human.
ACTING HUMAN: THE MINOR LITER ATURE OF KIM 
SA-RYANG AND KIM NAM-CH’ŎN
In comparing the Japanese-language works of Kim Sa-ryang with the Korean lan-
guage works of Kim Nam-chŏn, I will show how the difference introduced by mi-
nor literature is visible not solely at the interface between the ethnic and imperial 
language, but also in the way that the social practice of the imperial subject is 
represented. The language of imperial subjectification and the language of minor 
literature are not at odds solely within “Japanese,” but also at the point where what 
Leo Ching calls the “ontology of the personal” is at odds with the intersection 
of speech and practice imagined in Tanabe’s philosophy of expression or Ch’oe’s 
theory of the people’s standpoint.69 In other words, the breakdown of the tripartite 










































schema of interlingual, intralingual, and intersemiotic means that the interface 
between the language of empire and the language of a critical minor literature can 
occur in multiple “national languages,” in Kim Nam-chŏn’s Korean-language sto-
ries that reflect on the prisoner’s translation of the laws of world history as much 
as in Kim Sa-ryang’s Japanese-language stories that question the plausibility of 
imperial subjectification for destitute and marginal colonial subjects.
In the contrast between Ch’oe’s theory of multiethnic Japanese national literature 
and Kim Sa-ryang’s concern with the practice of translation, we can see that the 
cultural territorialization entailed by the anthropological and anthropomorphizing 
theory of the world-historical state came to necessitate a theory of national lan-
guage with the literary imperial subject, as the subject of the national language, at 
its center, while Kim’s understanding of the practice of translation kept the relation 
between the imperial language and the ethnic language in play as an irresolvable 
problem. While we might then conclude that the contrast between the ontology of 
an imperial national literature and the ontology of minor literature is a contrast be-
tween a subject attempting to live in a single national language and a subject still liv-
ing between languages, it is reductive to assume that “minor literature” refers solely 
to a cultural difference between monolingual and multilingual societies. There is 
another equally significant social difference that minor literature introduces into 
the sphere of imperial national culture, one that indexes the problem of personal-
ization that Ching points to in his reading of imperial subjectification.
This difference is between representations of practice and representations of 
performance. In culturalism, practice is conflated with morality. In proletarian 
literary discourse, practice is conflated with productive labor. In theories of the 
world-historical state, practice is conflated with the ethicality of the nation-state. 
Kim Sa-ryang introduces another view of practice with the attention he gives to 
the (im)possibility of translation. However, minor literature’s intervention into the 
sphere of discourses on practice is not simply to keep the ethnic language in play, 
but also to intervene into the way that speech acts are represented in literature, 
to show that speaking the language of imperial subjectification is not a matter of 
enunciating from the metaphysical position of Ch’oe’s “people’s standpoint,” with its 
conflation of speech and political practice, but rather of speaking and acting within 
a context. This context cannot be reduced to the ideal context of the imperial na-
tion-state, where speech and action can somehow coincide through the ontology of 
the personal and its metaphors; the contexts of minor literature are rather striated 
with social conflict, hierarchies of speech and position, and metonymic relations 
of power. The language of imperial subjectification assumes that performative lan-
guage can correspond seamlessly with imperial practice, that to speak and write in 
the language of nation and empire is at the same time to act in its political interests. 
Taking as my examples the late stories of Kim Sa-ryang (written in Japanese) and 
Kim Nam-ch’ŏn (written in Korean), I will show how minor literature is not merely 










































a disruption of the territory of cultural languages through a practice of translation; 
it also represents action within a contingent context for performance, thereby rela-
tivizing the ethicality of the nation-state, which rests on individual interiority as the 
site where speech and action can come to coincide. Insofar as morality, labor, and 
the ethicality of the nation-state are all anthropologically conceived perspectives on 
practice, minor literature also questions humanism and its basic assertion that the 
entirety of the world is the creation and product of human will.
Kim Sa-ryang’s and Kim Nam-chŏn’s literary texts are very conscious of both 
the concrete realities that the ideology of imperial subjectification tended to ig-
nore and the necessity for a different ontology of the personal, one that was con-
nected to a collectivity but irreducible to either a minority identity or an imperial 
subjectivity. By “concrete realities,” I mean the racial hierarchies, gendered forms 
of violence, class antagonisms, and cultural hegemony that persisted despite the 
new forms of equality that imperial subjectification was supposed to entail. By a 
“different ontology,” I mean a kind of becoming that could break away from the 
duality of Korean identity as “being” and Japanese subjectivity as “becoming.”
It was in the ambiguous space between the crisis of humanism and the funda-
mentalist attempt to reconstitute cosmopolitan humanity through the nation-state 
and the practices of a new national subject where critical colonial writers like Kim 
Sa-ryang and Kim Nam-ch’ŏn wrote deconstructive fictions exposing the limits 
to the new humanism of world-historical Japan. Their stories of the late 1930s are 
not concerned with a simple individual and national choice to be pro- or anti-
Japanese, which has been the typical way of analyzing the cultural politics of late 
colonial Korea in the aftermath of Japanese empire.70 They rather suggest a more 
complex issue, which is the cleft between abstract ideas about the cultural and 
moral practices of “the human” and the remaining narrow space for more con-
tingent cultural performances. These writers were conscious of the operation, in 
imperial ideology, of the definition of the proper human (that is, person) in terms 
of moral cultivation and the capacity for practical reason. They were also leery 
of the new complicities between these ideas of the moral human and fascism’s 
anti-intellectual, action-centered philosophy. Against the humanist call for moral 
regeneration, and its somewhat distorted version in fascism, they described the 
ideological aspect of moral humanism by contrasting colonial subjects’ perfor-
mances of prescribed social roles with the everyday impoverishment of society, 
culture, and the body. They illustrated that ideas of cultural practice derived from 
humanist philosophies were, in their conception of the moral society as an ideal, 
systemic whole, at odds with the fractious police and military violence that gov-
erned the everyday spaces of the war economy, as well as the economic destitution 
caused by the continuation of capitalist social relations beneath the propagandistic 
images of imperial unity and the formation of a new social order. The need to rep-
resent this gap between the ideology of systemic unity and the precariousness of 










































everyday life became the difficult task for engaged literature, particularly after the 
demise of the proletarian realist arts and the rise of state-centered theories of art 
and society between 1935 and 1945.
In “The Snake” (1940), a Japanese-language work, Kim Sa-ryang successfully 
surrealizes and estranges the human-centered fictions of proletarian literature in 
order to critique some of its uncomfortable similarities to the melodramatic real-
ism that characterized the moralistic humanism of the new fascist aesthetics.71 He 
depicts a junkman and former amateur actor of the Korean proletarian theater 
group of Tokyo. Historically, Kim had written for such a theater group, but the 
Japanese government suppressed it as part of the crackdown against communists 
and colonial activists in the mid-1930s.72 The actor in Kim’s story is itinerant and 
delusional, left without the public stage that once provided a context for perfor-
mance and for the left avant-garde’s attempts to synthesize realist art and political 
life. Typage, or the participation of amateur actors, was one method of the prole-
tarian theater. The story states that before the junkman’s theater group was sup-
pressed it was made up entirely of migrants from the colonies—cobblers, cleaning 
ladies, and newspaper delivery boys. Out of nostalgia, the junkman actor visits 
the small playhouse where the theater group had performed and imagines that he 
spends the night watching a rehearsal:
A moment ago, this large man had left the nearby playhouse. A rehearsal of Gorky’s 
The Lower Depths had been going on in that small theater. Since last night he had 
been crammed in there, watching the rehearsal. More than anything, he disliked the 
role of Satine. When he and his cohort had their own theater group in the past, he 
always performed the part of Satine when they did The Lower Depths.
The large man raised his shoulders involuntarily and tried yelling out Satine’s 
lines with the appropriate gestures.
“Huumaan beeing! How’s that? Doesn’t it sound terrific?”
He entered a dream, shaking both arms in the air, bending his body and yelling 
as though he were drunk.
“Huumaan beeing! We must respect the human being! We should empathize 
with it!”73
Just then, taking in a final breath, he gasped, “shouldn’t we?” and then stopped. 
His stomach, empty since yesterday, responded to his question and he staggered.74
The abandoned playhouse may or may not exist in the diegesis and the rehearsal 
he watches is certainly a dream or hallucination. The junkman actor recites Satine’s 
humanist proclamations, but the theater group and the theatrical audience are 
both absent. He ceases his recitation because he is weakened by hunger, wandering 
to a vacant lot where he encounters a giant snake. He goes to a snake store, where 
the owner has a large aquarium sitting on his desk “like a human figure from 
Greek ruins.”75 He tells the owner about the snake and the owner captures it and 
keeps it in the aquarium. After the junkman finally receives a meal at the house 










































of a “foster parent” to the poor, he visits the snake store again. Similarly to Julio 
Cortázar’s narrator in “Axolotl,” without actually metamorphosing through the 
mirror of the aquarium, the junkman peers through the glass and the snake stares 
back at him.76 The snake becomes the new object of the junkman’s identification 
in an economic and social context where Satine’s proclamations of his humanity 
cannot hide his physical and mental dehumanization.
In the darkness of the late 1930s, Gorky’s classic humanist play can only be 
performed in the destitute and hallucinatory world of the junkman. Social life is 
akin more to animal captivity than to the noble suffering and quest for redemption 
portrayed in social realism. In Gorky’s play, philosophical dialogue speaks of the 
natural equality of human beings of all social classes, but in “The Snake,” the ama-
teur actor’s proclamations of his humanity are entirely invisible to society. Stan-
islavskian acting techniques and the fourth wall of the theatrical stage normally 
lend psychological realism to The Lower Depths, but the actor in “The Snake” per-
forms the part of Satine in a waking dream, at the edge of death. The realism of his 
psychology is conveyed in the way he is forced or compelled to perform the hal-
lucination of his humanity, not through the reality of his social type. In removing 
the theater and staging the play as one character’s hallucination on the street, the 
fourth wall of realist theater dissolves into an uneasy intimacy with one character’s 
schizophrenia. This departure from realism destabilizes the humanist perspective 
and enacts what Deleuze and Guattari, in their analysis of Kafka’s minor literature, 
called “becoming-animal,” or, in another context, the deterritorializing power of 
“the schizophrenic out for a walk.”77
“The Snake” exploits the technical difference between reading fiction and spec-
tating a play to make a political point about aesthetic experience: the absent the-
ater is at once a regrettable historical fact of Japan in the late 1930s and a sign 
for the more general loss of the stability of realism. The story suggests that the 
synthesis of art and life within the new totalitarian environment takes the form of 
an extratheatrical but still performed hallucinatory interpenetration of dream and 
reality. Rather than acting the part of the proletariat who demands his humanity, 
the Satine role for which he was formerly typecast, the junkman instead identifies 
with the captive snake. As in many of Kim’s texts, politics has become a matter 
of inclusion and exclusion, visibility and invisibility, hollow humanist ideas and 
animal existence, particularly as these problems converge within a fantasy about 
identity. Essentialist ideas of the human figure—from Satine’s monologue to an-
cient Greek statues—are contrasted with the limits of the human in the near-death 
existence of the junkman and in the snake’s eerily nonhuman gaze.
Kim Sa-ryang was aware that for his fiction to remain true to a dystopian peri-
od of mass mobilization for war, it had to take account of the failures that engaged 
realist art had experienced in attempting to bring forth a proletarian subject of 
history, even if he remained dedicated to cultural revolution. In accentuating the 










































animal-like existence of the junkman actor, Kim works against prominent abstract 
notions of the human being by emphasizing the widespread experiences of abject 
poverty and mental instability in the everyday life of the empire. He situates the 
question of political and ethical action within a physiological and psychical world, 
challenging the implicit metaphysics in the notion of empire as a humanizing proj-
ect. Bringing out the incommensurability of performance and context required 
a certain break from the conventions of social realism, the estrangement of its 
methods through the literary depiction of a failed theatrical performance. Many 
of Kim’s stories similarly dramatize how the concepts and concerns of social real-
ism are haunted by the extinction of cultural practices that could actualize those 
concepts and concerns in a socially meaningful theater.
Gorky’s play is suitable for playing out this tension between the idea of the 
human being and the animal existence that also conditions action, because it 
saturates the figure of the human with such emotional intensity and historical 
import. By 1940, the recuperated Gorky had become a cultural celebrity in the 
Soviet Union, and despite his still contentious relation with Stalin, his humanism 
served the spectacle of Stalin-era socialist realism and its own masking of politi-
cal terror.78 Kim Sa-ryang seems aware of these contemporary political problems 
with Gorky’s realism in the Soviet Union, but was equally concerned with the fate 
of realist literature in his more immediate context. He was concerned with the 
nation-state’s new monopoly over the realist avant-garde, the effort of imperialist 
intellectuals to bring the art/life nexus out of the proletarian literature project and 
completely into the fold of the absolutist politics of the imperial state.
In many of Kim’s stories, it is also not the proletariat who is the primary subject 
of colonization, but rather the displaced subaltern peasant or subproletariat—the 
slash-and-burn farmer, the junk salesman, the migrant prostitute, the imprisoned 
peasant rebel, the elder opium addict.79 What these various characters have in 
common, in Kim’s fictionalization at least, is that they are not in the position of 
becoming imperial subjects. As Marx reminds us, such surplus male populations 
could become resources for the industrial reserve army (after the volunteer soldier 
system was introduced into the colonies in 1939). As for such female populations, 
they were certainly at the greatest risk of being mobilized for military sexual slav-
ery.80 What many of Kim’s stories present, therefore, are the excluded subjectivi-
ties that the dictates on imperial practice attempt to include through a moralistic, 
state-centered philosophy. They are in the most vulnerable position among the 
vulnerable because they exist at the margins of the system of abstract labor and the 
colonial economy, and are therefore not necessary for the production and repro-
duction of society. The deaths of the cave-dwellers, the self-immolation of the ex-
convict, the incorporation of the slash-and-burn farmers by the murderous leader 
of the “white-white” religious cult, the psychosis of the junk salesman, and the 
failed attempts on the part of the opium addict to convince the suicidal to forgo 










































their plans and smoke with him—all of this death and mental anguish are pre-
sented, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, as effects of colonization.81
These characters are unable to commit to the practices of the imperial subject, 
because they constantly confront the material, physical, and psychological lim-
its to their actions, the dire historical and social circumstances within which the 
demands of imperial subjectification are made. Characters that do come to think 
of themselves as imperial subjects do so as a last resort. Their grave, disjointed, 
and deranged experiences of colonial relations lead them to desire a disturbingly 
comic salvation. “Tenma,” another of Kim’s Japanese-language stories, describes 
an outcast writer who wanders colonial Seoul attempting to track down a famous 
novelist visiting from Tokyo.82 The story contains classic urban scenes of the writer 
waiting in a hotel lobby, engaging in disjointed conversation at a café, and wander-
ing the streets aimlessly after he embarrasses himself in front of the Japanese writer 
and the Korean guide. At the end of the story, rejected by the visiting novelist and 
left without the possibility of cultural fame, the writer is no longer capable of social 
interaction. He begins to communicate with animals, particularly frogs that mock 
him with the racial epithet yobo. Kim surrealizes, or rather derealizes, both colonial 
racism and the writer’s responses to it, using speaking animals to emphasize that 
racial and national identities are fantasy structures, not something written trans-
parently on the human body. He also compares himself to a mythical flying horse 
(Tenma). He declares his loyalty to the Japanese spirit, calling to the sky for the 
emperor to take him to heaven—he stutters, “Make me a Japanese (naichijin)!”83 By 
the time he has declared his political loyalty, he is already a nonperson; he stands 
outside the normative political discourse to the degree that no one can recognize 
his performance of Japanese nationalism. Rather than the writer’s profession of loy-
alty to Japan guaranteeing his return to society and the world of national literature, 
it is rather a sign of his psychological instability and his inability to mold himself 
into an acceptable imperial subject.
Written at the margins of Japanese national identity, Kim’s minor literature 
turns to such invisible, anonymous, and tragically alienated performances of 
political belief, performances that he situates within the impoverished social 
context and contrasts with the abstract ideas of practice that presume the moral 
and political efficacy of correct action. The invisibility of Kim’s characters’ per-
formances of imperial subjectivity to the society of the diegesis also accentuates 
the absurd effectiveness of colonial discourse. Colonial discourses about world 
history and the fulfillment of humanity’s ultimate purpose cause his characters 
to overidentify with a mode of practice that is materially, culturally, and psycho-
logically untenable under conditions of empire. By portraying these characters’ 
invisible performances of political faith, Kim reveals the absurd and ironic aspect 
of idealist nationalism, similarly to the way that his literary hero, Heinrich Heine, 
had parodied German idealism from a minority Jewish perspective.84 In many 










































ways, this technique of estrangement was a more effective method for conveying 
the function of ideology than proletarian literature’s garnering of sympathy for 
the purely oppressed, because it broke more completely from the illusion that 
shared experiences of victimization lead directly and organically to the forma-
tion of correct ideas and correct practices (a perspective that fascist melodrama 
shared with proletarian realism).
Thus every expression of political identity in Kim’s stories is framed by an ac-
knowledgment of the invisibility or caricatured presence of colonial subjects with-
in the dominant culture, as well as the spatial and social relations out of which a 
desire for identity emerges. Ideological fantasy and political identity both remain 
contingent and precarious, in contrast to the discourse of people’s literature, in 
which individuals are supposed to actualize the national subject through their 
fully conscious acts of human will. The result of Kim’s technique is not a cynical 
satire of colonial subjects’ desire for proletarian class identity or Japanese national 
identity, but rather an inquiry into the contingency of performance and the enun-
ciation of identity, the gap between the subject of enunciation and the subject that 
is enunciated. His characters’ acting out of identity is never true or necessary as 
an internalized code of national practice, as in the “people’s standpoint.” The rep-
resentation of contingency by way of a contrast between performance and context 
allowed Kim’s art to push against the nation-state’s subsumption of performance 
into abstract notions of political and moral practice in the project of people’s litera-
ture. It also transformed the representation of class dynamics and the relation of 
class to nations during a time when the idea of a unified international proletariat 
was collapsing along with the left avant-garde that had articulated it.
Kim Nam-ch’ŏn’s linked novellas “Management” (1940) and “Barley” (1941) 
also deal with the friction between contingent performance and abstract ideas of 
practice in the aftermath of severe police repression.85 Although Kim wrote these 
stories in Korean, they can be considered minor literature akin to Kafka’s works 
in the sense that they appropriate and allegorize the language of empire, bureau-
cracy, and the law, exposing the surreal, yet real and concrete, juridical apparatus 
through which the colonial intellectual was forced to speak the spiritual language 
of humanism and the world-historical state. Through the estrangement of the lan-
guage and everyday experience of the law and the discourses on world history, 
these stories show that the philosophical idea of “historical actuality,” which was 
central to philosophical claims about correct practice at the time, was not simply 
an idea about the historical present, but also a discourse spoken within a context. 
Kim’s stories show, through irony, satire, and an attention to the everyday, that 
the actions dictated through the concept of “historical actuality” were always also 
situated performances.86
“Management” focuses on the quotidian life of a philosopher, O Si-hyŏng, and 
a clerk at the Yamato Inn, Ch’oe Mu-gyŏng, who gives him a room to stay in at 










































the boardinghouse. The story describes Si-hyŏng’s life as he prepares for his trial, 
including his giving up on the study of economics (that is, Marxism) and his em-
brace of both the discipline of philosophy and a multiple modernities perspective 
on world history (in this way, Si-hyŏng’s life story and intellectual trajectory are 
very similar to the real philosopher Sŏ In-sik). The two stories explore the problem 
of philosophical detachment by depicting the everyday, mundane circumstances 
under which imperialist philosophers in colonial Korea articulated their idealist 
conceptions of human culture, society, and history. At the end of “Management,” 
Si-hyŏng leaves for Pyongyang with his father. In “Barley,” philosophical conver-
sations about world history, Europe, and the East continue between Mu-gyŏng 
and a new boarder, Kwan-hyŏng, who is a lecturer at the Imperial University. The 
detachment of the imperial philosopher from the everyday economic and political 
circumstances of Korea comes through in scenes in which Si-hyŏng gives his phil-
osophical justification for converting to Pan-Asianism or Kwan-hyŏng explains 
his own more Eurocentric views on history. Despite her intellectual interest in the 
men and their ideas, Mu-gyŏng’s uncertainty about each of them, including their 
everyday habits and ethics, provides a contrapuntal perspective to their grand 
philosophical narratives of culture and world history.87
Kim’s background in the proletarian arts movement certainly encouraged him 
to give attention to the everyday conditions that governed intellectual choices in 
the late 1930s. However, at a time when the more macrohistorical discourses of 
Marxism remained prominent and were often compatible with the modernizing 
impulse of imperialism, his concern with the everyday apartment life of the phi-
losopher-boarder also provided a way to work against the complicity of the grand 
narratives of humanism with the imperial project. From the somewhat eerie con-
trast between Si-hyŏng’s ideas about practical action and the contained everyday 
movements of the characters, one senses the concrete limits to the idea of sub-
jective freedom in narratives of alternative modernization (for example, Hegelian 
ideas of East Asian Community).
In addition to viewing the philosophers from Mu-gyŏng’s perspective, the sto-
ries also highlight the institutional and bureaucratic contexts within which philo-
sophical viewpoints were assumed. The final scene of “Barley” takes place in a 
courtroom, where the defendant Si-hyŏng makes a statement to the judge to con-
vince him that he has renounced his political activism and has committed himself 
to the Japanese empire. As in Kim Sa-ryang’s stories, the scene plays on the discord 
between performance and context. Imagining that he must prove he is dedicated 
to Japan’s “revolt against the West,” Si-hyŏng argues against the Europeans’ emana-
tionist and stagist views of history and claims that historical actuality has revealed 
the plurality of world history to him:
“I think Europeans have one belief concerning history. They believe that it is like 
flowing water or like a ladder with various steps. They think that the European 










































nations are leading the way and that the primitive nations are in the middle, under-
going a process that the European nations have already experienced. . . . I think we 
must shatter this illusion about history if we are to establish, with our own hands, a 
pluralistic world history. Historical actuality is revealing this to me.”
The judge asked, “With these thoughts of yours, defendant, how do you compre-
hend the present tendencies of world history and the ongoing war?” The defendant 
stopped talking to recover his breath. After a moment he seemed ready to speak 
again.
“If I look at my intellectual path, I feel I have moved from Dilthey’s humanism 
toward Heidegger. What left a deep impression on me was the fact that Heidegger 
came to admire Hitlerism out of an examination of the human being. I think that 
one recent tendency in our philosophical world is for philosophy to take up new 
problems out of the situations that presently surround it. Current events are very 
noticeable in Dr. Watsuji’s historical observations on climate and Dr. Tanabe’s in-
vestigations into the state, the nation, and the people. My excitement to purge the 
thoughts of the past and construct a new order arose from scholarly paths like these.”
A satisfied smile came to the judge’s lips.88
In the earlier story, “Management,” Si-hyŏng tells Mu-gyŏng that he had no ac-
cess to economics books in prison (for example, Marx’s Capital) and could only 
read philosophy (particularly ancient Greek philosophy). This turn from political 
economy to philosophy continues as he prepares for his courtroom appearance. 
By the time of his trial, he explains world history no longer as the history of global 
capitalism, but rather as a Hegelian World History made up of the Western and 
Eastern worlds.
Si-hyŏng mentions the humanism and engagement of the philosophers who 
have influenced him because he feels compelled to present the empire as a cosmo-
politan endeavor based on a superior mode of practice, no matter how inhuman 
the empire’s modes of governing have become. The defendant iterates a pluralist 
historical model in order to connect his political practice to the totality called hu-
man history, and even though he bifurcates this history into the East and the West 
for political reasons, the unity of humanity itself and the idea that it ultimately has 
a shared cosmopolitan purpose are not questioned. In acting human, Si-hyŏng 
presents himself as both a passive observer of historical actuality and a willful 
subject who is morally and politically free to act in accordance with these objective 
conditions. He visualizes empire as an unavoidable historical process, but one to 
which he contributes voluntarily. In this scene, acting human requires both under-
standing the objective conditions of human history and acting freely to actualize 
these very conditions—the anthropomorphizing of the state that we found in the 
works of An Ham-kwang and other imperial intellectuals eventually becomes a 
matter of the individual human’s capacity to act in the interests of the totality.
However, within the story, Si-hyŏng’s narrative of his scholarly path is an 
elegant fabrication that has less to do with the content of the philosophies he 










































mentions and more to do with trying to prevent his prosecution. His professed 
move from Wilhelm Dilthey’s humanism to Martin Heidegger’s Nazism and his 
assertion that Heidegger’s support of Hitler was an outcome of his analysis of 
Dasein are both interesting in their implications. What brings together Dilthey’s 
life philosophy and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is less the concrete lin-
eage of German intellectual history, but rather the fact that each is a humanist, 
and that the latter has derived a philosophy of practice from his humanism. The 
mention of Watsuji Testurō’s philosophy of climate and Tanabe Hajime’s philoso-
phy as examples of engaged philosophy elides the differences between Watsuji’s 
ethnic nationalism and Tanabe’s multiethnic nationalism, but unifies them under 
the concepts of humanism and practice. However, the story represents the point 
of Si-hyŏng’s philosophical education as solely a matter of being able to defend 
his practice to the court. There is no expectation in the setting of the courtroom 
that Si-hyŏng will elaborate on the conceptual details of his personal intellectual 
path. The whole narrative is detached from the intricacies of what he has studied 
so rigorously for the occasion. It is only necessary for him to avoid any refer-
ence to economics, to include the correct names of philosophers, and to connect 
these names to his political support of the revolt against European colonialism 
and Japan’s war in Asia. The courtroom is the very material context in which he 
proclaims to witness the meaning of the historical present, and where he is forced 
to see his subjection to the law as an expression of historical necessity and his 
own will. In this sense, his statement is a kind of pure ideology because he pieces 
together his narrative for the sole purpose of creating for himself an imaginary 
relation to history and an imaginary relation to his own intellectual practice that 
will potentially be affirmed by those who have control over his life and death.
Kim Nam-ch’ŏn contrasts the dominant philosophies of practice of the time, 
which asserted the subject’s free actualization of the laws of morality and history, 
with the quotidian and legal circumstances that conditioned life practices in late 
colonial Korea. As in Kim Sa-ryang’s stories, the performance of the colonial subject 
in “Barley” remains contingent and precarious, because there is no guarantee that 
Si-hyŏng’s professions of intellectual faith will earn him recognition as a Japanese 
national subject acting in the interests of the nation-state. Si-hyŏng can assert his 
humanity and national subjectivity in an act of will, but the degree to which he 
belongs to these categories is open to the interpretation of the judge and to his own 
existential uncertainty in the space where he proclaims his newfound ethics. Tanabe 
and other philosophers discussed historical actuality as the dialectical unity of con-
tingency and necessity, which was a way of conceptualizing culture and history as a 
dialectical movement.89 The courtroom scene in “Barley” intervenes into this imag-
inary unity of History by depicting a much more uncertain institutional relation 
between history and the laws of necessity. There is a point where the destruction 
implicit in the idea of World History meets its material limit in the body of the 










































politically accused. Kim Nam-chŏn’s tragic and ironic treatment of intellectual con-
version questions the institutional languages of both philosophy and law, as coher-
ently and realistically as any of Kafka’s representations of bureaucracy.
Kim Sa-ryang and Kim Nam-ch’ŏn both addressed the limits of humanism be-
cause they recognized that notions of humanistic moral practice allowed impe-
rialist discourse to present its dehumanizing political project as a cosmopolitan 
undertaking. In their stories they show how the rhetoric of liberating the human, 
of enlivening the freedom of the subject through the mediation of the nation-state, 
entailed the actual domination of national and colonial subjects. Kim Sa-ryang’s 
writer in “Tenma” is an outcast of official culture, no matter how close to the center 
he imagines himself to be. In describing the mental deterioration of this character 
as he gradually comes to embrace Japanese identity, Kim suggests that the libera-
tion offered by identification with Japan is a desperate act of imagination and that 
the desire for liberation is better considered a symptom of the impoverishment 
of social life in colonial Korea, not a local or regional expression of universal hu-
man will. Kim Nam-ch’ŏn’s Sihyŏng claims to free himself from Marxism and to 
embrace a different view of history that historical actuality reveals to him, but 
the story describes the terror and incarceration that lead him to view history and 
freedom in this way. The prisons and the courts institute the concept of historical 
actuality through the violence of the law.
Particularly in their pragmatic application within national and colonial gov-
ernmentality, idealist notions of the human are intimately tied to ontology, to how 
subjects relate to their existence and to their mortality. The colonial writer in Kim 
Sa-ryang’s “Tenma” embraces the Japanese state’s imperial mission at the moment 
of his furthest isolation, when he realizes that he can only remain a member of the 
human community by displaying his fanatical belief in the national spirit. Kim 
Nam-ch’ŏn’s philosopher, O Si-hyŏng, turns to philosophy and the cosmopolitan 
project of the East Asian Community when his communist political practice is no 
longer possible, when he can continue to live and write as a humanist philosopher 
of empire or otherwise not at all. In each case, a humanist discourse is empowered 
by the nation-state and the subject assimilates this discourse after confronting fi-
nite existence, entering a kind of waking dream that perhaps accompanies the 
anticipation or direct experience of war. The observations that critics have made 
of Kim Nam-ch’ŏn’s portrayals of prominent cultural figures of the time—that they 
too readily mimicked thinkers of Japan proper, that their ideas about culture and 
humanity were too divorced from the circumstances of colonial Korea, and that 
their philosophies reflected a petit-bourgeois or aristocratic worldview—are ap-
plicable to the psychology of “pro-Japanese intellectuals” (ch’inilp’a) or the Korean 
“converts” (chŏnhyangja) to Japanese nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s. However, 
reading the late 1930s and early 1940s as the period of the “pro-Japanese” does not 
adequately encapsulate what was involved in writing at the limits of humanism, 










































in depicting a proletarian actor’s homelessness and psychosis, a thwarted colonial 
writer’s suicidal and anonymous dedication to the ethical norms of empire, and 
a former communist, released from prison, turning to the utopian ideas of East 
Asian Community, even as his life becomes the object of totalitarian governance.
AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES :  “INTO THE LIGHT ”
“Into the Light” (1939) is the story of Kim Sa-ryang’s that deals most directly with 
the dynamic between minority identity and imperial subjectivity.90 While this 
story seems to address the question of minority identity in rather familiar terms, 
it is also possible to read it as a transitional text between a minority literature that 
displaces the concrete of the social into the ontology of the personal and a mi-
nor literature that allegorizes the social in a nonmetaphorical manner. An U-sik 
explains how Kim was initially pleased and inspired by the reception of the story 
as one that showed the “painful fate of an ethnic community.”91 However, in a pub-
lished statement explaining his decision not to choose “Into the Light” for the 
Akutagawa Prize, Kawabata Yasunari wrote that the text touched on “large issues 
for the emotions of a nation,” and that it was very well written, but that he was 
not satisfied with the lack of complex characterization.92 Although Kawabata felt 
compelled to give the prize to a minority, he was not satisfied with the way that the 
characters seemed to stand in for ideas. However, Kawabata’s reading depended on 
a certain understanding of the “national” as both minority identity and national 
Japanese identity. When minority literature is discussed in terms of a personal 
identity struggle, there is little difference, under the discourse of imperial subjec-
tification, between becoming one identity (a Japanese national subject) and being 
another (Korean minority). However, in his celebratory biography, An U-sik also 
reduces Kim’s motivations to a “responsibility toward the [Korean] nation.”93
Why did both Japanese imperial nationalists and Korean nationalists in post-
war Japan read the story as primarily about the internal struggle to become na-
tional? Besides losing the competition, why was Kim dissatisfied with Kawabata’s 
reading and why did he no longer write stories so directly focused on the problem 
of minority and national identity?94 First of all, the story does not deal with iden-
tity through the rubric of imperial subjectification, because the “national” of both 
Korean and Japanese is not framed as an internal identity struggle. The aspect of 
the story that Kawabata did not appreciate, which is the allegory that results from 
the dispersal of identity into multiple characters metonymically related to one an-
other, is actually one of the story’s virtues—it takes identity out of the interiority of 
the subject and situates it within the concrete social conditions of colonial moder-
nity and immigrant communities.
The most obvious reason that the story cannot be read simply as a descrip-
tion of an internal identity struggle is that in the final scene it is not the narrator 










































who asserts that his name (南) is the Korean name “Nam” rather the Japanese 
“Minami.” Rather, Yamada Shunsuke, the young boy helped by Nam, recognizes 
him as Korean and thus is able to find a certain resolution, for the moment, to his 
internal conflict over identity. Although the text is written in the first person, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the traces of the narrative voice (the enunciating 
subject) and the main character (the subject enunciated). Because a productive 
disjuncture is maintained between these two, it would be reductive to read it solely 
in terms of the narrator’s and the author’s individual identity struggle. Instead of 
having a central locus of subjective reference for identity, the story is rather a lay-
ered and multivocal text in which various identity formations occur in relation to 
one another, and specifically according to asymmetrical relationships determined 
by class, gender, and colonialism.
“Into the Light” uses the metaphorical problems often found in kōminka lit-
erature: Which pronunciation will stand in for the narrator/teacher? What is the 
ethnic identity of each character? However, it also calls attention to metonymical 
relations in a way that makes the text a more complex allegory for imperial sub-
jectification. The formation of identity in the story is primarily metonymical and 
relational, rather than symbolic and representational; all the identities in the story 
are defined only in relation to others. Furthermore, identities are not sites for the 
resolution of conflict, but rather traces of violent confrontations that have occurred 
in the past and that are visible only in the acts of violence and self-identification 
depicted in the narrative present. Shunsuke’s violence against his classmate, which 
is the teacher’s first clue that Shunsuke is part Korean, is a repetition of his father’s 
violent outbursts toward his wife (Shunsuke’s mother). The father’s violence be-
gins to emerge during his incarceration at the detention center, more than likely a 
racially motivated imprisonment, and from the anxiety over his hybridity, which 
is contrasted to the “purer” Koreanness or Japaneseness attributed to other charac-
ters. Shunsuke’s mother is Korean in relation to the teacher, whom she considers to 
be Japanese (naichijin), and to the husband who beats her in part out of self-hatred 
over his half-Koreanness. Shunsuke is able to accept that he is Korean by recogniz-
ing the teacher and his mother by way of the teacher as both Korean. Yi, the driver 
and a student of Minami, asserts his Korean identity partially as a class statement 
against his seemingly assimilated teacher. Finally, until the very end of the story, 
the narrator (南, Nam, Minami) shifts between signifiers fluidly, eschewing the 
question of his own identity and framing identity as a problem for the young (Yi 
and Shunsuke), the deranged (Habei), and women (Yi’s and Shunsuke’s mothers).
One is forced to discard a reading that remains within the idea of a dialecti-
cal struggle between minority identity and imperial subjectivity insofar as repre-
sentation, despite the first-person narrative, becomes decentered and relational. 
However, it is possible to locate a point around which the various identities, as 
traces of violence, circulate. One might expect that Shunsuke’s reconciliation with 










































his mother at the end of the story would have been the climactic scene where he 
accepts his mother’s Koreanness and makes a tentative return to the imaginary 
of mother and nation. His mother is a victim with no possibility of agency; she 
is only subjected to identities that she comes to despise. She is marked as purely 
Korean and yet herself has no place to which to return. She refuses to return home 
to Korea to escape her abusive relationship (the suggestion of Yi’s mother), she 
cannot be a Japanese national subject (her image of the teacher), and she cannot 
assert her Korean identity as a political statement (Yi). Her conversation with Yi’s 
mother in the hospital room is the only extensive section of the story marked 
as Korean language and it appears reported and translated into Japanese by the 
teacher, who listens in as he leaves the room out of politeness. This gendered trans-
lation, whereby the teacher conveys the two mothers’ Korean speech to the reader 
in Japanese, figures feminine speech as a passive original and masculine speech 
as active, translational, and public. Yet, despite these various acts of locating and 
translating the feminine in the story, they do not lead to a return to the feminine 
as a point of ethnic or national origin. At the moment when the imagination of 
such a return could have been given representation, the narrator does not relate 
the scene. We do not see the son reconcile with his mother by bringing her tobacco 
leaves to serve as bandages. Instead, following the teacher’s assertion to Shunsuke’s 
mother that Yamada had been transferring his love for her on to him, the story 
ends with the scene between the boy and the teacher.
While Shunsuke’s mother is the character whose ethnic and gender identity 
is the most violently and painfully inflicted, she is not the object or point around 
which identities as traces of violence circulate, or, of course, the source of any vio-
lence (her criticism of the teacher is self-debasing rather than aggressive). Shun-
suke’s male hybrid father (Habei) is rather the source of all of the extreme violence 
in the story, including his son Shunsuke’s repetitions. If identities, as traces of vio-
lence, are figured in the story in relation to other identities, then Habei, as the 
origin of the violence, is responsible for many of the figurations of identity that oc-
cur, particularly within his family. Shunsuke’s mother becomes a locus of Korean 
identity through the violence he inflicts, Yi’s mother is marked as Korean by her 
conversation with Shunsuke’s mother at the hospital, Shunsuke’s Korean identity 
becomes apparent to the teacher through the repetition of his father’s violence, 
and even the man that Shunsuke’s mother goes to visit to get food is marked as 
Korean by virtue of Habei’s anger about the visit. As for the teacher, he only be-
comes Korean again, to Shunsuke at least, through the whole process of witnessing 
Habei’s and Shunsuke’s violence and his attempts to encourage Shunsuke’s recon-
ciliation with his mother.
It is necessary to pause and ask why the hybrid father and the hybrid son are 
both the sources of violence and the figures around which identity formations 
emerge. There is a line of escape from the dialectical internal struggle into an alle-










































gorical structure of mourning centered on an originary colonial violence of which 
the hybrids are both the products and the agents of repetition. Stuart Hall has 
discussed the Caribbean as a territory of the “primal scene” of colonial violence 
between Euro-American power and black Africa.95 The Korean communities in 
Tokyo at the time were also hybrid territories where colonial domination had its 
direct and immediate effects, but was also at a certain distance from the site of 
primitive accumulation. Colonialism proper was something happening back in 
Korea, where one could not easily return, though it was also occurring, in a dif-
ferent form, in the metropole. With so much forced migration to Japan proper 
during the time when this story was written, Tokyo and its minority communities 
were the site of a displaced colonial relationship.96 There the effects of the exter-
nal colonialism of the empire confronted the internal stratifications at the center. 
In these communities, no one would have been, simply, a colonized or excluded 
other. Colonial violence would have been felt as a trace or memory that, through 
an experience of the pressure for assimilation at the center, could be transformed 
into a minority identity. At a time when the technology of imperial subjectifica-
tion was making the entire territory of the empire a site where colonial and class 
antagonisms were displaced into subjective struggles over identity, Kim’s depiction 
of scenes in the minority community in Tokyo was very timely. After all, it is in 
these communities where colonialism had already been a displaced and personal-
ized phenomenon for many years previous. Kim also would have been familiar 
with the politics of identity in Japan proper through his experiences working for 
Korean-language journals and theatre.
As Hall points out, the effect of colonialism was to make the colonized see him-
self as other. What imperial subjectification did was to make subjects recognize the 
other within not as an effect of colonialism, but as the content of an identity that 
could be preserved through its sublation into the imperial order. In my reading, 
by inserting the hybrid into the story as the initiator of violence and the catalyst 
for the formation of various identities, Kim was not calling for the purification or 
attainment of national identity, but rather bringing the trace of colonial violence 
to the surface and showing how this violence marks people with identities. He 
displaced the metaphorics of imperial identity formation into an allegory of the 
social that resituated the question of national identity within the concrete material 
and psychological context of the colonial relationship and its violence.
This approach differed from many of the earlier attempts of proletarian litera-
ture to represent imperialism in that it critiqued, and even satirized, the new con-
ditions of national identity formation that existed in the logic of imperial subjecti-
fication. However, it also owed something to the attempts of proletarian literature 
to represent the dire effects of imperialism. Kim’s “dangerous hybrid” was con-
strued with reference to the colony as a site of primitive accumulation, a theme in 
his earlier works. Before the proletarian journal Teibō was suppressed in 1936, Kim 










































published a story there, “Dosonran,” which depicts the lives of cave dwellers on the 
outskirts of Pyongyang. The story describes the troubled lives of the cave dwellers 
and their attempts to make it into the urban wage labor system. The original story 
ends with the destruction of the caves by the Japanese colonial authority, which 
builds a highway through the area. Afterward, the main character, an old man 
named Wŏnsami, commits suicide because his home and his hopes of becoming 
a wage earner are both destroyed. Perhaps because of concerns of censorship, the 
end of the second version of the story published in Bungei shuto in February 1940 
was changed so that a violent storm comes and washes away the caves.
Despite such capitulations and rewriting, in the context of imperial subjectifi-
cation, Kim’s stories served to remind the urban literati of the rapacity of coloniza-
tion and to give an image to those who were being excluded, or violently included, 
in the process of rapid urbanization, militarization, and the imperial expansion of 
industrial capital. When Japanese national literature and culture and its ontology 
of the personal were called on to mediate between the world-historical state and 
its internal ethnic and cultural differences, Kim diagnosed the need to address 
these social issues with an attention to the processes of inclusion and exclusion 
and by articulating an alternative politics of the personal. This politics of the per-
sonal described the ambiguous and metonymic construction of ethnic identity 
and exposed the impossibility of fully actualizing the idea of total integration that 
underpinned the metaphorics of imperial nationalism.
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Yi Sang’s poem “The Infinite Hexagon of Architecture,” published in 1932, be-
gins with a philosophical reflection on post-Euclidean geometry and twentieth-
century visuality, particularly in poetry after the advent of cinema: “A square 
inside a square inside a square inside a square inside a square / A square circle of 
a square circle of a square circle. A person sees through the scent of soap from 
a vein where soap passes. The Earth imitates a globe imitates the Earth.”1 The 
image expresses a mise en abyme—two mirrors are facing each other, framing 
smaller and smaller frames of infinitesimal sizes, infinitely. In the aftermath of 
Albert Einstein’s visit to Japan and brief travel through Korea in 1922, Yi Sang re-
flected on the recursivity of the mise en abyme with an added sense derived from 
popularized versions of the theory of relativity. The infinite lines bending around 
a singular point are not the extensive, straight lines of Cartesian geometry, but 
rather lines that curve in space-time (the notion of a square circle conveying 
this paradoxical space). As in most of Yi’s poems and fiction, the perspective at 
the center of this infinite recursivity is a “person” (hito). However, the person, 
or subject, is not constituted through the expressive causality of state-centered 
dialectics found in Tanabe Hajime’s philosophical texts, which also drew from 
the theory of relativity; the person is rather a singular intensive point, or frame of 
reference, around which space-time curves. Finally, this recursivity is a matter of 
mimesis, but mimesis as an infinite mirroring rather than as the means toward a 
total artwork that could reconcile self and other dialectically. There is no original 
object called the “world” to be subsumed into a subject, but a globe that trans-
forms and is transformed by the being of the Earth.
6
Modernism without a Home
Cinematic Literature, Colonial Architecture,  
and Yi Sang’s Poetics
Temporality—or historicity by way of popular thought.
—Yi Sang










































This chapter explores Yi’s linking of the space-time of the theory of relativity 
to literary modernism and modern subjectivity, but in order to see fully what was 
at stake in Yi’s poetics, and to evaluate the claims he made for another, more cin-
ematic colonial architecture, it is necessary to discuss the ecstatic temporality of 
the modernist subject (or the modern human’s constant projecting of itself outside 
of itself) more broadly in the context of fascism and imperialism. This discussion 
will focus on how space is reincorporated into ecstatic time differently between 
dialectical philosophy and Yi Sang’s minor literature.
When read in the aesthetic contexts of both colonial architecture and literary 
modernism, it is clear that Yi’s writings were political in their concern with vi-
sion, social space, architecture, and cinema. A series of Yi’s most famous poems, 
“Bird’s-Eye View,” presents the other side of modern visuality from the mise en 
abyme, the image of the ground from the sky. Although it is normally said that Yi 
began the series of fifteen Korean-language poems in 1934, the first poem actu-
ally bearing this title appeared, not accidentally, in the Japanese-language colonial 
architecture journal Korea and Architecture.2 In the most famous installment, Yi 
presents an image of frightened children viewed from above: “The first child says 
that he is frightened. / The second child also says that he is frightened. / The third 
child also says that he is frightened.”3 The poem continues in discrete, voiceless 
lines until the fifteenth child is documented. From the bird’s-eye view, each child 
appears faceless and enumerated on the page, and yet the fear professed by each 
suggests the violence and power of the poem’s abstract perspective. As a kind of 
spatial double-consciousness, Yi’s poems contain references both to the plan seen 
from the bird’s-eye view and to the infinite regress of the modern subject’s vision. 
Yi Sang subverted the architectonic images of the colony, both through concrete 
images of the violence of the “bird’s-eye view” and through his appropriations of 
the theory of relativity.
In order to see how the new geometries of postcinematic cultural life could be 
valued politically and socially in multiple ways, including fascism and imperial-
ism, it will be necessary to take a somewhat long excursion into the problem of 
ecstatic temporality and cinematic literature, before returning to one of Yi Sang’s 
most powerful poems dealing with the politics of space and time, “Blueprint for a 
Three-Dimensional Shape.”4 By then it will be clear what is at stake in the minute 
distinctions between the expressive subject and osmotic space of Tanabe’s philoso-
phy and the intensive expression that we find in Yi Sang’s cinematic poetics.
MODERNIST TEMPOR ALIT Y AND IMPERIALISM
The relation between culturalism and Japan’s colonial project is apparent in the 
simultaneity of the culturalist boom in Japan proper and the administration of 
cultural policy in Korea. The idea of culture was central to the reformist political 










































discourse of colonial bureaucrats as much as it was the primary concern of cul-
turalist intellectuals. The connections between imperialism and Marxism were 
also fairly direct, although more internally contradictory, insofar as Marxism 
both provided models for unilinear modernization and colonial assimilation and 
opened up the possibility for representations that exposed the dire social effects 
of capitalist modernity and the expansion of the empire. In each of these cases, a 
concept of the human genus-being and a belief in culture’s role in actualizing the 
general character of this being tended to legitimate the violence and exploitation 
of “development.”
The relations between modernism, imperial expansion, and humanism are 
somewhat more complex, because in fiction and criticism that have been con-
strued to be modernist we find a number of qualities that do not lend themselves 
as easily to a sociopolitical reading. The search for temporalities that could es-
trange that of cultural progress, explorations of the alienation, illness, and death 
of the modern subject, the hermetic artwork of “art for art’s sake,” and the self-
reflexive focus on aesthetic, linguistic, and formal experimentation rather than 
on political engagement—all aspects associated with modernism in Korean and 
Japanese literature—constitute a field of writing seemingly opposed to the notion 
of history as a process of humanity fulfilling a teleological purpose.
Many of the basic tropes associated with modernism reflect experimentations 
with time that contradict the reduction of time to history that we find in both 
culturalism and the proletarian arts. James Joyce compressed the sprawling time 
of the epic into a single day, Marcel Proust wrote in the alternative temporality of 
involuntary memory, and W. B. Yeats concerned himself with mythic historical 
cycles rather than historical progress. In East Asia, Akutagawa Ryūnosuke wrote 
of the repetitive cogwheel of modern life, Yokomitsu Riichi applied the aesthetic 
of cinematic time to the novel, and Pak T’ae-wŏn tracked the peripatetics of a 
single day in the life of a writer.5 Shu-mei Shih has explored the variety of experi-
mentations with time in semicolonial China.6 Many of these literary experiments 
exposed the division and nonidentity of the human subject to itself as an effect of 
the ecstatic temporality of modernity, the modern subject’s constant movement 
outside of itself, through which it constructs the future, the present, and the past.7 
This is a powerful critique of the search for stasis in the teleological anthropolo-
gies, because it figures the human’s alienation from itself as a permanently repeat-
ed condition that negates any moral or social teleology to history.
In addition to its narrative and visual experimentations with time, if we take 
modernism at its face value, it also seems more generally detached from the world-
ly political problems of empire. However, as Peter Bürger and Boris Groys have 
shown, the whole notion of a modernist avant-garde presupposes that at some 
point the separation of the artist from society will be overcome, and that aesthetic 
experimentation will be displaced again into social experimentation, into that 










































moment of anthropological pragmatism that characterizes modern political au-
thority.8 One purpose of this chapter is to address the imperialist dimension of 
modernism, just as I have tried to show how culturalism, Marxism, and imperial 
nationalism were not just imperialist impositions, but universalist discourses that 
mediated and facilitated the colonial relation.
Although there is no way to generalize about the politics of modernism, there 
are several moments of confluence between European modernism and fascism 
that have been explored in detail: Wyndham Lewis’s aggressive narratives and sup-
port for Hitler, Filippo Marinetti’s and Ezra Pound’s propaganda for Mussolini, 
Martin Heidegger’s version of the Führerprinzip, and so on (the examples accumu-
late quickly).9 Others have interpreted the colonial attitudes or blindnesses specific 
to European modernist works; Edward Said’s reading of Albert Camus in Oriental-
ism stands out in the way that it connects aesthetic and formal experimentation to 
the racial and cultural anxieties of the colonizer.10 As Seiji Lippit and Alan Tans-
man have shown, in the case of the Japanese empire the politics and politicization 
of aesthetic modernism must be considered in relation to Japanese fascism and 
imperialism.11
Those who represented ecstatic temporality as a break from tradition could also 
return to an anthropocentric mode, and also to fascist and imperialist political 
programs, when they began to foresee the possibility for a new anthropocentric 
thought that would neither be a static historical philosophy like the philosophy 
of culturalism nor rely on the materialist view of historical development belong-
ing to Marxism. For example, the iconoclastic New Sensationist Yokomitsu Riichi 
destroyed the essayistic form of the I-novel (shishōsetsu) through a kind of dere-
alization of the literary aesthetic and literary subject, but he also stepped into the 
political realm in his colonial novel Shanghai and, with more blatantly imperialist 
rhetoric, advocated the volunteer soldier system in the colonies and the violent 
unification of Japan and Korea.12 The Korean literary critic Ch’oe Chae-sŏ estab-
lished himself with an essay comparing the cinema eye of the novelist in Pak T’ae-
wŏn’s “Riverside Scene” and Yi Sang’s “Wings,” and providing an incisive analysis 
of the objective, externally directed “camera” of the former and the subjective, in-
ternally directed “camera” of the latter.13 However, as I showed in the last chapter, 
Ch’oe later argued that Japanese national literature could resolve the problem of 
modern alienation and fragmentation that he located in Yi Sang’s fiction, reunit-
ing consciousness and Being by establishing an authentic and organic poetics of 
the warring mass.
In order to analyze how the ecstatic temporality of modernist writing became 
political and politicized through spatial figures, I will compare two modernists 
who eventually supported a total war politics, Yokomitsu Riichi and Ch’oe Ch’ae-
sŏ, with the bilingual fictional and poetic works of Yi Sang. My approach will ad-
dress three primary factors that are significant for the way that modernism was 










































able to question the anthropological universals prominent in the Japanese empire, 
but also the ways that many modernists eventually capitulated to the total war 
system of the 1940s:
 1.  How modernist philosophers and writers discussed ecstatic temporality and 
the self-alienation of the human in a way that undermined the static view of 
the human as the subject and object of historical development.
 2.  The relation between this ecstatic temporality and the reproducible images 
of cinema.
 3.  The ways that the modernist critique of the human as empirico-transcen-
dental doublet was respatialized in fascist and imperialist turns in modern-
ist writing.
The turn to ecstatic temporality, and the way that philosophers and writers 
in the Japanese empire used it to challenge culturalism, cannot be conflated 
with political fascism. Ecstatic temporality is exemplified by statements that are 
not in themselves locatable on a political spectrum—the “being-toward-death” 
of Heidegger’s Dasein, Rimbaud’s proclamation that “the I is somebody else,” 
Yokomitsu’s dissolution of naturalism and the “I-novel,” and Yi Sang’s schizo-
phrenic subject. The political and ethical question that should be posed to these 
experimentations with time and a subject constantly moving outside of itself 
is, at what point does ecstasis reconnect with a spatial image of utopia and a 
poetic project of modernization? How is it that Heidegger’s Dasein transmogri-
fied, however briefly or obliquely, into a territorialized and ethnicized German 
national subject? How did Yokomitsu’s avant-garde destruction of the novel 
through an engagement with cinematic time become compatible with an image 
of imperial Japan in which Japan and Korea would become linguistically and 
ideologically transparent to each other though the Japanization of the Korean 
peninsula? In my view, these are the questions of social space through which the 
politics of modernist texts of the Japanese empire can be interpreted in a man-
ner that gives attention to the political ramifications of modernism while not 
assuming that it has any essential connection to fascism.
In a reading of Arthur Rimbaud that situates him in the space of both the 
Paris Commune and European empires, Kristin Ross proposes introducing 
Lefebvreian analyses of social space and the production of space as a Marxist’s 
way out of two familiar types of readings of modernism: one that proclaims 
the mythic genius of the rebel modernist poet and the other argument that 
abstracting and derealizing the linguistic medium of literature are tantamount 
to a transformation of a world entirely constituted through discourse and coun-
terdiscourse.14 Lippit makes another kind of turn to space in his use of the cat-
egory of topography. Although my own approach in this book has been spatial in 
the sense more of a Foulcauldian archaeology than of a fully developed literary 










































or cognitive mapping, I have shown that in the case of realism, breaking with the 
humanism of culturalism and the more schematic Marxist social science was a 
matter of developing other chronotopes that worked against the spatiotemporal-
ity of cultural modernization. This was a matter not only of finding represen-
tations that were more adequate to the objective conditions of imperialism or 
colonial modernity, but also of reconsidering how the form of literature coded 
personal psychology into a political and social narrative. Jameson, drawing from 
Deleuze and Guattari, improved on the psychobiographic approach of psycho-
analysis by referring to these two registers as the molecular and the molar of nar-
rative, which intersect, according to Jameson, through what J.-F. Lyotard called 
the “libidinal apparatus.”15 Realist texts that expanded their form and complexi-
fied their chronotopes were able to relate the molecular and the molar differently 
from the proletarian allegories of class consciousness, in which personal psy-
chology stands in typologically, and melodramatically, for a political or social 
position. Reimagining social space and the ways it is constructed through a kind 
of “desiring-production” was key to finding a different interface between the 
molecular and the molar for realist literature. The same could be said about both 
the subversive experimentations and the imperialist-fascist fantasies of mod-
ernism in the late Japanese empire. Insofar as cinema was the primary technol-
ogy through which desire was deterritorialized and reterritorialized in the early 
twentieth century, examining cinematic space and time and their bearing on 
the architectonics of modernist literature makes it possible to recognize the sig-
nificance of molecular modernist critiques of the anthropocentric space-time of 
culturalism and Marxist social science, while also clarifying the particular ways 
that these critiques of humanism eventually capitulated to imperialist and fascist 
ideologies in the register of the molar. I take up Ross’s concern with modernism’s 
connections to social space in the context of the early twentieth century, when 
cinematic metaphors and motifs allowed writers to question the self-identity 
of the human subject and the author function, but also created a mass culture 
whose transformation of space and time created a new moving-image of the col-
lective political bodies of nations and empires.
Tanabe’s reading of Heidegger, discussed in the previous chapter, provides a 
philosophical case in point of the problem of the return of social space. In articulat-
ing a passage from the “schema time” to the “schema world,” Tanabe reintroduced 
space into ecstatic temporality. While he does not discuss cinema directly in the 
essay, there are many analogies one finds between his concept of the world and the 
world-making power of cinema. More or less contemporaneously with Yi Sang’s 
references to Einsteinian physics (1931–33), discussed later in this chapter, Tanabe 
states that the theory of relativity has transformed modern humanity’s worldview 
from that of “three spatial dimensions plus the fourth dimension of time” into one 
in which four dimensional space-time unifies the past, present, and future into 










































a single spatiotemporal world, a unity symbolized in the human sciences as the 
process of world history. In arguing for the spatiotemporal unity of the world and 
world history against what he saw as Heidegger’s overly localized and temporal 
self-affection, Tanabe arrived at the problem of what the cultural mediation might 
be between the subject’s present moment of futural projection and the past lives 
that are made past by this very projection. He posited “expression” as the media-
tion between ecstatic temporality and the spatial difference from the past and the 
past self. Expression was the mediation that allowed for the unity of the subject 
in the spatiotemporal unity of the world, an idea that repressed issues of transla-
tion in the negotiation of ethnic differences. Tied to the mediation of expression 
was the state, which was the particular agent of world history that connected the 
general to the individual.
THE ECSTATIC TIME OF CINEMATIC LITER ATURE: 
CH’OE CHAE-SŎ AND YOKOMIT SU RIICHI
As a regulative idea, the genus-being remains in a kind of stasis, the thing-in-itself 
of human history that is never entirely present, but that does not itself transform 
in time. In neo-Kantianism, history is the actualization of moral universality, but 
moral universality itself is transhistorical. In Marxist social science, history is 
made up of the economic stages of the genus-being, but productive labor itself is 
transhistorical. In Gilles Deleuze’s philosophical reading of modern temporality, 
he makes a Nietzschean break from the time of human history (that is, Hegel) 
through a conceptualization of repetition and difference. He pinpoints the need 
to discuss regulative ideas, or simply Kantian Ideas, not as static norms for knowl-
edge, but rather as differential problems. Ideas change differentially in time, and 
therefore cannot guide History.16
In Deleuze’s work this philosophical insight into time and knowledge is associ-
ated with the experience of time for the subject of cinema, and critical work on 
cinematic literature in the Japanese empire was in some respects working through 
the transition from movement-image to time-image, as reflected in the shift from 
a stable realist sense of the human type to representations of experience emerging 
out of ecstatic temporality.17 In literary criticism of colonial Korea, the temporal 
estrangement of the human from itself was thought to originate in a division be-
tween the subject of representation and the self that is represented. As in Deleuze’s 
work, this division was conceptualized through the apparatus of cinema, or what 
Ch’oe Chae-sŏ called “cameric spirit” and “cameric existence.”18 In “The Expan-
sion and Deepening of Realism” (1936), Ch’oe discusses Pak T’ae-wŏn’s “River-
side Scene” and Yi Sang’s “Wings” as two stories that, respectively, expanded and 
deepened literary realism in Korea. Cinema creates the potential for a much more 
pervasive and psychologically complex mode of mimesis, not only for cinema, but 










































also for literature. Ch’oe argues that the two stories are comparable, despite their 
very different content, because each author writes as though through the machine 
of the camera (the term k’amera could also mean the photographic camera, but 
he uses the example of the cinematic spectator and the film director when he dis-
cusses our perception of the existence of the camera in reading a story). According 
to Ch’oe, Pak T’ae-wŏn directs his cameric spirit objectively, toward the external 
world, whereas Yi Sang directs his subjectively, toward the interior self, one enact-
ing an expansion of realism and the other deepening it. Whereas Pak’s engagement 
with cinema remains within the realm of simple, typological representation, Yi’s 
directing of the film camera toward the interiority of the subject is both pathologi-
cal and epiphanic:
With this camera the novelist can face the external world from his psychological 
type or face his own internal world. In the former case the situation is comparatively 
simple and in the latter case it is extremely strange, because the relation between the 
observer and the observed is internal to the same person. There is no problem in the 
case of a self-descriptive poet or an autobiographical novelist who expresses his life 
and feelings candidly. However, if we differentiate to an extent between the writer of 
“Wings,” or the artist who observes his own interior, and the human who is observed 
(as a living person), the observation and analysis of the interior of the self from the 
position of the artist may be pathological, but it is also the highest summit yet at-
tained by human wisdom. This is the development of a consciousness of self, which 
is premised on a division of consciousness. It is not a healthy state. However, if the 
division of consciousness is the status quo for modern people, then the work of the 
true artist is to express this state of division faithfully.19
Ch’oe questions the simplicity and lack of subjectivity in Pak’s use of the cin-
ematic eye, stating further along in the essay that refusing to turn the camera in-
ward means that Pak has not sufficiently dealt with questions of the truth and 
ethicality of his descriptions. Pak explores only the mechanical reproduction of 
external, objective reality and not the way that the camera functions also as an ap-
paratus for the modern person’s construction of an internal subjectivity. However 
treacherous a proposition turning the camera inward might be, and however path-
ological the resulting images, this is an unavoidable condition for modern people 
and the artists who represent them. Ch’oe defends Yi’s concern with cinema’s tech-
nological break with natural representation and his taking up of the position of the 
director in order to represent the material of internal consciousness. Embedded 
in Ch’oe’s admittedly reductive binary between Pak’s objective approach and Yi’s 
subjective approach is an important insight about representation and the human: 
after the emergence of the cinematic eye, it is anachronistic to return to either the 
philosophy of culturalism or the optics of omniscient realist narration and de-
scription, both of which rely on a typology of human individuals whose external 
cultural life and internal consciousness reflect each other. Culturalism assumes but 










































also represses this same division, because the empirico-transcendental doublet is 
a structure of identity between the experience of culture and the transcendentals 
that should govern culture, as well as the center of a teleological philosophy in 
which the human should eventually return to its moral essence. However, Ch’oe’s 
reading shows that after cinema the historical genus-being can no longer function 
as a stable mediator between the transcendentals of the self-conscious subject and 
the empirical signs of this interiority in the national, ethnic, or class type of the 
individual. Ch’oe critiques Pak T’ae-wŏn’s use of the camera spirit only to represent 
the world from the perspective of his type (t’aip), because in the era of cinema 
types can no longer adequately stand in for subjectivity. The project of seeking the 
origins of the transcendental in an empirical identity runs into the problem of the 
division between the external and the internal enacted by the cinematic apparatus. 
Ch’oe shows that in cinematic modernist literature, the worldview of culturalism is 
reversed and fragmented; rather than the internal self-consciousness and morality 
of the individual being the source for the unity of representation of the external 
world, this internal world, as Yi Sang’s works show, is a world of division, mirrors, 
pathologies, and discontinuity. Conversely, the external world appears continuous 
in Pak’s story only because the human will is completely subtracted and reproduc-
tion becomes an entirely mechanical operation of the camera.
The problem of interiority and exteriority in culturalism is how to locate the 
origins of transcendental subjectivity in the empirical object of the human. In 
cinematic modernism, the temporal interior of the human becomes fragmentary 
and discontinuous because of the intervention of the visual machine that usurps 
the transcendental subject’s ability to schematize the world. Suddenly, it is not the 
interior of the human but rather the mechanically reproduced external world that 
appears to the spectator as an ideal whole, whereas the internal time of the sub-
ject is the time of a radical dissolution, an abyssal and curved regression that Yi 
signifies with the image of two mirrors reflecting each other, shrinking into and 
encasing infinitely smaller squares.20 As with light in the theory of relativity, if we 
were to extend this reflection infinitely, it would eventually curve around a singu-
lar point, forming a circle. This was Yi’s image of both the space-time of cinema 
and the poetic subject. He was so enamored with the image of infinitely reflecting 
screen surfaces that in 1932, while publishing his poems in Korea and Architecture, 
he chose the penname “box” (Sang). The “box” of his name is a reference not to 
space as the empty container of Euclidean geometry, but rather to the screen upon 
which Sergei Eisenstein’s “filmic fourth dimension” is projected; this box is both a 
technology and a mode of subjectivity. This mode of subjectivity cannot be stat-
ic, because it is constantly reflected and reflected upon, projected and projected 
upon.21 As in Tanabe’s philosophy of the imperial subject, cinematic subjectivity is 
ecstatic, constantly projected in time and therefore constantly alienated from its 
past selves.22










































Ch’oe did not fully endorse the schizophrenia that resulted from Yi Sang’s im-
age of the subject as an ecstatic screen constantly transformed through reflection 
and projection. Even though he saw in “Wings” a valid reproach to the traditions 
of melodrama and realism in modern Korean literature and a necessary step to-
ward the deepening of realism, he was concerned about the nihilistic implica-
tions of Yi’s affective and fragmentary poetics. He guarded against the possibility 
that the age of mechanical reproducibility might be the age when the aesthetic 
disorientation of the fragmented and artificial human also entails a loss of capac-
ity for moral judgment. Adumbrating his later turn to a theory of state literature, 
Ch’oe’s concern at the end of “The Expansion and Deepening of Realism” is how 
truth and morality can be reestablished after the cinematic division of the human 
subject. Lacking a practical ideology connected to truth and morality, Yi’s inter-
nal cinematic consciousness can only muster a series of artificially and loosely 
connected affects:
The author [Yi Sang] connects each episode to the next, but has only an artificial 
method of doing so. This work was not constituted through the “-ism” of a living self 
that is steeped in everyday life, but rather connects each scene artificially. What is the 
main reason that the work is deprived of artistic elegance and faithfulness? Because 
the unnatural bursts of laughter and the unpleasant ridicule that appear occasionally 
in the work do not emerge from the morals of the author, but rather the artificial 
motivations of the surface. Won’t the acquisition of morals be the main problem that 
permeates this author’s future?23
The ramifications of Ch’oe’s questioning of the lack of a practical ideology, or 
“-ism,” in “Wings” extend well beyond the field of literary criticism into the philo-
sophical and social science discourses of imperial nationalism. The human sub-
ject is irreversibly divided by the space-time of cinema—all of the external world 
becomes reproducible by the machine, with little need for human intervention, 
and at the same time the human interior becomes a hall of mirrors in which the 
schizophrenic writer never arrives at a stable image of the human’s place in this in-
finitely reproducible world. External representations of everyday cultural life come 
to lack internal consciousness; the exploration of internal consciousness leads to 
a discontinuous, artificial, and ultimately pathological subject that loses any sense 
of the transcendentals that might organize representation. In Korean Literature in 
a Time of Transition, Ch’oe would eventually surmise that as the ecstatic subject 
of cinema loses any sense of order or organic cohesion, the individual life of the 
cosmopolitan modernist becomes pathological and void of meaning. In turning to 
Japanese national literature as the organic totality that could organize the spatio-
temporal ecstasis unleashed by cinema, Ch’oe, in his reactionary modernist mode, 
sought to reinvigorate culture without assuming a priori the kind of continuous 
cosmopolitan world that naïve culturalists had envisioned.










































In arguing for a literature that could unite the mass culture of everyday life (in-
cluding, prominently, film) with the elite culture of the cosmopolitan individual, 
Ch’oe did not seek a romantic return to anything that preceded the historical pres-
ent. After all, Koreans were not Japanese in the past, so the past offered no image 
for the utopian reconciliation to be brought about by people’s literature. He sought 
instead to overcome the aesthetic chaos and artificiality of the fragmented modern 
individual by inventing a new ethical order for the organization of representation, 
a practical “-ism” that could unite the dispersed affects and associations we find 
in Yi’s stories and poetry. In other words, Ch’oe’s modernism turns to fascism not 
in the antihumanist parts of his discussion of modernity—the parts in which he 
recognizes that the human is fundamentally divided and irreconcilable to itself—
but rather in the humanist part, in his search for a new moral continuity in the 
ecstatic space-time of cinematized life. This moral continuity was for him very 
much a narrative and spectacular continuity, a matter of creating a new story and 
a new image through which the fragments of modern life could be pieced together 
again according to a moral principle. As I showed in the last chapter, Japan’s world-
historical mission to unify East Asia into a single nation-state would become that 
story and that image through which to imagine a new morality and a new spatio-
temporal existence no longer troubled by division, perhaps best exemplified by the 
attempt to unify mechanical reproduction and expressive interiority that we find 
in the fascist film aesthetic (particularly fascist melodrama).24 Again, in Kōyama’s 
words, Ch’oe found in the aesthetic of national literature and imperial film a means 
toward a subjective culture, “the fundamental quality of which lies in breaking 
from anthropocentrism, even as one returns to anthropocentrism.”25
Yokomitsu Riichi’s New Sensationist literary works are similarly concerned 
with the way that the ecstatic temporality of life in the cinematic age creates a 
troubling but perhaps generative split within both the writer and his characters. 
In his works, the “external” representations of character are no longer cohesive 
with the “internal” time sense of the subject of writing or the subject of action. 
The I-novel relied on a sense of unity between the subject of enunciation and the 
subject enunciated. In titling his two most important short stories “Machine” and 
“Time,” Yokomitsu pointed to his engagement with cinema and its ecstasis. Like 
Ch’oe, when Yokomitsu turned to the social space of literature in an avant-garde 
fusion of aesthetics and political life, he also reintroduced essentialist anthropol-
ogy into his discussions of Korea and the volunteer soldier system.
“Time” opens with an abrupt break from the time of the official economy. The 
chairman of a boardinghouse absconds with the money in the cash box and the 
renters, eight men and four women, are forced to flee. They decide to leave on a 
rainy night, and are drenched in water for much of the story. They journey to an 
ocean cliff, where they search for food, shelter, and water. In this surreal land-
scape, the male characters flirt with progressively more grotesque acts of violence. 










































The violence begins when Sasa draws a knife and starts a fight with Takaki over 
a shared love interest, though the fight is subdued. One of the women, Namiko, 
is ill, and becomes both an object of hatred and the impetus for cooperation. The 
men are forced to take turns carrying her on their backs, and contemplate leaving 
her behind (though they never do). Eventually, the group finds a hut with a water 
source. Toward the end of the story, the group huddles together in the hut, “losing 
their individuality,” and hitting one another in their sleep. The narrator wonders 
if this violence arises out of love, or rather instinct. The characters are bound to-
gether by survival, but are also entirely alienated from one another through their 
violence. At one point, the narrator enters a state of hallucinatory solipsism, in 
which he contemplates the beauty of the state between life and death, and imag-
ines the possibility that his suicide would also annihilate the other characters. He 
emerges from this state and beats the person next to him in a fit of rage. The story 
ends with the narrator forcing Namiko, who is very near death, to drink water.
There are two main mentions of time in this story. In the first, the narrator 
is walking in the deepest darkness and the only thing he can feel is his stomach 
pangs. He states that time is nothing more than an empty stomach, an intense 
feeling of hunger. The second mention of time occurs when the narrator is de-
scribing his hallucinatory state between life and death. He says that the waves of 
color that undulate before the eyes in this state of near death are instances of time. 
Significantly, the story begins with an exit from the economy, and from a society 
that will not tolerate the impecunious. If we assume that the characters are work-
ers or students of some kind, their exit from the house is a dramatic break with 
the everyday life of wage labor or studying. The group leaves society and enters a 
Hobbesian state of nature in which time is a matter of life and death, rather than 
the repetition of the monetary circuit. The allegorical quality of the story is set up 
by this return to tribal organization and its effects on the lived experience of time 
on the part of the characters. Yokomitsu took his characters out of the modern 
capitalist present (where they presumably work, study, and pay rent), and depict-
ed them coming to grips with a more fundamental and authentic temporality in 
which actions are based on the violence of instinct and the immediate physical 
sense of impending death. The narrator muses that those sensations one feels at 
the finite limit of subjectivity are time. These sensations of time at the limits of 
life are at once depersonalizing and entirely individual. Everyone in the group is 
subject to the same existential limits; however, each must compete with the others 
for his or her survival, to the extent that the world itself may be nothing more than 
an individual hallucination. There is only a collective insofar as it is necessary for 
the survival of its parts, but this collective itself may be a product of individual 
imagination.
Yokomitsu discusses the fictionality of such an idea of time in a short essay, 
“The Novel and Time” (1932). In this short, impressionistic essay, Yokomitsu 










































distinguishes essay writing and fiction writing. This distinction was meaningful 
because in the genre of the I-novel, there was not always a clear demarcation be-
tween fictional narrative and an essay. Yokomitsu claims that an essay is not writ-
ten about reality directly because the subject who writes is self-reflexive (or, in his 
phrase, “measures its own mind”). In other words, because an essay is not simply 
an observation of objective reality, but also an observation of oneself and one’s 
own thoughts, its form can never be a precise empirical description of experi-
ence. As in Ch’oe Chae-sŏ’s reading of Pak T’ae-wŏn’s objective exterior and Yi 
Sang’s schizophrenic interior, the self-reflexivity of the modern subject creates a 
persistent temporal division between the observer and the observed. Essays and 
fiction are different media, but there is also a fictional aspect to essays. Therefore, 
he could write that a writer’s essays are not necessarily better than his fictional 
works simply because they appear closer to the truth. Essays do not provide a 
more immediate representation of psychical reality and the value of writing can-
not be derived from its degree of psychological realism. All representation is fic-
tional in the sense that it is written out of an ecstatic state between perspective and 
internal intuition.
The argument made against the I-novel and its interpretative community 
is that psychological description is involved in a kind of paradoxical folly. The 
desire for the real in psychological description leads to the fictionalization of 
the self. The I-novelist is in a position of weakness in relation to his audience 
because he must expose the most mundane aspects of his daily life. However, 
Yokomitsu provides a different possibility for the ascetic novelist. In his detach-
ment from the surrounding world, and in the progress of his training, he can 
assign value to himself by seeking what awakens his mind and senses. This image 
of the self-valuing writer is also a break from culturalism, because interpretative 
evaluation is no longer a matter of drawing the individual into relation with the 
social whole through a regulative concept of general cultural value and nation-
al culture. Instead, the relationship between the individual and society is itself 
a fiction, and therefore remains malleable to the writer and his own sense of 
meaning, art, and literary form. To take the time to write an essay is to sacrifice 
the more authentic and determinant time of novel writing, the time of fiction-
alizing rather than describing the self. It is this more authentic time of fiction 
writing in which the subject confronts the determination of his destiny, which 
is a matter of constantly confronting the possibility and inevitability of one’s 
death. In “Time,” he began with an exit from the imposed time of the monetary 
economy, contrasting the time of abstract labor with a more authentic existential 
time that passes outside the experiential subject. In this disoriented state, a new 
mode of perception was possible.
The loss of ethical bearings in this radical existential temporality appears at 
the end of the story “Machine,” when the narrator, who has killed one of his 










































colleagues, professes that, if asked, he cannot claim to know what he has done.26 
Reality has become a machine in which the subject has no control over his ac-
tions, at the same time as he decides who is to live and who is to die. Through 
the severing of the scene of fiction from the mundane passage of everyday life 
in modernity, Yokomitsu’s narrators proclaim a more immediate and authentic 
relation to time and sensation. However, this was at the cost of a relationality that 
could recognize others as more than the effect of the individual’s confrontation 
with death.
Yokomitsu’s break with the temporality of the I-novel, signified by his reart-
iculation of the relation between determination and destiny and his critique of 
the perspective of psychological realism, is closely related to the potential of cin-
ema, to that new “Machine” of “Time.” With its rapid cutting to different perspec-
tives and its capacity to reorder the perception of time, cinema was in many ways 
the sort of individual and collective experience that Yokomitsu imagined for the 
New Sensationist novel. The advent of cinema as mass spectacle exposed the fic-
tionality of the stable and individuated perspective of the I-novel. With cinema’s 
ability to restructure space and time, the image of the writer as a psychological 
type fully integrated into a spatiotemporal context no longer appeared natural. 
In Shanghai, and certainly in his short stories, Yokomitsu explored the potential 
to create cinematic sensations in fiction. His works aestheticize life and death by 
highlighting the interpenetration of fiction and reality, or, more particularly, the 
interpenetration of mechanical reproduction and everyday perception within the 
new ecstatic temporality of cinematized culture. Although he did not theorize the 
relation between cinema and modernist fiction as explicitly as Ch’oe, his critique 
of the I-novel and the imagery of his stories are in accord with Ch’oe’s theory that 
the moving image, in both its objectivist and its expressionist uses, could deepen 
rather than displace the realism of fiction in the era of cinema. At the same time, 
in both “Time” and “Machine” there also appears a great deal of anxiety about 
this new integration of the human being with mechanical representation. In his 
thematization of antisocial and criminal acts of violence and scenarios of collec-
tive confrontations with death, the new sensations of modern ecstatic temporality 
not only come to enliven desire and possibility, but also threaten to overwhelm 
perception and to create a concomitant desire to return to stasis. In Freud’s terms, 
the integration of human and mechanical representation creates new sensations 
and pleasures, but also a death-drive, the drive to return to an inorganic state.27
This death-drive had its colonial aspect. Particularly in Yokomitsu’s later es-
says concerning Korea and China, he still imagined an alternative space and time 
to the mundane everyday life of psychological realism. However, this desire for 
another temporality now located ecstasis very conservatively in the historical 
progress of multiethnic Japanese state subjectivity, and simultaneously reified the 
depth of the authentic space and time of the colonial cultural artifact that reveals, 










































transparently, the essence of the colonial other. In “Korean Things” (1943), Yo-
komitsu proclaims an exotic appreciation for the secret Korea that lies behind 
the façade of modern social life and behind the intermediaries of the tourist’s 
interpreter and his monetary compensation. At the same time, the Japanese state’s 
mobilization of Koreans into the military is a sign to him that the need for inter-
mediaries would be eliminated, and the true, secret essence of the Korean people 
could be revealed:
When I travel I always think, “What is it that is hidden in the greatest recesses of 
this land?” As long as I do not see this—what is breathing secretly in the furthest 
interior—travel is hardly different from a stroll in the mountains.
However, what is hidden in the greatest recesses cannot be known only with a 
passing glance. One cannot know it even if one imagines it from the stories of the 
land’s people, and it is not something that is easily understood through observation 
or writings. If so, how can the traveler know what lies in the inner recesses? These 
complex things always seem to remain unknown and are set aside and dismissed. 
Then, the interpreter (tsūben), who intervenes into this lack of guidance for his own 
profit, often causes confusion and disputes between him and the traveler, and goes 
from place to place of his own accord.
The past history between the Korean peninsula and Japan proper has not escaped 
from this example. Those who have gained have been the interpreters and those who 
have lost have been the human beings of Japan proper and the peninsula who were 
left not knowing those secret things that lie hidden in the inner recesses of the others’ 
daily lives. The first pioneer in Japan who noticed this was probably Shin-i Shiroishi.
With the institution of conscription now occurring on the peninsula, the various 
incomprehensible gasps that have arrived for thousands of years across that short 
distance have become the swell of a large wave formed into a single breath, and one 
feels happy to have entered an age in which interpreters are no longer required.
When I am at home looking at the pottery of ancient Korea, it is very pleasurable 
to listen to the sorrow of days gone by, to the murmuring of a secret and obscure 
beauty, to what lay at the innermost depth of the people who lived there. It allows me 
to see directly, without being misled by an interpreter, the true hidden desire, hap-
piness, and sadness of the person who made the form, and it is, more than anything 
else, the essence of travel. However, from then on it has already become a stand-in, 
lacking in the feelings of travel.28
An exoticizing colonial gaze accompanies the alienation of the modern writer 
and his search for a time outside of modernity. Yokomitsu contrasts his distrust 
of the interpreter with ruminations about the connection he feels with ancient 
Koreans when viewing their pottery back home. Actual travel becomes inauthen-
tic because one is subjected to the interpreter’s disorienting mobility, his economic 
compensation, and his present view of the past. This mediation alienates one from 
the true essence of the other, which lies in the “deep recesses” inaccessible to the 
tourist. Viewing the art of the colonized from a distance (of both space and time) 










































allows one a glimpse of their true past. This exotic view is accompanied by nostal-
gia for the context of the aesthetic object, its imagined time in history. He laments 
that the experience of viewing the pottery, while authentic in its lack of mediation, 
is detached from travel itself. The exoticization of Korea reinforces the feeling of 
sublime alienation from the present, but it also bridges the distance between the 
imperial subject and the colonial other. Still, the imperial subject’s melancholic re-
lation to the lost object is a feeling with a political and historical future, as military 
conscription promises to overcome interpreters and the fragmentation of the trav-
eler’s colonial gaze. Paradoxically, as Koreans assimilate into the Japanese nation, 
their difference will appear more freely and directly to the view of the traveler. 
Koreans will finally speak the same language and expose what has been lingering 
beneath the surface of their modern lives.
Lippit distinguishes between the experimental Yokomitsu of the 1920s 
and early 1930s, particularly of the novel Shanghai, and the ethnic nationalist 
Yokomitsu of the 1940s, while recognizing that there were both continuities 
and discontinuities between his modernist and ethnic nationalist writings.29 It 
is tempting to imagine a cosmopolitan Yokomitsu interested in translating the 
methods of the European avant-garde and a nationalist Yokomitsu who with-
drew into tradition and racist perspectives on the colonized. However, as in the 
case of other modernists who eventually took on a fascist aesthetic, the tempo-
rality of this turn to tradition was not the same as a Romantic nostalgia for a 
lost national past; nor was the original formulation of an avant-garde aesthetic 
entirely devoid of nationalism. More important is the way that the articulation of 
the ecstatic temporality of a literary I constantly moving outside of itself, as well 
as a spiritual vision of the machine as transformative of the human and its liter-
ary representation, eventually arrived at a new organic view of the social totality 
in which colonizer and colonized, human and machine, and the nation-state and 
its internal differences were all unified through an embrace of national culture, 
national language, and collective death. Imperial nationalists steeped in mod-
ernism could imagine that the deep time of the colonized was unified with the 
ecstasis of the imperial subject through a poetic national language and national 
spirit that erased the need for translation, and a shared sacrifice of life to the 
state that erased the political suspicion of the colonized that we find in Shanghai. 
The authentic Korea, existing outside the mechanical time of capitalism, merged 
with the ecstatic time of an imperial subject constantly moving outside of itself. 
In a cinematic image of simultaneity between the colonized and imperial subject, 
Yokomitsu’s radical break from the I-novel and the mundane time of the literary 
essay connected with the aesthetic of fascism, which imagines a totality in which 
all the visual, cultural, and social crises of capitalism are overcome through the 
visualization of an alternative temporality and historical trajectory. This is not 
an aesthetic return to a past Japan, but rather a cinematic image of a society in 










































which the temporal movement of the ecstatic subject forms a future community 
where colonial differences have been erased, or at least reduced to the reified, 
dead objects of Yokomitsu’s “colonial kitsch.”30
In connecting destiny and determination through ecstatic temporality, 
Yokomitsu broke from national literary and cultural tradition and developed a 
cinematic literature. However, like Ch’oe Chae-sŏ, he arrived at another imperialist 
notion of culture in his organic view of social space for which the temporal and 
spatial difference between metropole and colony would be overcome through the 
nationalization of Korea. Although he continued to discuss the “deep recesses” 
of Korean life, this anthropological view of Korea’s otherness to modernity was a 
projection of sameness and a disavowal of difference, an identification of an out-
side to modernity in the primitive other and the illusory conflation of that outside 
with the social space of an imperial state supposedly going against the grain of 
Eurocentric world history.
CULTUR ALISM AND ARCHITECTUR AL SPACE:  KOREA 
AND ARCHITECTURE
From these few texts of modernism in the early 1930s, it is clear that writers and 
critics were concerned with the transformation in perspective undergone through 
the cinematization of daily life, from which they derived an understanding of time 
not as a progressive movement toward the genus-being, but rather as an ecstasis 
that constantly compromised the coherency of the human as the subject and object 
of modern thought. It is equally clear that for many modernists this fragmentation 
should not persist indefinitely—a new ethics and a new politics had to intervene 
to restore meaning to a subject disoriented and incapable of positioning itself in 
any ethically meaningful way. Despite their iconoclasm, modernists often accord-
ed the capacity for this intervention to the world-historical state and its subjects. 
Ch’oe, Yokomitsu, and Tanabe each found in the multiethnic national community 
the potential to overcome or to sublate alienation and fragmentation through the 
individual’s immersion in collective warfare. Becoming imperial almost always 
entailed a kind of imperial humanism, as suggested by Kōyama’s call for a new an-
thropocentrism, Tanabe’s discussions of the nation-state as the worldly representa-
tive of the human’s genus-being, and the various searches for a new humanism in 
Korea. Modernism’s particular way of becoming imperial was equally humanist, 
in the way that Ch’oe sought a new moral continuity in fragmentary representa-
tion and Yokomitsu sought to arrest the play of difference by making the military 
state the center of ecstasis, while at the same time reducing colonial culture to a 
static object. Was this the only possible political and social direction for modern-
ism at the time? If not, then should we try to locate other political possibilities for 
aesthetic modernism?










































I will approach this question through a reading of the poetry of Yi Sang, not 
to present him as a modernist untainted by fascism or imperialism, but rather to 
address the more specific problems of ecstatic temporality, cinema, and modern-
ism’s tendency in the 1930s to return to nationalized space and particular origins. 
Modernism became political through its representation of social space, the Japanese 
imperial version of which gave a picture of a state subject sublating all past identities 
and affiliations in its ecstatic projection toward an unprecedented future. In Tanabe’s 
theory of expression as osmosis, in Ch’oe’s attempt to transform Japanese national 
culture internally, and in Yokomitsu’s celebration of the end of translation, there is 
a shared image of an ecstatic human subject constantly moving outside of itself but 
nonetheless constantly returning to an identity with itself—a poetic subject both 
ecstatic and completely immersed in the totality. If it is possible for the ecstatic and 
cinematic subject of modernism during this period to avoid this aesthetics and poli-
tics of territorialization and the imperial social space represented through it, then 
such a subjectivity might present another possibility for modernism in relation to 
the politics of imperial subjectification.
Because he died before the institution of the policy of imperial subjectification, 
it is difficult to know whether or not Yi Sang would have supported Japan-Korea 
unification, remained silent, or tried to negotiate between his individual artistic 
practice and the demands of imperialism. Although this remains an unknown, 
already in Ch’oe’s reading of Yi we can see dissatisfaction with his schizophrenic 
writing style on the part of those who would eventually advocate national litera-
ture. In his critique of Yi’s version of cinematic literature, Ch’oe lauded his willing-
ness to turn the camera inward and to expose the fragmentation of the modern 
subject, but he also argued that Yi lacked a moral direction and that he tended 
to piece together series of affects and sensations with no clear moral purpose.31 
Although we cannot know how Yi would have responded to the politics of the late 
1930s, if we take the fragmentation and experimentation of his works as a virtue 
rather than a shortcoming, his aesthetic can be seen to challenge the anthropo-
centric epistemology of culturalism without returning to another imperial mode 
of humanism in the manner of Kōyama’s anti-anthropocentric anthropocentrism. 
Yi’s aesthetic entails another kind of representation of the ecstasis of the cinematic 
subject in literature, one that imagines space and time outside the culturalist struc-
ture of the individual, the nation, and the world, but does not introduce an os-
motic state formation as the solution to the crisis of representation in the modern 
era of aesthetic disorientation (analyzed symptomatically by Ch’oe Chae-sŏ in his 
analysis of the cinematic apparatus’s effects on literature). In order to continue to 
read these political problems of modernism through the question of social space, I 
have chosen to focus on the four poems that Yi Sang published in Japanese in the 
colonial architecture journal Korea and Architecture. These poems are the most 
emblematic of a modernism that refuses to return to either tradition or empire, to 










































the particular or the universal, and are therefore the most significant of his works 
for the present project (as well as a useful place to end this study).
Korea and Architecture was not only a trade journal for architects and survey-
ors working in colonial Korea, but also a forum for the introduction of modernist 
discourse. Many of the articles in the journal are concerned with how to transform 
the urban space of Seoul. However, other articles introduce art and architecture 
movements as diverse as Cubism, Futurism, and the modernism of Le Corbursier, 
as well as anthropological perspectives on architecture. Korea and Architecture 
gave colonial intellectuals like Yi Sang, who was studying to become a surveyor, 
access to European modernist art and architecture. Furthermore, even though the 
journal mostly adhered to culturalist principles and was concerned mainly with 
the pragmatics of colonial architecture and the colonial project in general, the 
genre of manpitsu (random jottings) allowed Yi to contribute quite experimental 
and radical poems to the journal. Perhaps unbeknownst to the editors of the jour-
nal, Yi’s poems were nothing less than a complete dismantling of the dominant 
philosophical premises and spatiotemporal orientations of the journal, performed 
largely through a meditation on the relationship between the human subject, ar-
chitectural planning, and cinema. At the same time, unlike the many Hegelian and 
state-centered critiques of cosmopolitan culturalism offered by imperial philoso-
phers of time (including Tanabe’s appropriation of Einsteinian physics and Berg-
sonian duration to articulate the practice of the Japanese imperial subject), Yi’s 
forays into non-Euclidean geometry, the theory of relativity, and science fiction 
largely avoided any return to unity, identity, or stasis. In my comparison between 
Yi and Tanabe, I will focus in particular on the way that Yi’s mode of expression, 
which I will term “intensive expression,” differed in minute but important ways 
from Tanabe’s view of expression as the unifying mediation between past and pres-
ent selves, between the negated past and a positive future.
In order to interpret Yi’s poems and their intensive expression, it is necessary 
to situate them within this original visual context and to see how they interacted 
with the other pages of the journal. While attempts have been made to transform 
Yi Sang into a national genius of Korean literature through the translation of his 
Japanese works into vernacular Korean, in these poems there is a great deal go-
ing on at the interstices between language and the concrete images of science and 
mathematics. In order to interpret them, it is necessary to recognize these poems 
as minor literature (that is, literature written in a second, hegemonic language), 
as well as visual artifacts with important connections to their original visual and 
discursive context. Before entering into a discussion of how Yi’s cinematic poems 
engaged with and broke from the optics of the culturalist architecture project—
while not succumbing to an overtly imperialist ideology of ecstatic temporality—it 
is necessary to define more clearly the discursive and visual context in which these 
poems appeared.










































In Korea and Architecture there is a clear culturalist approach to questions of 
the relationship between space and time. For the inaugural issue the editors com-
missioned the Tokyo Imperial University professor and culturalist intellectual Ku-
roita Katsumi for an article, “Culture and Architecture,” which began a tendency 
of the journal to criticize the overly abstract, modernist approach to architecture, 
because it too radically broke with any sense of the cultural past.32 He argued that 
in Korea there would be a great deal of architecture that should be preserved and 
the theorists discussed the problem of finding public funding for these preser-
vation projects. Even as architects discussed the need to preserve the past, the 
journal was an integral site for the exchange of ideas concerning the building of 
schools, department stores, and other modern infrastructure. It is difficult to char-
acterize the general approach of a journal that was active for twenty years, and 
included many different perspectives on both architecture and art. However, the 
place of Korea in the journal, as object of perception and object of transformation, 
remained fairly consistent. As part of a modernizing colonial project, there was 
a concern for functionality and the modernization of subjectivity through archi-
tectural space in most of the building projects. However, the preservation of the 
Korean cultural past through museumification tempered this functionality with a 
concern for indigenous traditions, their interaction with Japanese culture, and the 
colonial fusion of Japanese and Korean design elements.
The reduction of indigeneity to tradition allowed many of the architects to see 
the time of the built environment through a dichotomy of modernity and tradi-
tion. In addition to discussions of architectural method, many geographical and 
anthropological studies appear in order to explain how the human being should 
inhabit a built space tailored to local cultural features that are assumed to be na-
tional features. The influence of Bauhaus, expressionism, and other European 
architectural movements is prominent in translated articles by figures like Peter 
Behrens, Adolf Behne, and Johannes Itten.33 However, statements in the journal 
frequently claim that architecture is necessarily national and that one needs to be 
aware of the characteristics and culture of the national people who are going to 
occupy the built space. This was part of the journal’s general critique of the ab-
stract modernist style epitomized by Le Corbusier. For example, in the issue from 
October 1931, when Yi Sang began publishing his poems, an assistant professor in 
the Engineering Department of Tokyo Imperial University, Itō Tadahiro, wrote the 
following comment in the lead article, which was directed toward the advocates of 
a purely international style:
Certainly, architects are free to build whatever they think up, but notwithstanding 
any other intervention, there is one condition. Japanese architects should not forget 
Japan, and, if the architecture is to be built in Korea, they should not forget Korea. 
When building for the Japanese, one must know Japan from various angles—land, 
climate, environment, as well as the interests, everyday conditions, and preferences 










































of the people. One must also know the origins of Japanese culture. In knowing Japan, 
research about Japan is by itself not enough. It is necessary to research the world as 
broadly as possible.34
Itō’s criticism of modernist architecture is that it does not incorporate the past into 
the present through the preservation of national cultural characteristics. Incor-
porating international styles and techniques from the Bauhaus and Le Corbusier 
was acceptable as long as architects also remained conscious of their national con-
texts. These national contexts could be understood through the study not only 
of existing traditional architecture, but also of climate, environment, practices of 
habitation, and, ultimately, national character. Articles in geography and anthro-
pology were prominent in the journal, because they could explain how national 
environments affect the dispositions of different peoples and contribute to their 
preferences in terms of spatial organization, design, and style. As part of a specifi-
cally colonial architectural project, the idea of national tradition allowed the ar-
chitects and theorists to reify the Korean past—particularly through preservation 
and museumification projects in Kyŏngju and Seoul—even as they sought to make 
Korean tradition compatible with both Japanese culture and functional modern 
structures. The goal of a cultural approach was to recognize and preserve tradition, 
while at the same time developing a sense of the national character of Japanese and 
Korean architecture that would inform the production of new structures.
In order to better define how anthropological discourse affected the theories 
and practices of architecture in Korea and Architecture, I will give four examples 
from the journal of construction projects, focusing on the way that the culturalist 
mode of architecture, despite its concern with local national difference, became an 
imposition of an abstract spatial model of modernity that simultaneously trans-
formed, erased, and recoded the local contexts of lived space. These projects are 
the construction of monumental architecture, the preservation of ancient Korean 
architecture, the hybrid fusion of Japanese and Korean styles for political pur-
poses, and the program for cultural housing (bunka jūtaku).
Example 1
Monumental public architecture is represented in the journal through sketches of 
public buildings that are objects unto themselves, imposed onto central spatial con-
texts. Modern public and financial buildings such as banks, post offices, and gov-
ernment buildings were typical of monumental architecture in colonial Seoul and 
architectural plans and sketches of such monuments appear frequently in Korea 
and Architecture. These include plans and sketches for the original Bank of Chosŏn, 
the Offices of the Governor-General of Korea, the Seoul Train Station, and the New 
Diet Building in Tokyo. Many of the designs were based on late-nineteenth-century 
German models and have a neoclassical design. For monumental public buildings, 










































discussions of habitation and the location of the building within the larger urban 
space are largely occluded. These buildings became important monuments in the 
urban space of Seoul as signs of both the modernity of Japan’s colonial rule and 
nodal points for the urban “psychogeography.”35 However, as an image for colonial 
Seoul, they give the sense of being set off and autonomous from the local landscape. 
It was this image of modernity and modern architecture as an abstract imposition 
of neoclassical design that the modernist, internationalist architects and the cultur-
alist architects in the journal tried to temper.
Example 2
Therefore, the preservation of ancient Korean architecture was a prominent theme 
in many of the discussions of culture, cultivation, and Korean national conscious-
ness. A large portion of the issue from May 1931 was dedicated to “A Roundtable 
Discussion concerning the Preservation of Ancient Korean Architecture” and ar-
ticles like “The Educational Value of Preserving Ancient Architectural Artifacts,” 
both of which were typical of the discourse of preservation and considered the 
importance of preserving traditional Korean architecture in order to cultivate 
and educate Korean and colonial Japanese schoolchildren about Korea’s ancient 
past.36 The preservation of the many beautiful temples and other older buildings in 
Kyŏngju was a primary concern of the journal, and the legacy of this effort is felt 
today, as Kyŏngju remains a tourist destination for those interested in traditional 
Korea.37 These preservation projects were in some ways commendable efforts to 
restore some of the cultural legacy of traditional Korean architecture. On the other 
hand, these preservation projects also served to monumentalize the Korean past, 
and were another way of reducing lived time and space to isolatable cultural tradi-
tions and characteristics whose only connection to the modern present was as a 
pedagogical tool for nationalization.
Example 3
The case of the construction of the Itō Hirobumi temple provides an impor-
tant and interesting example of the colonial dimension of architects’ attempts 
to temper the modernist, internationalist impulse, which entered in a strong 
way in the 1930s, with a concern for national cultural traditions. In this case, 
the concern for tradition was related directly to politics and the attempt to sa-
cralize the life and memory of Itō Hirobumi through a hybrid Japanese-Korean 
monument. Itō was the first resident general of Korea and was assassinated in 
Harbin, China, in 1909 by the Korean nationalist An Chung-gŭn. In the early 
1930s, the governor-general started on plans for a monument to Itō that would 
educate the Korean people about his historical importance. As was the case with 
the Offices of the Governor-General, designed by Georg de Lalande and built 
on the site of Kyŏngbŏkkung Palace, the planners of the Itō Hirobumi temple 










































explicitly chose a site valued by Koreans. Sasa Keiichi, an engineer working for 
the governor-general, writes,
Of the possible sites for the construction of Hirobumi temple, the most suitable can-
didate was Samjŏngdong, particularly because of its importance for Koreans, and in 
order to give living Koreans an understanding of the merits of Itō Hirobumi. Even 
though the existing establishment of Japanese (naichijin) is in the south of Seoul, the 
desire to commemorate Itō Hirobumi is less among Koreans compared to Japanese; 
therefore, turning to the north of Seoul, we proposed a site where many Koreans re-
side. The interior of Samjŏngdong is also recommended because the hilly landscape 
and the beauty of the scenery are truly spectacular.38
The choice to build the temple in a place where many Koreans resided shows that 
monumental architecture was explicitly political. Even though the building was 
to be imposed upon the lived landscape, it was also supposed to instill a new his-
torical and political consciousness in the residents. The architects and planners 
intended that residents would no longer think of Itō as a repressive colonial gov-
ernor, but instead remember him as one of the founders of modern Korea. The 
problem of how the building related to the existing environment in Samjŏngdong 
came out in discussions about the style to be employed in the construction of the 
building. Saki wrote,
In addition to determining the site, one of the most significant problems was the 
architectural style of the main building. Some were of the opinion that it must be 
constructed in the style of Korean temples, others said it would be ideal to construct 
a temple in the pure style of Japan proper, another group asked whether or not it 
would be better to use a newer, modern style; finally, there were various sugges-
tions that these styles be tossed out or mixed, and that the temple be made in a style 
appropriate to Seoul.39
The architects finally decided on the style of a Japanese Zen Buddhist temple, 
but with as much “Korean color” as possible:
With the guidance of various authorities, beginning with the chair of the commemo-
ration committee, and after asking the advice of various teachers in Japan proper, we 
employed the architectural style of Zen Buddhist temples in Japan proper. However, 
because the temple was to be constructed in Korea, it was decided that a more ap-
propriate style would include as much Korean color as possible and express the real 
harmony between Japan and Korea. The structure is made of inflammable materials, 
is fireproof and earthquake-proof, is equipped with heating and running water, and 
though we may have diverged too much from a traditional temple, our main objec-
tive was to construct a temple that took on the new demands for the establishment 
of cultural institutions.40
In the choice to make the temple in a Japanese Zen style with Korean color, 
the architects conflated stylistic harmony and political harmony. The inclusion of 










































Korean color and the choice to reference a religious tradition belonging to both 
Korea and Japan were supposed to allow for the building to blend into the envi-
ronment of Seoul, while at the same time cultivating a harmonious political con-
sciousness in the colonial population. The modern accoutrements of the temple 
were to allow it to serve as a “cultural institution” that would educate Korean sub-
jects. Again, cultural anthropology played a role in defining the local cultural fea-
tures. However, the hybridity of the monument is highly manufactured and still 
very much abstracted from the everyday processes of transculturation occurring 
in the city. I argue that such a monumental version of hybridity creates a spatial 
aesthetic of what Walter Benjamin referred to as “homogeneous empty time,” a 
time in which the traditions of Japan and Korea can coalesce in the present, sup-
posedly not through a dynamic and violent process of transculturation, but rather 
by way of quotation and the bringing together of static national elements. Yi Sang’s 
introduction of a different kind of temporality in his poems will explicitly confront 
this harmonious version of colonial hybridity.
Example 4
Finally, in a more functional and modernist vein, the journal was concerned with 
transforming the everyday dwelling of Japanese migrants and bourgeois Koreans. 
In the 1930s, the concepts and practices of cultural housing (bunka jūtaku) were 
key to this transformation. In 1932, Asagawa Noritaka described the transition to 
cultural housing in the following way:
The body of the human being is the dwelling for its soul. If a house is a dwelling for 
the body, we can say that it is also a dwelling for the soul.
The problem of housing is based on food, clothing, and shelter, and there is a say-
ing that “the home moves the heart.” If the problem of dwelling is our most heartfelt 
problem, then I think it is a problem for which we must utilize the heart.
The Japanese are a mysterious people, and with the introduction of new things, 
we have tried to invent dwellings appropriate to the age. . . .
Mainland Japanese have lived in Seoul for thirty years, and if we look back at past 
changes, we can see here, too, some interesting phenomena in the changes in resi-
dences during that time. We can roughly divide these thirty years into three decades:
1. The period of reconstructing Korean houses.
2. The period of the Japanese “barracks.”
3. The period of cultural housing.41
In Asagawa’s statement about the historical development of housing in colo-
nial Korea, he mentions a period when there was an attempt to rebuild Korean 
houses to suit the needs of Japanese colonials, a period when Japanese lived in a 
kind of “barracks” set off from the rest of the city, and, finally, cultural housing, 
which quickly became, in the 1930s, the most prominent style of housing for 










































Architectural plan for the Itō Hirobumi Temple, Korea and Architecture, November 1932.










































a matter of the heart, and that dwelling practices had to change as the demands 
of the soul changed. The spiritual demand in this case was really a need for cost-
effective, mass-produced housing that was also pleasing to the “soul.”
From the following discussion concerning the traditional division of the Korean 
house between inner and outer sections and the practice of husbands and wives 
sleeping in different rooms, we can see that the spiritual mission of cultural hous-
ing was a matter of creating more efficient and rationalized nuclear families. In the 
following discussion, in which a Korean architect also participated, the argument 
was made that modern women should be more visible, and the inner recesses of 
the house should not be off-limits to people outside the family. Houses should be 
integrated into an undivided, rational, and economic whole inhabited by modern 
individuals and modern families:
 Mr. Sasa:  From now on the human being will mature, and if economic prob-
lems arise, and people are to live a daily life in which they occupy a 
small space and pay high rents, then this custom [husband and wife 
occupying different rooms] will have to be abolished.
 Mr. Pak: I think so, too.
 Mr. Mori:  I think that there are various problems concerning customs, but the 
primary one is architecture. Because architecture is built every fifty 
or one hundred years, I think that if you change that, then other 
problems are greatly simplified.
 Mr. Pak:  Then, in order to remove the division between the inner and outer 
sections, it is best to make a room without a barrier wall.
 Mr. Nakamura:  As Mr. Pak says, the internal boundaries must be removed; if not, 
then the daily life of the inner and outer sections is split in half. Fur-
thermore, because the equipment of the inner and outer sections 
is split in half, if we don’t first end this practice, then we cannot 
facilitate the rationalization of daily life.43
In their insistence that the walls of the traditional Korean house should be bro-
ken down, and that the inner recesses of the house should become more visible 
to outsiders, these architects expressed the colonial desire to see the colonized 
more completely and to not have their view of daily life obstructed by the divi-
sion of houses into two sections. The purpose was to “rationalize daily life,” and to 
create modern individuals and modern nuclear families, a project that extended 
throughout most of the discourses of Japan’s cultural policy. The gendered aspect 
of this will to see everything is clear in that it is the inaccessible, feminine interiors 
of the traditional house that are the most troubling for the project of rationaliza-
tion and the creation of nuclear families.
In the dual concern in Korea and Architecture for the preservation of indig-
enous forms and the rationalization of everyday life, there was a certain instru-









































41Architectural plan for cultural housing, Korea and Architecture, October 1931.










































monumental architecture such as the Itō Hirobumi temple, an attempt to hybrid-
ize Japanese nationality in order to include within it aspects of Korean tradition. 
In cultural housing, there was a minimal attempt to reconcile existing architec-
tural forms, such as the use of water-heating systems in Korean floors, with the 
economic efficiency and familial structure thought necessary for a modern so-
ciety, but the emphasis was on what needed to be transformed or destroyed in 
order to produce nuclear families. In each case, there was a certain translation 
of spatial representations between contexts. In both cases, however, the instru-
mentality of this practice of architecture precluded any mode of construction and 
reconstruction performed by the inhabitants themselves, because it reduced the 
cultural agency of the colonized to a reified concept of tradition. The necessity of 
the nuclear family in Korea was determined through sociological and anthropo-
logical study and criteria. Cultural housing was built accordingly, and it was up to 
the colonial population to adjust to the historical necessity of cultural and spatial 
modernization, while preserving mostly fragments of their national cultural past.
YI  SANG’S  CINEPOETIC SPACE:  “BLUEPRINT FOR A 
THREE-DIMENSIONAL SHAPE”
Yi Sang (born Kim Hae-gyŏng) was a trained architect and surveyor, but he is 
remembered now mostly for his literature. By the invitation of the publishers, he 
wrote a series of poems for Korea and Architecture between 1931 and 1933. They 
were published in the short-lived section titled “random jottings” (manpitsu), 
dedicated to vignettes exploring the everyday experience of urban life. Of the 
works submitted in this genre, Yi clearly envisioned the greatest scope and po-
tential for an architectural and imagistic poetry that reflected on the experience 
of urban space.
The visual elements in Yi Sang’s poems, including numbers, graphs, and Chi-
nese characters, make it quite difficult to reproduce the poems in translation with-
out dramatically transforming the multiple relationships they create between word 
and image. Yi’s architectural poems are not purely literary or linguistic, and are 
therefore from the outset difficult to canonize into the poetic tradition of either 
Japanese or Korean national literatures. With a similar concern for the context of 
practice that I described in the works of Kim Sa-ryang and Kim Nam-ch’ŏn, Yi used 
concrete imagery in order to represent the performative context for the practice 
of bilingual writing; therefore, the inclusion of images is concretely related to the 
translation occurring in the writing. Furthermore, it was by combining linguistic 
and nonlinguistic elements in order to create a new language of space that Yi enact-
ed a spatial and bodily practice that was counter to the dominant discourses of the 
architecture journal. Translating Yi’s poems into a more literary format can erase 
the many reflections on space, spatial reasoning, and spatial practice that appear 










































through his bringing together of language, writing, and image. In particular it can 
erase the way the poems engage with cinematic space-time, or Eisenstein’s filmic 
fourth dimension, in order to articulate a subversive cinepoetic space.
In “Blueprint for a Three-Dimensional Shape,” Yi is interested in the relation-
ship between space, time, and light.44 He takes the primary figure of Euclidean 
geometry, the three-dimensional shape, and temporalizes it, making various ref-
erences to the transformation of space through cinematic space-time. He relates 
this space-time to the ecstatic becoming of a person constantly projecting him-
self into the future and confronting, through that projection, his past selves. Ein-
stein’s theories had been introduced into Japan and Korea and their populariza-
tion led to many artistic reflections on the new physics. Whatever physicists might 
think of the appropriation of the theory of relativity for cultural theory, writers 
and critics in the early twentieth century made various associations between the 
cinematic apparatus’s imprintation and projection of light and the ramifications 
of four-dimensional space-time for the productive subject of poetry and fiction. 
The attempt to monumentalize the harmonious relationship between Japan and 
Korea in projects like the Itō Hirobumi temple instituted an anthropological ho-
mogeneous empty time in which national characteristics were appropriated and 
combined for the instrumental purposes of modernization. In “Blueprint for a 
Three-Dimensional Shape,” Yi quotes popularized versions of Einstein’s theory of 
relativity in order to put into question the Cartesian notion of space as pure exten-
sion. The poem is divided into seven “memos concerning the line,” but just as the 
poem presents a number of significant challenges to the architectural ethos of the 
blueprint and the three-dimensional shape, each of these seven sections figures 
the line differently from the architectural plans and colonial anthropological dis-
course that appear in the journal.
Yi questions the way that architectural discourse initially subtracts time, par-
ticularly the time of habitation and lived space, from consideration. The result of 
this subtraction of time in the case of culturalist architectural discourse is that the 
time of lived space becomes history, particularly the uniform passage from tradi-
tion to modernity. It proposes that the space of Korea progresses at a constant rate 
out of a given national past toward modernity, and that the past should become 
an object of preservation. Like Tanabe in the same year, in “From Schema ‘Time’ 
to Schema ‘World,’ ” Yi references the theory of relativity in order to throw into 
question the subject position from which homogeneous empty time, the unifor-
mity of modernity, and the anthropological object of tradition are all perceived. 
Yi’s poem does not present physics in any sort of systematic way, but rather uses 
tropes of physics (including science fiction themes of time travel) to provide us 
with a different image of the poetic subject. This subject’s perspective, which is 
also a cinematic perspective, is referenced on the first page in the image of 3 + 1 
that turns 180 degrees and doubles as it is repeated across the page.45 The matheme 










































refers to the three dimensions of space plus a fourth dimension, time. The Euclid-
ean notion of time is that it is a fourth dimension that is constant in relation to 
space. However, in Yi’s poem, the matheme turns as it is repeated across the page 
in order to mimic another space-time, one that includes within it the Euclidean 
formula. What is this other dimension that neither the 3 nor the 1 can reference 
directly, but only when they rotate in repetition? On the one hand, this dimension 
is spatial, because without the series of rotating formulas spread on the page we 
could not register the time of the repetition. On the other hand, this dimension is 
temporal, because each instance of the rotating formula presents a movement that 
must happen in time. Yi combines the three dimensions of space and the fourth 
dimension, time, into a single “space-time,” because the repeated, rotating image 
figures another dimension in which the formula for Euclidean space is itself tem-
poralized as it is spatialized.
In this way, Yi conveys space-time through an image of repetition and differ-
ence that is evocative of a series of film cells that are both spatially and temporally 
sequential. However, in making the Euclidean geometric formula the recorded 
content of each film cell (so to speak), he points symbolically and concretely to a 
paradox in cinematic space-time (or Eisenstein’s filmic fourth dimension). This 
paradox is that cinematic space-time is three-dimensional space plus time, trans-
ferred into two dimensions through the imprintation and projection of light. In 
physics as well, in the post-Einstein universe, light is the only constant and time is 
no longer constant in relation to space. Time is now relative to the space of refer-
ence and the speed of the perceiver, two factors that this poem relates metaphori-
cally to the space-time of cinema. Through cinematic imprintation and projection, 
and depending on a number of formal factors, objects can be made to move faster 
or slower in time without the recorded object itself changing speed. According to 
Einstein, time is not independent of motion, but rather different velocities, relative 
to the speed of light, can change the speed at which time passes. For Yi as well, the 
rate of time can shift according to the velocity and coordinates of the object in mo-
tion. Through some basic precepts of the theory of relativity, cinematic metaphors, 
and science fiction reference to time travel, Yi challenges the idea that time passes 
at a constant rate, independently from spatial coordinates or the speed of objects 
(clarified in the first image of a grid of singular points represented by black dots). 
And yet without the mundane raw material of three-dimensional space and its ob-
jects, film could not transform space into space-time in this manner. Yi expresses 
this paradox in the line “Today, when Euclid has died, Euclid’s point of focus burns 
the brain of humanity like dry hay.”46
(Through a convex lens a ray of sun is concentrated, it shines brightly at a single 
point, burns brightly at a single point. It is amusing to consider the luck of Genesis, 
that a layer of the heavens and another layer combined to make another, creating a 
convex lens; isn’t geometry such a play of light? Today, when Euclid has died, Euclid’s 










































point of focus burns the brain of humanity like dry hay. By enumerating a concentra-
tion, it stimulates the greatest concentration, it stimulates danger. A person despairs, 
a person is born, a person despairs, a person is born.)47
He might have stated that with the advent of cinema, Euclid is dead, but what re-
mains is his intensive point of focus, the concentrated singular point of the convex 
lens of the camera or magnifying glass.
Representing the death and survival of Euclidean space through the rotation of 
the image of the formula as though in film cells is an ingenious artistic expression 
of transformations of space and time in the cinematic twentieth century. However, 
in addition to this aesthetic ingenuity, in its context, the ironically titled “Blueprint 
for a Three-Dimensional Shape” has an important discursive and political register 
as well. Yi’s turn to cinematic space-time appears in an architecture journal that 
had a clear set of parameters concerning space, time, modernity, and tradition, 
one that imagined time historically as a passage from tradition to modernity, from 
the stagnant and petrified things of the cultural past to the formation of the mod-
ern cultural individual and his nuclear family.
In order to challenge the architectural notion of three dimensions of space plus 
the time of history, Yi rearticulates a fundamental element of geometry, the line. 
He introduces three points—A, B, and C—and writes three equations: A + B + 
C = A; A + B + C = B; A + B + C = C.48 Whenever there is a line with three points, 
there is also an intensive point from which it is viewed. A line is never merely an 
extension in space, but also a perspective. When the points are added together, or 
synthesized, they can become equal to any one of the points on the line. This is 
a reflection on “spaces of reference” in Einsteinian physics. His discussion of the 
subject as a “ray of sun” means that he appropriated the new theories of light in 
order to think perspective as constituted by energy, rather than perspective as a 
res cogito for which a line is a mere extension in space. He writes, “Enjoy light, be 
saddened by light, laugh at light, cry at light. / Light is a person and a person is a 
mirror. / Wait for light.”49 The metaphor of the mirror enters into his view of the 
poetic subject, suggesting that in its intensive relation to space the subject enters 
into a kind of schizophrenic self-awareness in which the poetic “I” is akin to two 
mirrors facing each other, reflecting each other infinitely, as in the first image of 
“The Infinite Hexagon of Architecture.”50
As in Tanabe’s discussion of the dialectic and expression, Yi discusses this 
schizophrenic I as an ecstatic movement in time that brings the future I into con-
tact with an alien past. For Tanabe, the osmotic expression of the dialectic allowed 
for identity between this future I and the past. Yi, on the other hand, figures this 
being outside of oneself through an intensive rather than osmotic relation to space. 
As in the Hegelian dialectic, the present, future, and past subjects remain forever 
nonidentical to one another in the constant “invention” of the person, but this is 
not the invention of a state subject and its world, but rather a singular intensive 










































point of focus without a clear social determination. Yi refers to the popular idea af-
ter Einstein that if one travels faster than the speed of light then it might be possible 
to travel back in time. He refers to this movement faster than light as a “discarding 
of numbers,” as the “invention of a person,” and as a birth that happens “through 
the despair of three-dimensions”:
Memo 1 Concerning the Line
(Outer space through curtains)
(A person discards numbers)
(Silently make me an electron’s proton)
Spectral
Axis X Axis Y Axis Z
The control of velocity, etc.; for example, if it is certain that light 
travels at 300,000 kilometers per second, then certainly the inven-
tion of a person can occur at 600,000 kilometers per second. 
Multiply this by tens, hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, 
millions, billions, then can’t a person see a reality that is tens, 
hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, millions, billions of years 
in the ancient past? Or else is one destroyed? An atom is an atom 
is an atom is an atom. Do physiological functions mutate? An 
atom is not an atom is not an atom is not an atom. Is radiation 
destruction? When a person lives the eternal that is eternal . . . life 
is neither vitality nor existence, but rather light.
The taste of smell and the smell of taste.
(Birth through the despair for three dimensions)
(Birth through the despair for movement)
(When the globe is an empty nest, I long for the feudal period to the 
point of tears)51
Throughout the poem, Yi is concerned with how a person or a subject is constitut-
ed, and how this constitution might occur without the person being counted arith-
metically, and without reducing subjectivity to the empty res cogito that observes a 
three-dimensional res extensa. Yi suggests that in viewing and occupying space in the 
manner of cultural housing, the “person” feels “despair,” and that this despair leads 
the person to project himself, to “hypothesize” himself as a “phenomenon of dynam-
ics” (as he writes later in the poem). For Yi, this invention occurs through light, and, 
indeed, at the speed of light. In this invention, life (seimei) is transformed into light, 
and is no longer “vitality” (sei) or “existence” (mei)—that is, the two common ways to 
describe the mere fact of living. This line is particularly difficult to translate, because 
Yi splits the character compound for seimei, playing with the relationship between 










































the two characters. In my reading, sei refers to the biological fact of life, or “vitality,” 
and mei refers to a person’s mortal life, or “existence.” Yi writes that as a combination 
of the biological fact of life (sei) and one’s existence (mei), the term seimei is more 
than the sum of its parts, and that “light” (hikari), in a sense, is what brings together 
the biological body and one’s mortal existence.
The only constant in the theory of relativity is the speed of light, which for Yi 
would constitute the poetic subject. However, the poetic subject is not purely light. 
He or she is at once caught in three-dimensional space and seeks to reinvent itself 
out of three-dimensional space by traveling at the speed of light. The activity of the 
poetic subject (or the “person”) is precisely this sort of back and forth between the 
despair of three dimensions and a rebirth through light. The person still despairs, 
because of the power of architectonic space to condition life, and to treat the hu-
man being as the contents of a container. It is this denial of the temporality of life 
and lived space that leads to nostalgia for feudal life, when space was perhaps not 
subjected to such abstraction. In the first quotation, he writes, “If the globe is an 
empty nest, I long for the feudal period to the point of tears.”52 This longing for the 
feudal period is a sentimental and nostalgic response to modernity and the shock 
that accompanies the lived experience of abstract space.53 Yi’s mention of the globe 
as an “empty nest” seems directed at the architects of Korea and Architecture. In 
occupying the space of Korea, which architects take as an empty tableau upon 
which to actualize their structures, the poet desires to return to the feudal period, 
before this kind of abstract spatial imaginary was possible. However, the overall 
tenor of the poem is not to remain in this nostalgia, but rather to move ahead of 
the colonizer, in terms of both scientific progress and the imaginative possibilities 
for space. By thinking through advancements of physics by way of physical, bodily 
activity in space, Yi articulated a critical mode of spatial practice that could chal-
lenge the biopolitcal worldview of culturalism.
In the passage quoted, we get a sense of how the post-Einstein version of light is 
significant for Yi not only because it offers the possibility for rebirth or invention 
out of three dimensions, but also because it allows for a particular kind of vision. 
In the very first image of the poem, we are presented with a set of coordinates, 
and the suggestion is that according to the speed of any one coordinate, space-
time will curve differently. As the poem progresses, it becomes clearer that for this 
poetic subject, space is not the container that allows us to view extended objects, 
but rather space is curved around singular points of intensity that have a gravita-
tional pull. Metaphorically speaking, this gravitational pull is the person’s vision, 
and ultimately the vision of the camera; it is included within space by traversing 
space at varying speeds that transform the frame of reference. The poetic subject 
and the cinematic subject are each one of these singular points through which the 
intensity of light is magnified and concentrated. The curvature of space both cre-
ates this singular point through its many layers and curves around it. This singular 
point that marks the position and speed of the subject is, for Yi, a perspective. It is 










































not a Cartesian, Euclidean, or culturalist perspective, but an intensive perspective 
that is itself included in space, and around which space curves. In this sense, Yi 
was articulating a spatial perspective and a spatial practice that were quite differ-
ent from an architectonic concept of space. His poetics was engaged with both the 
emergence of cinema and cinematic perspective, as well as the ecstatic temporality 
of a schizophrenic human subject constantly moving ahead of itself and outside 
of itself.
In his discussion of the singular point as a “convex lens,” Yi refers to the way 
that cinema and cinematic perspective relate to space differently than a Euclidean 
geometry. Yi asks, “Isn’t geometry such a play of light?” suggesting that spatial 
reasoning is now intimately connected to light and vision, rather than Euclidean 
abstract space.54 We can imagine how this notion of geometry could greatly trans-
form the perspective of the architect, and therefore the way that he or she actu-
alizes structures. Monumental architecture is set off from the environment, and 
imposes its rational forms onto lived space. Cultural preservation reifies the past 
and the cultural hybridity of the Itō Hirobumi temple combines traditions with 
modernity for political purposes. If geometry is rather a “play of light” for which 
the subject is an ecstatic point of concentration, then the architect would have to 
imagine space from the perspective of the inhabitant, the person whose vision and 
activity will gradually transform the structure. In cinematic city spaces, the city is 
not a conglomeration of monuments; rather, the camera’s angle, its proximity to 
the object, its relative speed and slowness all shape our vision of the city. In cin-
ema, it is precisely light that registers these changes; it is the constancy relative to 
which various coordinates and perspectives can be arranged.
In reference to the popular or populist aspect of this cinematic perspective, Yi 
writes, “Temporality, or historicity by way of popular thought.”55 It was this sort 
of popularization of time in which he was ultimately interested. If history was the 
time of grand movements that allowed culturalist architects to contextualize their 
works in relation to the individual, the nation, and the world, “popular thought” 
was related to the everyday, temporal experience of space as a lived and intensive 
space. Yi appropriated a science fiction notion of time from the theory of relativity 
in order to articulate this popular, temporal relation to space. The question of the 
name for this popular aspect of the cinematic perspective comes through at the 
end of the poem, when he writes,
Vision’s name is numerical, or one point, that should live eternally along with the 
person. Vision’s name does not move, but has only a course of movement.
Vision’s name has light and does not have light; because of vision’s name, a person 
has no need to escape more quickly than light.
Forget the names of vision.
Preserve the names of vision.










































A person conserves velocity, to escape faster than light, and selects the past in the 
future.56
In writing that “vision’s name does not move, but has only a course of movement,” 
Yi was juxtaposing the idea of movement through Euclidean space with a course 
of movement that itself curves and transforms space. Vision’s name has no final 
locale in which to settle, and from which space would be present before it as a 
comprehensible externality. The person transcends the everyday, and becomes 
“eternal,” but time is also not a “perpetual development,” to use Kuwaki’s phrase, 
but rather a variable dependent upon the poetic subject’s speed and course.
Yi’s poetic engagement with science and philosophy dramatically transformed 
the premises of space and time discussed by the architects of Korea and Architec-
ture. From the position of a colonial intellectual and a bilingual writer, Yi saw the 
architectonic view of space as a kind of stasis that could only produce despair. 
This view comes through in the lines “a person is the eternal hypothesis that it is 
not a phenomenon of statics / a person casts off the objectivity of the person.”57 
The political and social stakes of Yi’s rewriting of personhood are evident. The 
architectonic space of cultural housing was a violent imposition represented by 
the “destruction of barriers” and the formation of individuals and modern nuclear 
families. It viewed the person as a single member of a cultural totality that had to 
be rationalized and modernized. This view of the individual person’s relationship 
to the totality treated the person as “a phenomenon of statics.” Yi’s idea that the 
“person casts off the objectivity of the person” articulated a spatial practice that 
would not situate the human being as an object in space. The hypothesis of person-
hood is eternal; the refusal to be a mere object requires a persistent forward inven-
tion that draws the person out of the realm of objects. However, this movement 
is not the same as Kuwaki’s practical subject setting itself off from phenomena so 
that it can become capable of applying the universal law to itself as an object. It is 
rather an entrance into an intensive and cinematic space-time enlivened through 
new relations between light, vision, and the possible social spaces to be created by 
a modernism that does not desire to return home. This intensive space does not 
lead Yi to the problem of morals, or of how to establish that condition in the series 
of perceptions that is itself unconditioned. After his critique of Yi, that uncondi-
tioned condition became the human and eventually the imperial state in Ch’oe 
Chae-sŏ’s modernism. Yi’s turn to temporality, or historicity by way of popular 
thought, suggests instead a critical spatial practice of persons as singular points of 
vision that never become subjects, objects, or individuals. It is possible that this 
practice, too, could constitute a genus-being.
There is a fine line between such a genus-being, constituted by intensive space 
and the mise en abyme, and a dynamic imperial subject mediated by the cinematic 
apparatus. If culturalism established the possibility for a continuous cosmopolitan 










































world made up of individuals and nations, both imperial nationalism and minor 
literature sought to break with these ideal wholes and to present the spaces and 
times of modernity as ecstatic, relative, and caught in a circulation of metonymical 
images that never arrive at the kind of symbolic closure sought in culturalist alle-
gories. The question then becomes not if one can continue to imagine a self-iden-
tical, general human subject at the center of knowledge, life, and politics, because 
clearly one cannot; it is rather a matter of how to confront permanent nonidentity 
and alienation. There is no absolute distinction between Tanabe’s dialectical total-
ity of singular individuals projecting themselves in time and Yi Sang’s image of 
space curving around singular points of vision. However, by continuing to refer to 
the totality of these points as the social being of the state, and by maintaining the 
absolutely negative ideal of the genus as the center of world history, Tanabe kept 
alive a means to reterritorialize the human being. On the other hand, Yi Sang’s 
poems and minor literature in general gesture toward a space and a time at once 
deeply contextualized and beyond any territory.
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OPENING AN UMBRELL A ON YOKOHAMA PIER/IM HWA
Woman of the harbor! Woman of another country!
Do not come running on the dock, the dock is wet with rain
My heart burns with the sorrow of leaving and the grief of being pursued
Oh, you are the woman of Yokohama whom I love!
Do not come running on the dock, the railings are wet with rain
“What if the weather were fine today?”
No, no. These are only your poor, useless words
When it rains in your country, we depart from the dock
And poor you, you cry until your voice is cracked
Do not hold back this treasonous young man from another country
Poor woman of the harbor—do not cry
Your man knows that this ticket he carries is his banishment
And if you return now on this road
To that house where we spent every day in the midst of the laughter and the  
unyielding passion
 of those courageous men,
Now, there would be nothing to greet you but the clumps of dirt from the shoes 
that once trod
 inside
I know this better than anyone
Woman of the harbor!—you must know, too
Those people who now lie sleeping “inside a birdcage”—they have not lived in the
Appendix
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 embrace of your country’s love
Nor have they lived in your beautiful heart
And yet—
I for you, and you for me
The others for you, and you for them
Why have we promised our lives?
Why have we stayed up together so many snowy nights?
We had no reason to do so
We did not share the same fate
You are a woman from another country and I am a man of the colonies
Yet—there was one reason
You and I—we were siblings who labored
At the same task
Two lives from different countries ate the same food
And we came to live in love
Oh, woman of Yokohama whom I love
The rain falls upon the sea and the waves are like the wind
I am leaving everything behind on this land
I am departing on the Pacific Ocean
To return to the country of my mother and father
If I do not see a flock of long-winged seagulls on the sea
Yokohama woman, you who entered my heart will also disappear today
You, the bird of Yokohama—
You mustn’t feel lonely. Doesn’t the wind blow?
What if your paper umbrella were to break
Go back
The sound of your geta and the sound of the rain are buried in each other and fade 
away
Go, go
I am being hunted down, but those brave fellows,
Aren’t they sitting behind iron bars and wearing clothes wet with sweat?
At the factory where you work, aren’t there men from the Northern continent who 
long for their
 sisters and mothers?
You must wash the clothes of those men
Shouldn’t you hold them against your chest?
Go! Go! You must return!
Already, the siren has cried out thrice
And the black clothes have tugged at my hand
Now we must go, you must go and I must go
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Woman of another country!
Do not shed tears
I am not in the demo that flows through the streets, and many of the others have 
already fallen—
You must not be sad
When you come out of the factory, I will no longer be waiting for you behind the 
electrical pole
But the waves of other young workers swell your heart
And the hands of those starved for love await you
And again proclamations from the mouths of the young
Ignite a flame in the minds of working people
Return! Return quickly
The rain falls upon the dock and the wind strikes the deck
The umbrella may break—
With this umbrella that today bid farewell to a pursued young man from another 
country, you will tomorrow welcome those fellows
Shouldn’t you walk the Kyōbin road making the sound of your geta?
Oh, you are the woman of the harbor whom I love
You are not one to sink into sorrow for sending me off
Or petty thoughts about parting with the man you love
The man you love, am I not chased from this land?
Those fellows are imprisoned and do not know I am pursued. That thought, that 
regrettable truth
Will be dyed in scarlet upon your dove-like chest
When your flesh becomes hot and you cannot bear it
Hold their faces and heads tight against your heart
By then, I, who am now leaving you, will have passed through Pusan, and Tokyo, 
and
 returned to Yokohama with a comrade
Bury your beautiful, weary head in my chest
And cry, and laugh
You are my woman of the harbor!
Do not come running on the dock
The rain falls on your gentle back and the wind blows your umbrella.
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ASIAN HISTORY
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human as both concept and historical figure.
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